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To Stefania
Preface
I have been thinking about singular reference for many years and I have always
been inclined to view it, like Frege and Russell, from a descriptivist perspective, in
spite of the many contrary arguments put forward by Donnellan, Kaplan, Kripke
and others. However, in the light of these arguments, descriptivism needs nowa-
days a careful and thorough defence, if it is to be considered a viable and respected
approach. I became fully aware of this when a referee who reviewed my earlier
paper “A Description Theory of Singular Reference” (2003) complained that, no
matter how interesting my form of descriptivism might be, I neglected to shield it
from the well-known anti-descriptivist objections. I then decided that I should at the
same time present a descriptivist framework capable of resisting these objections
and also show, by confronting these objections head on, that the framework could in
fact resist them. Clearly, this plan could not be carried out in the space of a journal
article, but required a whole book. And this is the outcome of that decision taken a
few years ago. I wish to thank Springer NL and in particular Ingrid van Laarhoven
for having expressed their interest in my project from the start and having waited
patiently for the final manuscript.
My past commitment to descriptivism has come in various forms and in various
ways underlies most of my writings since my Ph.D. dissertation, Natural Language
Semantics and Guise Theory (Indiana University, Bloomington, 1986), where a kind
of descriptivism is implicit in my endorsement of Castañeda’s guise theory. For that
is a theory according to which each singular term refers to a guise, an entity play-
ing in many respects the role of a Fregean sense. More explicit previous versions of
descriptivism can however be found in the treatments of proper names and/or index-
icals in the above-mentioned 2003 article as well as in my other papers “Kripke’s
Translation Puzzle and the Property-Theoretical Performative-Nominalistic Theory
of Proper Names” (1998) and “The Property-Theoretical Performative-Nominalistic
Theory of Proper Names” (2000) as well as in portions of my short mono-
graphs Predication, Analysis and Reference (1999) and La référence singulière et
l’autoréférence (2006). In all these works, proper names are always viewed, roughly
speaking, as common nouns with a meaning characterizable as “called N” (where N
is the name in question), which can be used as singular terms by virtue of an implicit
definite article. This has remained in the present account, but it has been embellished
with a touch of Reichenbach-style token-reflexivity and a touch of so-called causal
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descriptivism. The appeal to token-reflexivity is part of a general strategy adopted
in an effort to deal with the so-called problem of choice (discussed in § 4.11 below),
as will be clear in a moment. On the other hand, the recourse to causal descriptivism
seems to me now the best choice in response to certain data that in the past I did
not perhaps consider with due attention. As regards indexicals, I endorsed in the
1999 monograph a stand analogous to the one defended by Russell at some point
of his career (see § 3.8 below), according to which, roughly speaking, the descrip-
tive content expressed in a given context by an indexical such as “this” (or token
thereof) is characterizable as “the object presented by p”, where p is a subjective
mental item that perceptually presents to the speaker the object that she refers to.
The idea is that the descriptive content available to the hearer is a different one,
because it involves a different subjective mental item, although the two descriptive
contents are, we may say, extensionally equivalent. The views about indexicals pro-
posed in the 2003 paper and the 2006 monograph differ from each other only in
matters of detail but disagree more substantially with the Russellian perspective in
that they allow for descriptive contents of various kinds to be associated as mean-
ings to indexicals. The descriptive contents involving mental items representing the
referred-to objects are among the options, but others are possible. Notably, there can
be descriptive contents characterizable as “the object pointed at by the utterer of the
token presented by i”, where i is a subjective mental image of the token of “this”
used by the speaker.
There are two central ideas in all these attempts. First, there is a certain reac-
tion to the problem of choice, according to which it is typically difficult to choose,
among the many possible candidates, the descriptive content that functions as the
meaning of a given singular term in a certain context. Roughly, the reaction consists
in claiming that a term can have, even after the context has done its disambiguating
job, many distinct meanings, provided these meanings are extensionally equivalent.
Thus, for example, a given token of “this” may have, inter alia, two meanings, one
characterizable as “the object presented by p” and another as “the object pointed
at by the utterer of the token presented by i”. Second, there is an uncompromising
internalism, according to which meanings and contents of propositional attitudes
do not depend for their existence on concrete items objectively existing outside the
minds of thinking subjects, which I summarized in the slogan that “all meanings
must be entertainable”. This is why I had recourse to a descriptive content charac-
terizable as “the object pointed at by the utterer of the token presented by i”, but not
to one characterizable as “the object pointed at by the utterer of t”, where t is the
objectively existing token of “this” uttered by the speaker.
The approach presented here drops these two ideas. It abandons the uncom-
promising internalism for a moderate form of externalism, which allows for
token-reflexive meanings that depend for their existence on the objectively exist-
ing linguistic tokens that express the meanings in question. For, contrary to what
I thought in the past, it seems to me now that descriptivism can make this con-
cession to externalism without jeopardizing the possibility of offering a viable
account of propositional attitudes and without running into trouble in dealing
with the very two issues that any form of descriptivism is especially designed
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to tackle, namely the problems of co-reference and no-reference (discussed at
length in Chapter 3). Moreover, the current approach reacts to the problem of
choice by claiming that, when the problem seems to arise, one token-reflexive
meaning can be, after all, the meaning of the singular term in question, for
the other candidates can be given a subsidiary role by exploiting in the appro-
priate way Kent Bach’s theory of conversational impliciture (as explained in
Chapter 5). It should not be difficult for someone who favours full internalism to see
how it could be restored within the framework of this book, by (i) replacing token-
reflexive meanings involving objectively existing linguistic tokens with meanings
involving subjective mental images of linguistic tokens; and (ii) allowing speaker
and hearer meanings to diverge insofar as they involve distinct subjective mental
images of one objective linguistic token rather than the mental token itself.
Apart from differing in the way that I have indicated from earlier attempts, my
current view is much broader than them in scope, in particular because it deals with
tense and anaphora. While on tense an effort is made to remain neutral as regards the
current debate between eternalism and temporalism (see § 1.9), a definite stand is
taken in the treatment of anaphoras. I propose a version of the paraphrase approach,
according to which, for example, and roughly speaking, the anaphoric “her” in “Tom
met an Irish woman and liked her very much” expresses a meaning characterizable
as “the Irish woman that Tom met”. I think that this is a good road to take, because,
inter alia, by coupling this treatment of anaphoras with descriptivism about non-
anaphoric singular terms, we get a unified account of the meaning of all pronouns,
whether used deictically or anaphorically, and this, I submit, is as it should be.
Over these years, I have discussed the topics of this book with many colleagues,
friends and experts and I wish to thank them all for whatever help they have
contributed. In particular, I wish to mention Tyler Burge, Michael Devitt, Nevia
Dolcini, Richard Fumerton, Paul Gochet, Tomis Kapitan, Michael Nelson, John
Perry, Elisabetta Sacchi, Barry C. Smith, Scott Soames. Special thanks go to my
friend Greg Landini for having read and usefully commented on a previous ver-
sion of the book and above all for his encouragement and support, to Manuel
Garcia-Carpintero and Aldo Frigerio, who read the penultimate version of the whole
manuscript and offered insightful criticisms, and to Richard Davies, who, in read-
ing the last version, improved its English, while spotting many slips and providing
valuable suggestions.
I have offered some of the ideas in this book, or forerunners of them, in lec-
tures at various institutions: University of Palermo (1999), University of Parma
(1999), University of Siena (1999), Institut Jean Nicod CNRS, Paris (2004, 2005),
Université Paris IV (2005), University of Iowa, Iowa City (2006), Northern Illinois
University, De Kalb (2006), and University of Bologna (2007). Moreover, I pre-
sented papers on topics covered here at the following conferences: From Semantics
to Pragmatics, Problems and Theories of Reference (University of Palermo, 1997)
2nd German-Italian Colloquium in Analytic Philosophy (University of Heidelberg,
October 2000), 7th National Conference of the Italian Society for the Philosophy of
Language (Certosa di Pontignano, Siena, November 2000), 9th National Conference
of the Italian Society for the Philosophy of Language (Noto, October 2002), 6th
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National Conference of the Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy (University
of Genoa, September 2004), Descriptions and Logical Forms, 100 Years of On
Denoting (Padua, December 2004), 33rd Annual Meeting of the Bertrand Russell
Society (University of Iowa, Iowa City, 2006), International Conference on Analytic
Philosophy (Soochow University, Taipei, Taiwan, 2007), and The Multiple Uses of
the Self (University of Siena, 2008). I wish to thank all the participants who helped
me shape my views on these matters with comments, criticisms and suggestions.
Parts of this book were written while I was on a sabbatical leave at the
Department of Philosophy of the University of Iowa, Iowa City (January-July 2006)
and at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Cambridge (September–
December 2008). I wish to thank both institutions for their wonderful hospitality.
Last but not least, I want to express my love and gratitude to Stefania, Ruggero
and Delia for their constant love and support, for their patience when I delved too
deeply into this project, and, when all is said and done, for just being around.
Macerata, Italy Francesco Orilia
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Chapter 1
Introduction: Referentialism vs. Descriptivism
1.1 The Topic
There are expressions called singular terms. As Salmon (1991, p. 835) puts it, “A
singular term is any expression whose function, when used in a particular context, is
to refer to (denote, designate), i.e., to stand for, a single individual”. I would say that
the typical function of singular terms is to allow us to single out one specific object
in order to verbally attribute properties to it, i.e. to “talk about” it (in the terminology
of Reimer 2003). There are three main kinds of them, definite descriptions such as
“the director of La vita è bella”1 or “the president of the USA”, proper names such
as “Roberto Benigni” or “George W. Bush” and indexicals (deictics) such as “I”,
“here”, “there”, “now”, “today”, “tomorrow”, “this”, “he”, “she”, “this woman”,
“that man”, etc. For example, I can single out Roberto Benigni and attribute to him
the property of being a great comedian by relying on the knowledge that he is the
only person who directed La vita è bella and saying “the director of La vita è bella
is a great comedian”; or by exploiting the fact that he was baptized with a certain
name and say “R.B. is a great comedian”. Alternatively, if he is in my surroundings,
I can take advantage of that fact and say “he is a great comedian”, while pointing at
him. Recourse to a natural language such as English, with its repertoire of singular
terms, may not be necessary to single out an object. I might perhaps single out an
object in my vicinity and attribute to it the property of being a coin by focusing my
attention on the object and realizing that it is a coin (thereupon deciding to put it
into my pocket), without uttering, not even in inner speech, any natural language
word, but simply exercising the coin concept with respect to the focus of attention.
Or, as we shall see in discussing a famous example proposed by Donnellan, one can
succeed in referring to an object by using a definite description “improperly” in that
the description does not really characterize the object. When someone succeeds in
1More precisely, we should call “the director of La vita è bella” a singular definite descrip-
tion to differentiate it from plural definite descriptions such “the boys” or “the winged horses”.
For brevity’s sake however we can call the latter plural descriptions. Following Russell, definite
descriptions are usually distinguished from indefinite descriptions such as “a man” or “a brown
table”. I shall often use “description” as short for “singular definite description”.
1F. Orilia, Singular Reference: A Descriptivist Perspective, Philosophical Studies Series
113, DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-3312-3_1, C© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010
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singling out an object, whether by using a singular term, properly or improperly,
or by some other means, as in the coin example, we may say that she refers to the
object in question. For example, as is well known, Strawson, uses “reference” to
speak of something that people do (see his 1950). This singling out of an object by a
person is typically called (at least when accompanied by speech) speaker reference
(Donnellan 1978).2 The fact that we succeed in referring to an object by means of
a singular term suggests that the term can have in virtue of its meaning (given the
appropriate context) a special link to the object in question, a link that allows us
to achieve the feat of referring to it. This link is usually called singular reference
and it is something the nature of which I wish to elucidate in this book. (Although
there are, as we shall see in § 2.9, other kinds of reference, in the following I may
often drop for brevity’s sake qualifiers such as “singular” and “singularly” in talking
about reference and related notions, when they can be supplied from the context.)
There are on the market two lines of thought on singular reference, referentialism
and descriptivism. They will be contrasted in more detail below, but we may begin
with an outline of these views. Referentialists admit that certain singular terms,
proper names and indexicals in particular, are directly referential terms (rigid desig-
nators).3 That is, they are capable of direct (singular) reference to ordinary objects
(middle-sized, public individuals such as people and dogs, tables and chairs, trees,
stones and mountains) and possibly other individuals such as times and places. The
idea is that when this relation of direct reference links a term to an object, the lat-
ter counts as the meaning of the former. In contrast, according to descriptivists, all
singular terms require (in the way clarified in § 1.5) mediation of abstract entities,
descriptive contents, individual concepts or the like,4 to singularly refer to ordinary
objects. Frege is a paradigmatic example of descriptivist. I think that Russell, albeit
with some qualifications, can also be considered a descriptivist. Under the influ-
ence of these great thinkers, descriptivism was dominant in 20th century analytic
philosophy of language until the 1970s,5 when this trend was reversed and referen-
tialism took the lead, mainly because of works of Donnellan on definite descriptions
and proper names (1966, 1970) and of Kripke (1971, 1980) and Kaplan (1989) on
proper names and indexicals, respectively.6 Nowadays, the received view is that the
2To encompass also those cases in which this reference is not accompanied by speech we may
more generally say thinker reference.
3As noted by Kaplan 1989, p. 492, there is a subtle difference between the notion of a rigid designa-
tor and that of a directly referential term. But we can ignore this for the time being. For discussions
that help distinguish how “directly referential term” is to be understood here from other possible
interpretations, see Marti 1995 and Voltolini 2004.
4Other expressions that are used as by and large equivalent to “descriptive content”, as this term
is employed here, include the following ones of Fregean origin: “mode of presentation”, “sense of
singular term”, “individual sense”.
5See for example Carnap 1928, § 16 and 1934, p. 12 (cf. Farrell Smith 1989, pp. 123 and 134),
Quine 1953, Chapter 1 and 1960, Katz 1972.
6At p. 49, n. 16 of his 1980, Kripke notes that he considers indexicals (“demonstratives” in his
terminology) as capable of being used as rigid designators just like proper names, but at p. 12, n. 10
he recognizes that “[t]he rigidity of demonstratives has been stressed by Kaplan” (as noted, saying
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latter doctrine is right and the former wrong (see, e.g., textbooks such as Devitt and
Sterelny 1999 and Akmajian et al. 1995 and the handbook or encyclopaedia entries
Braun 2001, Jacob 2003, § 6, Forbes 2003, Reimer 2003, Salmon 2003). This is not
to say that after the referentialist trend began its arguments were not challenged or
that descriptivist views have not been proposed.7
that a term is rigid is fairly close to affirming that it is directly referential, although there is a subtle
difference made clear by Kaplan). As is well known, the referentialist account of singular terms
typically goes hand in hand with a parallel referentialist treatment of natural kind terms fueled by
the arguments in its favour put forward in Putnam 1975 and Kripke 1971, 1980 (as Kripke notes at
p. 122 of his 1980, although his and Putnam’s views on natural kind terms have much in common,
they were developed independently; in 1975, p. 232, Putnam however acknowledges that Kripke
was the first to recognize the implications of such views for the theory of necessary truth). Since I
concentrate on singular reference, natural kind terms fall outside the scope of this book.
7For example, it is well known that Kripke’s modal argument has been challenged by Dummett
and others (see § 8.4) and that “causal descriptivism” has been proposed in various guises as an
alternative to Donnellan’s and Kripke’s causal account of proper names by Lewis (1984) and oth-
ers (cf. § 5.9). But there is more and I shall mention some notable samples in the rest of this note.
Although Gareth Evans is not in the end by my standards a descriptivist (see note 21 below), a
form of descriptivism about proper names may perhaps be attributed to him in his 1973, where
criticisms of the causal-referentialist standpoint can be found (see § 5.9). Castañeda 1974 takes
all singular terms as directly referring to guises, understood as concrete particulars that make up
ordinary objects by means of a relation of consubstantiation in a bundle-theoretic ontological pic-
ture (guise theory). But from the point of view of this picture, Castañeda’s guises play the role
of Fregean senses of singular terms (descriptive contents) and thus his position turns out to be a
form of descriptivism. Not surprisingly, then, Castañeda 1977 contains reactions to Donnellan’s
and Kripke’s anti-descriptivist arguments and Castañeda 1989a opposes the referentialist elements
in Kaplan’s theory of demonstratives. A distinctive feature of Castañeda’s position is that proper
names are restricted variables that in context take different guises (or descriptive contents, if one
wishes) as values (see Castañeda 1990 for a fully articulated defence of this view of proper names).
Loar 1976 presents a rather thoroughly descriptivist view that in some measure assigns descriptive
contents to Donnellan’s so-called referential descriptions and takes proper names to express met-
alinguistic descriptive contents (as I have done in Orilia 2000 and as I shall do in a different way
here, by taking advantage, as we shall see, of token-reflexivity à la Reichenbach). As regards index-
icals, Loar takes self-ascriptive belief as primitive (pretty much as will later be done in Lewis 1979
and Chisholm 1981) and builds up a descriptivist account of indexicals on that (see Castañeda 1987
and Austin 1990 for some problems that a view of this kind must confront). Schiffer in his 1978
distinguishes between “Russell’s description theory of singular terms” and “Russell’s description
theory of de re thoughts” and explicitly defends the latter rather than the former. Yet, he seems to
be at least inclined to a form of descriptivism that relies on ideas from Castañeda 1977 (Schiffer
1978, p. 194) and perhaps from Loar 1976 (Schiffer 1978, n. 27). Certainly, he is committed to
theses that a descriptivist about singular terms might like, such as the idea that beliefs are not
propositions that can have ordinary objects as constituents (a view to which, as we shall see, a
referentialist might be driven). Roughly speaking, according to Schiffer, when we might think an
ordinary object is a constituent of a belief, the constituent is really a corresponding descriptive
content, apart from the following exceptions: beliefs about oneself and the present moment need
not be mediated by descriptive contents. (Schiffer has also criticized referentialist positions in later
writings, to be considered in § 8.13, below.) Plantinga 1978 criticizes referentialism about proper
names and by building up on his essentialist standpoint in ontology takes them to express individual
essences. Searle 1983 explicitly defends descriptivist and internalist positions about proper names
4 1 Introduction: Referentialism vs. Descriptivism
In this essay, I would like to provide, first of all, a general introduction to the
topic of singular reference by placing it in the more general context of a theory of
meaning and by surveying the main arguments in favour of descriptivism and ref-
erentialism. Next, I wish to challenge the current referentialist wisdom by showing
that a version of descriptivism can still be maintained. More specifically, I shall
put forward in some detail a descriptivist theory, to be called for ease of reference
Contextual Descriptivism (CD, in short), which I believe can account for all the
problems that are typically taken to favour referentialism, the referentialist data, as
we may say in short. At the same time, being a form of descriptivism, CD addresses
in a straightforward way what we may call, to use a parallel expression, the descrip-
tivist data, i.e., all those traditional issues that are notoriously hard to deal with in a
referentialist framework. Among them, there are in particular the co-reference and
and indexicals against referentialist attacks (roughly, internalism is the view that takes proposi-
tional attitudes to be narrow; cf. § 1.8 below). According to Searle, the meaning of a proper name
is provided by something like a definition and its reference-fixing content (for a given speaker)
is given by the totality of the “intentional content” that a speaker associates with the name (this
may make it impossible always to equate the meaning of the statement uttered in earnest by a stan-
dard speaker with a belief of the speaker in question, as in the kind of descriptivism that I would
like to defend). Moreover, Searle recognizes that indexicals are essential in the sense proposed by
Perry (see § 4.2) and thus takes sentences with indexicals to express indexical propositions that
somehow show a self-referentiality. As I understand Searle, this amounts to the idea that, e.g., the
proposition expressed by a sentence like “that man wears a red hat” is a proposition perspicuously
representable along the lines of “there is exacly one x that is a man causing g and x wears a red
hat”, where g is a visual presentation in the mind of the speaker (Searle 1983, p. 212; Russell
held a similar view, as discussed in § 3.8 below). There are elements of descriptivism in Burge’s
position, as he rejects the view that proper names and indexicals “simply import a referent into a
proposition” and admits that “all reference is perspectival, mediated by cognitive factors” (1983,
p. 89). Burge is however committed to externalism about propositional attitudes (1977, 1979), in a
way that makes his position akin to referentialism (cf. § 1.8 below). In fact it seems to me that he
allows for ordinary objects as constituents of propositions expressed by means of demonstratives
(and thus possibly of proper names, since Burge views them as involving a hidden demonstrative
(1973)). For he views demonstratives as free variables that in a context are assigned a referent,
which may well be an ordinary object. Jubien 1993 takes proper names to be descriptions rigidi-
fied by means of an implicit “actually”. For example, “Hesperus” must be understood as celestial
body that actually occupies position p at time t (p. 500). Geurts 1997 presents a form of descrip-
tivism about proper names and sees the need for descriptivism for indexicals as well. Brinck 1997
defends descriptivism for the first-person pronoun, by taking any token of it to express at the same
time a stable self-concept and a de re sense that shifts with context (p. 121) and consists in informa-
tion gained from the latter (p. 123). Although Jackson inclines towards two-dimensionalism (see
note 10 below), the position defended in his 1998a can be counted as a form of descriptivism about
proper names (as well as general kind terms, which are not our concern here). Jackson admits there
that speakers and hearers may well associate different descriptions to the same proper name, but
argues that this does not hinder communication as long as the descriptions are co-extensive. King
2001 defends the view that complex demonstratives should not be treated as directly referential,
although it seems to me that all the data he considers have to do with cases in which a term of the
form “that F” can be understood as the description “the F” (e.g., “that hominid who discovered
how to start fire was a genius”) or with anaphoric uses (as we shall see, I myself treat anaphoric
complex demonstratives as descriptions). Finally, some challenges for referentialism based on data
regarding plural indexicals can be found in Palma 2004.
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no-reference problems which (inter alia) led Frege and Russell to descriptivism and
which will be discussed at length in the following.8
The leading motivation for attempting this revival of descriptivism is that I side
with those who think that a complete semantic theory, must be, so to say, cogni-
tivist, i.e., capable of going hand in hand with a plausible psychological account of
the mental processes that are involved in the generation or interpretation of a lin-
guistic token and of the mental representations that such processes give rise to (see,
e.g., Geurts 1997). In fact, it is generally agreed that a semantic theory that relies
on a referentialist account of singular terms has a much harder time in fulfilling
this constraint than a theory that relies on descriptivism. For example, this is how
Schiffer expresses this concern about referentialism (which he calls, as many do,
“The New Theory of Reference”):
To my mind, the New Theory of Reference has been cavalier in the way it has ignored the
connection between semantics and psychology. Not one of these theorists [the supporters
of referentialism] has ventured a theory of the thought in the mind of a person using a
singular term as a rigid designator; a theory, that is to say, of de re propositional attitudes.
This is a notable lack, for the connection between semantics and psychology is such that,
without such a theory, there can be no hope of an adequate theory of reference. Here I
am not alluding to the idea — thought by some to be dubious — that semantics reduces
to propositional attitude psychology; I mean to be saying something with which everyone
agrees.
Schiffer 1978, pp. 174–175.
A satisfactory account of the co-reference and no-reference problems is a cru-
cial step toward a cognitivist semantic theory. Now, it cannot be denied that, so as
to answer at least in part Schiffer’s above complaint, there are now well-developed
referentialist attempts to address them (such as Salmon 1986, 1998, Recanati 1993,
Perry 2001, Soames 1989a, 2002).9 Nevertheless, even if we grant that these
attempts have had some degree of success, it must at the same time be acknowl-
edged that a descriptivist approach can cope with these issues more simply (see
§§ 3.6 and 8.13 below). In particular, as we shall see in detail, in addressing the co-
reference and no-reference problems the referentialist seems forced to distinguish
between the cognitive significance of a statement and its official intersubjective
meaning, whereas the descriptivist can simply equate them. By equating them, the
descriptivist can make room for the intuitively plausible identification of the offi-
cial intersubjective meaning of a statement with a belief of the speaker, in those
cases in which the speaker is linguistically competent and is speaking in earnest.
This option is not similarly open to the referentialist, if she divorces meaning from
8Interestingly, there may be cultural differences regarding how some of the referentialist and
descriptivist data are appreciated (Machery et al. 2004). Unfortunately, it falls outside the scope of
this book to discuss the philosophical issues that this raises.
9Attempts to deal with the problems of co-reference and no-reference of course pre-date Schiffer’s
concern. For example, Kaplan 1989 (circulating at least since 1977) tries in some degree to address
the former by appealing to characters and can perhaps be said to address the latter by admit-
ting merely possible objects. See also the distinction between thoughts and senses in Perry 1977.
Moreover, Kripke 1973 in a sense addresses the no-reference problem.
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cognitive significance and says that a subject believes that S when she is appropri-
ately related to the cognitive significance that she attaches to sentence S or a token
thereof (rather than to the meaning of S or token thereof). Whatever the details here,
there are complications that the referentialist must face and the descriptivist can
duck. The latter thus seems to have an advantage once the goal of a general cog-
nitivist semantic theory is accepted. To be sure, this advantage may be balanced or
even discarded by a failure to account for the referentialist data. Indeed, the refer-
entialist typically claims that this is the case. In reply, I shall try to show that the
descriptivist approach put forward in this book, CD, does not exhibit such a failure.
If this is right, CD should at least be considered a theory worthy of attention when
we compare it with the other available semantic approaches in the dia-philosophical
spirit of Castañeda’s methodology (1980); more specifically a theory worthy of seri-
ous consideration by those who share the goal of constructing a general cognitivist
semantic theory. This claim is further supported by the fact that CD puts forward,
as we shall see, a unified account of both the deictic and anaphoric uses of indexical
terms, something that to the best of my knowledge has not been provided so far, at
least not from a referentialist perspective.10
10In addition to referentialist and descriptivist theories, the current literature also acknowledges
approaches to reference that try to combine referentialist and descriptivist aspects in order to have
the best of both worlds. Depending on their distinguishing features and one’s classificatory pur-
poses, they may be considered as somehow both descriptivist and referentialist or as neither. I have
in mind here (i) the so-called “two factor” or “dual aspect” semantic theories developed in the
late 1970s and early 1980s primarily in order to deal with propositional attitudes in the light of
Putnam’s distinction (cf. § 1.8 below) between narrow and wide content (Field 1977, Loar 1981,
McGinn 1982, Block 1986) and (ii) the “two-dimensional” approaches mainly inspired by the
desire to make clearer sense of Kripke’s claims (cf. § 4.6 below) that there are necessary a priori
and contingent a posteriori truths (Stalnaker 1978, 2004, Davies and Humberstone 1981, Jackson
1998, Garcia-Carpintero 2006, Garcia-Carpintero and Macià 2006, Chalmers 1996, 2002, 2004;
see Davies and Stoljar 2004 and Chalmers 2006 for surveys and Chalmers 2007 for an attempt to
deal most explicitly with propositional attitudes from this perspective). Roughly, in these theories
one factor or dimension of meaning (the primary intension, in Chalmer’s terminology) takes care
of Fregean intuitions concerning cognitive significance, while the other (the secondary intension,
in Chalmers’s terminology) deals with Putnamian or Kripkean intuitions regarding wide content
and metaphysical necessity. These two levels must be appropriately independent, i.e., not systemat-
ically related in the way sense and reference are in the Fregean framework (where sense determines
reference; see § 2.9 below), for otherwise these dual theories, as we may call them, would hardly
be distinguishable from the latter (Marconi 2005). Since I try to counter the referentialist trend by
proposing a purely descriptivist alternative, an examination of these hybrid proposals falls outside
the scope of this book. I would like to claim, however, without any pretense of doing full justice
to them, that the descriptivist approach that I defend here can deal, as we shall see, with both the
descriptivist and the referentialist data, without the quite formidable technical and theoretical com-
plications that these approaches appear to require when fully developed, as they appeal to such
things as possible worlds, centred worlds, different kinds of intensions, diagonal propositions and
the like in order to bring cognitive significance to the fore (as is well exemplified by Chalmers’
works). In requiring such complications to enjoy the benefits of cognitive significance, the dual
theories are quite similar to the explicitly referentialist attempts to deal with the descriptivist data,
which I criticize in § 8.13. Needless to say, the dual theories encouter resistance in referentialist
quarters as well, because they incorporate elements of descriptivism (see Soames 2005a and, for a
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1.2 Plan of the Book
This book is subdivided into eight chapters. In the rest of this first and introductory
chapter, after having fixed some useful conventions, I present descriptivism and ref-
erentialism in more detail. Then, I start working out some notions, such as linguistic
and pragmatic meaning, which are important to articulate the contrast between
these two doctrines and more generally for semantics. This task is completed in
Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, I present the descriptivist data and I also characterize, to
the extent that is relevant for our purposes, the descriptivist theories that furnished
the main polemical target for the referentialist revolt of the 1970s. In Chapter 4, I
present the referentialist data and I try to show as best as I can how they can serve
the purpose of attacking descriptivism. Overall then these two chapters have two
purposes. On the one hand, they try to explain why descriptivism was successful
and why referentialism is successful. On the other hand, they present the main data
that any good theory of singular reference must tackle. They thus provide the data
base for the evaluation of my own descriptivist approach, namely CD.
The presentation of the central aspects of the theory occupies Chapters 5 and 6.
As we shall see, CD exploits the idea that singular terms are determiner phrases
and that, as such, may express as pragmatic meanings descriptive contents involv-
ing special “contextualized properties” of the form, we may say, “F@t”, where
F is a property capable of working as linguistic meaning of a general term such
as “dog” or “round”, t is a contextual parameter11 and “@” (the contextualiza-
tion sign) stands for a relation that in some way links F and t so as to generate
a specific meaning bound to the context of utterance and whose nature will be
clarified in § 5.4. I work with the default assumption according to which t is the
very singular term (understood as a token) that has the descriptive content in ques-
tion as a pragmatic meaning. Given this approach, CD can be viewed as a sort
of generalization of Reichenbach’s (1947) token-reflexive account of indexicals.12
reply, Chalmers 2006a). For a criticism of dual theories that presupposes neither a descriptivist nor
a referentialist perspective, and that I am inclined to endorse in its essentials, see Marconi 2005,
based on the idea that the dual theories have trouble in accounting for the “articulation problem”,
namely the problem of explaining how the two aspects of meaning precisely relate to each other
(Marconi focuses on two-dimensionalism and Chalmers in particular and relies on Fodor 1987 to
criticize the two-factor theories). It is worth noting that Kaplan’s semantics for indexicals, because
of its distinction of character and content, is often seen by two-dimensionalists as a forerunner
of their approach (Davies and Stoljajr 2004, Chalmers 2007). By my lights, however, Kaplan is a
clear-cut case of referentialist and I shall treat him as such in line with what is typically assumed
in current literature.
11The way I use the expression “contextual parameter” here should not be confused with how I
use it in § 2.10 in order to refer, roughly speaking, to the speaker, receiver, time or place of an
utterance.
12Other authors, such as Manuel Garcia-Carpintero and John Perry have similarly made use in
recent years of Reichenbach’s token-reflexivity in order to account for singular reference. However,
they do not do this in an attempt to defend descriptivism as I try to do here. Garcia-Carpintero 2000
does not take the token-reflexive items as pragmatic meanings in the way I do from my descriptivist
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It should be noted however that alternatives to this default option may be worth
considering, for example that according to which the contextual parameter is a
“space-time” pair that identifies a linguistic token (cf. § 7.9 below).
As will be apparent in the following, my approach presupposes a general account
of determiner phrases — whether used anaphorically or not — and not just of that
particular type of determiner phrase that is a definite description. In Chapter 5,
I provide this account and then I concentrate on definite descriptions and proper
names. The task of dealing with indexicals from the perspective of CD is left for
Chapter 6. The presentation of CD is completed in Chapter 7, where we deal with
temporal indexicals, tense, Castañeda’s quasi-indicators and various miscellaneous
issues. Finally, the 8th and concluding chapter tries to show that CD can deliver
the promise of accounting satisfactorily for the referentialist data presented in
Chapter 4.
1.3 Some Conventions
The traditional distinction between linguistic types and tokens will play an impor-
tant role in what follows. Let us then emphasize at the outset that whereas a type is
an abstract entity, a corresponding token is a concrete entity that occupies a precise
location in space, at any time at which it exists (of course the location may vary
over time). It counts as “linguistic” to the extent that a speaker or hearer can attach a
meaning to it by viewing it as the concrete realization, parole, of an abstract element
in a langue (to use Ferdinand De Saussure’s well-known terminology). As we shall
see in detail, a type (and thus any token thereof) can be associated to a meaning
that I call linguistic, intuitively, a meaning that does not depend on the context, but
solely on grammar and vocabulary. Moreover, a token can be associated to a mean-
ing that I call pragmatic, a meaning that can be understood by relying not only on
grammar and vocabulary, but also on the context surrounding the token in question.
A token can be realized and be perceivable in different ways, depending on whether
it is an oral token (e.g., produced by someone who speaks out loud in an ordinary
conversation), an inscription (a written token), a gestural token, as in a conversa-
tion in sign language, an inner token (occurring in an episode of inner speech), etc.
viewpoint, but as reference-fixing devices involved in propositions presupposed by the proposi-
tions expressed by sentences with indexicals or proper names. Such expressed propositions may
well contain ordinary objects referred to by the indexicals or proper names, pretty much in line
with referentialism. The token-reflexive items are however used by Garcia-Carpintero in order
to account for the co-reference and no-reference problems, in something of the spirit of a two-
dimensional semantics. As we shall see in § 8.13, Perry 2001 takes advantage of token-reflexive
“reflexive contents” to deal with the co-reference and no-reference problems from a clearly refer-
entialist point of view and thus without taking them as “official contents” (which is what I do from
my descriptivist perspective, when I take them to be pragmatic meanings). Of course, my token-
reflexive descriptive contents differ from Garcia-Carpintero’s and Perry’s token-reflexive items in
that mine involve the relation @, to be be discussed at length as we proceed.
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I may use words such as occurrence and utterance instead of token and statement
for tokens of sentences.13
Because singular terms are central to this book, it is worth classifying them, qua
types, with some more precision, relying both on morphological features and on how
tokens of them are typically used. As already mentioned in note 1, singular definite
descriptions such as “the tallest man” are typically distinguished from indefinite
(“a man”, “a dog” and so on) and plural ones (“the tables”, “the dogs”, etc.). And
because singular definite descriptions are of central concern in this book, I typically
use “description” to mean singular definite description. I call pure a description in
which the predicate does not involve a proper name or an indexical, e.g., “the tallest
spy”. In contrast, indexical descriptions such as “my father” or “the father of that
boy”, or descriptions involving proper names, e.g., “the capital of Italy”, or “the
teacher of Alexander”, are called impure.
Following Kaplan’s terminology, we may distinguish within the indexical (or
deictic) subcategory of singular terms demonstratives such as the indexical pro-
nouns “this”, “that”, “it”, “he”, “she”, “this man”, “that chair”, from pure indexicals,
e.g., the indexical pronouns “I”, “you”, “here”, “now”, “today”, “tomorrow”, etc.),
although the distinction probably does not cut as deep and precisely as Kaplan might
have thought (Dolcini 2006, 2009). Moreover, we may distinguish between simple
indexicals (or indexicals simpliciter, if you wish) such as “this”, “that”, “it”, “he”,
“she”, “I”, “you”, “here”, “now”, “today”, “tomorrow”, etc., and complex indexi-
cals, or indexical phrases, e.g. expressions such as “this man”, “that chair”, or “that
brown table”.
The following should be noted. Suppose we define “indexical”, as is often done,
as an expression whose meaning and/or reference changes in a systematic way from
context to context, in the way paradigmatically illustrated by “I”, “left” and the tense
components of the verbs in sentences such as “I am tired”, “it will rain” or “John
turned left”. Then, there are indexicals that are not (at least prima facie) singular
terms, as here defined. For example, “we” is just as indexical as “I”, but does not
count as a singular term in that “we” is not an expression whose typical function
is to allow us to single out one specific object. For “we” is typically used to single
13To make for a lighter reading, I often take advantage of the ambiguity of “sentence” and other
metalinguistic terms such as “name” or “singular term” and use them to refer either to a type or
to a token, as the case may be. In connection with the type/token ambiguity, there is an ambiguity
in reporting speech or in syntactic-grammatical classifications, that can be illustrated as follows.
When one says for example that Tom has uttered “snow is white”, this may mean either, so to
speak, that a concrete uttering relation links Tom to a token of the type “snow is white” or that a
somewhat more abstract uttering relation links Tom to the type itself in virtue of his more concrete
link to the token. Similarly, that an expression E is, say, a proper name may mean either that (i) the
token E is classifiable as proper name in that it is a token of a type of the kind proper name or (ii)
E is a type of the kind proper name. We may leave these ambiguities unresolved unless something
crucial hinges on them. Similarly, I may sometimes use a numeral in parentheses used as label for
a sentence type, e.g., “(1)” above, to also refer to a (hypothetical) token of the sentence type rather
than to the sentence type itself. In these cases the context is meant to make it clear which token has
been referred to.
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out a class of individuals rather than a single individual. Similarly, “left”, indexical
as it is, hardly counts as a singular term. In the following, by “indexical” I shall
normally mean “indexical singular term”. I sketch a treatment of tenses in Chapter
7. Apart from that, I shall not deal with other indexical expressions that are not
singular terms, except for a quick analysis of the plural pronouns “we”, “you” (as
plural), “they”, “these” and “those”. However, I hope that the main ideas that I shall
present in relation to the indexicals that I treat explicitly can be extended to those
that I do not dwell upon.
As we have seen, definite descriptions can be taken to express descriptive con-
tents. It is convenient to group descriptive contents in one class with all the meanings
typically expressed by determiner phrases (DPs, in short; also called quantifier
phrases). The members of the class in question may be called denoting concepts,
in the terminology of Russell’s Principles of Mathematics (1903) (we may also say
referential concepts; cf. Cocchiarella 1989, 2008). As paradigmatic cases (at least
from the point of view of English), the expressions classifiable, qua types, as DPs
are expressions involving a determiner such as “the”, “every”, “a”, “some”, “most”,
etc., followed by what we may call, most generically, a predicate (qua expression
expressing a property), which may be plural or singular, such as “man”, “women”,
“winged horse”, “director of La vita è bella”. Thus, among determiner phrases we
find singular definite descriptions such as “the director of La vita è bella”, as well as
plural descriptions, e.g., “the tables”, and expressions involving determiners other
than “the”, e.g., “every man”, “all women”, “most lions”, “some winged horse”, “a
young boy”, “no Italian city”, and similar noun phrases. Just as in these paradig-
matic DPs we can distinguish a determiner component, such as “the” or “every”,
and a predicate component, such as “man” or “director of La vita è bella”, in denot-
ing concepts we can distinguish a determiner meaning component and a property
component. For example, in the denoting concept corresponding to “every man”,
there is, or so we shall assume, a determiner meaning component corresponding
to “every” and a property component corresponding to “man”. Similarly, in the
descriptive content “the director of La vita è bella”, there is a determiner mean-
ing component corresponding to “the” and a property component, corresponding to
“director of La vita è bella”.
Following common terminology, DPs can also be called noun phrases (NPs, in
short), as they can work as subjects or direct or indirect objects in a sentence. It is
typically assumed that there are NPs that are not DPs, since they do not involve
determiners, e.g., common nouns, proper names and pronouns. As we shall see
in more detail, however, some NPs that do not exhibit a determiner, e.g., “Mary’s
sister”, may be viewed as truncated DPs, involving, so to speak, a zero realized
determiner (beside being viewed as predicates, because they express properties). In
contrast, the DPs that exhibit a determiner may be called integral DPs. In a lan-
guage without articles such as Latin, most, if not all, predicates must be viewed as
truncated DPs. For example, “rosa” (rose) can be interpreted either as “the rose” or
“a rose”. Moreover, from a descriptivist perspective, as we shall see in great detail,
proper names and indexical pronouns can work as DPs, by having descriptive con-
tents (or, more generally, denoting concepts) as their meanings. To the extent that
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this is accepted, we may say that proper names and indexical pronouns such as
“Tom” or “this” are (qua types), non-standard DPs, as opposed to standard integral
ones such as “the table” or “every man”, or standard truncated ones such as “Tom’s
father”. Such non-standard DPs are also truncated DPs because they not involve a
determiner.
Informally, I shall often enclose sentences and sentential forms within bars, as in
“|snow is white|”, so as to represent meanings of sentences, i.e., propositions. Thus,
|red is a colour| is the proposition expressed by “red is a colour”. Similarly, |the
director of La vita è bella is a comedian| is the proposition expressed by “the direc-
tor of La vita è bella is a comedian”. This will be done to distinguish clearly between
propositions and the sentences expressing them, especially when an attempt is made
to (partially) uncover the structure and constituents of the proposition, from the
point of view of a certain approach, whether referentialist or descriptivist. Similarly,
I may use bars for other kinds of meanings, e.g., the properties (concepts) expressed
by common nouns, as in “|red|” to express the property of being red, “|colour|”, to
express the property of being a colour, “|bank|” to express the property of being a
bank, “|the director of La vita è bella|” to express the denoting concept (descriptive
content) expressed by “the director of La vita è bella”. I shall skip the bars when
they can be easily supplied from context or when the context does not seem to call
for recourse to them in the effort to gain clarity. We are to understand that the prop-
erties |red| and |colour| are constituents of the proposition |red is a colour|, that
the denoting concept |the director of La vita è bella| and the property |comedian|
are constituents of the proposition |the director of La vita è bella is a comedian|
and similarly for other examples. As noted, in denoting concepts we can distin-
guish a determiner component and a property component. Thus, as regards denoting
concepts such as |every man| and |the director of La vita è bella|, we are to under-
stand that they involve as constituents a determiner meaning component, |every| and
|the|, respectively, and a property component, i.e., the properties |man| and |director
of La vita è bella|, respectively. Other examples should be understood in the
same way.
As “bank” paradigmatically witnesses, natural language expressions are typi-
cally ambiguous in that they correspond to different meanings. Thus, their ambiguity
transfers to the further technical expressions that they contribute to generate when
put between bars, as “|bank|” illustrates (because it is as ambiguous as “bank”).
However, we shall pretend that a unique meaning is picked out when an expression is
put between bars. Usually, in dwelling on English expressions in common use with
a view to discussing a certain philosophical issue, we need not care to specify the
selected meaning. When the need for more precision arises, we can resort to obvious
devices, such as using “shore-bank” and “financial-bank” to distinguish two mean-
ings of “bank”. As in this example, I may sometime use hyphens to make it clear, in
representing a meaning, that a certain complex English expression corresponds to
one property. Alternatively, I may also use brackets. Thus, “president-of-the-USA”,
and “[president of the USA]” should be taken to correspond to the property of being
president of the USA. Similarly, “winged-horse”, and “[winged horse]” should be
taken to correspond to the property of being a winged horse. These devices will be
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used for clarity’s sake, especially to avoid ambiguities, when the context seems to
require it, but otherwise will be avoided. It is worth noting, however, that, as I see
it, the properties that invite the use of the devices in question are usually complex
properties, often involving as constituents propositional connectives or operators
(meanings of sentential connectives or operators, which are typically used in the
complex predicates by means of which we can express complex properties). Obvious
examples of these operators are conjunction, disjunction or negation. For instance,
“[winged horse]” should be seen as corresponding to a conjunctive property, which
we may want to represent, more precisely, as “[winged and horse]”.14 More for-
mally and for brevity’s sake, we may want to use familiar formal symbols, such
as “&” for conjunction and write, e.g., “[winged & horse]”. In addition to “&”, I
also resort to the following: “∃” and “∀” to express existential and universal quan-
tification, respectively, “∨” for disjunction, “∼” for negation, “⊃” for the material
conditional and “≡” for the material biconditional (as we shall see, to express condi-
tionals and biconditionals involving a conceptual link among the relata, as when we
say that being a bachelor entails being unmarried, I shall use “→” and “↔“, respec-
tively.) Parentheses to indicate the scope of these formal symbols will be used when
necessary, as in “[winged & (horse ∨ donkey)]”.15
In representing a meaning, I shall use whenever possible a proper name with
a lower-case initial, e.g., “bush”, to indicate that an individual, such as Bush, is
a constituent of a proposition (otherwise I shall use free variables such as “x”,
“y”, etc.). Given these conventions, |bush is president-of-the-USA| is a proposition
with |bush|, a man in flesh and blood, and |president-of-the-USA|, a property, as
constituents.16
1.4 Referentialism
Roughly, referentialism holds that singular reference to ordinary objects and other
individuals can be direct, in that at least some singular terms, especially indexicals
or proper names, can directly refer to such items (these terms are directly refer-
ential). That is, these singular terms can occur in sentences that express singular
14The example “winged horse”, together with countless others, such as “gentle young man”, may
suggest that when adjectives and then a noun are put in sequential fashion, a conjunctive property
is expressed. But, as the classic counterexample, “fake diamond”, testifies, this is not always the
case. It would be improper of course to represent the meaning of this predicate as [fake & diamond].
At any rate, for simplicity’s sake, I shall avoid being fussy about these details unless the context
suggests otherwise.
15From an even more formal point of view, it should be noted that complex properties such as
[winged & (horse ∨ donkey)] can be appropriately represented by recourse to the lambda operator
familiar from second-order logic and often used in natural language semantics in the Montague
tradition. More on this in note 25 below.
16I neglect as far as possible the issue of what precisely in a proposition corresponds to tense. More
on this later.
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propositions having as constituents the very ordinary objects (or other individuals)
that these singular terms refer to. In other words, what the singular terms contribute
to the propositions that these sentences express are the items to which the singular
terms in question singularly refer. This terminology is current and widespread (see,
for example, Perry 2001). It is also commonly said, in a Fregean terminology that
I follow here, that meaning determines reference. However, what we just said indi-
cates that, according to referentialism, the singular terms in question have meanings
that coincide with their referents and thus can be said to have meanings that deter-
mine their referents only in the trivial sense that such meanings are identical to
the referents (cf. § 2.9 below). For example, a referentialist (with respect to proper
names) would hold that Bush in flesh and blood is a constituent of the proposition
expressed by the sentence
(1) Bush is American,
or, more precisely (see below for my preference of a token-oriented rather than
a type-oriented approach to semantics), by a corresponding statement (as uttered
in the appropriate context). The relevant token of the proper name “Bush”, in
this approach, contributes Bush himself to this proposition, just as “American”
contributes the property of being American. Accordingly, Bush himself is both a
constituent of such a proposition and the meaning of the proper name token, a mean-
ing that determines the referent, Bush, in the trivial sense that the meaning, Bush, is
identical to the referent, Bush. More precisely, as we shall see in more detail, Bush
is, on the basis of the context of utterance, the pragmatic meaning of such a token.
This is not meant to imply, of course, that the linguistic type “Bush”, independently
of context, has Bush, the current president of the USA,17 as linguistic meaning, for
anyone called “Bush”, e.g., the former president (his father), would have an equal
claim for this role (unless we type-identify names by taking reference into account,
thereby saying, e.g., that there are two homophonic “Aristotle” names, one referring
to the philosopher and the other to the second husband of Jacqueline Kennedy18).
Given the above conventions, we can say that, according to the referentialist, in the
appropriate context, |bush| is the meaning of a token of “Bush” and the proposition
expressed by (1), qua pragmatic meaning, is:
(1a) |bush is American|,
a proposition with |bush|, the president in flesh and blood, as constituent.
According to a referentialist (with respect to indexicals), this very proposition
can also be expressed, qua pragmatic meaning, by a token of
17 This and many other examples in the following were formulated when George W. Bush was the
president of the USA.
18I shall neglect this option, although many philosophers and in particular many referenialists seem
to prefer it. At any rate, nothing crucial in my attempt to assess the dispute between descriptivists
and referentialists will depend on this point.
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(2) this is American.
For this to be the case, it suffices (in a typical case) that the relevant “this” token is
uttered while pointing at Bush. In this case, it is the “this” token which, according
to the referentialist, has |bush| as its (pragmatic) meaning (as well as referent) and
thus contributes him to the proposition (1a). Similarly, the same proposition can be
expressed by a token of
(3) I am American.
For this to be the case, it suffices, roughly speaking, that Bush himself utters (3),
thereby producing an “I” token. If this happens, the token (pragmatically) means,
once more, |bush|, and thus contributes him to (1a).
One can also be a referentialist with respect to definite descriptions. For it has
been argued, as we shall see in detail, that even a sentence such as
(4) the man drinking a martini is American
can be used in such a way that the relevant token of the description, “the man drink-
ing martini”, directly refers, e.g., to Bush in flesh and blood (Donnellan 1966).
When, according to the referentialist, this is the case, there occurs a token of (4)
whose pragmatic meaning is, once more, proposition (1a), with Bush in flesh and
blood as a constituent, a constituent contributed to the proposition by the description
token in question.
As these examples illustrate, one is a referentialist, typically, with respect to a cer-
tain very general category of singular terms such as proper names or indexicals. And
it should not be ruled out that someone might be referentialist with respect to a more
restricted category or subcategory of terms (e.g., the first-person singular pronoun,
which belongs in the more general category of indexical), without being such in rela-
tion to another subcategory in the same general category (e.g., third-person singular
pronouns, which are also indexicals). In general, one can be a descriptivist with
respect to a category or subcategory, but not with respect to another. Thus, someone
might be a referentialist in relation to indexicals and a descriptivist with respect to
proper names, or vice versa. And it is also possible to be a referentialist with respect
to “I” and a descriptivist with respect to “this”. However, I normally use “referen-
tialist” to refer to a prototypical supporter of typical referentialism (or referentialism
tout court), understood as the view that, for each category C of singular terms, ref-
erentialism with respect to C holds, i.e., in at least some cases, tokens of singular
terms of category C are directly referential and indeed they are always such if C
is the category of indexicals or proper names, with the possible exception of those
cases in which they are used anaphorically. “Descriptivist” and “descriptivism” are
used in a corresponding manner.
It should be noted that some referentialists have argued that there also are some
artificial singular terms, not found in natural language, that should be considered
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directly referential terms. These are the free variables of logic and the terms gen-
erated by Kaplan’s “dthat” operator. As regards the former, Kaplan (1989a, p. 572)
has argued that the assignment of a value to a free variable is in essence like the
assignment of a referent to a demonstrative on the basis of a demonstration (a point-
ing at an object): in both cases the meaning is the referent. Indeed, Kaplan considers
variables as capable of providing paradigmatic cases of direct reference. As regards
the latter, Kaplan has claimed that he has introduced an expression that can turn
any definite description into a directly referential term. The idea is that “dthat” is
so defined that, e.g., the meaning of “dthat[the author of Namimg and Necessity]”
is precisely the referent of “the author of Namimg and Necessity”, i.e., Saul Kripke
in flesh and blood (Kaplan 1989, p. 521 and Kaplan 1978). I shall not consider
these kinds of singular terms, since we shall concentrate on the issue of whether
there are directly referential terms in natural language. Accordingly, artificial lan-
guages will not be of particular interest to us. In any case, it should be said that
whether these artificial terms are actually directly referential is not entirely obvious.
As Kaplan notes (1989a, p. 572), these terms can be taken to be directly referen-
tial, on the assumption that their “cognitive value” (i.e., cognitive significance, in
Kaplan’s alternative terminology) does not coincide with their meaning (because
the meaning is equated with the referent). But, as we shall see, one central point
in the controversy between descriptivists and referentialists is precisely whether we
should admit that the cognitive significance of a term should be anything different
from its pragmatic meaning (cf. Chapter 3 below). Thus, claiming that the terms in
question are directly referential comes rather close to begging the question against
the descriptivist.
1.5 Descriptivism
In contrast to referentialism, descriptivism holds that singular reference to ordinary
objects is always indirect, in that all singular terms refer indirectly (if they refer
at all), by means of intermediaries, i.e., descriptive contents (also called individual
senses, individual concepts, etc.). That is, a sentence with a singular term embedded
in it (a singular sentence, we may say) always expresses a proposition having some
such descriptive content (contributed by the singular term) as constituent (the locus
classicus for this contrast between direct and indirect reference is Kaplan 1989). In
typical cases (if not always), descriptive contents are meanings of definite descrip-
tions and we shall thus represent them, as anticipated in § 1.3, as having the form
|the F|, where F, the property component, is a certain property and |the|, the deter-
miner meaning component, corresponds to the English definite article (qua modifier
of singular nouns) and somehow indicates that F (univocally) identifies an entity x,
i.e., x is the only object that exemplifies F (to put it otherwise, F is an identifying
property for x). If there actually is such an object, x, the term that expresses the con-
tent in question singularly refers to it. And if this is the case, we can also say that
the meaning of the singular term determines the referent, x, in that the meaning is
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of the form |the F| and F identifies x. If this is not the case, the term fails to refer,
since its meaning does not determine anything.19
Consider, for example, tokens of these sentences:
(1) The president of the USA is American.
(2) The winged horse flies.
Both descriptivists and referentialists might agree that they express propositions of
the form |the F is G|, i.e., |the president-of-the-USA is American| and |the winged-
horse flies|, respectively (the fact that according to the referentialist even definite
descriptions may in some cases directly refer does not prevent her from claiming
that in other cases they could refer indirectly). In case (1), the descriptive content
|the president-of-the-USA| is a constituent of the proposition, contributed to it by
the definite description, “the president of the USA”. The property component of
the descriptive content is |president-of-the-USA| and since there is an entity that is
uniquely identified by it, namely Bush, the description singularly refers to this entity.
In case (2), the descriptive content, |the winged-horse|, is a constituent of the propo-
sition, contributed to it by the definite description. The property |winged-horse| is
the property component, and since no entity is uniquely identified, or even exem-
plified, by it, the description does not singularly refer to anything.20 (It should be
noted that the descriptive contents in question do not occur in these propositions in
quite the same way in which |bush| is supposed to occur in |bush is American|; more
on this later.) Descriptivists and referentialists however disagree over the tokens of
(1), (2) and (3) of the previous section. For according to the descriptivist, far from
expressing the proposition |bush is American|, they express three different proposi-
tions of the form |the F is American|, where the nature of the property component,
F, depends on the kind of singular term used to refer to Bush and on features of the
context. Moreover, they disagree because, according to the descriptivist, no token of
a definite description can ever directly refer and thus no token of (4) of the previous
section can ever express a proposition such as |bush is American|.
A definite description is typically the juxtaposition of a definite article, “the” in
English, and a predicate, such as “man”, “winged horse”, “tallest spy”, etc., although
of course we should count as definite descriptions expressions like “my sister” or
“Tom’s brother”, in which the definite article does not occur. We can take them
19As we shall see, there are cases (having to do with anaphora) in which the property component of
a descriptive content expressed by a definite description is “open” in the sense that, as we may put
it, it is expressible by recourse to a variable. In these cases, because of the variable, the descriptive
content cannot determine any object in particular. More on this below.
20Although this picture may be faithful to what Frege would have said, it may not be faithful to how
Russell would put the matter, for according to his doctrine of definite descriptions as “incomplete
symbols”, there is no single constituent, |the F|, contributed by “the F” to the proposition expressed
by “the F is G”. However, for present purposes, we may ignore divergences among descriptivists
on such fine-grained details.
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to be truncated definite descriptions, in which the meaning typically correspond-
ing to the definite article has a zero realization. Thus, in the appropriate context,
a token of “Tom’s brother” can be, as it were, a token of “Ø Tom’s brother”, in
such a way that the |the| component of the corresponding descriptive content, |the
brother of Tom|, is expressed, so to speak, by the Ø-component of the token. In
other words, in a case like this, the meaning |the| is a zero realized constituent of the
descriptive content, (and more generally of the proposition in which this descrip-
tive content occurs), i.e. a constituent contributed (to the descriptive content and to
the proposition) by a “zero” element in the linguistic token (we shall return to zero
realized constituents in § 2.2 below, where we note that the phenomenon of zero
realized meanings is very general and not limited to definite descriptions). Since
the descriptivist takes a proper name or indexical to mean a descriptive content of
the form |the F|, we can take descriptivism to involve the thesis that English proper
names and indexicals (in their typical uses as singular terms) are truncated defi-
nite descriptions. A similar thesis of course is embraced by descriptivism as regards
other languages in which, as in English, proper names and indexicals are used with-
out definite articles. There are languages, like ancient Greek, in which proper names
and some indexicals are used as singular terms with the definite article. In view of
such languages, of course, descriptivism can maintain that there are proper names
and indexicals that are untruncated definite descriptions, expressing a descriptive
content in which |the| is not zero realized. For simplicity’s sake, we shall not dwell
on such languages and thus, from a descriptivist perspective, we shall usually speak
as if all proper names and indexicals, used as singular terms, are truncated definite
descriptions.
1.6 Propositions, Singular and Otherwise
I take it for granted that a proposition is an entity which (at least in typical cases)
can be expressed by a sentence and which is a truth-bearer (par excellence), i.e. the
kind of entity for which the issue of truth and falsehood (primarily) arises, and thus
a truth-valued item, something that is true, false, or some other truth value, if any
such thing is admitted (possibly relative to a time, as we shall see in more detail). A
sentence type or token can be said to be truth-valued derivatively, to the extent that
it expresses a certain proposition. To use a convenient label, the propositions that
function as sentence meanings may be called meaning propositions.
Sometimes, the distinction between descriptivists and referentialists is conveyed
by saying that, according to the latter, some meaning propositions are singular
propositions. But this is not quite right, since singular (or Russellian) propositions
are distinguished by their having some particular as constituent, and accordingly
contrasted with general (or Fregean) ones, i.e. those with no particular as con-
stituent. Now, clearly, according to the referentialist, some meaning propositions
must be singular, e.g., the proposition |bush is American|, expressible with a token
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of “Bush is American”. Yet, one can be a descriptivist and yet accept some singular
propositions as meaning propositions. For example, a descriptivist can admit that
some particular is somehow a constituent of the descriptive content expressed by a
singular term. A view of this kind can be attributed to Russell when he claims that
a token of “this” refers to a certain ordinary object to the extent that it expresses
a descriptive content such as |the object causing d to be experienced|, where d is
a particular sense datum with which the speaker comes to be acquainted (Russell
1918, p. 62; see also Farrell Smith 1989). For the referentialist, nevertheless, a
meaning proposition P involving a particular x can be a singular proposition sim-
ply because x is directly contributed to the proposition by a singular term in the
sentence expressing P. In contrast, according to the descriptivist, x can be a con-
stituent of P only insofar as it happens to be a constituent of the descriptive content
expressed by a singular term in the sentence that expresses P. Moreover, the sin-
gular propositions appealed to by referentialists are typically, as we may call them,
mundane propositions, i.e. propositions having conspicuous worldly entities such as
ordinary objects among their constituents. In contrast, even if a descriptivist allows
for singular propositions as meanings, they would involve not ordinary objects but
peculiar particulars as constituents, less conspicuous or less worldly, so to speak.
For example, Russellian sense data as in Russell’s account of indexicals, or linguis-
tic tokens, as in Reichenbach’s (1947) account of indexicals.21 And a paradigmatic
example of a descriptivist such as Frege, at least as he is typically interpreted, would
even deny the existence of singular propositions altogether. Although there is room
to think that perhaps Frege allows for particular times as constituents of proposi-
tions (see Salmon 2003, p. 70). We may however call singular (or Russellian) par
excellence the singular and mundane propositions typically appealed to by the ref-
erentialists as meaning propositions. Thus, for example, the proposition with Bush
in flesh and blood as constituent, |bush is American|, expressed according to the
referentialist by a token of “Bush is American”, is a singular proposition par excel-
lence. In order to keep in line with the usual terminology I sometimes skip the
qualifier “par excellence” in discussing a referentialist position on the assumption
21In his 1981 exegesis of Frege’s account of indexicals, Gareth Evans seems to admit senses of
indexicals that somehow involve as constituents the referents of the indexicals themselves, referents
which in typical cases are of course ordinary objects (see also Peacocke 1983). Such an approach is
thus by my standards not a form of descriptivism (which is in line with taking Evans as wanting to
render Frege somehow compatible with referentialism rather than as wanting to defend a Fregean
descriptivism). In fact, it is an approach that runs into problems when an indexical happens to
have no referent, contrary to descriptivism as I understand it (cf. § 3.5). For in such a case it is
unclear how the indexical can have a sense, given that the sense must involve the referent and there
is no referent. This problem remains even if the sense of the indexical is not taken to have the
referent as constituent, but is still seen as dependent on the referent for its existence (Evans 1982,
McDowell 1984). The kind of descriptivism I want to defend here does not face this problem and
it falls outside the scope of this work to address the issue of how the problem can be dealt with in
a framework à la Evans (see on this McDowell 1990, Peacocke 1991, Dummett 1993, Chapter 7).
For more details on Evans’ position, cf. Coliva and Sacchi 2001.
1.7 Active and Non-active Denoting Concepts 19
that it can be supplied from the context. These singular propositions par excel-
lence typically appealed to by the referentialists need often to be contrasted with
those appealed to by descriptivists, which involve descriptive contents precisely
where the former typically involve ordinary objects or the like. We may call such
propositions descriptive, without forgetting that the descriptive contents involved
in them may well contain particular entities such as linguistic tokens or Russellian
sense data.
1.7 Active and Non-active Denoting Concepts
The predicational tie must somehow be viewed differently when we compare two
propositions such as
(1) |bush is American|,
as understood by the referentialists, and
(2) |the president-of-the-USA is American|,
if the latter is taken to predicate |American| of whatever entity uniquely exemplifies
|president-of-the-USA|, as the descriptivists have it. To put it otherwise, the particu-
lar |bush| does not occur in (1) in the same way in which the descriptive content |the
president-of-the-USA| occurs in (2). For (1) is a proposition in which the property
of being American is predicated of |bush|. In contrast, (2) is not a proposition in
which the property of being American is predicated of the descriptive content |the
president-of-the-USA|. It is rather a proposition logically equivalent to a proposi-
tion that, following Russell 1905,22 we could express in the language of first-order
logic (FOL) along these lines:
(2a) ∃1x(president-of-the-USA(x) & American(x)).
(I use a formula of the form “∃1x(A(x) & B(x))” to abbreviate “∃x(∀y(A(y) ≡ y = x)
& B(x))”.) Or, if we want to avoid formal symbols, as follows:
22Given this understanding of definite descriptions, a sentence of the form “the F is G”, such as
(2), turns out to be false if no object is F or more than one object is F. As is well known, Frege
1892 has a different view, according to which in such cases the sentence lacks a truth value, and
Strawson 1950 argued against Russell by defending a position similar in this respect to Frege’s.
Whereas in Russell’s view the sentence entails that there is exactly one F and thus it is false, when
this is not the case, in the Frege-Strawson view, the sentence presupposes that there is exactly one
F and thus cannot reach the level of having a truth-value when this is not the case. The discussion
on which standpoint is the right one still continues (Ludlow 2009), but it seems to me that Neale
1990 offers a very good defence of the Russellian line, which I shall take for granted here.
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(2b) there is exactly one entity, x, such that x is a president of the USA and x is
American.
Similarly,
(3) every man is mortal
should be taken to express a proposition,
(3a) |every man is mortal|,
logically equivalent to a proposition expressible in FOL as
(3b) ∀x(man(x) ⊃ mortal(x)),
or, less formally, as:
(3c) for every entity, x, if x is a man then x is mortal.
With (2a) and (3b), I have illustrated the truth conditions for sentences appro-
priately involving “every” and the singular “the” (and thus for propositions appro-
priately involving |every| and |the|). It might also be worth dwelling on the truth
conditions of sentences (and corresponding propositions) involving in the same
fashion other widely used determiners, i.e., the plural “the”, “a”, “some”, and “no”.
Here are some sample sentences:
(4) the boys are smart.
(5) Some philosopher is wise.
(6) Some philosophers are wise.
(7) A philosopher drank the hemlock.
(8) No philosopher is crazy.
Let us first deal with the plural “the” and thus with (4). As we have seen, among
determiner phrases we find not only singular definite descriptions, but also plural
ones such as “the boys” or “the winged horses”. These can be taken to express
denoting concepts such as |thepl boy| and |thepl winged horse|, where the determiner
component, |thepl|, corresponds (roughly) to “the” + the plural morpheme, “s”, of
the expressions in question. Thus, a sentence such as (4) can be taken to express, in
a typical case, the proposition
(4a) |thepl boy are smart|,
to be understood as logically equivalent to
(4b) ∃x∃y(boy(x) & boy(y) & y = x &∀x(boy(x) ⊃ smart(x)),
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i.e., less formally,
(4c) there is more than one boy and whoever is a boy is smart.
Consider now “some” and thus (5) and (6). We may note that “some”, just
like “the”, can have both a singular and a plural meaning, |some| and |somepl|.
Accordingly, we take (5) and (6) to express, respectively, the following propositions:
(5a) |some philosopher is wise|.
(6a) |somepl philosopher is wise|.
The corresponding truth conditions are:
(5b) ∃x(philosopher(x) & wise(x)).
(6b) ∃x∃y(philosopher(x) & philosopher(y) & y = x & wise(x) & wise(y)).
Less formally:
(5c) at least one entity, x, is such that x is both philosopher and wise.
(5c) At least two entities, x and y, are such that x is both philosopher and wise and
y is both philosopher and wise.
As regards the determiner “a”, I assume that it paradigmatically expresses the
linguistic meaning |a|. Hence, (7) expresses the proposition
(7a) |a philosopher drank-the-hemlock|.
I shall assume that the truth condition in this case is:
(7b) ∃x(∀y((philosopher(y) & drank-the-hemlock(y)) ≡ y = x)),
i.e.,
(7c) there is exactly one entity, x, such that x is a philosopher and x drank the
hemlock.
Let us finally turn to the determiner “no”. We can assume that it expresses the
determiner component |no|, so that (8) expresses the proposition:
(8a) |no philosopher is crazy|,
with the truth condition
(8b) ∀x(philosopher(x) ⊃ ∼crazy(x)),
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less formally representable as
(8c) For every entity, x, if x is a philosopher, then x is not crazy.
Apart from the fact that determiners such as “the” and “some” may be inter-
preted as either singular or plural, a determiner may be ambiguous in other ways.
For example, although “a” is paradigmatically interpreted as |a|, it could perhaps be
taken to mean |every| in
(9) a philosopher is wise.
Of course, if this is the case the truth condition for (9) is
(9a) ∀x(philosopher (x) ⊃ wise(x)).
Moreover, we should presumably also grant that “a” may also express, as often
assumed, the meaning |some|, and thus (9) can also get the truth condition
(9d) ∃x((philosopher(x) & drank-the-hemlock(x)).23
We can have propositions wherein a property is predicated of a denoting concept,
just like being American is predicated of Bush in |bush is American|. For exam-
ple, “some man is a concept” or “logicians often use the concept, every man, as an
example” are best understood as expressing propositions of this kind. Hence, to be
sure, an expression such as “|the president-of-the-USA is American|” is ambigu-
ous in that it could be taken to stand either for a (true) proposition equivalent to
the proposition expressible by (2a) or for a (false) proposition that asserts that the
denoting concept |the president-of-the-USA| is an American citizen. Given the first
interpretation, let us say that the denoting concept |the president-of-the-USA| occurs
actively in the proposition designated by “|the president-of-the-USA is American|”.
And let us also say (as we shall see in more detail) that the relevant token of
the determiner phrase “the president of the USA”, as it is used in expressing this
proposition, is used as an active determiner phrase, or as a quantifier. Given the sec-
ond interpretation, let us say that the denoting concept |the president-of-the-USA|
occurs non-actively in the proposition designated by “|the president-of-the-USA is
American|” and that the corresponding determiner phrase, a token of “the president
23The issue arises of how we should treat the “a” that follows the copula in sentences such as
“John is a man” or “the morning star is a planet”. Following Montague 1974 (Chapter 8), and
taking the “is” to express identity rather than simply a predicational link, we may take the “a” as
expressing the very same determiner, |some|, that it expresses in a sentence such as (9), understood
as having truth condition (9b). It seems to me that this is the right path to follow, since it minimizes
assumptions of ambiguity. However, since nothing crucial depends on this for our main purposes,
I shall follow the common practice of viewing expressions such as “is a man” or “is a planet” as
ways of attributing properties without involving identity or the determiner |a|.
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of the USA”, is used as a non-active determiner phrase (and thus not as a quantifier).
(Similarly in Cocchiarella (1989, 2008) there is a distinction between active and de-
activated referential concepts.) We should not worry much about this ambiguity,
however, for we shall typically be concerned with active determiner phrases and
denoting concepts occurring actively in propositions. Thus, unless otherwise indi-
cated or unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, let it be understood that when
I represent a proposition by means of expressions such as “|the president-of-the-
USA is American|” or “|every man is mortal|”, I intend to represent a proposition
in which a denoting concept (such as |the president-of-the-USA| or |every man|)
occurs as active and is thus expressed by a corresponding active determiner phrase.
However, to make it especially clear and emphasize that a certain denoting concept
occurs actively in a proposition I shall put the relevant expression into braces. For
contrast, we may use two occurrences of “%” to indicate that a denoting concept
occurs non-actively. To illustrate, the denoting concepts |the president-of-the-USA|
and |every man| occur actively in |{the president-of-the-USA} is American| and
|{every man} is mortal|, whereas the denoting concept |some man| occurs non-
actively in |%some man% is a concept|. An additional benefit of these conventions
is that they set a denoting concept clearly apart from the other constituents of a
proposition. I shall thus have recourse to these conventions, in particular to the use
of braces, whenever I think that more precision may be useful.
It should be noted that in sentences involving anaphoras a determiner phrase may
depend on another in a way illustrated by examples such as these:
(10) Every diamond belongs to the person who finds it.
(11) No man forgets the first woman he falls in love with.
In (10), “the person who finds it” depends on “every diamond” in a sense that can
be captured by recourse to a variable as follows:
(10a) |{every [x such that x is a diamond]} belongs-to {the [y such that y is a person
and y finds x]}|.
Similarly, as regards (11), there is a dependence of “the first woman he falls in
love with” on “no man”, which can be captured as follows (with the simplifying
assumption that FWFL is the relation that obtains of a and b when b is the first
woman with whom a falls in love):
(11a) |{no [x such that x is a man]} forgets {the [y such that FWFL(x, y)]}|.24
24In presenting (10a) and (11a), I neglect to take into account, at least from the perspective on
anaphora that I intend to defend in the following, the linguistic meaning of the pronouns “it” and
“he”. This is not important at this juncture, but will be taken care of below.
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For present purposes, propositions (10a) and (11a) can be assumed to have,
respectively, truth conditions along these lines:
(10b) ∀x(diamond(x) ⊃ ∃1y(person(y) & find(y, x) & belongs-to(x, y))),
(11b) ∀x(man(x) ⊃ ∼∃1y(FWFL(x, y) & forgets(x, y))).
These examples suggest the usefulness of canonical representations of denoting con-
cepts wherein the property components are represented by recourse to a locution of
the form v such that . . ., where “such that” is understood as a variable binding oper-
ator.25 Note that the denoting concepts |the [y such that y is a person and y finds
25In other words, the locution “such that” is used in (10a), (11a) et similia pretty much as the
lambda operator functions in formalistic approaches to natural language semantics (see, e.g., Partee
et al. 1990, Chapter 13). We can add, for the more formalistic-minded philosopher, some detail on
how we could represent more precisely propositions involving denoting concepts. For example, the
proposition |{every man} is mortal|, in which the denoting concept |every man| occurs as active,
can be represented, by assuming a second-order logical language with the lambda operator, as [λf
∀x(man(x) ⊃ f (x))](mortal). From the point of view of this representation, a denoting concept such
as |every man| is seen as a complex property, [λf ∀x(f(x) ⊃ mortal(x))] (expressed by a so-called
lambda abstract), which can be predicated of another property, being mortal in our example (and
could thus be called a property of properties) (cf. Montague 1974, chs. 6-8). The formal princi-
ple of lambda conversion grants that the proposition [λf ∀x(man (x) ⊃ f(x))](mortal) is logically
equivalent to ∀x(man(x) ⊃ mortal(x)). The principle of lambda conversion can be stated as follows
(where A(a1/b1 . . . an/bn) is the wff that results from the wff A after simultaneously replacing each
occurrence of ai with bi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where bi is free for ai in A):
[λa1 . . . anA](b1, . . . , bn) ≡ A(a1/b1 . . . an/bn).
The other propositions involving active denoting concepts can be understood in the same fashion.
For example, |the president-of-the-USA is American| should be seen as [λf ∃1x(president-of-
the-USA(x) & f(x))](American), which is equivalent, by lambda conversion, to ∃1x(president-of-
the-USA(x) & American(x)). As these examples suggest, the determiner meaning components of
denoting concepts are relational properties such as [λgf ∃1x(g(x) & f(x))] and [λgf ∀x(g(x) ⊃ f(x))].
They are relational in that they have, so to speak, two “holes” to be filled, corresponding to the
two variables bound by the lambda operator in their formal representations. By filling the first hole
of a denoting concept with a monadic property we create by composition a denoting concept just
as (roughly speaking) we create a noun phrase by combining a determiner and a predicate. For
instance, by combining “the” and “table” we get “the table” and similarly by filling in the first
hole of [λgf ∃1x(g(x) & f(x))] with |table| we get [λf ∃1x(table(x) & f(x))]. The difference between
active and non-active occurrences of denoting concepts can be captured by taking non-active denot-
ing concepts as occurring qua logical subjects rather than qua properties of properties. Thus, for
example, the proposition |%every man% is a concept| in which the denoting concept |every man|
occurs non-actively can be represented as concept([λf ∀x(man(x) ⊃ f(x))]), which makes it clear
that the proposition in question should be understood as the attribution of the property of being a
concept to the denoting concept [λf ∀x(f(x) ⊃ mortal(x))]. It should be noted that the principle of
lambda conversion is not applicable in this case, because “[λf ∀x(man(x) ⊃ f(x))]” does not occur
in predicate position, but rather in subject or argument position. As is well known, once we allow
for lambda conversion and for predicate terms such as lambda abstracts to occur in both predicate
and subject positions, we have to face Russell’s paradox and similar conundrums (the problem
does not arise for Montague, since he assumes type theory). For two different ways of dealing
with these issues and further formal details on representing propositions with denoting concepts
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x]| and |the [y such that FWFL(x, y)]| are represented by recourse to a free vari-
able, x (which is bound, as it were, by a “such that” in another denoting concept).
Denoting concepts such as these may be called open (and similarly we may use the
term open for their property components, the determiner phrases that express them
and the predicate components of such determiner phrases).26
For generality’s sake, it may be desirable to always use a locution of the form
v such that . . . in representing a denoting concept. With this in mind, the denoting
concept expressed, for instance, by “every man” would be |every [x such that x is
a man]| and correspondingly, instead of (3a), we should have (by also taking into
account our convention about the use of braces):
(3d) |{every [x such that x is a man]} is mortal|.
But, as a matter of fact, at least for our purposes, recourse to variables is useful
only in the presence of dependent determiner phrases such as “the person who finds
it” and “the first woman he falls in love with”. Hence, for simplicity’s sake, I shall
in the way sketched in this footnote see Orilia 1999, 2000a, 2006. A similar approach to denoting
concepts, from which I have drawn inspiration, can be found in the work of Cocchiarella (1989,
2008 and others). Cocchiarella however deals with Russell’s paradox and the like in a way that I
find problematic (Orilia 1996; see Landini 2009 and Cocchiarella 2009 for a discussion of this).
Before bringing to a close this rather technical note, it is worth pointing out that lambda abstracts
offer us a way to represent not only denoting concepts but all complex properties in general. Thus,
for example, the property [winged & (horse ∨ donkey)] used above as an example can be repre-
sented by the lambda abstract “[λx (winged(x) & (horse(x) ∨ donkey(x))]”. In the light of lambda
conversion, to predicate this property of an object, a, so as focus on the proposition [λx (winged(x)
& (horse(x) ∨ donkey(x))](a), is equivalent to asserting the conjunctive proposition (winged(a) &
(horse(a) ∨ donkey(a)).
26More formally, propositions involving open denoting concepts may be understood (following
Cocchiarella 1989, § 7) in a way that can be illustrated by focusing, e.g., on (10a). The idea
is to view a proposition such as (10a) along these lines: [λF ∀x(diamond(x) ⊃ f(x)]([λx [λg
∃1y(person(y) & find(y, x) & g(y)]([λy belongs-to(y, x))]) (i.e., roughly, as the result of predi-
cating |every diamond| of the property of being an x belonging to the person who finds x. Clearly,
by lambda conversion, the latter is equivalent to (10b) and thus has the desired truth condition. The
open denoting concept, given this formal representation, is [λg ∃1y(person(y) & find(y, x) & g(y)].
I shall not tackle here the difficult issue of the consequences, for an ontological account of proposi-
tions, of admitting that some denoting concepts (and, more generally some concepts) seem to call
for free variables in order to be adequately represented. In other words, this is the issue of the onto-
logical status of open denoting concepts and their open property components. This issue may be
neglected here, for after all it is a problem for descriptivists and referentialists alike. For example,
the need for a semantic account of (10) and (11) may invite both descriptivists and referentialists
to appeal to open denoting concepts, even though in accounting for other sentences (involving sin-
gular reference) the descriptivist, but not the referentialist, will appeal to denoting concepts. For
what it is worth, let me simply state that my tentative way to go would be by appealing to operators
in the style of combinatorial logic to get rid of variable binding operators (see, e.g., Fitch 1952).
Note in fact that a variable that appears as free, when one considers an open determiner phrase in
isolation, can be seen to be, when that phrase occurs in the context of a sentence, a variable bound
“from outside the determiner phrase” by means of a preceding variable binder.
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usually avoid “such that” and variables in representing denoting concepts, unless
the need to deal with such determiner phrases indicates otherwise.
1.8 Contents and Meanings
When a relational fact xRy subsists, wherein we can distinguish a subject or agent
x and an object or patient y, e.g., when it happens that John is kissing Mary, let
us call y an accusative of the relation R, indeed the accusative of the relational
fact xRy. We may call contents both the accusatives of the meaning relation on the
one hand, and of propositional attitude relations, such as believing, doubting, desir-
ing, intending, etc., on the other hand. In the former case, we presuppose that there
are relational facts of the kind E expresses (means, designates, stands for) M, e.g.
“dog” means |dog|, where E is a linguistic item and the content M is (usually)27
an abstract entity, which is called more specifically meaning or sense (as we saw,
it is a proposition, if E is a sentence). In the latter case, we presuppose that there
are relational facts such as John believes that snow is white, wherein a proposi-
tional attitude, believing, links an agent, John, to a content, that snow is white. Here
the content is also a proposition (which justifies the term “propositional attitude”),
indeed the very proposition expressed by “snow is white”. Thus, propositions can
be both meanings and contents of propositional attitudes.28 Similarly, constituents
of propositions functioning as contents of propositional attitudes can be meanings.
For example, the meaning of “white” is a constituent of the proposition that snow
is white. According to this picture, then, meanings can be complex, i.e., can have
other (simpler) meanings as constituents and semantics should be viewed as com-
positional. Of course, some meanings can be simple, i.e., without constituents. As
we shall see in more detail, this presupposes that propositions (and possibly their
constituents) are structured entities, with structures to some extent, if not fully, cor-
responding to the syntactic structures exhibited by the natural language sentences
that express them. Propositions qua structured entities may be conveniently repre-
sented by logical forms, i.e. (structured) symbols of an artificial language whose
purpose is to mirror more perspicuously their structures (see note 25 above). Such
logical forms, unlike natural language expressions, are meant to represent mean-
ings unambiguously (up to a level of detail to be decided for the purposes at hand,
27According to referentialism, M is not always an abstract entity, for it could be a particular directly
referred to, e.g., by a proper name. Moreover, according to “weak” forms of descriptivism, as we
may call them (see § 3.8, below), in some special case M could be a peculiar kind of particular,
e.g. a Russellian sense datum.
28The dispute between descriptivists and referentialists can hardly be understood without the
assumption, plausible in my view, that there are such things as contents of propositional attitudes.
Some may want to refuse this assumption. Perry’s “The Search for the Semantic Grail” (unpub-
lished) usefully comments on those who like and those who dislike content and on the advantages
the former have.
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as the previous section illustrates). All this, in line with a tradition shared by both
descriptivists and referentialists and which I myself take for granted here.29
A proposition functioning as propositional attitude content may be called, in
Fregean terminology, a thought. Intuitively, then, the very same proposition, say,
that snow is white, can be a thought (suppose that John believes that snow is white)
and a meaning (what “snow is white” expresses). More specifically, a thought is a
belief, doubt, desire and the like, depending on the propositional attitude in ques-
tion (believing, doubting, etc.). These terms may also ambiguously designate (i)
the propositional attitudes themselves, i.e., the relations of believing, doubting, etc.;
(ii) propositional attitude properties, i.e. mental states such as believing that snow
is white, wherein we can distinguish an attitude (or act; believing in our example)
and a content (that snow is white, in the example); (iii) relational states (of affairs)
(facts) involving propositional attitudes, e.g. the fact that Clinton believes that snow
is white, wherein we can distinguish not only an attitude and a content, but also
an agent (subject, attributee; Clinton in our example). As is well known, propo-
sitional attitude properties may be exemplified by a subject either dispositionally,
as is the case for most people now with respect to the property of believing that
320 × 5 = 1,600, or actively, as is the case with respect to this property for some-
one who has just correctly computed 320 × 5. As usual, we shall say that a sentence
that attributes a propositional attitude property, such as “John believes that Mars is
a planet”, involves an intensional context (“John believes that . . .” in the example).
More precisely, I call such a context intentional, to differentiate it from other inten-
sional contexts, e.g., modal ones, such as “necessarily, . . .”, or temporal ones such
as “it will be the case that . . .”.30
Since Putnam 1975, it is customary to make a distinction between two kinds
of mental states: the narrow states, which can be exemplified by a subject in a
way that (roughly) does not require the existence of any worldly entity in the envi-
ronment external to the mind (or mind-brain) of the subject; and the wide (broad)
29The dispute between descriptivists and referentialists is best understood with the assumption
of structured propositions in the background. There are however philosophers who deny it. As is
well known, there is a well-developed tradition according to which propositions are sets of pos-
sible worlds or functions from possible worlds to truth values (Hintikka 1969, Montague 1974,
Stalnaker 1984, Lewis 1986). Moreover, there are those who even deny that there are propositions
understood as language-independent entities, for they think that linguistic (or language-related)
items such as sentences (Carnap 1958, Quine 1956), sentence tokens (Davidson 1968) or inter-
preted logical forms (Harman 1972, Higginbotham 1991, Larson and Ludlow 1993) can play the
roles that propositions are called for, in particular as accusatives of propositional attitudes. I think
that these approaches are unsatisfactory (see McKay and Nelson 2005, § 7 for a survey and criti-
cism of these views). But in any case talk in terms of them can presumably (at least for the most
part) be translated into structured propositions talk. For example, something like this is assumed in
classifying Carnap and Quine as descriptivists (see Chapter 4 below).
30The contexts in question here are of course intralinguistic contexts, i.e., other expressions sur-
rounding a certain text, not to be confused with the extralinguistic context, made up of all the
objects and states of affairs relevant for the comprehension of the text in question (L. Marti’s
terminology in her 2006).
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states, which can be exemplified by a subject only if there is in the external envi-
ronment some worldly entity to which the subject is appropriately related. Putnam
has famously argued for what is now called an externalist position, according to
which some propositional attitude properties, such as believing that water is trans-
parent, are wide states, since their being exemplified by a subject “presupposes”
that worldly entities other than the subject exist.31 This can be understood as the
idea that propositional attitude contents involve worldly entities as constituents (in
the example in question, a natural kind, H2O). Similarly, Putnam has argued that
the mental state that one exemplifies when one grasps (understands) the meaning of
a linguistic token, e.g., a token of “water”, may well be wide, for it might involve
appropriate relations to the referent of the token or samples thereof (samples of H2O
in the example) and/or to members of the subject’s linguistic community. If a mental
state is wide in that it consists of a relation to a content which involves a worldly
entity (or which is itself a worldly entity), we usually say that the content is wide;
otherwise we say that the content is narrow (a position that allows only for narrow
contents is typically called internalist). Thus, if Putnam is right, the propositional
attitude content that water is transparent is a wide content. It is worth noting that a
way to convey the distinction between referentialism and descriptivism is by saying
that the former, but not the latter, seems to involve an immediate commitment to
the thesis that some thoughts are wide contents. For clearly someone, say Tom, can
believe what is meant by tokens of “Venus is a planet” or “that is a planet” (said
while pointing at Venus). Now, according to referentialism (at least in a typical for-
mulation, prior to sophisticated attempts to deal with the co-reference problem; cf.
Chapter 8 below), in both cases what is meant is the proposition |venus is a planet|,
with Venus itself as a constituent. Thus, when Tom believes what one such token
means, he is in a wide mental state, for he is related by the believing relation to a
thought involving an item in the external environment, namely Venus, as constituent.
This makes the thought ipso facto a wide content. We shall discuss in due course
whether a viable descriptivism should admit that some thoughts are wide (cf. the
discussion of Kaplan’s twins argument in the last chapter, § 8.9).
Beside being truth-valued and potential contents of propositional attitudes,
propositions are also said to be possible, impossible, necessary or contingent. It is
often convenient to say that a proposition is true in a certain possible world in order
to express that it is possible (more precisely, possibly true) and similarly to say that
it is true in all possible worlds in order to express that it is necessary (necessarily
true). Philosophers who adopt this terminology need not be committed, like David
Lewis, to the real existence of possible worlds. I shall myself sometimes use possible
world terminology, especially when this will be useful to convey some referential-
ist arguments against descriptivism, without any intention to being committed to a
Lewis-style ontology of possible worlds (although I may accept that possible worlds
are special propositions as in Prior and Fine 1977).
31After Putnam 1975, Burge 1979 famously argued in favour of externalism by relying on the
social dimension of language and since the 1970s the literature on the topic has been growing.
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Properties and relations are commonly considered to be meanings of general
terms or predicates just as propositions are considered to be meanings of sentences.
It is thus convenient, following Bealer 1982, to have a common label, PRP, for prop-
erties, relations and propositions. We can also employ the locution meaning PRP by
analogy with the use of meaning proposition proposed above, i.e. to indicate those
PRPs that happen to be meanings of some expression. However, PRPs, qua enti-
ties capable of functioning as meanings (potential meanings), must not be confused
with properties, relations and propositions qua entities determining the causal struc-
ture of the world, which Bealer also labels collectively as “PRPs” (for a noteworthy
account of such entities, see Armstrong 1978, who calls propositions so understood
states of affairs, in line with standard practice). To distinguish between these two
kinds of PRPs, Bealer speaks of type I PRPs in the one case and type II PRPs in the
other case. He also uses qualities, connections and states of affairs for type II prop-
erties, relations and propositions, respectively, as well as the Fregean word thought
for type I propositions, and concept for type I properties and relations. (In doing
so, Bealer does not thereby presuppose conceptualism as traditionally understood,
according to which properties and relations are concepts in the sense of being mind
dependent. Bealer prefers Platonism to conceptualism, but we may leave the issue
open for present purposes.) I find this terminology useful and I follow it here as I
have done elsewhere (see, e.g., Orilia 1999).32
Type I and type II PRPs may also be identified in some theory, as is perhaps the
case in Russell’s account of universals, but no such identification can be taken for
granted at a pre-theoretical level. To see the need for the distinction, note that, even
when a sentence or predicate is taken to have a type I PRP as its meaning, it cannot
always be assumed that there is also a corresponding type II PRP, for whether this
is the case depends on how the world happens to be, independently of semantic
considerations (Armstrong 1978). For example, given our current scientific beliefs,
we assume that although both “phlogiston” and “H2O” express a Type I property as
meaning, only for the latter there is a corresponding type II property (a natural kind,
as someone might prefer to say). Moreover, two expressions that have different type
I PRPs as meanings, say “water” and “H2O”, may correspond, depending on how
the world happens to be, to one and the same type II PRP. In this essay we deal
primarily with type I PRPs and thus for brevity’s sake I typically drop the qualifier
“type I” in talking about them (unless confusion might arise).
32Following Armstrong and Bealer, I view properties and relations as universals. Some of course
prefer a tropist ontology (see, e.g., Maurin 2002 and references therein) where they are understood
as tropes, i.e. as particulars. However, the assumption of an ontology with universals should not
be seen as an essential part of my present defence of descriptivism: a philosopher convinced that
a tropist ontology is preferable should presumably be able to translate any talk of properties and
relations understood as universals into a tropist way of speaking.
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1.9 Tense
Although we have neglected it so far for simplicity’s sake, it should be noted that
sentences such as “Bush is American” or
(1) Bush is a president
are tensed, in particular they are in the present tense. That is, a certain temporal
modality, present, rather than past or future, is in some way conveyed by them.
There are two points of view on how to understand this: temporalism and eternalism
(in a widespread terminology used, e.g., in Richard 2003). To illustrate them, I shall
use “B” to indicate what is contributed by “Bush” to the proposition expressed by
a token of (1) and leave it open whether B is a descriptive content or an ordinary
object, since this is immaterial here. More importantly, I shall use for convenience
a “detenser” sign, let us use “#”,attached to a verb, in order to indicate that the verb
conveys a predicational link without expressing a specific temporal modality such a
present, past or future, i.e. a predicational link such as the one that can be conveyed
by using a gerundive, as in “Bush’s being a president” or “Bush’s running”. This
tenseless predicational link is perhaps also conveyed in certain cases by the present
tense, as witnessed by the “is” of sentences such as “sometimes, the US president is
a Democrat”, or “two is a number”.
Now, temporalism can be characterized by saying that a token of (1) expresses a
proposition such as:
(1a) |present(B is# a president)|.
In (1a) the property of being present is predicated of an “untensed proposition”,33 |B
is# American|, in such a way that the truth-value of (1a) varies with time. Thus, (1a)
happens to be true in 2006, but it is capable of becoming false at a later time, when
Bush ceases to be a president. Correspondingly, the truth-value of a sentence token
expressing (1a) depends on the time of utterance. The typical supporter of tempo-
ralism posits temporal A-properties (understood as qualities or type II properties).
In particular she posits a basic A-property of presentness that can be possessed by
times and that different times come to possess, one after the other, as time flows.34
The existence of this property explains well why (1a) can change truth-value over
33An untensed proposition is basically a “proposition matrix”, in the terminology of Salmon 1986,
p. 39. Richard 2003 speaks of “temporally neuter propositions”.
34Other temporal type II A-properties would be futurity and pastness. Temporal type II
A-properties are typically contrasted with type II B-relations such as earlier and later (see, e.g.,
Q. Smith 1993 on this). Richard (2003, p. 30) notes that one can be a temporalist and still deny that
there are A-properties. Richard attributes this view to Hugh Mellor. For present purposes we can
confine ourselves to the view of the typical temporalist, according to whom temporalism and the
acceptance of A-properties go hand in hand. Accordingly, I use “temporalism” in the following to
mean typical temporalism.
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time. Let us use the predicate “A-present” to express the concept (type I property)
that is meant to correspond to the quality of presentness. Note that the notion of
A-present should not be confused with that of present introduced above. Both are
type I properties, but the former is supposed to be exemplified by times, whereas the
latter by (untensed) propositions. By assuming the former, the latter can be analyzed
as the property of being an untensed proposition which is true at a time t such that t
exemplifies the property A-present. With this in mind (1a) is equivalent to
(1b) |there is a time t such that A-present(t) & at(t, B is# a president)|.35
This is a proposition which is true as long as the property |A-present| is exemplified
by a time at which Bush is president (i.e., as long as such a time enjoys the quality
presentness), and which ceases to be true afterwards.
Let us now turn to eternalism. On this view, the notion conveyed by the present
tense in (1) is a relational notion for which the appropriate relata are an untensed
proposition and a time. In this perspective, a token of (1) expresses a proposition
which says of |B is# a president| that it occurs (is true) at the time of utterance (or,
more precisely, what I would call the “contextual time;” more on this below). In
other words, the relational notion in question is the one typically expressed by “at”,
and which occurs in (1b). In a referentialist framework, it is natural to say that the
time of utterance is referred to directly. Thus, if a token of (1) is uttered at a time d,
the expressed proposition is:
(1c) |at(d, B is# a president)|.
For example, apart from minor differences given our current concerns, this is the
stand taken in Salmon’s referentialist framework (1989).36 In a descriptivist per-
spective it is more natural to say that the reference to the contextual time d should
be taken to occur via a descriptive content determining it, say, |the F|, the nature
of which will have to be clarified. Accordingly, the proposition expressed by (1) is,
roughly,
(1d) |at({the F}, B is# a president)|.
35From a formal point of view, we can represent the property of being present by means of this
lambda abstract: [λp ∃t(at(t, p) & A-present (t))]. Once the property of being present is repre-
sented in this way, (1a) becomes [λp ∃t(at(t, p) & A-present (t))]([λ B is# a president]). By lambda
conversion, the latter is equivalent to ∃t(at(t, [λ B is# a president]) & A-present (t))), which is a
more formal counterpart of (1b). Here (and elsewhere below), as “[λ B is# a president]” testifies,
I have followed the common practice of representing propositions embedded in subject position in
another proposition by means of a “vacuous” lambda abstract in which the lambda operator does
not bind any variable.
36Salmon is not committed to taking the “at” of (1b) as tensely predicated and takes the time to be
somehow part of the property conveyed by the predicate, “is a president” in this case.
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In (1c),|the F| occurs actively and thus this proposition asserts of |B is# a president|
that it occurs at the time determined by the descriptive content in question. In other
words, (1d) equivalent to:
(1e) |there is exactly one time t such that t has the property F and at(t, B is# a
president)|.
The eternalist usually denies the existence of A-properties.37 If she takes this stand,
(1c)–(1e) are to be regarded as tenselessly true, true tout court in an absolute sense.
Otherwise, they can still be regarded as propositions that were not true at some
point in the past, but which are true from a certain time onward (or at least until
their constituents, such as B and the property of being American exist). In contrast,
as noted, (1a) will cease to be true as soon as Bush ceases to be a president.38
To further illustrate the two options, consider a sentence in the past tense,
(2) Bush was a student,
uttered at a time d in 2006. According to temporalism, the proposition expressed by
a token of (2) is something like
(2a) |past(B is# a student)|, 39
which is equivalent to
(2b) there are times t and t′ such that A-present(t) and t′ precedes t and at(t′ , Bush
is# a student)|.
According to eternalism, the expressed proposition in a referentialist perspective is,
more or less,
37Richard (2003, p. 30) however notes that an eternalist could in principle accept A-properties, and
takes Salmon to be an eternalist who admits them (note 9, p. 44).
38The issue arises whether the predicational link connecting |at| to |B is# president)| in |at(t, B
is# president)| is tensed or not. It depends on whether we admit A-properties. If not, the link is
tenseless. Otherwise, there is room for viewing it as tensed. The idea is that t is not atemporally
such that Bush is a president with respect to t, as if the contingencies of becoming, or of the world
history, had nothing to do with the properties that moments of time happen to have. Rather, t is
presently a time with respect to which B is# a president, but at some point in the past (when t was
not the time of the utterance in question, for such utterance did not exist), t was not a time with
respect to which B is# a president, for at that point it was not yet determined that Bush would
become a president. And if we are referentialists and we assume that |bush is# a president| is a
proposition with Bush in flesh and blood as constituent, we might want to say that at some point,
when Bush will pass away, t will lose the property, which now has, of being a time such that |bush
is# president| is true at it.
39The property of being past can be represented by an appropriate lambda abstract just as we have
done for the property of being present in note 35 above.
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(2c) |there is a time t′ preceding d and at(d , Bush is# a student)|.
Similarly, in a descriptivist perspective, the expressed proposition is roughly this
(where |the F| is assumed to determine d and occurs as an active denoting concept):
(2c) |there is a time t′ preceding {the F} and at(t′, Bush is# a student)|.
It is not the purpose of this work to decide which of these contrasting views is the
right one. I will be content with showing that my descriptivist approach is compat-
ible with both. At any rate, when nothing crucial hinges on it, I shall neglect tense,
just as I have done in the previous sections. Accordingly, I shall usually avoid using
the detenser sign, #, in representing propositions.
1.10 Linguistic vs. Pragmatic Meaning
Expressions can be taken to have a linguistic (or dictionary or semantic) meaning,
i.e., a meaning based exclusively on the syntactic and semantic conventions of the
language to which they belong, i.e., based simply on a langue in De Saussure’s
sense, as we might say. Expressions are typically ambiguous from this point of view,
as the types “bank” and “every man loves a woman” illustrate. A linguistic meaning
can be attributed to a type, and correspondingly, we may assume, to any of its tokens.
Expressions can also be attributed a pragmatic meaning, given a context, i.e., in a
way that depends not only on a langue, but also on what De Saussure would call
parole. Thus, this attribution is based more generally on what we may call semiotic
rules, for it exploits on the one hand the specific syntactic and semantic rules of the
langue in question and on the other hand (presumably inter-linguistic) pragmatic
rules fed by relevant features of the context.40 As noted above, an expression can
have multiple linguistic meanings. However, it is often taken for granted that an
expression, given a context, is not ambiguous and it has just one pragmatic meaning.
It is far from obvious that this is true, but for simplicity’s sake I shall typically speak
as if this were the case, at least as long as nothing crucial hinges on that.
In talking about pragmatic meaning, we may follow either a token-oriented
approach to meaning (to semantics or more generally pragmatics and semiotics) or
a type-oriented approach, depending on whether by “expression” we mean a token
or a type. In the terminology of Forbes 2003 (p. 108) the distinction is between
an expression theory of meaning, on the one hand, and a token-utterance theory of
meaning, on the other hand.41 According to the former option, a pragmatic meaning
40In saying this, I presuppose the traditional tripartition of semiotics (understood as theory of signs,
or semantics, theory of meaning, in a broad sense) into syntax, semantics (theory of meaning in a
narrow sense) and pragmatics.
41Recall that I use words such as “expression”, “singular term”, “predicate” or “sentence”
ambiguously to mean either a token or a type, unless more precision is required.
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attaches to a linguistic token (in a given context). According to the latter, a pragmatic
meaning attaches to something like a linguistic type plus a context. For reasons that
we shall see, I shall assume the token-oriented approach. Though not followed by
everybody, this choice is not uncommon, even if it is not always expressed in the
terminology adopted here. For example, Neale (1990, p. 67) speaks, as I have done,
of the linguistic meaning of an expression ζ , but prefers semantic value of a dated
occurrence u of ζ, where I would say “pragmatic meaning of a token u of ζ”.
The type-oriented approach has been proposed, most notably, by Kaplan. His
motivations are as follows:
Utterances take time and are produced one at a time; this will not do for the analysis of
validity. By the time an agent finished uttering a very, very long true premise and began
uttering the conclusion, the premise may have gone false. Thus even the most trivial of
inferences, P therefore P, may appear invalid. Also, there are sentences which express a
truth in certain contexts, but not if uttered. For example, “I say nothing”.
Kaplan 1989, p. 584.
Kaplan is suggesting that certain sentences, such as those of the form “S therefore
S ”, should never be taken to convey an invalid argument, but are bound to be taken
as such in a token-oriented approach. However, in reply to Kaplan, we can say that
logical truth and validity should be considered, primarily, as properties of propo-
sitions or sequences of propositions, and once we settle on this, we see that there
is nothing wrong in taking a sentence of the form “S therefore S” as conveying an
invalid inference, when a long time is taken in uttering it. For which proposition
is expressed by a token is quite naturally assumed to depend on the time at which
the token is uttered (unless we say that the proposition can change truth-value over
time, which we do not assume here; see above on this). Thus, consider a subject
who takes such a long time in uttering a token of
(1) it is sunny here therefore it is sunny here
that the place he refers to is sunny when he utters the premise, but cloudy when
he utters the conclusion. It is plausible to assume that, in spite of the fact that he
utters a token of the form “S therefore S”, he expresses two different propositions, P
and Q, by his two tokens of “it is sunny here”. 42 Thus he can be taken to convey an
invalid inference. In any case, it can also be assumed that the time of both utterances
of “it is sunny here” is the (long) time at which the whole token of (1) is uttered.
In this case the two tokens of “it is sunny here” can be taken to express the same
proposition P and thus the conveyed inference is of the form “P therefore P”. In this
case the conveyed inference is indeed valid, although P is false, because the place
42For the referentialist the two propositions could be |at(t, h is# sunny)|, and |at(t′, h is# sunny)|,
where h is the place referred to by both the first and second “here” tokens and t and t′ are two
distinct times of utterance, corresponding to the two tokens of “it is sunny here”. For a descriptivist,
on the other hand, the two propositions would involve descriptive contents determining h, t and t′,
rather than h, t and t′ themselves.
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referred to is not (by hypothesis) sunny simpliciter, but sunny up to some point and
then cloudy.
As regards the example
(2) I say nothing,
Kaplan is trading on two correct intuitions: (i) as soon as a speaker utters a token of
(1), she gives rise to what could be called a self-defeating token, a token which, in
virtue of the very fact that has been uttered, expresses a false proposition.43 Thus,
the property of saying nothing cannot be veridically attributed by a speaker X to
oneself, as if saying nothing were not one of X’s contingent properties. Yet, (ii) say-
ing nothing is a contingent property that a speaker could have and in fact a speaker
who utters a token of
(3) I might have said nothing
can be said to express a true proposition. Kaplan is alleging that a token-oriented
approach can hardly reconcile these two apparently conflicting intuitions. We shall
see however that this is not so in discussing my descriptivist approach, which will
be presented while presupposing the token-oriented approach. It will be apparent
that it can also handle related examples such as “either a token exists now, or it has
existed in the past, or will exist in the future”, which have been proposed by Predelli
(2005, 2006) to back up a type-oriented approach.44
On the positive side, it seems to me that a token-oriented approach is prefer-
able, because a theory of meaning should address at some point the issue of the
semantic and pragmatic competence of the speakers and obviously this competence
is exercised in their dealing not with linguistic types directly, but with their physi-
cal manifestations, i.e., tokens. Moreover, there are the examples involving multiple
occurrences of a demonstrative which make me favour the token-oriented approach.
Consider a token of
(4) this is a hand if and only if this is not,
uttered by a speaker who points at two different objects. Intuitively the speaker can
express a true proposition here, by referring to two different objects by means of
two distinct “this” tokens, but there are difficulties in accounting for this in a type-
oriented approach. The problem is that we have one “this” type and one context C,
which leads in a type-oriented approach to thinking that a single object is referred to
43That there are sentences whose tokens are of this kind has long since been known. For exam-
ple, Gale (in the introduction to § 4 of his 1968, p. 297) speaks of “pragmatically self-falsifying
sentences” such as “I do not exist”.
44Predelli admits that Kaplan’s arguments are not conclusive against the type-oriented approach
(as is argued in Garcia-Carpintero 2000), but he provides these examples in order to offer a stronger
support for it.
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twice by the type “this” in context C. In order to tackle this problem, modifications
have been proposed to Kaplan’s type-oriented referentialist account of indexicals.
But they do not seem very convincing or at least they bring in complications which
look like ad hoc epicycles (see Forbes 2003, p. 107). Presumably, similar epicycles
would be called for, if one presupposed a type-oriented approach to semantics in
developing a descriptivist theory. I thus adopt the token oriented approach.45
1.11 Subjective vs. Official Meaning
The notion of pragmatic meaning of a token, discussed above, is often identified
with, or at least is considered to be heavily dependent on, that of speaker mean-
ing.46 But I think that we should sharply distinguish them. More precisely, given a
linguistic token t, we should distinguish between an official pragmatic meaning (or
pragmatic meaning simpliciter) of t on the one hand and a (pragmatic) X’s subjective
meaning of t on the other hand, where X is a subject exposed to t either qua utterer
of t or qua hearer of t, i.e., we may generically say, qua speaker/hearer or user of
t. The former meaning is one that could be attributed to t, so to speak, by an ideal
speaker of the language in question, on the basis, on the one hand, of the relevant,
intersubjectively accepted, semiotic rules, and, on the other hand, of the relevant
objective features of the context, which can in principle be available to a typical
speaker/hearer of t.47 The latter meaning is the one attributed by X to t and which
can be further characterized as speaker or hearer (pragmatic) meaning (of t for X),
depending on X’s role with respect to t. This distinction must be made, because a
subjective meaning may happen to be idiosyncratic and thus fail to be an official
pragmatic meaning. Consequently, there is also a difference between a standard
speaker/ hearer X and a deviant speaker/ hearer Y, with respect to a token t: X’s sub-
jective meaning of t coincides with the official pragmatic meaning of t, whereas Y’s
subjective meaning of t is not an official pragmatic meaning of t. Consider for exam-
ple the case of someone who wants to say to the driver that he should turn right but
mistakenly says “turn left” (something that my wife often does). Clearly the prag-
matic meaning is the command |turn left|,48 but the speaker meaning is |turn right|.
The speaker is thus deviant in this case. Had she said “turn left”, she would have
45At any rate, with appropriate adjustments, there might be a “translation” from one approach
to the other and vice versa. If so, we need not worry too much in following the token-oriented
approach here.
46See, e.g., Kaplan’s Afterthoughts (1989a) and Bach 1994, p. 136. For a recent defence of this
line, see Fodor and Lepore 2004.
47Note also that, alongside the notion of an ideal speaker (of a given language), we should also
take for granted – as obviously presupposed in the former – that of a standard thinking subject,
who is assumed to have normal mental capacities, i.e., she has neither superhuman, nor subhuman
intelligence.
48I take a command to be a practition (Castañeda 1975), something akin to a proposition but devoid
of truth value. This is of course inessential for the main topic of this book. For what matters here,
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been standard.49 Of course, mutatis mutandis, we can similarly distinguish between
an official linguistic meaning, or linguistic meaning simpliciter, and a subjective
one, speaker or hearer, as the case may be. As we shall see, it is appropriate to dis-
tinguish a further level of meaning, intermediate between the levels of linguistic and
pragmatic meaning. I shall thus speak of “contextualized linguistic meanings”. The
distinction between official and subjective meanings should be considered active at
that level as well.50
It is a commonplace that expression types are usually ambiguous in that they
have more than one official linguistic meaning, but it may be worth recalling at
this juncture that the pragmatic rules and the context may fail to eliminate some
ambiguity and thus even a token in a given context may be ambiguous by having
more than one official pragmatic meaning (although, as I said above, I shall normally
neglect this, as far as possible). This of course does not mean that a token, uttered by
the speaker X, may have more than one X’s subjective meaning. In fact, to say that
M is X’s subjective meaning of t (speaker or hearer and official or not, as the case
may be) amounts to saying that X views M as the one meaning encoded in t, which
appears to be essentially a matter, following Grice, of X’s having an appropriate
propositional attitude involving somehow t and M, i.e., very roughly, something like
a belief to the effect that t is being used to convey M.
someone unconvinced by Castañeda’s distinction between practitions and propositions may view
a command as a proposition of sorts.
49To indicate that a token t has speaker or hearer meaning M for X, we may use rather obvious
variants such as: X expresses M with t, t means M for X, X attributes M to t.
50Note that speaker, hearer and official meanings may have subconstituents, at least to the extent
that a compositional view of meaning is assumed (as it is here). In this case, we may consider such
subconstituents as in turn speaker, hearer or official (sub-) meanings.
Chapter 2
Background Notions
2.1 Linguistic and Pragmatic Meaning Further Characterized
In order better to convey the distinction between linguistic and pragmatic meaning,
let us focus on some examples, which, by involving singular terms, are specifi-
cally relevant to the dispute between descriptivists and referentialists. Consider the
sentence types:
(1) Barry Smith loves Austrian philosophy.
(2) He dislikes Austrian philosophy.
(3) The table is dirty.
Both descriptivists and referentialists can agree that, if a token s of (1) is uttered in
a context in which we discuss which British philosophers have devoted particular
attention to Austrian philosophy, then, in relation to the context in question, this
token expresses as pragmatic meaning a true proposition. For in this case the token
b of “Barry Smith” involved in s has, in turn, a pragmatic meaning that determines
Barry Smith, the current editor of The Monist (and accordingly b refers to him). In
contrast, if we simply consider the linguistic type (1), or the token s as taken apart
from its context, the corresponding linguistic meaning can hardly be considered a
true proposition (if a proposition at all; we shall discuss later, in § 2.3, whether
the linguistic meaning of a sentence should be considered a proposition or not).
For, since context is not taken into account in the assignment of linguistic meaning,
“Barry Smith” (or its token b) can hardly be taken to have a linguistic meaning that
determines Barry Smith, the current editor of The Monist, among the many persons
called “Barry Smith”. At most, this linguistic meaning is something that allows us to
make some sense of (1) as a linguistic item, but not so far as to establish a correlation
between the name and a specific person.
Consider now a token s of (2) uttered while pointing at Barry Smith, the editor of
The Monist. Clearly, s has a pragmatic meaning, a certain proposition which happens
to be false. This depends on the fact that, given the context, a certain token h of “he”,
embedded in s, has a pragmatic meaning that determines the Barry Smith in question
(who in fact loves Austrian philosophy), a meaning appropriately embedded in the
39F. Orilia, Singular Reference: A Descriptivist Perspective, Philosophical Studies Series
113, DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-3312-3_2, C© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010
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pragmatic meaning of s. On the other hand, the linguistic type (2) must be assigned,
when considered independently of its context, a different (linguistic) meaning, for
its meaning cannot involve a constituent that determines the Barry Smith in ques-
tion if we disregard the contextual fact that a certain token of “he” was used by a
speaker who pointed at the editor of The Monist. Perhaps the linguistic meaning of
(2) involves a constituent contributed by “he”, which allows us to make sense of (2)
as a linguistic item, but this cannot be Barry Smith in flesh and blood or a descriptive
content involving a property that identifies him.
Let us now turn to (3), which we can use as a variant on Strawson’s well-known
example, based on “the desk is covered with books” (1950). Imagine that a token s
of (3) is uttered as the first sentence of a dialogue in a context in which it is clear
that the speaker is talking about a certain table, x. Say, s is uttered at dinner time
while the speaker and an interlocutor are cooking their meal in an apartment where
x is the only table, which happens to be dirty. We can imagine that the speaker utters
s with the clear intention of inviting her interlocutor to clean x in preparation for
the dinner. Then, clearly, s has a true proposition as its pragmatic meaning. This
depends on the fact that there is a token t of “the table”, embedded in s, which has
a pragmatic meaning that determines x. The linguistic meaning of (3) cannot be
the true proposition in question, for a linguistic meaning assignable to “the table”
independently of context cannot of course determine x from among the many tables
that there are in the world.
The distinction between linguistic and pragmatic meaning can also be conveyed
by means of examples that at least prima facie do not directly bear on the descrip-
tivist/referentialist dispute because they do not involve singular terms. Consider,
e.g., this variant on the above example based on (3). The interlocutors are now
waiters at the restaurant Spanò in Palermo. One of them starts a dialogue with a
token s of
(4) every table is dirty.
This token s can be taken to express as its pragmatic meaning a true proposition,
for in that context the speaker may well be taken to use s to express a belief to the
effect that every table in the restaurant Spanò in Palermo is dirty (at the time of the
utterance); a belief that, for present purposes, can be assumed to be true. In contrast,
the sentence type (4), or any token of it considered independent of context, can at
most express the more generic proposition that every table in the universe is dirty,
a proposition presumably made false by the existence of many clean tables, say in
other restaurants.
Or take
(5) some student is very bright.
Consider a token t of it uttered by Lucy, who is teaching the intermediate Latin class
in school S, as she is reporting to the principal. The pragmatic meaning of t is a
proposition, which is true if at least one student in Lucy’s class is very bright. In
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contrast, the linguistic meaning of the sentence type (5) is a more generic propo-
sition (if a proposition at all), one which is true, if there is at a least a student in
the whole world who is very bright, whether in Lucy’s class or not. Accordingly,
it seems appropriate to acknowledge that the noun phrase “some student” has a
linguistic meaning that differs from the pragmatic meaning of the token of “some
student” embedded in t.
We can admit however that there are cases in which the pragmatic meaning of
a token coincides with the linguistic meaning of the corresponding type (or at least
with one of them, if the latter is ambiguous). Mathematical sentences, it seems to
me, often provide examples. Consider a token t of
(6) every even number is a multiple of two.
Once we assume that t is an English token, we need to know nothing about the
context surrounding t to understand that it expresses a true proposition (provided of
course we know enough arithmetic). Thus, there seems to be no reason to think that
t has a pragmatic meaning that differs from the linguistic meaning assignable to (6)
independently of context. Perhaps we could similarly say that, had the speaker of
the above token s of (4) uttered, more explicitly, something like
(7) every table located, at 6:00 p.m., March 27, 1973, Italian time, in the restaurant
Spanò in Palermo, Italy, is dirty,
she would have produced a token with a pragmatic meaning that coincides with the
linguistic meaning of (7). In cases such as these, there is also no need to say that
the noun phrase tokens in question have pragmatic meanings that differ from the
linguistic meanings of the corresponding noun phrase types.
2.2 Contextualized Linguistic Meaning vs. Pragmatic Meaning
The assignment of a pragmatic meaning M to a token t in a given context can be
taken to presuppose, at least at the level of an ideal reconstruction, the selection of
one meaning M′ from the set of all linguistic meanings of t. We may call M′ a con-
textualized linguistic meaning of t (relative to the context in question), a meaning
from which the pragmatic meaning M can somehow be derived. This is essentially
what Bach (1994) would call, adapting to his own purposes a locution from Grice,
“what is said”, or more precisely “what is explicitly said” or “what is strictly and
literally said”. The selection of a contextualized linguistic meaning of a token t
typically involves lexical disambiguation, achieved on the basis of syntactic clues
and contextual information. To the extent that contextual information is needed for
this selection, Perry 2001 talks of “presemantic use of context”. For example, in a
given context, a token of “bank” is interpreted as |shore-bank|, while in another as
|financial-bank| (cf. Bach 1994, p. 125 and Perry 2001, p. 41). Scope assignment
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may also be involved as when, e.g., a token of “every man” is assigned wide scope
as it occurs in a token of “every man loves a woman”.1 Furthermore, the assignment
of a contextualized linguistic meaning might involve the interpretation of anaphoric
pronouns, e.g. an interpretation that ensures that the token of “it” in a statement
of “every man who buys a donkey vaccinates it” is appropriately “bound” to its
antecedent, namely the token of “a donkey” in the statement in question. Similarly,
the assignment might involve the interpretation of determiner phrases that are used
anaphorically by way of relying, roughly speaking, on a conceptual link with their
antecedents. For example, there could be an interpretation ensuring that the token
of “the pet” in a statement of “every kid who has an ugly little dog and a beauti-
ful toy likes the pet more than the toy” is appropriately “bound” to its antecedent,
namely the token of “an ugly little dog” in the statement in question (we shall dwell
on similar examples in discussing anaphora below). Finally, the selection of a con-
textualized linguistic meaning of a token t might involve what we may call an ideal
supplementation of t with (a representation of) elliptical elements (not explicitly rep-
resented by sub-tokens embedded in t). The elements in question here are such that
they can be easily recovered “by grammatical means alone” (Bach, 1994, p. 131)
from the intralinguistic context in which t occurs, as when we ideally supplement
with “wants” the second conjunct of “John wants pie and Al pudding”. Thus, a token
of this sentence could be taken to have the same contextualized linguistic meaning
that could have been expressed by a token of “John wants pie and Al wants pud-
ding”. In a terminology previously introduced, we may say that the contextualized
linguistic meaning in question has a zero realized constituent corresponding to the
ideally-supplemented “wants”.
There may be zero realized constituents for reasons that depend idiosyncratically
on the grammar of the language in question. For example, suppose, for the sake
of illustrating this point, that LOVE [subject: peter, theme: mary] is a contextual-
ized linguistic meaning for both “Peter loves Mary” and “Petrus Mariam amat” (see
Orilia 2006 for this way of representing the meanings of sentences). The thematic
roles, |subject| and |theme|, are then conceptual elements that are explicitly repre-
sented in the Latin sentence (by the nominative ending “-us” and by the accusative
ending “-am”, respectively), but not in the English sentence, wherein they can be
taken to have a zero realization.2 On the other hand, in Latin there are no articles
and thus “equus” may be translated, depending on the context, as either “the horse”,
“a horse” or simply “horse”. Thus, suppose we take |the horse| to be a contextual-
ized linguistic meaning of both a token t-h of “the horse” and a token e of “equus”.
In this case, the conceptual element |the| is realized by the “the” sub-token, t, in the
1 Bach (1994, p. 130) is inclined to see in many cases of scope assignment a “structural underdeter-
mination“, which means that for him the result of scope assignment is a conversational impliciture
(see below), rather than what I call a contextualized linguistic meaning. These details are not
important for present purposes.
2 Someone might object that they are somehow realized by the different positions that “Peter” and
“Mary” have in the sentence. But the point is that there is no word or morpheme corresponding to
the thematic roles in question in the English sentence.
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English token t-h, but it has a zero realization in the Latin e, which should then be
considered a truncated definite description. Notice that taking the token e as mean-
ing |the horse| should not invite one to think that “equus” is lexically ambiguous in
that it has both the linguistic meaning |horse| and the linguistic meaning |the horse|.
This would be multiplying linguistic meanings without necessity. The idea then is
simply that |the| has a zero realization in e, which can then be taken to have |the
horse| as contextualized linguistic meaning. Similarly, as we have seen, |the| can
be zero realized in English, e.g., in tokens of “my book” and “Mary’s car”, tokens
which can then have contextualized linguistic meanings such as, roughly, |the book
that belongs to me| and |the car that belongs to Mary|, respectively. Allowing the
possibility of zero realization, we can handle the difference between uses of locative
or temporal pronouns such as “here”, “there”, “now”, “today”, “tomorrow”, etc. as
adverbs on the one hand and as noun phrases on the other hand. This difference is
witnessed by pairs of sentences such as: “John will sleep here” vs. “Milan is five
miles from here” and “Tom is eating now” vs. “from now on you should be on
diet”.3 As regards “here” and “there” we can speculate that when they are used as
adverbs the corresponding meanings involve a zero realization of notions such as
|in| or |to|, explicitly realized, e.g., in “John will sleep in this room” and “John will
go to Milan”. As regards “now”, “today”, etc. we can similarly assume that their
adverbial uses involve a zero realization of the same notion, |on|, explicitly realized
in “the meeting will start on Monday, April 23, 2008, 3.00 p.m.” This is the line that
I shall take for granted in developing my own approach to indexicals in Chapters 6
and 7.
The contextualized linguistic meaning of a token does not in general coincide
with the pragmatic meaning of the token. This can be easily illustrated by slightly
modifying the previous example based on a teacher, Lucy, who utters a token t of
“some student is very bright”, in a context where it is clear that she is talking about
the students in her intermediate Latin class. Suppose the teacher had uttered instead
a token t′ of “some student is very bright and some very diligent”. Clearly, t′ would
have a contextualized linguistic meaning that could have been expressed by saying
“some student is very bright and some student is very diligent”. But this can hardly
be taken to be the pragmatic meaning of t′, for the pragmatic meaning is a propo-
sition that is true just in case at least one student in Lucy’s class is very bright and
at least one student in the same class is very diligent. In contrast the contextualized
linguistic meaning is a more generic proposition that is true just in case at least
one student somewhere is very bright and at least one student somewhere is very
diligent.
It is customary to distinguish between complete and incomplete determiner
phrases, in general, and between complete and incomplete definite descriptions,
more specifically. In the light of the above examples, we may say that a token t
3 Another example of a locative pronoun used as noun phrase is provided by “here is nicer than
there”. I am told by some native speakers of English that this sentence is not ungrammatical,
although it sounds odd. Perhaps, the oddness is due to the fact that by default “here” and “there”
are taken to be adverbs, equivalent to “in this place” and “in that place”, respectively.
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of a determiner phrase (definite description) counts as pragmatically complete (or
complete tout court) when its contextualized linguistic meaning does not appear to
require a further appeal to context to transform it into a more specific meaning. In
that case it can be considered identical to its pragmatic meaning. Otherwise, the
token t counts as incomplete. In relation to a given context, a noun phrase type may
also be called (pragmatically) incomplete or complete, as the case may be, and we
may regard as (pragmatically) complete a noun phrase type that counts as complete
in practically every context, e.g. “the (only) even prime number”. By contrast, a
noun phrase type such as “the table”, which clearly counts as incomplete in most
contexts, may be called incomplete (tout court).
With reference to the examples in § 2.1, we can say that the relevant tokens
of “the table”, “every table” and “some student” provide instances of pragmati-
cally incomplete determiner phrase tokens. In contrast, the relevant tokens of “every
prime number” or “the even prime number” provide examples of pragmatically com-
plete determiner phrases. These determiner phrases have to be distinguished from
anaphoric terms that can be “completed” in the sense that a certain contextualized
linguistic meaning can be assigned to them simply on the basis of the intra-linguistic
context, as when we say that “the woman” of “if Pedro meets a beautiful woman
he admires the woman” corresponds to “the woman that Pedro meets” (see § 2.7
below). In these cases, we may speak of intra-linguistically completable terms.
2.3 Conversational Implicatures and Implicitures
The pragmatic meaning of an expression should not be confused with any “Gricean”
conversational implicature that the expression might have. To adapt a well-known
example from Grice, imagine that all Ph.D. candidates from the philosophy depart-
ment of university A applied for a certain job at the philosophy department of
university B. Professor Y in the latter department calls professor X in the other
department to inquire about their professional qualities. Professor X replies with
just a token t of
(1) all the applicants are nice guys.
Because he has said so little, he can be taken to conversationally implicate that the
applicants in questions are not particularly good as philosophers. That is, there is a
conversational implicature at play, a proposition that could be expressed by saying
something like
(2) all the applicants from University A for the job at university B are not good
philosophers.
This proposition should not be confused with the pragmatic meaning of t. The for-
mer is a proposition which is true just in case all the applicants in question are nice.
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The latter is a proposition which is true just in case all the applicants in question are
poor philosophers. We can say that the latter, given the context, is a conversational
implicature of the former, but not that it is identical to the former.
Bach 1994 has correctly distinguished between conversational implicatures and
conversational implicitures. According to Bach, both a conversational implicature
and a conversational impliciture can be derived somehow by a sort of inferential pro-
cess from what is (strictly and literally) said, i.e. what I have called contextualized
linguistic meaning, but they are not the same thing. Bach describes a conversa-
tional impliciture as a middle ground between what is said and any conversational
implicature that could be associated to it. According to Bach, the passage from a
contextualized linguistic meaning M of a token t to a corresponding conversational
impliciture M′ (associated to the same token t) may involve either the resolution of
a “structural underdetermination“, or of a sort of “conceptual strengthening” (see,
e.g., Bach 1994, p. 134 and p. 157), which, roughly, adds to M new conceptual
elements which thus come to be present in the corresponding conversational implic-
iture M′, elements that could be called unarticulated constituents in the sense of
Perry 1986 (see Bach 1994, p. 127 note 4).
As Bach explains (1994, pp. 127–129), structural underdetermination is involved
in a sentence such as “Willie almost robbed a bank” and “I love you too”, in that
in interpreting them “something like scope must be assigned”. Bach distinguishes
structural underdetermination from scope ambiguity, which he is very reluctant
to acknowledge. He tends to see the former, where linguists and logicians typi-
cally see the latter (p. 130). Notice that, in his view, the linguistic meaning of an
affirmative sentence may not be a proposition, for presumably, being structurally
underdetermined, it is neither true nor false.
As regards conceptual strengthening, this can be illustrated by Bach’s example
(1994, p. 127)
(3) steel isn’t strong enough
and by a sentence which we have considered above, namely
(4) every table is dirty.
Given two different contextual backgrounds, we could interpret (3), e.g., as some-
how conveying what could have been expressed by either
(3a) steel isn’t strong enough to build a 500-storey building
or
(3b) steel isn’t strong enough to resist bending by Superman.
In these two cases, different conceptual elements are added to the same contex-
tualized linguistic meaning to generate two distinct conversational implicitures.
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According to Bach, although the linguistic meaning in question is expressed by
an affirmative sentence, it is not a proposition in that it cannot be considered full-
fledged enough to be truth-valued. It is merely a proposition radical. In a case
like this, Bach sees the passage from the linguistic meaning to the conversational
impliciture as a completion. It is not always the case, however, that mere propo-
sition radicals, as opposed to propositions, are at work. When they are not, Bach
speaks of expansion rather than of completion. An example is offered by (4). As
we saw, at the level of linguistic meaning, a token of it can be taken to express a
proposition, albeit a false one. However, if uttered in a context in which two waiters
are talking about the tables in the restaurant Spanò in Palermo, the token can be
taken to express a proposition which is true just in case every table in the restaurant
Spanò in Palermo is dirty, i.e., a true proposition (as we may assume, at the moment
of utterance). Hence, according to Bach, the contextualized linguistic meaning of
the token is a (false) proposition that generates, via completion, a certain conversa-
tional impliciture, namely the proposition that could have been expressed explicitly
by saying something like
(4a) every table in the restaurant Spanò in Palermo is dirty.
This proposition is the result of a completion, because it arises from a contextual-
ized linguistic meaning which is already a proposition, by adding a new conceptual
element to it, expressible by “in the restaurant Spanò in Palermo” (see Bach 1994,
p. 139) (we neglect here details having to do with tense and the use of proper names
which are immaterial for present purposes).
In the light of arguments such as those offered in Cappelen and Lepore 2005,4 I
am inclined to say that we should not really admit a distinction between propositions
and proposition radicals, and consequently between expansions and completions.
More generally, I would say that we should not grant meanings of affirmative sen-
tences that are not propositions, whether they are the proposition radicals that we
have just discussed or the structurally underdetermined meanings mentioned above.
Thus, in my view, even a sentence such as (3) should be taken to have a proposition,
although a rather vague one, as its linguistic meaning. But whether Bach is right or
not on this specific issue need not concern us much here, for nothing important for
the main goals of this book is seriously dependent on it. In particular, this issue is not
crucial for the examples involving incomplete determiner noun phrases such as (4),
which are specifically important here. With respect to them, as we have seen, Bach
recognizes that the contextualized linguistic meaning may well be a proposition. At
4 Bach’s distinction between propositions and proposition radicals flows from his adherence to
what Cappelen and Lepore 2005 call “moderate contextualism”, the view according to which
some sentences, such as (3) above, do not express propositions. Other philosophers have embraced
a related but more radical view that Cappelen and Lepore call “radical contextualism”, accord-
ing to which only sentence tokens express propositions; sentence types of all kinds can at most
express proposition radicals or the like (“incomplete logical forms”, “propositional schemas”,
etc.). I think Cappelen and Lepore offer good arguments against both views. For a criticism of
these contextualist views from a type-oriented and referentialist perspective, see Predelli 2005.
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any rate, we can use the neutral term, conceptual strengthening, that Bach uses for
both completion and expansion. More specifically we can use this term in the way
illustrated as follows. I would like to say that, given that there is a token a of (3) that
has a conversational impliciture expressible by (3a), then |strong enough to build a
500-storey building| is a conceptual strengthening of |strong enough| with respect
to x, where x is the token of “strong enough” in a. Similarly, Given that that there is
a token b of (4) that has a conversational impliciture expressible by (4a), then |every
table in the restaurant Spanò in Palermo| is a conceptual strengthening of |every
table| with respect to y, where y is the token of “every table” in b. It may also be
convenient to generalize the use of “conversational impliciture” so as to use it not
only for statements and propositions, as we have done so far, but also for sub-tokens
of statements and corresponding conceptual strenghtenings. Thus, we can say that
|strong enough to build a 500-storey building| and |every table in the restaurant
Spanò in Palermo| are conversational implicitures of x and y, respectively.
Once we have generalized the use of “conversational impliciture” in this way, it
may be tempting to say that the pragmatic meaning of a token is the conversational
impliciture of the token (in those cases in which the pragmatic meaning cannot
already be identified with the contextualized linguistic meaning). Something like
this is Bach’s view and it has been mine in the past (cf. Orilia 2003, 2006). If we
take this line, however, it is more difficult (although not impossible) to do justice
to the intuition that usually the context succeeds in disambiguating expressions.
In fact, typically, many different conversational implicitures can be associated to a
given token. To see this, take again the example of the intermediate Latin teacher in
school S, Lucy, who says
(5) some student is very bright.
Suppose Lucy is the only teacher called Lucy in school S, that the only interme-
diate Latin class in the school is taught by her and that she teaches nothing else.
Then, Lucy’s token of (5) can be taken to have two conversational implicitures,
expressible by
(5a) some student in the class of school S taught by a teacher called Lucy is very
bright;
(5b) some student in the intermediate Latin class of school S is very bright.
Thus, I think it is better not to identify pragmatic meaning and conversational
impliciture, although they are closely related.5 This idea will be developed in detail
later.
5 It should also be noted that it is controversial to identify the pragmatic meaning of an incomplete
noun phrase with a conversational impliciture associated to it; for some argue, contrary to Bach,
that such a noun phrase requires a “domain restriction”, rather than a conceptual strengthening
of its contextualized linguistic meaning. But for reasons that I have explained elsewhere (Orilia
2003a), the domain restriction view is not very plausible from the point of view of the cognitivist
approach to semantics that I wish to pursue (as declared in the introduction). Accordingly, my
48 2 Background Notions
With this idea in mind, it is important to notice that the passage from a contextu-
alized linguistic meaning to a corresponding conversational impliciture is grounded
on the fact that the context has certain properties rather than others, is what it is
and not something else. If the token of (4) had been uttered in another restaurant,
say Chez Maxim in Paris, this token could not have been associated to a conver-
sational impliciture expressible by (4a). It would have been associated instead to a
conversational impliciture expressible as
(4b) every table in the restaurant Chez Maxim in Paris is dirty.
Clearly, then, we need appropriate contextual information regarding the context sur-
rounding a token to determine which conversational impliciture(s) the token carries.
This point will be pursued in Chapter 5.
Before going ahead let us record the following. The fact that, on the basis of
contextual information, we can assign to linguistic tokens such things as linguistic
meanings, contextualized linguistic meanings, pragmatic meanings, conversational
implicitures and implicatures suggests the following. There must be intersubjective
semantic and pragmatic rules that somehow determine such assignments on the basis
of contextual facts (understood as objectively given so as to constitute an “objective
context” in the sense of Sbisà 2002). More precisely, for any given linguistic token
t, there must be a complex of contextual facts regarding the token, which somehow
determines, on the basis of the rules in question, assignments of these kinds. This
complex of facts may be called the contextual complex for t. And the rules in ques-
tion may be called in one fell swoop the semantic-pragmatic module, which we can
view as subdivided into a semantic and a pragmatic sub-module. The former has
to do with the assignment of (contextualized) linguistic meanings to tokens and the
latter with the assignments of pragmatic meanings, conversational implicitures and
implicatures.
Since, as already mentioned, there are tokens which, being anaphoric, depend
on an antecedent, it is appropriate to distinguish primary and secondary contextual
complexes, in a sense that I shall now explain. A primary one, given the semantic-
pragmatic module, informs us that the token in question is basic (not dependent
anaphorically on an antecedent) and thus allows for the assignment of a contex-
tualized and then of a pragmatic meaning to it, without taking into account the
meaning already assigned to an antecedent. A secondary contextual complex, given
the semantic-pragmatic module, informs us that the token in question is anaphoric
and accordingly allows for the assignment of a contextualized and then of a prag-
matic meaning to it, in a way that takes into account the meaning assigned to the
antecedent.
As hinted in § 2.2 above, we have to distinguish, I think, two kinds of anaphoric
terms. First, there are those that, because of their linguistic meaning, can be linked to
account of the pragmatic meaning of incomplete determiner phrases, presented in Chapter 5, does
not presuppose it.
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their antecedent, without recourse to encyclopaedic (world, empirical) knowledge.
We may call them linguistic anaphoras. Second, there are encyclopaedic anaphoras,
as we may say, those that can be linked to an antecedent only on the basis of ency-
clopaedic knowledge. Sentences with anaphoric pronouns such as the following
provide typical examples of linguistic anaphoras:
(6) any friend of Bill who has met the main actress of Prizzi’s Honor likes her.
Given a token of (6), once the contextual complex for the embedded token of “her”
allows us to rule out that it is not used as an indexical to refer to a woman in the
vicinity (say, the speaker is not pointing at anything), we can determine by purely
linguistic knowledge that this token traces back anaphorically to the relevant token
of “the main actress of Prizzi’s Honor” (rather than to “Bill”).
Sentences involving (standard) determiner phrases rather than pronouns can also
provide examples of linguistic anaphoras, as this example already considered above
illustrates:
(7) every kid who has an ugly little dog and a beautiful toy likes the pet more than
the toy.
For an example of an encyclopaedic anaphora, imagine that someone utters a
token of:
(8) when Tom met Buffon and Toni, he recognized the centreforward, but not the
goalkeeper.
We can take the embedded tokens of “the goalkeeper” and “the centreforward” as
anaphorically tracing back to the embedded tokens of “Buffon” and “Toni”, respec-
tively, only by relying on encyclopaedic knowledge regarding current football,
which tells us that Buffon is a goalkeeper and Toni a centreforward.6
The term “anaphora” is used not only for terms that have an antecedent in the
way illustrated by the above examples, but also for so-called associative anaphoras
(Kempson 1986, Frigerio 2003). Here is an example of an associative anaphora
adapted from Frigerio 2003:
(9) when Tom got into the car, the driver was ready.
6 It might be objected here (and at other points too; see e.g. the principle DPCA below) that in
distinguishing between linguistic and encyclopaedic anaphoras, I am presupposing a distinction
between analytic and synthetic truths which is outdated after Quine. However, as the vast literature
on Quine’s criticism of the analytic/synthetic distinction shows, there is no consensus on the thesis
that Quine, or anybody for that matter, has really shown that the distinction is wholly bankrupt. I
myself side with those who think that some sort of analytic/synthetic (conceptual/factual, linguis-
tic/encyclopaedic, etc.) distinction is hard to dismiss. It may very well be a vague distinction with
unsharp boundaries, but nonetheless a real and useful one (cf. Castañeda 1977a, p. 324).
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Another example is this:
(10) Tom decided to sell his car, because the engine did not work well.
In sentence (9), “the driver” does not have an antecedent in the sense in which “the
main actress of Prizzi’s honor” can be considered the antecedent of “her” in (6),
“an ugly little dog” can be considered the antecedent of “the pet” in (7), and “the
goalkeeper” the antecedent of “Buffon” in (8). However, we can somehow interpret
“the driver” on the basis of a preceding term, namely “the car”, which justifies the
use of the term “anaphora”. Similar considerations apply to “the engine” of (10).
To the extent that we take to be linguistic knowledge the knowledge involved in
establishing the link between the associative anaphora and the preceding term, asso-
ciative anaphoras may be considered linguistic anaphoras. In other words, as I see
it, it is at the level of contextualized linguistic meaning that tokens working as lin-
guistic associative anaphoras are appropriately interpreted. For example, at this level
of meaning, a token of “the driver” embedded in a token of (9) should be taken to
have a contextualized linguistic meaning that could have been expressed by saying
“the driver of the car”. At any rate, for the purpose of this work, we need not dwell
more on associative anaphoras. More attention will be devoted to the anaphoras
that we have illustrated by means of examples (6)–(8). They may be called, by way
of contrast, strict anaphoras. However, since I shall not further discuss associative
anaphoras, I shall neglect the use of the qualifier “strict” in the following.
2.4 Genuine vs. Non-genuine Determiner Phrases
Let us say that a token is used as a determiner phrase (is a genuine DP) when
its contextualized linguistic meaning is a denoting concept. These tokens can be
either tokens of integral DPs, involving a determiner and a predicate component,
e.g., “some man” or “the winged horse”, or tokens of truncated DPs (also counting
as predicates), like “Tom’s brother” or the Latin “homo”. Let us thus record this
principle:
DPL. Determiner Phrases: Linguistic meaning. An integral DP, det P, where
det is a determiner and P a predicate can be assumed to have a denoting
concept, |det P|, as linguistic meaning, where |det| is one of the linguistic
meanings of the determiner det and |P| one of the linguistic meanings of
the predicate P. For example, on the assumption that “the” may mean both
|the| and |every| and that “bank” may mean both |shore-bank| and |financial-
bank|, the linguistic meanings of “the bank” include |the shore-bank|, |the
financial-bank|, |every shore-bank|, |every financial-bank|. A truncated DP,
P, where P is a predicate, can be assumed to have the property |P| as linguis-
tic meaning, where |P| is one of the linguistic meanings of P. For example,
the Latin “homo” may be seen as a truncated DP which enjoys as linguistic
meanings the two properties |species-man| and |gender-man|.
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Obviously, tokens of truncated DPs are sometime not used as DPs, as they are
simply used, we may say, as predicates. For example, a token of “homo” is so used
in a token of “Petrus homo est”, meaning that Peter is a man. But tokens of integral
determiner phrases may fail to be used as determiner phrases too. This happens most
obviously when one such token occurs as quoted. For example, a token of “every
table” occurs unquoted in a token of
(1) every table is dirty
and quoted in a token of
(2) the determiner phrase “every table” is made up of two words.
Only in the former case can the token of “every table” be taken to have |every
table| as contextualized linguistic meaning and accordingly be classified as a gen-
uine determiner phrase. I shall assume that in general we can discern quite easily
whether a determiner phrase token is used as determiner phrase or not.
As we have seen (and as we shall discuss in more detail), determiner phrases used
as such can be used, more specifically, as anaphoras (anaphorically). In contrast,
determiner phrases not used anaphorically can be said to be used as basic. The
anaphoric use of determiner phrases can be illustrated by the relevant tokens of “the
boy” and “the girl” in a statement of
(3) if a boy meets a pretty girl, the boy falls in love with the girl.
To specify the contextualized linguistic meaning of a determiner phrase used as
anaphora is a complicated matter to which we shall return. For the time being,
let us concentrate on determiner phrases used as basic (non-anaphoric) determiner
phrases, by simply recording that, on the basis of the above discussion, in general,
a descriptivist can assume a principle along these lines:
DPCB. Determiner Phrases: Contextualized linguistic meaning when used as
Basic. The contextualized linguistic meaning of a token t used as a basic
(possibly truncated) DP is a denoting concept |det M| such that: (i) if t is not
truncated and thus involves a token d of a determiner (“some”, “the”, etc.)
and a token p of a predicate (“man”, “round table”, etc.), then |det| is one
of the linguistic meanings of the determiner and |M| is one of the linguistic
meanings of the predicate; (ii) if t is truncated, so that t is the token of a
predicate, then det is a zero realized determiner component and M is one of
the linguistic meanings of the predicate.
A referentialist might also agree with this, except perhaps for those tokens of definite
descriptions that she considers as directly referential.
We noted in Chapter 1 that determiner phrases can be used as quantifiers or not
(can be used as active or non-active), depending on whether they contribute an active
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or a non-active denoting concept to a proposition. More precisely, suppose that a
token d, used as DP, occurs in a statement s in such a way that s expresses (qua
contextualized linguistic meaning) a proposition P in which there occurs an active
denoting concept that is (i) what d expresses (qua contextualized linguistic meaning)
and (ii) what d contributes to P. In this case d is used not only as a determiner phrase,
but also as a quantifier. In other words, it is used as an active determiner phrase. On
the other hand, if everything is as above except that the denoting concept contributed
by d occurs as non-active in P, then d is used as a determiner phrase but not as a
quantifier (is used as a non-active determiner phrase). Consider:
(4) the positive square root of four is even;
(5) the positive square root of four is a descriptive content involving the property
of being positive.
In a typical mathematical context C, a token s of (4) involves in turn a token d of “the
positive square root of four” with a certain denoting concept, |the positive square
root of four|, as contextualized linguistic meaning, a concept which can be taken to
occur as active in the proposition constituting the contextualized linguistic meaning
of s. Thus, d is used as an active determiner phrase. Accordingly, the expression type
“the positive square root of four”, we might also want to say, is used as a genuine
determiner phrase in sentence (4), given context C. In contrast, in a typical context
in which one might utter (5), call it C, uttering (5) would result in a token d of “the
positive square root of four”, a token contributing a non-active denoting concept
to the proposition expressed by its contextualized linguistic meaning. In this case
d would be used as a non-active determiner phrase. Accordingly, the expression
type “the positive square root of four”, we might also say, is used as a non-active
determiner phrase in sentence (5), given context C. (If we implicitly assume as given
a typical context in which a certain sentence S can be expected to occur, we can say
tout court that a certain determiner phrase is active or not in S. Thus, we can say that
“the positive square root of four” is active in (4), but non-active in (5).) In sum:
A/N1. Active/Non-active determiner phrase 1. If a token d is used as a DP and
thus has a denoting concept, |det M|, as contextualized linguistic meaning,
it is also used as an active (non-active) DP only if d occurs in a statement
s in such a way that it contributes an active (non-active) denoting concept
(the contextualized linguistic meaning of d) to the proposition P that is the
contextualized linguistic meaning of s. In particular, if the contextualized
linguistic meaning in question is a descriptive content, |the M|, d is an active
or non-active definite description, as the case may be.
It seems correct to also assume the following principle:
A/N2. Active/Non-active determiner phrase 2. If a token d occurring in a
statement s contributes an active (non-active) denoting concept (the contextu-
alized linguistic meaning of d) to the proposition P that is the contextualized
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linguistic meaning of s, then the following holds: d contributes to the propo-
sition that is the pragmatic meaning of s an active (non-active) denoting
concept, which is the pragmatic meaning of d.
For example, consider again a token, s, of
(6) every table is dirty.
Suppose that s is uttered in a context such as that described in § 2.1, involving two
waiters in a restaurant. Then, we may assume, s involves a token t of “every table”
that occurs as an active DP. Thus, t contributes to the proposition
(6a) |every table is dirty|,
expressed as contextualized linguistic meaning by s, a denoting concept, |every
table|, that occurs actively in it. As we saw above, we should take the pragmatic
meaning of t to be a different denoting concept, say |every tablep|. We shall see in
Chapter 5 how it should be characterized. But in any case, by A/N.2, we can assume
that |every tablep| occurs actively in the pragmatic meaning of s, just as |every table|
occurs actively in (6a).
2.5 Singular Terms Used as Singular Terms
We classified in Chapter 1 certain expressions, qua types, as singular terms. This can
be done because in paradigmatic cases, such as those that we saw in § 1.1, tokens
of these expressions are used by a speaker in a way that allows her to refer to a
unique particular. In these cases, we may say that the tokens in questions are used
as singular terms. To put it otherwise, we may say that they are genuine singular
terms. For example, we considered in Chapter 1 the sentence
(1) the director of La vita è bella is a great comedian.
A typical token of (1) involves a token of “the director of La vita è bella” that refers
to Roberto Benigni. This token, beside being used as a DP, and more specifically as
a definite description (as its contextualized linguistic meaning is a denoting concept
of the form |the F|), is also used as a singular term.
By analogy with these cases, we can say that other tokens of singular terms are
used as such (or are genuine), even though they and their users fail to refer to any-
thing, or refer to an abstract entity rather than a particular, or even if there is no user.
Consider for example a token of
(2) the ghost of the pirate Blackbeard appears at night,
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asserted by someone who is convinced that there are ghosts. Even if in fact his
token of “the ghost of the pirate Blackbeard” refers to nothing, we may say that this
token is used as a singular term. We should add that it is also used as a determiner
phrase and in particular as a definite description. Or consider someone who utters a
token of
(3) the thing most highly regarded by Plato is an important virtue.
We might suppose that this person, by using a token of “the thing most highly
regarded by Plato”, refers to an abstract entity, a property, namely wisdom, rather
than to a particular. Still, we can consider the token in question a genuine singular
term (and, in addition, a token used as DP and as a definite description). And, I
think, if a token of (3) is randomly created by clouds in the sky, so that it has no
utterer, we can still regard the embedded token of “the thing most highly regarded
by Plato” as a genuine singular term (as well as a token used as DP and as a definite
description).
A token may fail to be used as a singular term, even if it is of the form “the
F”. In these cases, it does not get a descriptive content as contextualized linguistic
meaning. For example, the token of “the president of Italy” occurring in a token s of
(4) the expression “the president of Italy” contain four words
is not used as a singular term, since it occurs as quoted (although the token of
“the president of Italy” occurring in s may be considered a genuine singular term,
depending on which account we give of quotations.). Setting aside quoted occur-
rences, another case is when the relevant token of “the” does not get |the| as
contextualized linguistic meaning (where, as noted in § 1.7, |the| is such that a
proposition of the form |the F is G| is true just in case there is exactly one object
with the property F and this object also has the property G). For example, it is com-
monly held that “the” may have a generic meaning which does not coincide with
|the|, as when used in a sentence such as
(5) the lion is a beast of prey.
On the assumption that there is such a generic meaning,7 we may represent is as
|theg|. We may then assume that a token of (5) is taken to express the proposition
(5a) | theg lion is a beast of prey|.
7 Perhaps this can be avoided by assuming that a determiner phrase such as “the lion” can be viewed
as elliptical for something like “the species lion”, a definite description that refers to the unique
species called “lion” rather than to a lion in flesh and blood. Nothing crucial however hinges on this.
This assumption could be easily added without undermining the account of reference presented in
this book.
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In this case, the token of “the lion” in question is not used as a singular term.
As we shall see in more detail in the next section, there are anaphoric tokens
of the form “the F” such that the determiner component should perhaps not be
interpreted as |the|. This can be illustrated with (3) of the previous section. For
another example, consider
(6) if a man runs a long way, the man gets tired.
In a typical situation, the token of “the man” involved in the relevant token of
(6) may perhaps fail to express as contextualized linguistic meaning a descriptive
content (a meaning of the form |the F|), for it might be argued that it rather stands for
something like |every man who runs a long way|. If so, since the meaning involves
the determiner component |every| (rather than |the|), we should not say that the
token is used as a singular term. However, an anaphoric token with a descriptive
content as its contextualized linguistic meaning may well be taken to be used as
a singular term (as an anaphoric singular term). For example, the tokens of “the
king” and “the emperor” in a certain statement of (7) below can be taken to be
used as (anaphoric) singular terms (as well as determiner phrases and as definite
descriptions).
(7) When the French king saw the German emperor, the king greeted the emperor.
By contrast, a token used as a singular term, but not used as anaphora, is said to be
used as basic. Thus, going back for illustration to example (1), the relevant token of
“the director of La vita è bella” is used as basic.
There are cases in which a token has a descriptive content as contextualized
linguistic meaning and yet it does not seem appropriate to say that it is used as
a singular term. This happens when the token is used as a non-active determiner
phrase. For example, consider again a token s of
(8) the positive square root of four is a descriptive content involving the property
of being positive.
As we have seen, we should give to s a contextualized linguistic meaning in which
|the positive square root of four| occurs as non-active. Accordingly, there is in s a
token t of “the positive square root of four” that occurs as a non-active determiner
phrase. It seems appropriate to say that in this case t is not used as a singular term, for
it contributes to the proposition expressed by s a constituent with a role analogous
to the constituent contributed by the general term “red” to the proposition expressed
by “red is a property”.
In the light of the above discussion, we can record for future reference the
following principle:
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DPST. Determiner Phrase used as a Singular Term. A token d used as deter-
miner phrase is used as a singular term only if d is used as an active
determiner phrase and more specifically as an active definite description.
Just as we have distinguished descriptions used as singular terms and descriptions
not used as singular terms, it is appropriate to make a similar distinction with
regard to proper names and indexicals, in such a way that no disagreement between
descriptivists and referentialists need arise. This can be illustrated with some simple
examples. One may say, e.g., that “Bush”, taken in isolation, can be classified as a
proper name and thus as a singular term. However, a token of it is used as a singular
term (and, we may add, as a proper name) when, for instance, in discussing current
politics one says
(9) Bush trusts his secretary of state,
but not when used in quotation marks or when, in discussing recent American
history, it is recalled that
(10) Two Bushes have been president.
Similarly, the token of Homer in a typical statement of (11) is used as proper name
and as singular term (even if in fact Homer did not really exist), whereas the token
of Homer in a statement of (12) is not so used.
(11) Homer wrote the Odyssey.
(12) There are two Homers, the one who wrote the Odyssey and the one who wrote
the Iliad.
We have seen that a token of a definite description may be used at the same time as
a singular term and as an anaphora. We can say the same about proper names, since
we can admit that proper names have anaphoric uses. For example, in a token of
(13) if John is hungry, then John is hungry
the second occurrence of “John” can be taken to trace back anaphorically to the first
occurrence.8 This second occurrence is then used as a singular term and as a proper
name and, in addition, as an anaphora. The first occurrence, on the other hand is
used as a singular term, as a proper name and as basic
Analogous considerations apply to indexicals. For instance, in Hegel’s
Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807, A, Chapter 1) we find a passage, “. . . und der
8 Aldo Frigerio has objected to the idea that a proper name can be used anaphorically, on the ground
that anaphoric expressions cannot be appropriately interpreted without taking them as dependent on
a previous expression, whereas proper names can always be interpreted autonomously. I postpone
discussion of this point to § 8.7.
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Gegenstand und Ich sind Allgemeine, in welchen dasjenige Jetzt und Hier und Ich,
da Ich meine, nicht bestehen bleibt oder ist . . .”, translatable in English as follows:
(13) . . . and the object and the I are universals in which that Now and Here and I
which I cognize do not subsist or are . . .
Clearly, in a token of (13), meant to be a translation of the passage of Hegel, we find
tokens of “I”, “now”, and “this” that are not used as singular terms. More specif-
ically, we may say, they are not used as indexicals. Even more specifically, they
are not used as I-indexicals, now-indexicals or here-indexicals. Other philosophical
texts by Kant or Fichte could provide analogous examples. Moreover, when in a
grammar book we find
(14) “I” is a pronoun,
we get a token of “I” not used as a singular term, let alone as I-indexical. In contrast,
given a typical context in which
(15) I am Italian
would be used, we would say that a token of (15) used in such a context involves a
token of “I” used as singular term and specifically as an I-indexical. More generally,
for any statement containing a token of an indexical type T we can usually discern
whether it is being used as an indexical, and more specifically as a T-indexical, or
not (to put it otherwise, whether the token is a genuine (T-)indexical or not).
To set clearly aside tokens of indexicals discussed in relation to examples like
(13) and (14), we may say that even tokens of indexicals used anaphorically are
used as indexicals and as singular terms (just as we said that tokens of definite
descriptions and proper names can at the same time be used anaphorically and as
singular terms, and more specifically as definite descriptions or as proper names, as
the case may be). For example, consider
(16) Tom found a book; he gave it to Mary.
In a typical case, in a statement of (16) the token of “he” is used as he-indexical
as well as anaphorically or, more specifically as anaphoric pronoun. In contrast, if
someone uses a token h of “he” while pointing at a man and saying, e.g.,
(17) he is American,
then h is used as basic he-indexical. Similarly, there is a token of “it” used as basic
it-indexical when someone points at an object and utters, e.g.,
(18) it is a chair.
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In typical cases, when a token of a singular indexical such as “it” or “this” is used as
an indexical, it is also used as a singular term, although, as we shall see, there may
be cases in which this is not so (for example, according to some the “it” of “every
man who owns a donkey vaccinates it” may go proxy for something like “every
donkey that he owns”; see note 18, below). Moreover, there are plural indexicals
such as “we” or “they”, whose tokens can be used as indexicals while not being
used as singular terms. For example, if one says
(19) they are American,
while pointing at a group of people, there is a token of “they” used as a they-
indexical, but of course this token is not used as a singular term. It is used, we
may say as a plural term or, more precisely, as a plural indexical (term).
2.6 Anaphoras
Roughly, anaphoras are terms that, given the context in which they occur, are linked,
so to speak, to a previously-used linguistic item (typically, a noun phrase), which
allows us to determine what the anaphoric term refers to or, more generally, how it
should be interpreted. This linguistic item counts as the antecedent of the anaphoric
term. Many kinds of determiner phrases can work as anaphoras, as these versions of
so-called “donkey sentences ” testify:9
(1) any farmer who buys a donkey vaccinates the donkey.
(2) Any man who has a daughter loves each daughter.
(3) Any man who meets some beautiful women admires the women.
In these sentences, the determiner phrases “the donkey”, “each daughter” and
“the women” function as anaphoras. Typically, however, one chooses to use as
anaphoras, more precisely as anaphoric pronouns, certain pronouns which can also
be used as basic indexicals, such as “it”, “he”, etc. For example, instead of (1), (2)
and (3), we could say:
(1’) any farmer who buys a donkey vaccinates it.
(2’) Any man who has a daughter loves her.
(3’) Any man who meets some beautiful women admires them.
9 Donkey sentences are so-called after Geach 1962, where examples involving “donkey”, such
as “every farmer who owns a donkey beats it”, are discussed at length. Since then, the literature
on donkey sentences has flourished. See, e.g., King 2006 and Büring 2007 for references and
discussions. The donkey sentences usually discussed in the literature involve anaphoric pronouns,
as in (1’)–(3’) below.
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Sentences (1’)–(3’) provide examples of what King 2006 call problematic
anaphoras. As I would put it, these are distinguished by the fact that they are
neither pronouns of laziness, i.e., their antecedents are not terms that could have
been repeated verbatim, nor are they c-commanded by their antecedents.10 Here is
a sentence with “he” working as pronoun of laziness:
(4) after the author of the Divine Comedy was exiled, he went to Ravenna.
And here is a sentence with “it” as an anaphoric term which is c-commanded by its
antecedent (“every diamond”):
(5) every diamond belongs to the person who finds it.
Anaphoras of these kinds are called by King 2006 unproblematic.
As King notes, there is substantial agreement on the treatment of unproblematic
anaphoric pronouns: the referent of a pronoun of laziness is taken to be the same as
that of its antecedent and a c-commanded pronoun is interpreted like a variable of
first-order logic . Thus, most experts would agree if one said that the propositions
expressed by (4) and (5) can be (by and large) faithfully expressed, respectively, by
(4a) after the author of the Divine Comedy was exiled, the author of the Divine
Comedy went to Ravenna
and
(5a) every x such that x is a diamond belongs to the person who finds x.
In contrast, King continues, there are many different approaches regarding prob-
lematic anaphoras, such as the paraphrase approach11 (to be discussed at length
10 For present purposes, we can understand the notion of c-command as in Neale 1990 (pp. 173,
193) to which I refer for further details and references. I thus presuppose that syntactic trees
familiar from generative grammar can be associated to sentences in such a way that noun phrases
correspond to nodes in such trees, both at the level of surface structure, a level that yields S-trees,
and at a level of logical form (LF), a level that yields LF-trees. An LF-tree is generated from
an S-tree by a Quantifier Raising rule (QR) that assigns scopes to determiner phrases by using
bound variables. With this in mind, we can say that a phrase P c-commands another phrase Q of
a sentence S at the level of surface structure (logical form) when, in the S-tree (LF-tree) for S, the
first branching node dominating P also dominates Q and neither P nor Q dominates the other. For
present purposes, we need only look at surface structure. Neale (§ 5.6) argues however that certain
anaphoric pronouns should be interpreted as bound anaphors, since they are c-commanded at the
level of logical form.
11 I call the paraphrase approach by this name because of the terminology of an early supporter of
it, who speaks of “pronouns as paraphrases” (Parsons 1978). King prefers to speak of “descriptive
approaches”.
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below) and those based on discourse representation theory (Kamp 1981, Heim
1982), dynamic logic (Groenendjik and Stokhof 1991) or the employment of
context-dependent quantifiers (Wilson 1984, King 1987).12 The latter three require
rather complex departures from the logical and semantic tradition that we find
enshrined in Montague’s work. If possible, these breaks from tradition should be
kept to a minimum. This is one of the reasons why I am inclined to accept the more
conservative paraphrase approach. Another reason is that, as we shall see in Chapter
6, this standpoint can be made compatible with the idea that pronouns have a uni-
form meaning, whether they are used anaphorically or indexically (and I am not sure
that this is possible with the other approaches). This compatibility is not to be under-
estimated, since it hardly seems a mere coincidence that we use the same words both
as indexicals and as anaphoric pronouns (Braun 2001, Frigerio 2003, § 4.2). As a
matter of fact, if indexical and anaphoric uses of pronouns were not based on a uni-
form linguistic meaning of the pronouns in question, we should by the same token
say the same of most determiner phrases, given that these can be used anaphorically,
as we have seen. And of course we should avoid postulating this multiplication of
ambiguities at the level of linguistic meaning, if possible. As we shall see, avoiding
any such multiplication of ambiguities will be possible, by adopting the paraphrase
approach so as to provide a unified account of anaphoric uses of determiner phrases
such as “the donkey” and indexical pronouns such as “he” or “it”. Needless to say,
alongside these virtues, there are well-known problems that the paraphrase approach
must face, e.g., the issues raised by so-called misdescriptions and pronominal con-
tradictions (§ 4.10). Like other supporters of this standpoint, however, I believe that
these problems can be satisfactorily dealt with. We shall see how in § 8.10 and thus
we shall not worry about them for the time being.
The paraphrase approach is typically presented in the literature as an account of
anaphoric uses of indexical pronouns. In order to reach the promised goal, I would
like to present it, in the first place, as an account of the use of determiner phrases
as anaphoras, a use illustrated by sentences (1)–(3) above. Since, as we shall see in
Chapter 6, from my descriptivist standpoint I treat pronouns as determiner phrases,
an account of the anaphoric uses of the pronouns in question will descend as a spe-
cial case from what will be proposed here. Before applying the paraphrase approach
to examples involving determiner phrases, such as (1)–(3), it is appropriate however
to give an idea of how it has been exploited in dealing with anaphoric pronouns.
I shall rely in particular on a prominent supporter of this approach, namely Neale
(1990), although on some points I shall depart from his treatment for reasons that
will be indicated.
The basic idea of the paraphrase approach, as understood by Neale and other
typical supporters such as Parsons (1978),13 is that anaphoric pronouns (at least
the problematic ones) go proxy for determiner phrases, which we may call proxy
12 See King 2006 for further references regarding these approaches.
13 See Ludlow 2009, § 5, for other contributions to the paraphrase approach (including some by
Ludlow himself) and further discussion.
2.6 Anaphoras 61
paraphrases, recoverable in some way from the intra-linguistic context. This is so
in accordance with a rule along the lines of the one outlined in Neale 1990, § 5.5.
I shall not try to specify precisely what this recovery rule, as we may call it, is,
but the examples below will give an idea of how it operates. As far as English is
concerned, it seems that the proxy paraphrase is always, or at least very often, of the
form “the F” or “the F’s” and perhaps for this reason this approach is also called
a descriptive approach. However, as already noted, there are reasons to think that
“the” is ambiguous. For example, Parsons (1978, p. 20) considers this hypothesis:
“Sometimes ‘the’ doesn’t mean ‘exactly one’ but rather ‘at least one’ or ‘every’. It
means ‘at least one’ in everyone must pay the clerk five dollars and it means ‘every’
in you should always watch out for the other driver, or something like this”. Let
us follow this hypothesis (pretty much in line with Neale) and accordingly assume
that an anaphoric pronoun need not always be taken to express, according to the
paraphrase approach, a descriptive content, i.e., a denoting concept of the form |the
F| (given the terminology of this book) or a denoting concept of the form |thepl F|.
We may assume however that it does express some sort of denoting concept. As we
shall see, in many cases the denoting concept is indeed a descriptive content, but we
shall see cases in which it may be of the form |every F|. To get our terms straight
as far as possible, let us recall, before going ahead, that pronouns understood in the
way the paraphrase approach sees them have been called E-type or D-type pronouns
and thus a paraphrase approach may also be called an E-type or D-type approach
(King 2006). Neale prefers to speak of “D-type” rather than “E-type” pronouns and
I follow him in this.14
Consider now this example (from Neale 1990, § 5.5):
(6) John bought a donkey and Harry vaccinated it.
According to the paraphrase approach, the pronoun “it” in (6) works as a D-type
pronoun, since, given the recovery rule, it goes proxy for a definite description and
thus specifies, we may say, a certain denoting concept. In Neale ’s opinion, the
description (the proxy paraphrase) is “the donkey that John bought” and thus the
specified denoting concept is a descriptive content such as (roughly) |the donkey
that John bought|. Hence, (6) could be put as
(6a) John bought a donkey and Harry vaccinated the donkey that John bought.
14 Evans 1977 speaks of E-type pronouns and consider the recoverable description not as some-
thing they go proxy for, but as something that merely fixes their reference. I accept Neale’s
arguments (1990, § 5.5) on how these pronouns should be understood, and accordingly I follow
him in calling them D-type pronouns. According to Neale, not all anaphoric pronouns are D-type
pronouns, for some of them must be understood as bound variables of first-order logic. However,
if we admit that some anaphoric pronouns must be interpreted by appealing to “open predicates”
with free variables (see below), we can see all anaphoric pronouns as D-type. As we shall see, this
is the line that I will follow.
62 2 Background Notions
To anticipate a bit, I hold that (i) each pronoun has its own specific linguistic
meaning: |he| for “he”, |she| for “she”, etc.; and (ii) a token of a pronoun can be
understood as a truncated determiner phrase, so that, e.g., a token of “he” may be
understood as if it were a token of “the he”, etc. Consequently, I think that this
should be taken into account in specifying the proxy paraphrase corresponding to a
pronoun. As far as (6) is concerned, the proxy paraphrase corresponding to “it” is
then more faithfully put (with some violence to grammar) as “the it and donkey that
John bought” and accordingly, instead of (6a), we should have:
(6b) John bought a donkey and Harry vaccinated the it and donkey that John
bought.
As I see it, (6b) expresses a proposition different from the one expressed by (6a).
The difference however is not very noticeable, because (given the standard way of
understanding “it” as applying to inanimate objects, plant or non-human animals)
any donkey is, so to speak, an it. But we shall see in a moment an example that
shows how taking into account the linguistic meaning of a pronoun makes for a
more noticeable difference.
The paraphrase approach can be applied also to “unproblematic” laziness pro-
nouns, thereby viewing them as D-type pronouns (Neale 1990, p. 168). For example,
the “he” of (4) can be understood as a D-type pronoun that, according to Neale, goes
proxy for “the author of the Divine Comedy”. Given this, (4) and (4a) express the
same proposition. What happens with a pronoun of laziness is thus that the para-
phrase associated to it by the recovery rule coincides with the antecedent of the
pronoun and, hence, the latter happens to specify the denoting concept expressed
by the antecedent. However, if we are to take into account the linguistic meaning
of “he”, as I would like to propose, this is not quite correct. The paraphrase should
rather be something like “the he and author of the Divine Comedy”. That this is on
the right track is suggested by the fact that (4a) cannot be taken to express the same
proposition as (4), for the latter provides a piece of information that the former does
not, namely that the author of the Divine Comedy is male (given that it involves
“he” rather than “she”). Sentence (4) is then more appropriately taken to express the
same proposition as
(4b) after the author of the Divine Comedy was exiled, the he and author of the
Divine Comedy went to Ravenna.
Consider these further examples from Neale 1990:
(7) Jones is a crook; he tried to bribe the judge.
(8) That man is a crook; he tried to bribe the judge.
With respect to typical tokens of (7) and (8) (uttered while pointing at a certain
man), since the antecedent of the D-type anaphoric pronoun is a proper name or an
indexical, Neale says, from his referentialist standpoint, that the pronoun is a directly
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referential expression that refers to (and means) the same item referred to by the
antecedent. A descriptivist of course will not follow him in this and thus would claim
that even in these cases there is a paraphrase for the pronouns. In my view, then,
there are proxy paraphrases (expressing denoting concepts) even in cases of this
kind. In our examples the proxy paraphrases should be, respectively, as follows: “the
he and Jones” and “the he and that and man” (or, more succinctly, “the he Jones” and
“the he that man”). These paraphrases make sense (specify corresponding denoting
concepts) on the assumption that proper names like “Jones” and indexicals like “he”
and “that” are predicates and thus express properties. We shall dwell on what kind
of properties these might be in Chapters 5 and 6.
2.7 The Contextualized Linguistic Meaning of Anaphoric
Determiner Phrases
Neale raises the issue of whether the interpretation of D-type pronouns that we
have illustrated corresponds to a “full-blown syntactic transformation” (1990,
p. 184). If something like this is the case, then, given my terminology, a token d
of a D-type pronoun contributes to the contextualized linguistic meaning of the sen-
tence a meaning (a certain denoting concept) that could have been expressed by a
certain paraphrase (obtainable by means of the recovery rule), a paraphrase to be
called, in line with the terminology already used in the previous section, the proxy
paraphrase for d. Thus, the contextualized linguistic meaning of a certain token of
(1) John bought a donkey and Harry vaccinated it
is a proposition involving a descriptive content such as (in my view) |the it and
donkey that the John bought|, contributed to the proposition by the relevant token
of “it”. Similarly, the contextualized linguistic meaning of a certain token of
(2) after the author of the Divine Comedy was exiled, he went to Ravenna.
is a proposition involving a descriptive content such as |the he and author of the
Divine Comedy|, contributed to the proposition by the relevant token of “he”. Neale
notes that there is a “rather impressive array of facts” in favour of this idea and he
takes it as a working hypothesis, although he is “ready to back down when neces-
sary” (Neale 1990, p. 184). I shall do the same. However, as announced above, I
would like to start from an application of the paraphrase approach to anaphoric uses
of determiner phrases such as “the donkey” or “each daughter” and generalize from
there.
The hypothesis, then, is that anaphoric tokens of these determiner phrases have
contextualized linguistic meanings that could have been expressed by corresponding
proxy paraphrases pretty much as we have seen for anaphoric pronouns. In general,
I thus claim that, given a token t of a determiner phrase such as “the donkey” used
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anaphorically, there is a corresponding proxy paraphrase for t (obtained by means
of the recovery rule), a paraphrase that specifies a certain denoting concept, which
we can call in turn the proxy denoting concept for t. This denoting concept is to be
taken as the contextualized linguistic meaning of t. When the denoting concept is a
descriptive content, |the F|, we can say more specifically that the proxy paraphrase
(which will be of the form “the F”) is a “proxy singular term” for t. Consider this
example:
(3) John bought an ugly little donkey and a beautiful horse, but Tom liked the
donkey more than the horse.
Following the paraphrase approach, there is a recovery rule by virtue of which
the token of “the donkey” embedded in a certain token of this sentence corre-
sponds to the following proxy paraphrase: “the ugly little donkey that John bought”.
Accordingly, the token can be taken to specify a denoting concept along these lines:
|the x such that x is an ugly little donkey and the John bought x|, which then counts
as the contextualized linguistic meaning of the token in question. The proxy para-
phrase is in this case also a proxy singular term. Similarly, the relevant token of “the
horse” corresponds to the proxy paraphrase and singular term “the beautiful horse
that the John bought” and thus specifies a denoting concept such as: |the x such that
x is a beautiful horse and the John bought x|.
As can be seen from the above, I assume that the proxy paraphrase involves
the determiner used in the anaphoric determiner phrase in question. Thus, e.g., the
determiner “the” occurs in the proxy paraphrase, “the ugly little donkey that John
bought”, that I have associated to a certain token of “the donkey”. However, to the
extent that English determiners are ambiguous (e.g., as we saw, “the” may mean
not only |the| but also |thepl| or even |every|), the proxy paraphrase may not clearly
indicate which determiner meaning component is involved in the proxy denoting
concept. But we can assume that at least in typical cases the intra-linguistic context
tells us which determiner meaning component is in play (without ruling out that
ambiguities may sometimes remain). In the above example, it seems plain that the
determiner component is |the|.15 In a language without articles such as Latin, the
opportunities for ambiguity multiply and the burden on context becomes heavier.
The Latin version of (3) (after choosing typical Latin names) is:
(3L) Titius asinum sibi comparavit parvum turpemque et equum nobilem, sed Caius
asinum quam equum maluit.16
15 The issue of how to choose the determiner component is controversial and there is a vast litera-
ture on it (Kanazawa 1994, 2001, Yoon 1996, Geurts 2002). But after all, its relevance for the main
concern of this work, the dispute between descriptivists and referentialists on singular reference, is
limited and so I think that for present purposes we need not investigate the matter in detail.
16 Thanks to Klaus Fisher and Stefania Fortuna for the translation of (3) into Latin.
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A token of (3L) involves an anaphoric token a of “asinum” and an anaphoric token
e of “equum” to which we can assign, by relying on the intra-linguistic context, the
proxy denoting concepts (and contextualized linguistic meanings) |the x such that x
is a donkey and the Titius bought x| and |the x such that x is a horse and the Titius
bought x|, respectively. Note that |the| is zero realized to the extent that |the x such
that x is a donkey and the Titius bought x| is expressed by a. Similarly, |the| is zero
realized to the extent that |the x such that x a is horse and the Titius bought x| is
expressed by e.
Before going ahead, it is worth noting that (3) suggests an important constraint
on the possibility of taking a certain determiner phrase as anaphorically linked to
another token working as antecedent. To see the point, consider the following tokens
embedded in a token of (3): the tokens d1 of “an ugly little donkey”, h1 of “a beau-
tiful horse”, d2 of “the donkey”, and h2 of “the horse”. It seems clear that we take
d1 as the antecedent of d2 because (i) the former has the linguistic meaning |a ugly
little donkey|, (ii) the latter has the linguistic meaning |the donkey| and (iii) |ugly
little donkey| conceptually entails |donkey|. Similarly for h1 and h2. For pairs of
tokens such as d1 and d2 and h1 and h2, we may use this terminology: we could
say that the second token has a predicate component (“donkey” or “horse”) which
is an “impoverished version” of the predicate component (“ugly little donkey” or
“beautiful horse”) of the previous token.
It seems that the conceptual entailment can also go the other way around.
Consider these examples:
(4) John owns a cat and a dog and he likes the friendly cat more than the aggressive
dog.
(5) The table and the chair were broken and Tom repaired first the broken table and
then the broken chair.
Tokens of sentences such as (4) and (5) provide what may called “embellished ver-
sions” of the predicate components of previously occurring tokens. For example,
consider the tokens t1 and t2 of “a cat” and “a dog” in a statement s of (4). The
occurrences of “the aggressive dog” and of “the friendly cat” in s have predicate
components which are embellished versions of the predicate components of the sin-
gular terms t1 and t2, respectively. Similarly, in a statement of (5), there are tokens of
“the broken table” and “the broken chair” whose predicate components are embel-
lished versions of the predicate components in the relevant tokens of “the table”
and “the chair”, respectively. Taking into account the evidence provided by state-
ments with tokens involving impoverished or embellished predicate components
and the possibility that determiner phrases are truncated, we are led to the following
principle:
DPRA. Determiner Phrases: Restriction on their Anaphoric use. A token, t2,
used as determiner phrase, is anaphoric on another token, t1, having as
contextualized linguistic meaning the property |P| or the denoting concept
|det1 P| (depending on whether or not t1 is a truncated determiner phrase)
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only if t2 has as linguistic meaning a property |Q| or a denoting concept
|det2 Q| (depending on whether or not t2 is a truncated determiner phrase)
such that P conceptually entails Q or vice versa.17
Now I would like to dwell on previous or new examples in order to get a firmer
grasp on how the recovery rule works. First of all, let us record that, as regards
(4), the recovery rule provides these proxy paraphrases for the relevant tokens of
the anaphoric terms “the friendly cat” and “the aggressive dog”: “the friendly cat
that John owns” and “the aggressive dog that John owns”. As regards (5), the proxy
paraphrases for the relevant tokens of the anaphoric terms “the broken table” and
“the broken chair” coincide with the terms themselves: “the broken table” and “the
broken chair”.
To further see how the recovery rule works consider now
(6) Tom owns some donkeys and some horses. The donkeys are nicer than the
horses.
The recovery rule should decree for a token of “the donkeys” embedded in a certain
token of (6) that it has the proxy paraphrase “the donkeys that John owns” and thus
specifies a denoting concept such as |thepl x such that x is a donkey and the John
owns x|. Similarly, for the relevant token of “the horses”.
Let us now go back to examples such as (1)–(3) of the previous section, which I
repeat here:
(7) Any farmer who buys a donkey vaccinates the donkey.
(8) Any man who has a daughter loves each daughter.
(9) Any man who meets some beautiful women admires the women.
These differ from those just discussed in that the proxy paraphrases corresponding to
their anaphoric terms exhibit a special dependence on the antecedents of the terms,
a dependence that can be captured by a recourse to variables of the kind we are
accustomed to from logic, along the lines anticipated in § 1.7. For (7)–(9) can be
understood, roughly, as follows:
(7a) Every x such that x is a farmer and x buys a y such that y is a donkey vaccinates
the z such that z is a donkey and x buys z.
(8a) Every x such that x is a man and x has a y such that y is a daughter of x loves
every z such that z is a daughter of x.
(9a) Every x such that x is a man and x meets somepl y such that y is a beautiful
woman admires thepl z such that z is a beautiful woman and x meets z.
17 Aldo Frigerio has pointed out in correspondence that the cases in which embellished predicate
components are appropriate are much rarer than those in which impoverished predicate compo-
nents are. Nevertheless, I urge, these cases, albeit rare, do exist and thus we need to take them into
account, which is what I do in the principle DPRA.
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Note that, in line with what we said above regarding the ambiguity of “the” (and
the assumption that “a” can be regarded as meaning either |a| or |some|), (7) and
(7a) could perhaps be understood as corresponding to two different propositions,
namely:
(7b) |every x such that x is a farmer and x buys a y such that y is a donkey vaccinates
the z such that z is a donkey and x buys z|
and
(7c) |every x such that x is a farmer and x buys some y such that y is a donkey
vaccinates every z such that z is a donkey and x buys z|.18
We should admit in these cases that the proxy paraphrases corresponding to
anaphoric terms contain variables bound by a quantifier in the antecedent. For exam-
ple, roughly speaking, the proxy paraphrase for the term “the donkey” of (7) is the
“open” determiner phrase “the y such that y is a donkey and x buys y”. Similarly,
the proxy paraphrase for the term “each daughter” of (3a) is “every y such that y is
a daughter of x”. As we have seen in § 1.7, these determiner phrases are open, since
they contain an open predicate component, i.e., a predicate with a free variable, e.g.,
“y such that y is a donkey and x buys y” or “y such that y is a daughter of x”.19 We
18 That (7) can be understood as either (7b) or (7c) is in line with opinions we find in the literature
about (1’) of the previous section and the paraphrase we could give for it, namely, “every x such
that x is farmer and x buys a donkey vaccinates the y such that y is it and y is donkey and x buys
y”. For example, Parsons 1978 and Cocchiarella 1989 admit (apart from details that we can neglect
here) that “the”, in a paraphrase along these lines, stands for |every|, where |every F is G| is true
when the class of objects which are F is a subset of the class of objects which are G. In contrast,
according to Neale 1990 (see also Davies 1981 and Ludlow 2009, § 5, for further references), the
“the” in question could be interpreted as involving a “numberless” description, i.e., in such a way
that “the” stands for |whe|, where the special symbol “whe” must be understood as follows: |whe F
is G| is true just in case there are one or more objects with the property F and all such objects have
also the property G. For present purposes, we do not need to inquire whether or not Neale is right
on this score. It is important to note, rather, that, assuming that “the” may fail to entail uniqueness
(by standing for |every| or for |whe|), the paraphrase approach cannot be criticized on the ground
that, e.g., if two men enter the room, only the first of these two sentences is true: “if a man enters
the room, he will turn the switch”, “if a man enters the room, the man who enters the room will turn
the switch”. Similarly it cannot be criticized on the ground that it can hardly account for a sentence
such as “if a man buys a sage plant he buys nine others with it” (Heim 1982, Ludlow 2009). For,
as regards the first example in question, the second sentence may well be true, by taking “the” to
mean |every| or |whe|. As regards the second example, roughly speaking, if we take “it” to mean
“the sage plant such and such”, we must by the some token take “the” to mean |every| or |whe|.
For illustration, consider this similar example: “any man who buys a sage plant buys another with
it”. This can be understood as follows (by treating “buys with” as expressing a triadic relation):
|{every x such that x is man & x buys some y such that y is a sage plant} buys {every z such that z
is a sage plant and x buys z} with {some w such that w is a sage plant and w is different from z}|.
19 Alternatively, we could follow Cocchiarella 2008 in assuming that the proxy paraphrase is of
the kind “that F” where “that” is meant to stand for a special determiner governed by a meaning
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are thus led, as anticipated in § 1.7, to acknowledge denoting concepts with an open
property component, viz. |the y such that y is a donkey that x buys y| or |every y
such that y is a daughter of x|.
Let us consider a further example:
(10) if a man meets a pretty woman, the man falls in love with the woman.
Since, as we saw, “the” may be interpreted as |every|, in this case the relevant proxy
paraphrase for “the man” could be along these lines: “every x such that x is a man
and x meets a pretty woman”. Correspondingly, “the woman” gets the proxy para-
phrase “the y such that y is a pretty woman and x meets y”. The idea here is to
understand a sentence such as (10) along these lines:
(10a) some man meets some pretty woman ⊃ every x such that x is a man and x
meets a pretty woman falls in love with the y such that y is a pretty woman
and x meets y.20
According to Neale, in line with the tradition, c-commanded pronouns are to be
treated as bound variables. Thus, apart from matters of details, Neale would agree
with interpreting (11) as (11a):
(11) every novel is loved by the person who has written it.
(11a) every x such that x is a novel is loved by the y such that y is a person and y
has written x.
postulate, labelled as (MPT 2) by Cocchiarella, a postulate that, roughly, allows one to move from
a sentence such as “any man who owns a donkey feeds that donkey” to “for any x and any y if x
is a man and y is a donkey, then x feeds y” (Cocchiarella 2008, p. 211). It seems to me, however,
that this approach brings complications that we had better avoid. First, this meaning postulate has
a special status, for, as Cocchiarella explains, the standard logical rules cannot be applied until
all occurrences of the special operator have been eliminated by a recourse to (MPT 2). Second,
it seems to me that, in addition to (MPT 2), other meaning postulates of this special brand are
needed, to get rid of the special operator, as we appeal to it in order to interpret sentences such
as “John bought a donkey but his wife did not like it”. Third, other special operators [or at least
other meaning postulates like (MPT 2)] are presumably needed if we want to account in the same
fashion (without open predicates as components of determiner phrases) for sentences such as “if
two donkeys meet, one likes the other”. I do not rule out however that one may want to turn to an
approach of this kind in an attempt to avoid the problem of clarifying the ontological nature of the
denoting concepts expressed by open determiner phrases.
20 Aldo Frigerio has argued in correspondence that the strategy of interpreting “the” as |every| is
not adequate for (10), since it cannot be applied to sentences such as “if two men meet a pretty
woman, the two men fight for the woman”. He thus suggests understanding (10) by appealing to
situations along these lines: every situation in which a man meets a pretty woman is a situation in
which the man falls in love with the woman. But I think that Frigerio’s example can be interpreted
in the spirit in with which I have interpreted (10), roughly as follows: if two men meet a pretty
woman, then every x and y such that x is man and y is man and x = y and x and y meet a pretty
woman are such that x fights with y for the pretty woman whom x and y meet.
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However, this is not in line with the idea of assigning a uniform meaning to pro-
nouns. Moreover, it is not in line with the constraint of trying to minimize linguistic
ambiguities for determiner phrases. For notice that we can have this variant of (11):
(11’) every novel is loved by the person who has written the novel.
If we are to treat a c-commanded pronoun as a bound variable, by parity of reasoning
we should assume that a determiner phrase such as “the novel” can also stand for
a bound variable. We would then be led to multiply ambiguities. Fortunately, we
can provide appropriate proxy paraphrases even for such determiner phrases used
anaphorically. Sentence (11’) can in fact be understood as follows:
(11’b) every x such that x is a novel is loved by the y such that y is a person and y
has written the z such that z is a novel and z is identical to x.
In general, the dependence on a previously occurring antecedent a exhibited by a
c-commanded term t with linguistic meaning |det F| (or |F|, if t is truncated) can be
captured by assuming that the contextualized linguistic meaning of t is representable
by something of the form “|det y such that y is F and y is identical to x|”, where the
free “x” is bound by an occurrence of the same variable in the representation of
the contextualized linguistic meaning of a. Thus, as regards (11’), we can assume
of course that “the novel” has the linguistic meaning |the novel|. As a token n of
this determiner phrase is embedded in a token of (11’), its contextualized linguistic
meaning is (in a typical case) something like |the y such that y is a novel and y
is identical to x|. This is so on the assumption that n has an antecedent, a, with a
contextualized linguistic meaning such as |every x such that x is a novel|. As we
shall see in Chapter 6, this approach can be generalized to c-commanded pronouns,
so as to have a unified approach to anaphoras.
The hope is that the notions of proxy paraphrase and of proxy denoting concept
have been sufficiently clarified for present purposes. Given them, we can record,
by way of summary, the following principle regarding the contextualized linguistic
meaning of anaphoric determiner phrases:
DPCA. Determiner Phrases: Contextualized linguistic meaning when used
Anaphorically. The contextualized linguistic meaning of a token t used as
(possibly truncated) anaphoric determiner phrase is the proxy denoting con-
cept for t (as specifiable by the proxy paraphrase for t). Constraint: A token,
t2, used as determiner phrase, is anaphoric on another token, t1, having as its
contextualized linguistic meaning the property |P| or the denoting concept
|det1 P| (depending on whether or not t1 is a truncated determiner phrase)
only if t2 has as linguistic meaning a property |Q| or a denoting concept
|det2 Q| (depending on whether or not t2 is a truncated determiner phrase)
such that P conceptually entails Q or vice versa.
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For convenience, I have incorporated as a constraint into DPCA the previously
discussed restriction on the anaphoric use of determiner phrases, namely DPRA.
2.8 Quasi-Indicators
Castañeda (1966, 1967, 1968) has forcefully argued that sometimes anaphoric
pronouns are used as quasi-indicators (quasi-indexicals), or, as linguists say, as
logophoric pronouns (see Corazza 2004, Chapter 8 for a combined discussion
of quasi-indexicality and logophoricity). Quasi-indicators are anaphoric pronouns
occurring in an intentional context in order to attribute to the subject of a proposi-
tional attitude an indexical reference. Consider:
(1) Tom believes that he is happy.
(2) At 3:00 p.m., Tom realized that the meeting was about to start then.
(3) At the Église du Dôme, Tom saw that Napoleon was buried there.
(4) Since the table was dirty, Tom thought that it should be cleaned.
The idea is that the relevant token of “he” embedded in a statement s which is a
token of (1) is used quasi-indexically, if s is to be interpreted in such a way that
it attributes to Tom a belief in a proposition that he would express by means of a
first-person pronoun, say, by a token of
(1a) I am happy.
Similarly, tokens of “then”, “there”, and “it” are used quasi-indexically in tokens
of (2), (3), and (4), if they give rise to attributions to Tom of intentional attitudes
relating him to propositions that he (could have) expressed by means of indexicals,
e.g., as follows:
(2a) The meeting is about to start now.
(3a) Napoleon is buried here.
(4a) This table should be cleaned.
Following Castañeda, we can use an asterisk to indicate that a certain pronoun is to
be understood as a quasi-indicator. Thus, for example, the proposition expressed by
(1b) Tom believes that he∗ is happy
must be taken to imply that Tom believes a proposition that is expressible by him
by means of a first-person sentence such as (1a). The asterisk convention in a sense
artificially introduces into philosophical works written in English new words such
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as “he∗” or “there∗”, which function explicitly as quasi-indexicals.21 In due course
we shall see how my theory of reference accommodates quasi-indicators.
2.9 Reference
As we have seen in § 1.1, we can use “to refer” and related words to talk about
something that people do. For example, we can say that Bush referred to the USA
when he said “our nation” in one of his speeches. But here we are mainly concerned
with reference (denotation) as a relation linking words to other entities, which we
may accordingly call referents (references, denotations, denotata). When this ref-
erence relation subsists between a term t and an entity x, we say that t refers to
(or denotes) x. This relation between t and x may be mediated by a further entity,
a meaning expressed by t (of course, according to referentialism, there is in some
cases no such mediation, for referent and meaning may coincide). Singular refer-
ence, the focus of this book, is just one kind of reference and should be sharply
distinguished from general reference, which may come in several subspecies, as we
shall see below in some detail. Typically, whereas meanings are viewed as abstract
conceptual entities or the like, type I PRPs, referents are conceived of as worldly
entities such as ordinary objects, or as sets of them (which rules out neither that in
some cases meanings are worldly (indeed, this is so in many cases, according to the
referentialists), nor that referents may in some cases be non-worldly, as witnessed
by the referent of the singular term “the proposition expressed by the first sentence
of Plato’s Parmenides”).
The notion of general reference applies to general terms or predicates (such as
“table” or “gold”, or “is a table” and “is gold”, if you wish). A subspecies of it is
generic reference, which links a general term to any individual to which the term
applies in virtue of the concept that it expresses, e.g., it links “table” to every single
table. But a general term may also be taken to generally refer to a unique entity,
irreducible to the plurality of entities to each of which it generically refers. For
example, if we are willing to acknowledge sets in our ontology, a general term may
be taken to refer to its extension, i.e. to the set of individuals to which it generically
21 There appears to be languages that have in their natural repertoire logophoric pronouns cor-
responding to Castañeda’s “asterisked” pronouns, as we may call them. For example, Anscombe
(1981, p. 22) notes that there are (rare) occurrences of them in ancient Greek and both Schlenker
2003 and Corazza 2004, by drawing on the literature in linguistics, report that they are commonly
used in a West African language called Ewe. Schlenker 2003 also claims (p. 31) that there is a
language, Amharic, where the first-person pronoun can take narrow scope (see below for the dis-
tinction between narrow and wide scope occurrences of terms). The reason he offers is that the
Amharic equivalent of, e.g., “John says that I am a hero” can be interpreted as attributing to John
a first-person self-attribution of the property of being a hero. However, this seems to me evidence
that in Amharic the equivalent of “I” can be used not only as a first-person pronoun but as the
quasi-indexical “he∗”. The appropriate translation of this last example would then be: “John says
that he∗ is a hero”. Or perhaps, as suggested by Richard Davies, Amharic does not appropriately
distinguish use and mention in these cases.
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refers. Or, if we admit type II PRPs, it may be taken to refer to that worldly quality or
connection, if any, to which somehow the concept it expresses corresponds. We can
speak also of the reference of sentences, especially as we view them as limit cases of
predicates (zero-adic ones). One option is to take states of affairs as the referents of
true sentences and consider false ones as non-denoting, unless one (problematically)
endorses negative states of affairs. Another option, as is well known, is provided
by Frege, who considers truth and falsehood as the referents of sentences, which
we may assume as a convenient way of talking, without necessarily buying all of
Frege’s ontology and semantics. In general, what the referents of general terms and
sentences precisely are taken to be depends on a combination of our semantic and
ontological beliefs. But since we focus on singular reference most of these issues
are immaterial for present purposes and we leave them as open as possible.
Singular reference, as we have seen, links a singular term to a referent. This rela-
tion subsists only when the term in question is used as a singular term, in the sense
explained above. In this (default) case, the singular term is assigned as its meaning
either a descriptive content (from a descriptivist perspective) or a particular (from
a referentialist standpoint). We may use the label singularist for these meanings. A
constraint on singular reference is of course that a term (in virtue of its singular-
ist meaning) may singularly refer to at most one entity. For the sake of assessing
the debate between referentialists and descriptivists, we can assume, without aban-
doning neutrality, that there are ordinary objects, to which our natural language
singular terms normally succeed in singularly referring to. Moreover, in assessing
the dispute we can bring to the fore shared pre-theoretical judgements regarding sin-
gular reference to them, e.g., judgements that take tokens of “Cicero” and “Tully”
as co-referential, tokens of “Zeus” as non-denoting (an assumption of Meinongian
objects22 or the like is of course at the theoretical level), tokens of “I” as referring
to the speaker and so on (in all cases, under the assumptions that the tokens were
uttered in appropriate circumstances). We may also assume that a singular term type,
in virtue of its linguistic meaning, could succeed in singularly referring to an entity.
This may be the case, for example, for complete definite descriptions such as “the
positive square root of two”.
Following Frege, whatever the precise nature of referents, the subsistence of a
reference relation, whether singular or not, between a term and an entity is usu-
ally assumed to depend on the fact that the term expresses a certain meaning,
in virtue of which the relation subsists. In other words, meaning is traditionally
taken to determine reference and accordingly meanings are reference determi-
nants. I take this assumption for granted in agreement with most participants in
the descriptivism/referentialism debate, and thus it is important to note that it does
not automatically involve any begging of the question in favour of the descriptivist.
22 I use “Meinongian object” as it is typically understood in current analytic philosophy in the light
of works such as Castañeda 1974, Parsons 1980 and Routley 1979, i.e. as standing for objects that
have being, somehow instantiate properties of ordinary objects like being horse or being winged
and yet do not exist (cf. Orilia 2002). There is however some debate over what Meinong’s objects
really were (see e.g., Alai 2006, Modenato 2006, Perszyk 1993, Raspa 2006).
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To ensure this neutrality, it suffices, as I did in Chapter 1, to leave a certain theoreti-
cal option open, namely the option that in some cases meaning determines reference
in the trivial sense that the former is identical to the latter. The idea that meaning
determines reference can be put as follows:
MDR. Meaning Determines Reference. If two expressions have the same mean-
ing in a given context, they are co-referential. Conversely, if they have
different referents, then they have different meanings.
The special case regarding singular reference obviously follows:
MDSR. Meaning Determines Singular Reference. If two singular terms have the
same meaning in a given context, then they are co-referential. Conversely, if
they have different referents, then they have different meanings.
In virtue of the latter principle, we can say that, given that a token m of “the
morning star” has the same meaning as a token m′ of the Italian expression “la
stella del mattino”, m and m′ have the same referent. For another example, since
we take for granted that two tokens of “I” uttered by two different subjects (in a
typical circumstance) are not co-referential, we can conclude that their meanings
are distinct. As we shall see, this way of arguing will play a role in a “twin-style”
argument by Kaplan against descriptivism.
2.10 Contextual Parameters
As is well known, when indexical elements are involved, the correct attribution of
a truth-value to (the propositions constituting the official pragmatic meanings of)
certain statements may involve an appropriate identification of corresponding con-
textual parameters, as we may call them, typically taken to be speakers, hearers,
(utterance) times and (utterance) places (of the statements in question). To charac-
terize them, I propose to use the terms “contextual speaker (utterer)”, “contextual
hearer (addressee, receiver, interlocutor)”, “contextual place” and “contextual time”.
These terms stand for basic contextual notions, we might say, which will figure cru-
cially in my account of indexicals. They are relational notions that can be true of an
individual with respect to a linguistic token. Thus, for example, Tom could be the
contextual speaker of a certain token and Mary the contextual hearer of an another.
Similarly a certain volume of space could be the contextual place of a given token
and a certain interval of time the contextual time of another token. To fix ideas, we
can say that an individual counts as the contextual speaker of a linguistic token if this
token refers to the individual, provided the token is used as an I-indexical. Similarly,
an individual counts as the contextual hearer of a linguistic token if this token refers
to the individual, provided the token is used as a you-indexical. As regards the con-
textual time and the contextual place of a token, we could analogously be tempted to
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say that the former is the place to which the token refers, if used as a here-indexical,
whereas the latter is the time to which the token refers, if used as a now-indexical.
However, as will become clear later on, it is better to say that the former is a time
that it is essential to identify in order to understand what the token refers to, if used
as a now-indexical and the latter is a place that it is essential to identify in order to
understand what the token refers to, if used as a here-indexical. Similarly, we could
say that the contextual time and the contextual place are, respectively, the time and
the place that is essential to identify in order to correctly assign a truth-value to the
token, if it is a token of a sentence such as “it’s raining”, “it’s cold” and the like.
However, the basic contextual notions are graspable by way of paradigmatic
examples, independently of an understanding of what it is for a token to be used as
an I-indexical, a you-indexical, a now-indexical and so forth. Indeed, to understand
such things probably already presupposes a grasp of the basic contextual notions.
Let us, then, proceed to discuss some paradigmatic examples of the kind that allow
us to grasp them. I shall start with the concepts of (contextual) speaker and hearer
(I take the liberty of skipping the qualifier “contextual” when it is easily seen as
implicit).
Although contextual speakers and hearers need not be conscious agents, which
requirements they have to fulfil to qualify as contextual speakers or hearers can be
characterized by first relying on paradigmatic cases involving such agents. The most
obvious example is given by an ordinary conversation in which two subjects produce
linguistic tokens to which they associate meanings that they consciously entertain
in an effort to communicate these meanings to each other. In a case like this, the
producer of a given token is also its contextual utterer and the other subject is the
contextual hearer or interlocutor. When the latter replies by producing new linguistic
tokens she becomes the speaker and the former becomes the interlocutor. Of course
we can have a conversation where the speaker addresses different contextual hearers
at the same time.
Thus, in the most typical case of an ordinary face-to-face conversation, the
contextual speaker of a token is the one who orally produced the token and the
contextual hearer the interlocutor who hears it. But someone can count as a con-
textual speaker or hearer with respect to a given token even if the token in question
is not oral. Thus, for example, an inscription can have as contextual speaker the
person who writes the inscription and as contextual hearer the one who reads it.
Furthermore, note that the contextual utterer of a token need not coincide with its
producer, i.e. the one who brought the token into existence (by speaking, handwrit-
ing, typewriting or what have you). We see this very clearly when the token is an
inscription. For example, consider a written token of “do not disturb” that a guest
finds in her hotel room and places outside her door. Clearly, the guest counts as the
contextual speaker of the token, even though somebody else produced it. Or consider
the case of Mary who cannot go to work, calls her colleague Tom and asks him to
post on her office door a token of “Sorry, I am not in today”. In this case, Tom is the
producer of the token, but Mary counts as its contextual utterer. Copying, printing,
tape recording and the like provide ways of producing tokens that call for a distinc-
tion between the utterer and the producer. Consider the several printed versions of
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a manuscript written by Tom. The producer or producers of the printed versions do
not count as contextual utterers of the tokens in it. The utterer is Tom. Such tokens
should be considered as copies of corresponding tokens in the original manuscript,
which we may call the archetypes of the copies in question (for convenience, any
token which is not a copy of an archetype could be called an archetype, even though
no copies of it are ever made). Similarly, when a speech is recorded on a tape, the
tokens in the speech count as archetypes of corresponding copies that are brought
into existence by the activation of the tape recorder. In general, whenever a token
t counts as a copy of a corresponding archetype, the contextual utterer of t is the
utterer of the corresponding archetype, even if someone else is in a certain sense
entitled to be considered the producer of t.
In an ordinary conversation speaker and hearers co-exist at a given time and are
near each other, typically placed face-to-face. But written language, the smoke lan-
guage of American Indians, telephones, tape recorders, etc., allow for speakers and
hearers spatially and/or temporally removed from each other and from the corre-
sponding tokens. For example, consider a token of “you have reached Mary Smith’s
apartment . . .” brought into existence by an answering machine in Rome, triggered
by a phone call by Tom who is in Milan, while the owner of the machine, Mary
Smith, is in Florence. Mary Smith counts as the utterer and Tom as the hearer of the
token in question, although they are both far away from it. Or consider the reader of
a manuscript written 300 years ago. She is a receiver of the tokens in it but she does
not co-exist with the utterer of them. Written language also provides the opportunity
for tokens with multiple utterers, for of course different agents can cooperate to the
production of a manuscript in such a way that they all count as utterers of the tokens
contained therein. Written language allows for still other interesting possibilities.
Consider the case of a group of supporters of the presidential candidate John Smith,
who wear on their jackets a badge with “I shall vote for John Smith” written on it.
Each of them counts as the contextual speaker of the token of “I” occurring on the
badge on her/his jacket.
We can have a contextual speaker with no hearer, as when one speaks to oneself,
whether in inner speech or out loud. Or we can have a speaker without any precise
corresponding contextual hearer, as when someone writes a book. Correspondingly,
although it might seem less obvious, we can have a hearer of a token that does
not have and never had a speaker. By a meteorological accident, a token of “snow is
white” made of clouds could occur in the sky. An English speaker might notice it and
count as its receiver to the extent that she associates a meaning to it (presumably,
the proposition she would associate with a token of “snow is white” uttered by
another English speaker). The cloud token however can hardly be taken to have an
utterer.23 We can perhaps also regard as lacking an utterer an inner speech token
23 From the discussion of a similar example in the opening lines of Chapter 1 of his 1981, we
can infer that, according to Putnam, marks which look like linguistic tokens, but that have not
been intentionally produced by an agent, have no meaning. This reflects a widespread opinion.
But it seems wrong, given that someone who looks at the marks can attach a meaning to them, by
interpreting them as belonging to a certain language in which she is competent.
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unconsciously self-produced by a subject in the course of an auditory hallucination
in which the subject does not experience the token as produced and uttered by her.
Perhaps a hallucination of this kind occurred when Joan of Arc claimed to have
heard an inner voice saying something like a French version of “I want you to fight
for France”.24 In this case the subject is the producer of the token and to the extent
that she assigns a meaning to it, she is also a receiver of the token, but she is not
causally connected to it in the appropriate way to count as its utterer.25
By analogy with cases in which speakers and receivers are conscious agents,
we can understand the notions of speaker and receiver more widely so as to allow
even unconscious creatures to count as speakers or receivers. For example, robots
with sufficient natural language understanding capacities can be considered speak-
ers and/or receivers (we can also attribute to them the appropriate propositional
attitudes, by adopting, in Daniel Dennett’s (1987) well-known terminology, an
intentional stance toward them). Actually, our use of indexicals suggests that we
should take the notion of contextual speaker so widely that it does not even require
any power of interpreting linguistic tokens in a speaker, a power of the kind we can
attribute to both humans and the above-mentioned robots. For example, consider the
machine envisaged by Soldati 1998 (Chapter II, § 2), which automatically prints a
token of “I am hot”, when it gets hot. This machine could be considered a contextual
speaker, to the extent that there can be a receiver who interprets the printed sentence
and infers that the machine is hot, by taking the token of “I” to refer to the machine.
By analogy with cases involving conscious agents, such as that of the supporters of
the presidential candidate John Smith, we can indeed view as contextual utterer any
item with the appropriate label on it. Consider, e.g., a car labelled with a token t of,
say, “I belong to the King of Spain”. Even if t is made of sand and was put together
and randomly placed on the car by a sand storm, the car can be seen as a contextual
speaker, since the token of “I” in the label can be taken to refer to the car. Indeed, t
can be taken to express a truth by someone who sees the car and comes to believe
that it really belongs to the King of Spain. In these cases, of course, we have no
speaker meaning but only a hearer meaning (which may happen to be an official
meaning). In sum, to the extent that there is a potential hearer meaning, i.e. that pos-
sibly a subject views the tokens in question as linguistic tokens and interprets them
in accordance with semiotic rules, it makes sense to consider as contextual utterers
Soldati’s machine and even the car with the self-referential label on it.
Let us now turn to the notions of contextual time and contextual place of a token.
For clarity’s sake, it should be emphasized that I take for granted neither that the
contextual place of a token coincides with its referent when this token is a token of
24 Note that, since the referent of a token of a first-person pronoun is the utterer of such a token, we
seem to have in Joan of Arc’s case a first-person pronoun token which fails to refer. I shall discuss
this in more detail in due time.
25 By contrast, it seems to me that, if someone is forced (by some device) involuntarily to move his
mouth so as to utter a token t, he is connected to t appropriately enough to count as its (involuntary)
utterer. In any case, nothing crucial will hinge on this.
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“here” (used as here-indexical), nor that that the contextual time of a token coin-
cides with its referent when this token is a token of “now” (used as now-indexical).
However, as we shall see in due course, it is essential to know the contextual time
and place of such tokens in order to know their referents. In typical cases, as in a
normal conversation, we may say that the contextual time and place of a token coin-
cide with the time of its production and the place it occupies when just produced, in
brief, the production time and place. And this is so also for an inscription occurring
in a typical manuscript such as a letter written to a friend. But this need not always
be the case. The contextual time and place of a token may be different from those
of its production, given the appropriate circumstances, in a way that depends on the
intentions of either the utterer or the producer in their use of the token. Consider
again the case of the guest in a hotel who places a certain token of “do not disturb”
on the door of her room. In this case, the intentions of the utterer, the guest, make
it the case that the contextual place is the current location of the token and not the
place of its original production. What about the contextual time of the token? It sim-
ilarly depends on the intentions of the utterer. We cannot just say that it coincides
with the moment at which she places the token on the door, for clearly the token
is meant to be “active” as long as the guest keeps it on the door. We should rather
say that the contextual time keeps changing as time goes by. This possibility can
be seen more clearly if we consider a posted statement involving a token of “now”.
Suppose Tom posts on the door of its office a token of “I am off for lunch now, but
I shall be back by noon”. We may say that as long as the message is posted, at any
time t at which it is read, the token of “now” in it refers to t. This suggests that the
contextual time of the token of “now” (and of the whole statement) keeps changing,
as if there were a new message at each successive moment. We can similarly have
a changing contextual place of the token. Consider a bizarre boss who sometimes
gets very nervous to the point that he does not want to be addressed by any of his
employees, when he exits his office door. He then wears a conspicuous label with
a token of “do not talk to me here”, when he ventures outside his office. We might
say that, as he moves along with this label on him, the contextual place of the token
keeps changing, for it always coincides with the place that the token occupies time
after time until the boss is back in his office and puts the label to rest into the drawer
of his desk. And as the contextual place of the token of “here” changes, its referent
changes accordingly.
Similarly, when a token is a copy of a corresponding archetype, what counts as
the time and place of the copy seems to depend on the purpose for which the copy
is used. Consider the several printed versions of a letter written at some point by a
notable person, versions produced at different times and different places by a pub-
lishing house. Intuitively, because of the intentions of the producers, the contextual
time and place of a token in one such version are not those of its production, but
those of the production of the corresponding tokens in the original manuscript. In
fact, tokens of “now” and “here” in any of the printed versions must be understood
in relation to the time and place in which the notable person wrote the original letter,
and not in relation to the time and place in which the printed version is produced,
let alone read. However, when a token is produced by the activation of an answering
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machine, we should say that the contextual time and place of the token are those
of its production, and not those of the corresponding archetype, for this choice is
pre-determined by the intentions of the utterer at the time at which he decided to pro-
gramme an answering machine. In fact, tokens of “now” and “here” in the recorded
message should be understood in relation to the time and place in which they are
produced by the activation of the machine caused by a phone call, not to the time
and place in which the corresponding archetypes were produced.
By way of summary, we could say that, by and large, the contextual time and
the contextual place of a token t coincide with the utterance time and the utterance
place of t, apart from more or less peculiar situations such as those paradigmati-
cally illustrated by the typical uses of a “do not disturb” label in a hotel or by the
case of the bizarre boss. In such situations the contextual time and the contextual
place are determined in the different ways that I have characterized in the foregoing
discussion.
Chapter 3
Why Descriptivism Was So Successful
3.1 Premise
Descriptivism can be seen as an attempt to provide a theoretical simplification based
on reducing singular reference to generic reference. This is most evident in Quine’s
proposal (1960) for the elimination of singular terms from his canonical language,
a proposal according to which, as we shall see, both proper names and indexicals
are descriptions in disguise, so to speak.1 By contrast, for referentialism, singular
reference is not reducible in this way. Since theoretical investigation is typically
seen as aiming at reductive explanations, the prospect of an account of singular
reference in this spirit should be considered an important motivation in favour of
descriptivism, one that has presumably attracted many philosophers. By far the most
important motivations for descriptivism spring however from two problems which
took centre-stage in contemporary philosophy thanks to Frege and Russell: the co-
reference problem and the no-reference problem. In the following sections we shall
focus on the former and then we shall turn to the latter.
3.2 The Co-reference Problem I
In order to explain the co-reference problem, it will be convenient to make use of
this definition: two sentence tokens A(s) and A(s′), embedding the singular term
tokens s and s′, respectively, are co-referentially equivalent (in a given context C
and with respect to the singular terms s′ and s′) when s and s′ are co-referential in
context C and A(s) and A(s′) differ only in that the former contains s precisely where
the latter contains s′. For example, in a typical context, tokens of
1Of course, it is not quite appropriate to consider Quine a descriptivist, since he does not allow
for intensional entities such as descriptive contents and propositions in his ontology. But these
details should be set aside for present purposes, e.g., by saying not so much that Quine does not
admit descriptive contents and propositions but rather that he equates them with descriptions and
sentences. For a discussion of Quine’s views, see, e.g., Gochet 1986.
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(1) the morning star is visible in the morning
and
(2) the evening star is visible in the morning
are co-referentially equivalent (with respect to the relevant tokens of “the morn-
ing star” and “the evening star”). In assessing whether two statements are
co-referentially equivalent, minor differences in them required by grammar should
of course be neglected. For example, a token of “I am Italian” may well be
co-referentially equivalent to “F.O. is Italian”, even though “am” and “is” are two
different words.
The problem of co-reference it that of accounting for the following datum:
CO-REF. The CO-REFerence datum. There are situations involving two state-
ments A(t) and A(t′), which are coreferentially equivalent with respect to t and
t′, situations given which it seems prima facie that the proposition expressed
by A(t) has a certain property that the proposition expressed by A(t′) does
not have. And so these situations suggest that A(t) and A(t′) do not have the
same pragmatic meaning. The property in question could be being believed
(doubted, desired, . . .) by a certain subject,2 being necessary, being infor-
mative (not being a trivial tautology), and the like. In other words, it is a
property typically attributable by means of an intensional context such as
“Tom believes that . . .”, “it is necessary that . . .”, etc., which leads us to sus-
pect that Leibniz’s law of the substitutivity of identicals fails in such contexts
(or, to put it otherwise, that co-referential singular terms are not mutually
substitutable in such contexts).3
As we shall see, this datum is particularly evident and easy to describe when definite
descriptions and proper names are involved, but even when the only singular terms
involved are indexicals a case for it can be made.
The standard Fregean morning star/evening star example proves the case for
definite descriptions. As Frege noted, a statement of
(3) the morning star is the evening star,
2Of course we need assume here that the believing in question is de dicto and it is also convenient
to assume for ease of exposition that it is active. A subject believes a proposition in this most basic
sense, when, upon entertaining the proposition, she gives assent to it (more on this later). The other
propositional attitudes should be understood in the same fashion.
3We could extend the definition of “co-referentially equivalent” so as to focus not just on singular
terms but on terms in general. Once understood in relation to such an extended definition, the
co-reference datum would remain true. But since the emphasis in this book is on singular terms,
we can set this issue aside.
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as standardly interpreted, is co-referentially equivalent (with respect to the relevant
tokens of “the morning star” and “the evening star”) to a statement of
(4) the morning star is the morning star.
Yet, (3) can be used to express an informative proposition, whereas (4) a (differ-
ent) tautological one (at least on the assumption that the relevant singular terms are
singularly referring). We may assume here that the predicates “morning star” and
“evening star” abbreviate, roughly, “last celestial body other than the moon visible
in the morning” and “celestial body other than the moon which appears first in the
evening”, respectively. With this in mind, a token of (1) also appears to express a
necessary proposition and accordingly it seems that we express a truth by uttering
(5) necessarily, the morning star is visible in the morning.
In contrast, a token of (2), albeit co-referentially equivalent to a certain token of (1),
appears to express a (different) contingent proposition.
Relatedly, we could say of a standard English speaker, Tom, who is rather
ignorant about astronomy, that
(6) Tom believes that the morning star is visible in the morning.
And we could add that
(7) it is not the case that Tom believes that the evening star is visible in the morning.
For example, there could be a token of (1) rehearsed with sincere assent in his mind
by Tom, while he hears with sincere dissent a token of (2) proposed to Tom by his
more knowledgeable friend Mary (so that Tom does not accept the token of (2) in
question). It might be noticed that, in moving from Tom’s acceptance of (1) to a
commitment to (6), we appeal to a principle such as this:
DP. Disquotation Principle. If an agent A sincerely, reflectively and compe-
tently accepts at time t a statement s, then A believes at time t the proposition
expressed by s in the context in question.
Similarly, in moving from Tom’s failure to accept (2) to a commitment to (7), we
appeal to:
CDP. Converse Disquotation Principle. If an agent A sincerely, reflectively and
competently withholds acceptance at time t from a statement s, then it is not
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the case that A believes at time t the proposition expressed by s in the context
in question.4
However, these two principles are intuitively plausible (in discussing other instances
of the co-reference problem in the following I shall leave recourse to them implicit).
In sum, we can have two statements which (i) are co-referentially equivalent with
respect to the relevant tokens of “the morning star” and “the evening star”, and (ii)
express different propositions, one believed by Tom at a certain time, and another
not believed by Tom at the same time.
It should be clear why, given all this, doubts can be cast on a principle usually
accorded the status of logical law, Leibniz’s law of the substitutivity of identicals,
according to which, given sentences of the form x = y and A(x), one can infer a
sentence of the form A(x/y).5 For “is” is typically taken to express identity and thus,
given, e.g., that the relevant tokens of (3), (6) and (7) are simultaneously true, we
seem to have a triad of sentences which falsify this law.
The descriptivist can provide a simple explanation of all this, by taking CO-REF
at face value and claiming that the relevant pairs of co-referentially equivalent
sentence tokens, A(t) and A(t′), indeed express distinct propositions, e.g.,
(1a) |the morning star is visible in the morning|
and
(2a) |the evening star is visible in the morning|,
which differ from each other only in that the former has a certain descriptive content,
|the morning star|, contributed by a token of “the morning star”, where the latter has
a different descriptive content, |the evening star|, contributed by a token of “the
evening star”. Given this approach, as is well known, there are ways to account
for the apparent failure of the law of substitutivity, along lines indicated by Frege,
Russell and others. The referentialist can provide, if he wishes, the same explanation
as long as definite descriptions are involved (except perhaps for those interpreted as
referential in Donnellan’s sense; see below), but this is not open to him as soon as
proper names and/or indexicals enter the picture and descriptions are out of the way.
4The principles DP and CDP are of course pretty much like the “disquotational principle” of Kripke
1979 (see KDP below). In stating DP and CDP I follow closely McKay and Nelson 2005.
5A(x/y) is the sentence that result from replacing the occurrences of the term x in it with the term y
(possibly making some adjustments required by grammar). For example, if A(x) is “you are happy”,
x is “you” and y is “Tom”, then A(x/y) is “Tom is happy”.
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3.3 The Co-reference Problem II
We can appeal to the standard Cicero/Tully example to illustrate CO-REF in rela-
tion to proper names. For example, Tom may be a standard English speaker who is
ignorant about Roman history. He can then sincerely assent to a token of
(1) Cicero is an orator,
rehearsed in his mind, without sincerely assenting to a token of
(2) Tully is an orator,
proposed to him by Mary. This may well happen in a context in which we can
say that the two statements are co-referentially equivalent, say during a discussion
of Roman history. The referentialist is at a first glance forced to say that the two
statements express the same proposition,
(1/2a) |cicero is an orator|,
which is the meaning on the one hand of a statement involving a token of “Cicero”
and, on the other hand, of a statement involving a token of “Tully”. And yet it
seems, in this situation, that the former statement expresses a proposition believed
by Tom, while the latter expresses a proposition not believed by Tom (at the same
time), and thus a different one. The referentialist owes us an explanation of this. By
contrast, as in the morning star example, the descriptivist can simply claim that the
relevant tokens of “Cicero” and “Tully” express two distinct descriptive contents,
whose nature need not concern us at the moment. I shall then simply represent them
as follows: |the C| and |the T|. Accordingly, for the descriptivist, the relevant tokens
of (1) and (2) express two propositions, only one of which is believed by Tom:
(1a) |the C is an orator|
and
(2a) |the T is an orator|.
To adapt to present purposes a famous example by Kripke, suppose that Pierre
moves from Paris to an ugly neighbourhood of London, without realizing that the
city he now inhabits is London. Recalling what he had studied in geography books,
he sincerely assents to a token of
(3) London is a beautiful city,
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(say, while he rehearses this token in his mind). At the same time, let us imagine,
Pierre sincerely dissents from a token (uttered by a passerby, while Pierre is strolling
in his ugly neighbourhood) of
(4) this is a beautiful city.
Pierre is, we may assume, a standard speaker of English. Under these circumstances
we have two co-referentially equivalent statements (with respect to a “London”
token and to a “this” token), which appear to express two different propositions.
For the one expressed by the token of (3) is believed by Pierre, whereas the one
expressed by the token of (4) is not believed by Pierre. This illustrates CO-REF for
the case in which the relevant singular terms are a proper name and an indexical.
The descriptivist can account for it by claiming that there are indeed two distinct
propositions in question, expressed by the two different co-referentially equivalent
statements. In the Pierre example, the two propositions are, let us say,
(3a) |the L is a beautiful city|
and
(4a) |the T is a beautiful city|,
where |the L| and |the T| are two descriptive contents, expressed by the “London”
token and the “this” token, respectively. In contrast, the typical referentialist will
have to say that both such tokens express the same ordinary object, |london|, and
therefore that the two different co-referentially equivalent statements express the
very same proposition:
(3/4a) |london is a beautiful city|.
And hence the referentialist owes us an explanation of why prima facie one
statement expresses a proposition believed by Pierre, whereas the other does not.
It is a bit more difficult to show that CO-REF holds when both singular terms
are indexicals, but it is important to do so, for the above mixed case is not problem-
atic for an untypical referentialist who is descriptivist with respect to either proper
names or indexicals, but not to both (for example, Frigerio (2003) is referentialist
as regards proper names and descriptivist for indexicals). There are in the literature
many alleged illustrations of CO-REF involving terms such as “this”, “that” or “he”,
although they are, I think, somewhat controversial. This is so, because they involve
pointing by a speaker at different parts of one object, while the speaker uses two
allegedly co-referential demonstrative tokens, (e.g., the two parts are the front and
the rear of the same ship, as in Recanati 1993, § 4.4). Someone may object in such
cases that the two tokens in question are not really co-referential for they refer to dif-
ferent parts of an object rather than to the same object. Or there are examples with
“I” and “this” that involve mirror images. For instance, there is the case of Mach
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who reports (1886)6 that in one occasion he failed to realize that he was referring to
himself when, while pointing at a mirror image, thought with sincere assent a token
of the German equivalent of: “that is a shabby pedagogue”. Clearly, he could have
done this, while sincerely dissenting from a token of (a German version of) “I am a
shabby pedagogue” that somehow crossed his mind at the same time. Mirror image
examples such as Mach’s however are also controversial, for one could argue that if
a person X uses a demonstrative while pointing at a mirror that is reflecting X, then
X is in fact referring to a mirror image of X and not to X. Perhaps these objections
are misguided, but in any case, we can provide examples without mirror images.7
6This is an example discussed, e.g., in Soldati, 1998, Chapter I, § 8 and in Perry 2001.
7Examples without reference to mirror images or to parts of objects are the auditorium example
of Wettstein 1986, p. 196 (discussed in Perry 2000, p. 191), the tunnel example of Loeffler 2001
and the “two tubes case” of Austin 1990, p. 243. However, they involve demonstratives such a
“he”, “this” and “that” and have nothing to do with “I”. But I think it is important to also provide
examples with “I”. The only ones in the literature known to me that involve “I” and that do not
appeal to reference to different parts of one object or to mirror images are science-fictional in an
extreme way, such as the following one by Castañeda. In formulating it, he appeals to a possible
world, call it w, described in this quotation (1989, p. 72): “It is only an empirical fact, though
perhaps psychologically necessary for us, that binocular persons see the physical world from the
top of their noses as the focus of the perspective they find in their visual perceptions. We can easily
imagine a universe – ours after some future technological development – in which one’s focus of
visual perspective is located several feet away from one’s nose. In that universe, besides, the focus
of visual perception changes from time to time, according, perhaps, to certain happenings in one’s
brain caused by what one has digested. In such a universe one’s focus of visual perception may
at one moment be on the left of one’s body, and later on in front, with one’s own body among
the object one sees. One would know that a certain body is her own in the usual way, namely by
feeling kinesthetic sensations, pains, itches, and so on, in that body. At moments in which all his
bodily sensations were nonexisting, or too dull and unattended, one of two identical twins may be
momentarily confused as to which of two similar bodies in his visual field is his”. Let us suppose
that Tom is an inhabitant of w. He sees somebody with a red hat and thus he fails to assent when
the color-blind Mary (who is walking alongside with him) points at the man with the red hat and
utters:
(a) that (guy) is not wearing a red hat.
Tom rejects Mary’s statement. Indeed, he objects to her that what she said is false, for the hat
in question is actually red. However, given the very unusual features of the world w, we can
assume that the token of “that” in question refers to Tom, whereas Tom takes it to refer to his
twin. Moreover, Tom (mistakenly) thinks that he forgot to wear his red hat that morning and so at
the same time he utters sincerely
(b) I am not wearing a red hat,
thereby assenting to a statement co-referentially equivalent to Mary’s one, which he rejects. It could
be objected however that the world w is too different from ours to draw from it conclusions about
how language works in our world. I thus prefer to provide a different example, as we shall see in the
following. (An example not too different in kind from the above one by Castañeda is a variation on
the theme of Perry’s messy shopper (see below) hinted at by Austin in note 12, p. 26 of his 1990.)
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Imagine that John and Bill (two standard speakers of English) are lying on the
ground, next to each other, after a minor motorcycle accident. John’s forehead is
bleeding, but he is not aware of it (fortunately for him it is a superficial cut). A
beautiful woman comes to the rescue. Pointing at John, she says:
(3) he is wounded.
There is a cloud of smoke around John, due to the accident, sufficient to distort his
vision in such a way that the woman’s finger pointing toward him is mistakenly
taken by John to point toward Bill. John does not believe that he is wounded but he
wants the woman’s attention and thus he says at the very same time:
(4) I am wounded.
Under these circumstances, we should say that John does not believe the proposition
expressed by his own statement, since he thinks he is lying in uttering it. However
he has noticed Bill’s swollen arm and thus he sincerely assents to the woman’s
statement. He believes the proposition expressed by it, we can say. The “he” token
and the “I” token in question are, we should admit, co-referential: they both refer to
John. Thus we seem to have a situation in which a token of (3) is co-referentially
equivalent to a token of (4) and yet the former expresses a proposition that John
believes, while the latter expresses a proposition that John does not believe.8
We can further enrich the story by imagining that Tom is also coming to the res-
cue from behind and thus cannot see the mouths of the two men, when John utters
(4). He has no reason to doubt that the woman is speaking truthfully and thus sin-
cerely assents to her statement (which is in fact true). But he also recognizes that the
voice of the man who declared that he is wounded is the voice of a famous Casanova
who often lies in order to have women’s attention. He thus attributes the statement
to the man next to the one pointed at by the woman, i.e., Bill. Accordingly, it seems
we should say that, like John, Tom does not believe the proposition expressed by
John’s statement, whereas he believes the proposition expressed by the woman’s
8To illustrate CO-REF in relation to the failure of the law of substitutivity, we can imagine that
the story continues as follows. John replies to the nurse saying: “OK, you are right I believe that
he is wounded but I believe that I am wounded too”. Assume also that at the moment when John
says “I believe that he is wounded” he rehearses in his mind (without assenting to it) “I believe
that I am wounded”, as he is about to pronounce it. Given the context, the uttered “he” token
refers to John. Moreover, John’s rehearsed tokens of “I” refer to John as well. Hence, we have
two co-referentially equivalent tokens of “I believe that he is wounded” and “I believe that I am
wounded” uttered at the same time. One of them can be regarded as the result of substituting a
term in an intensional context with a co-referring term. Yet, the former is true and the latter is
false. Furthermore, to illustrate CO-REF in relation to the property of informativeness, imagine
the story continues as follows. The nurse has now realized that John’s vision is distorted and thus
she says, while pointing at him: “he is you!”. Although John distortedly sees the nurse’s finger as
pointing at the man next to him, he comes to realize that the nurse has conveyed a true informative
identity statement and that his vision is distorted.
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statement. For reasons analogous to the previous examples, the descriptivist can say
that in fact two distinct propositions are at issue here, one believed by John and Tom,
and another not believed by John and Tom. We could represent them, respectively,
as follows:
(3a) |the Hj is wounded|
and
(4a) |the Ij is wounded|.
In contrast, the referentialist should say that, despite any prima facie evidence, the
two statements express one and the same proposition:
(3/4) |john is wounded|.
The referentialist thus bears the onus of offering us an explanation of why we seem
two have two propositions, one believed by John and Tom and the other not believed
by John and Tom.
We can also provide the following example. Tom lives in New York and believes
that San Francisco always has a warm weather. He receives a phone call from John,
an acquaintance he has never met and who lives in San Francisco. John says:
(5) it is cold here,
(6) I am wearing a heavy coat.
John dissents in his mind, for he believes the phone call comes from San Francisco
and thinks his acquaintance is lying for some reason, perhaps wanting to make fun
of him. As a matter of fact, John is in New York, actually he is calling from a phone
booth across the street from Tom’s house, but does not want to reveal it in order
to surprise Tom by paying him an unexpected visit. Tom can see John from the
window, but in Tom’s mind that man in a heavy coat in the phone booth, who in
fact is John, is just some unknown person making a phone call. Yet, while listening
to his friend on the phone, two statements are rehearsed with sincere assent in his
mind, namely a token of (5) and, as he focuses on the guy in the phone booth, a
token of
(7) he is wearing a heavy coat.
The former crosses his mind precisely upon hearing with sincere dissent John’s own
token of (5) and the latter upon hearing with sincere dissent John’s token of (6).
We can assume in this situation that Tom believes the propositions expressed by
these two statements crossing his mind, call them statement j1 and statement j2,
respectively. At the same time, he does not believe the two propositions expressed
by the statements uttered by Tom, call them t1 and t2, respectively. Yet, j1 and t1
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are co-referentially equivalent with respect to two tokens of “here”, for both tokens
refer to New York. Similarly, j2 and t2 are co-referentially equivalent with respect
to an “I” token and a “he” token, for both tokens refer to John. As before, the moral
is an encouraging one for the descriptivist, who can simply say that, in line with the
prima facie evidence, j1 and j2 on the one hand, and t1 and t2 on the other hand,
express distinct propositions. An option which does not seem to be available for the
referentialist.
Perhaps we can also make an example with “now”. Imagine that at dinner time
Tom hears two simultaneous tokens, s1 and s2, of
(8) it is dinner time now.
While he thinks that s1 has just been uttered “live”, he takes s2 as coming from
a tape recorder and thus relates it to a past event. Accordingly, he assents to the
former, but not to the latter. But in fact s1 has been uttered “live” just like s1. It
seems then that the two statements are co-referentially equivalent (with respect to
two tokens of “now”) and thus they should express, according to the referentialist,
the same proposition. But the former expresses a proposition believed by Tom and
the other does not. Therefore, we are bound to say, at least prima facie, that they
express different propositions.
Before closing this section, it may be worth dwelling for a moment on a recent
line that someone may want to take in an attempt to downplaying the importance
of the co-reference problem and its relevance in backing up descriptivism (Braun
and Saul 2002, § 5).9 It has been pointed out that many speakers tend to assent to a
token of
(9) Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent,
without assenting to a token of
(10) Superman leaps more tall buildings than Superman,
in spite of the fact that they are aware of the truth of the proposition expressible by
the identity sentence
(11) Superman is Clark Kent.
(We assume here for illustration that the Superman stories are true). Now, upon
reflection (in view of the extensional nature of the context “Superman leaps more
tall buildings than . . .”), (9) and (10) should have the same truth value (false), given
the truth of (11). And one should not want to throw away the result of this reflection,
just because there is a widespread tendency to judge that (9) and (10) differ in truth
9The issues raised by sentences such as (9) and (10) below, discussed in Braun and Saul 2002,
originate from Saul 1997. See the references in Braun and Saul 2002 for further opinions on them.
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value. Similarly, it might be argued, upon reflection (given the truth of (11) and
referentialism), these sentences express the same propositions:
(12) Lois believes that Superman flies,
(13) Lois believes that Clark Kent flies.
(Many referentialists would say (cf. Chapter 8, below) that both of them express
the true proposition that links Lois, by means of the believing relation, to one
and the same singular proposition with Superman/Clark Kent as constituent). And
we should not want to dismiss the result of this reflection just because there is a
widespread tendency to judge that (12) and (13) differ in truth value.
There is however a crucial difference. A speaker who wrongly judges that (9)
and (10) differ in truth values can be easily convinced, it seems to me, that her
judgement was wrong, without having to elicit highly theoretical commitments in
her. For example, to achieve this, one can point out to other (less misleading, but
otherwise similar) examples involving contexts that are as extensional as “Superman
leaps more tall buildings than . . .”:
(14) Cicero is taller than Tully.
(15) Cicero is taller than Cicero.
One should have no temptation here to assign different truth values to (14) and (15)
(given the knowledge that Cicero is Tully) and, when necessary, this can used to
convince someone that similarly (9) and (10) must have the same truth value. In
other words, I submit, a consensus can be reached rather easily among ordinary
speakers about the fact that (9) and (10) do not differ in truth value and thus, despite
any initial mistaken judgements (whose existence may well be explained in the way
suggested by Braun and Saul 2002), in the end there is no serious reason to doubt
the result of the reflection leading to the thesis that (9) and (10) have the same truth
value. Nothing comparable, however, can be said on behalf of the reflection leading
to the thesis that (12) and (13) express the same proposition, for this reflection can
hardly be separated by a highly theoretical commitment to referentialism. It is thus
difficult to imagine that an ordinary speaker can be easily convinced that (12) and
(13) express the same proposition. It seems to me that, in order to convince an ordi-
nary speaker of that, something like a theoretical stand in favour of referentialism
must be first induced in him.
3.4 Coherent and Incoherent Assent
Notice that in all these examples involving belief, the referentialist cannot evade the
problem by saying that the relevant subject attaches a non-standard meaning to at
least one of the two sentence tokens in question and that this is why there are two
distinct propositions at issue (say, an official pragmatic meaning of one statement,
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believed by the subject, and a deviant meaning wrongly attributed to the other state-
ment by the subject and disbelieved by him). For in all these examples the subject
can be assumed to be a standard speaker of the relevant language. Nor can the ref-
erentialist evade the problem by saying that the relevant speaker is irrational in that
she incoherently believes and disbelieves the same proposition at the same time.
Perhaps something like this can happen in the following sense. Let us assume that
a speaker X accepts (sincerely assents to) a statement when X (i) attaches a certain
proposition as meaning to the statement, and while doing so, (ii) actively believes
the proposition. Similarly, X does not accept (sincerely dissents from) a statement,
i.e. rejects it , when, in attaching a proposition as meaning to the statement, fails to
actively believe the proposition. Thus, a speaker who outwardly assents to a state-
ment is sincere, if he accepts the statement and is not sincere otherwise. We might
perhaps conceive of someone who at the same time attributes the same proposi-
tion as meaning to two statements s and s′ and yet accepts one statement, but not the
other. For example, suppose that a subject grasps a PRP, say a proposition P, by way
of an internal subjective representation of it, R(P). Moreover, assume that a subject
associates a meaning M to a token t to the extent that he appropriately associates in
his mind a representation of t to a representation of M, R(M). This is a “meaning
structure”, we could say, in some way individually present in the subject’s mind or
brain. This meaning structure could be called a propositional representation when M
is a proposition. If so, the acceptance by a subject X of a sentence token s to which
X is exposed and to which X attaches as meaning the proposition P can be under-
stood as the insertion of a propositional representation R(P) in the subject’s “belief
box”. Similarly, the failure to accept a token to which X is exposed can be under-
stood as the insertion of the meaning structure in X’s “judgment suspension box”
or, worse, in X’s “disbelief box” (which in turn can be viewed as the placing of a
representation R(not-P) in the belief box). Nothing crucial hinges here on the use of
this way of speaking, reminiscent of Harman’s (1973) and Fodor’s (1975) language
of thought hypothesis. It is a way of speaking that could be considered more or less
literal or metaphorical, depending on one’s inclinations in philosophy of mind. At
any rate, it is convenient to use it at least for illustrative purposes. Now, an irra-
tional speaker could, for example, at the same time, associate the same proposition
P as meaning to two statements s and s′ and yet accept s by putting a propositional
representation R(P) of P in his belief box and at the same time reject s′ by putting
another propositional representation R(not-P) in the belief box. In a case like this
we could indeed say that the speaker has incoherently accepted s and rejected s′. For
a speaker X who accepts a statement s and rejects another statement s′ in a certain
moment does this coherently only if, in doing so, is not in an irrational state of mind
such as the one that I have tried to describe by recourse to propositional represen-
tations, belief boxes and the like.10 But of course there is no reason to say that the
10A less drastic kind of irrationality and thus of incoherence can be illustrated by the following
example: s is a token of “all men are mortal and Socrates is a man”, s′ is a token of “Socrates
is mortal”, and yet a certain speaker at the same time accepts s and rejects s′. Such a situation is
however less relevant for our concerns here.
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standard speakers of our examples are in such irrational states of mind. They do not
appear to believe a contradiction “in the sense in which thoughtful people do not do
it” (to use an expression from Perry 1977, also quoted by McKay and Nelson 2005,
§ 1). Their acceptance of a statement and rejection of another appears to be coherent
because it is always simply due to a lack of some factual information and thus there
is no temptation to attribute it to an irrational state of mind.11
3.5 The No-reference Problem and Negative Existentials
Call gappy (with respect to a singular term token t) a sentence token A(t) which is
uttered in a context in which t is a non-referring singular term token. For example,
in a context in which an astronomer is putting forward his conviction that there are
ten planets in the solar system, a token uttered by him of
(1) The tenth planet of the solar system is rather small
is a gappy sentence token (on the assumption that there are nine planets in the solar
system12).
Frege and Russell were aware of the following datum (at least as regards definite
descriptions and proper names):
NO-REF. The NO-REFerence datum. There are gappy sentence tokens which
appear to be meaningful, for (i) they seem to be able to convey contents of
propositional attitudes (e.g., they seem to convey beliefs or disbeliefs, in that
11Of course, there is always the possibility that a prima facie incoherence, exhibited by a speaker
who assents to a statement and fails to assent to another statement with the same meaning, is not a
real one, for the speaker may be insincere or may attribute a non-standard meaning to the statement.
But for present purposes we can assume that we are dealing with sincere and standard speakers.
And indeed the following principle (versions of which are attributable to Frege and Gareth Evans)
seems to be a priori true:
ASP. Acceptance Synonymy Principle. Suppose (i) X is a fully competent subject with respect
to sentence token s to which at time t she is exposed and (ii) with respect to sentence token
s′ to which at time t she is also exposed. Suppose further that (iii) X accepts (sincerely
assents to) s at t, but, without being incoherent, (iv) fails to accept (sincerely assent to) s′
at t. Then, s and s′ do not have the same (pragmatic) meaning. Similarly, given (i) and (ii),
if X had been exposed, rather than to s, to another statement s′′ with respect to which X is a
fully competent subject and, everything else being equal, X had failed to accept (sincerely
assent to) s′′ at t, then s does not have the same (pragmatic) meaning that s′′ would have
had.
12Actually, this may not be true, given a recent proposal by the experts about how “planet” should
be understood, but let us assume it is, for the sake of using a typical example.
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fully competent speakers can sincerely assent to them or sincerely dissent
from them), and (ii) they seem to have a truth-value.13
Given the idea, common to descriptivists and referentialists, that the meaning of
a sentence is a proposition, this datum tells us that a gappy sentence expresses a
proposition. The problem of no-reference is the task of accounting for this datum.
It is fairly obvious that NO-REF holds with respect to definite descriptions. For
example, the astronomer of our example, call him Smith, can be taken to be a fully
competent speaker who sincerely assents to a token of (1), because of his conviction
that there is empirical evidence in favour of a tenth planet, e.g., perturbations in
the orbits of the already accepted nine planets. Thus, the token in question appears
to express a proposition believed by the astronomer, albeit a false one. Moreover,
consider a colleague of his who reacts with a negative existential, such as a token of
(2) the tenth planet of the solar system does not exist.
The token in question is another gappy statement, and indeed a true one, given that
Smith’s theory is wrong. Thus, we have another gappy statement that appears to
express a proposition, a true one in this case. Other examples of gappy sentences
that appear to express true propositions can be offered with reference to works of
fiction. For example:
(3) In the Iliad, the goddess of wisdom helps the Achaeans to win the Trojan war.
It is easy for a descriptivist to account for NO-REF. The descriptivist indeed can
take the datum at face value, noting that, in her perspective, there is no problem in
granting that gappy sentences can express propositions. For non-referring singular
terms are assumed to express as their meanings descriptive contents (albeit ones that
determine no referent). Thus, for example, the token of (1) uttered by Smith can be
taken to express a (false) proposition such as:
(1a) |the tenth planet of the solar system is rather small|.
As long as the relevant singular term is a description, this strategy could be accepted
by a referentialist, for he may grant that the description in question is not directly
referential. However, NO-REF regards not only definite descriptions, but also proper
names, as we shall now see.
Consider for instance a token of
(4) Homer is a great poet,
13As is well known, Frege believed that some gappy statements are devoid of truth-value. For some
of them he however admitted a truth-value. For example, a token of (3) below is true, according to
Frege, since it involves an intensional context.
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uttered during a discussion concerning ancient Greek literature. Given what the
scholars tell us, it is likely that this token of “Homer” does not really refer to a single
writer. Yet, we may assume, someone, Tom, may sincerely assent to this token of
(4), for he is ignorant of what the experts say about the authorship of the so-called
Homeric poems. Thus, it seems that the token of (4) in question expresses a propo-
sition, namely a proposition that happens to be believed by Tom. To relieve Tom of
his ignorance we can use another gappy statement, i.e., a token of
(5) Homer does not exist.
If we do this, we provide a negative existential that appears to express a true
proposition. And with reference to fiction we can easily find other statements involv-
ing proper names which are gappy and at the same time appear to express true
propositions. For example:
(6) In the Odyssey, Ulysses blinds Polyphemus.14
It is less obvious that CO-REF holds for indexicals, but still a case for it can be made
(see, e.g., Burge 1983, p. 79). Suppose for example that a thirsty man in the desert,
Tom, hallucinates a fountain and cries to his fellow, John:
(7) that will save us.
He does this, while pointing straight ahead of them, where in fact there is just sand.
It is plausible in this case to say that we have an empty token of the indexical “that”
embedded in a gappy token of (7), to which Tom sincerely assents. And thus this
token appears to express a proposition, namely one believed by Tom. We might also
assume that John is not having any hallucination and that accordingly he does not
believe the proposition in question. Accordingly, he may convey this to Tom by a
token of
(8) that does not exist.
And thus we seem to have another gappy statement involving an indexical. Indeed
a statement classifiable as a true negative existential that appears to express a true
proposition (believed by John).15
Perhaps, contrary to a widespread opinion,16 even a statement involving a token
of a first-person pronoun can be used to illustrate NO-REF. We considered in
14As noted in Sainsbury 2005 (p. 90), examples with names such as “Homer”, for which there is
or there was dispute over whether they refer are most telling. For example, names coming from
fiction like “Ulysses” or “Pinocchio” are of course more contentious since they may be taken to
refer to fictional characters (Thomasson 1988, Voltolini 2006).
15For a different example, involving “you”, see Burge 1983, p. 88.
16See, e.g., Burge 1983, p. 101, note 1.
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Chapter 2 the case of Joan of Arc who hallucinates an inner token of the French
equivalent of
(9) I want you to fight for France.
Perhaps we should say that the token of the first-person pronoun embedded in Joan
of Arc’s statement does not refer to anything. Further, suppose that a token of (9) is
randomly produced by clouds in the sky. In this case, there is no utterer at all and
thus the “I” token fails to refer to anything. Or consider a token of (9) occurring in
a letter written by someone who has now passed away. A presentist who does not
believe in afterlife might argue that although this token did at some point refer to its
utterer, it now refers to nothing since the utterer no longer exists. In all such cases,
it should be noted, the relevant token of “I” (or the French “je”), as contrasted with
a token of “I” in quotation mark or in a philosophical text by Hegel, is used as a
first-person indexical and thus as singular term.
Perhaps these examples are controversial, but we can construct a less controver-
sial case. Consider a group of people who are concocting an ambush for the guerrilla
leader Jack Smith. They want to make him believe that he will meet a single person,
Fred Thomson, at a designated spot, Stone Place, somewhere in Madison County.
The group jointly writes and sends to Jack Smith a message, with a token of:
(10) I am Fred Thomson. I shall meet you on April 28, 2007 at 3:00 p.m. at Stone
Place in Madison County.
I would say that in this case the token of “I” fails to refer in the same sense in
which a token of “the author of most Beatles songs” fails to refer (for there are two
individuals who satisfy the predicate “author of most Beatles song”). Accordingly,
the token of (10) in question could be considered a gappy statement that expresses a
false proposition, just as a token of “the author of most Beatles songs is British” (if
we take a strictly Russellian line on definite descriptions). Suppose further that Jack
Smith is captured as a result of this trick and that the members of the group want to
scorn him, while he is detained by them. They thus write the following message for
him:
(11) Hi! I am Fred Thomson. I tricked you and yet I do not exist.
It seems to me that we may have here a true gappy token of “I do not exist”, one to
which each member of the group sincerely assents. It can thus be taken to express a
proposition that each of them believes.
Now, referentialism appears to predict that a statement involving a non-referring
proper name or indexical does not express a proposition as its meaning. For the
existence of a proposition corresponding to one such statement appears to require
a meaning contributed to the proposition by the non-referring term, a meaning
with respect to which the meaning of a certain predicate token is predicated (by
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analogy with the fact that, for example, a token of (1) appears to express a propo-
sition because the meaning corresponding to a certain token of “is a small planet”
is predicated somehow of the meaning of a certain token of “the 10th planet of
the solar system”). Yet, according to referentialism, non-referring proper name and
indexical tokens express no meaning, since their meanings should be their refer-
ents and they have no referents, or so it seems (we shall consider in the following
some referentialist attempts to deny this). In sum, NO-REF is at least prima facie
at odds with referentialism and it is thus a datum that appears to favour descrip-
tivism. For according to descriptivism, a non-referring proper name or indexical has
a meaning, namely a descriptive content, |the F|, which fails to determine a corre-
sponding object, because the property F is not uniquely exemplified, or simply not
exemplified.
3.6 Cognitive Significance
Wettstein (1986, 1991) has argued that the referentialists should not worry about
problems for them which appear to arise from CO-REF and NO-REF, because they
concern philosophy of mind, rather than semantics. A better referentialist response
is to account for these data by claiming that, very roughly, to the extent that they
seem to pose problems for referentialism, they have to do not so much with the (offi-
cial) meaning of whatever statement is in question, but with something somehow
related, but not identical, to it, namely the “ cognitive significance” that a state-
ment may have for a given speaker in a given context.17 According to this strategy,
two co-referentially equivalent statements, s and s′, that, according to referentialism,
17Cognitive significance is far from being a clear-cut notion, as Perry 2000, p. 205, recognizes
(while offering a bit of history on the use of the term, thus providing inter alia the information
that it was used in H. Feigl’s translation of Frege 1892). Kaplan (1989, p. 530) defines cognitive
significance as the manner of presentation of a content, where by content he means a proposition,
possibly a singular one. Kaplan also equates cognitive significance with his notion of character.
In his opinion, for Frege cognitive significance and content wrongly coalesce in the notion of
thought. But, as I see it, there are good reasons to consider cognitive significance as a thought,
something that can be true or false, rather than a manner of presentation of a thought, whatever
this may mean. The pre-theoretical characterization of cognitive significance I am about to offer (a
characterization which is meant to be neutral with respect to the dispute between referentialists and
descriptivists) is based on Perry’s work, who in turn draws on Wettstein (see Perry 2001, pp. 6–9,
Perry 2000, Chapter 11 and Wettstein 1986 and 1989). Note that these works do not make it explicit
that cognitive significance is relative to a speaker, although something like this should be admitted.
For example, Kaplan himself (1989, p. 538) speaks of the “cognitive significance (to Lauben)”
of a certain sentence. Perhaps the above-mentioned philosophers neglect this relativization to a
speaker because they always consider a standard speaker (in the terminology of Perry 2000, p.
191, a speaker “who understands the language”). In fact, it seems sensible to say that the cognitive
significance that a statement s has for a speaker X is the cognitive significance of the statement tout
court (and not just for X), if X is a standard speaker. This is what I shall assume. Beside Kaplan
and Perry, there are other referentialists who in different ways appeal to something like cognitive
significance; see § 8.13 below.
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express as their meaning the same proposition may nonetheless have a different cog-
nitive significance and it is because of this that a standard speaker may at the same
time sincerely assent to s and sincerely dissent from s′. Similarly, a statement that,
according to referentialism, fails to really express a proposition as meaning could
still have a cognitive significance and by virtue of this a standard speaker could sin-
cerely assent to it or dissent from it. The cognitive significance of a statement thus
appears to be something which obeys the following principles:
CSP1. Cognitive Significance Principle 1. Suppose X is a subject who at time t
is exposed to sentence token s and to sentence token s′. Suppose further that
X sincerely assents to s at t, but, without being incoherent, sincerely dissents
from s′ at t. Then, s and s′ do not have the same cognitive significance for
X.18
CSP2. Cognitive Significance Principle 2. If there is a subject X who sincerely
assents to a sentence token s, or sincerely dissents from it, then s has a
cognitive significance for X.
Once we distinguish between the meaning and the cognitive significance of a
statement, the above examples suggest that (i) not only statements, but syntacti-
cally identifiable parts of statements (e.g., tokens of noun phrases or verb phrases)
can themselves be taken to have cognitive significances and (ii) the cognitive sig-
nificance of a statement s results compositionally (by and large) from the cognitive
significances of its parts. For example, with reference to the example of the wounded
John of § 3.3, it makes sense to say that John assents to a token of sentence (3) of
§ 3.3, but fails to assent to a token of sentence (4) of § 3.3, because (at least from
his perspective), the tokens of “this” and “I” in question contribute two different
(partial) cognitive significances to the (total) cognitive significances that the two
sentence tokens have for him.
But what exactly is cognitive significance? The descriptivist can simply equate it
with meaning, where meaning is in turn understood as a reference determinant, as
explained in § 2.9, thereby obtaining a simpler theory. More precisely, the descrip-
tivist can say that the cognitive significance of a token t for a speaker X is the
subjective meaning that X attaches to t. If X is a standard speaker, then the subjective
meaning is meaning tout court and accordingly the cognitive significance is not just
cognitive significance for X, but cognitive significance tout court, i.e. meaning and
reference determinant. In contrast, the referentialist owes us an account of cognitive
significance that goes beyond the simple claim that it is something different from
meaning qua reference determinant and that obeys principles CSP1 and CSP2 (we
shall come back to this issue in § 8.13, below).
18The following could be added: Similarly, suppose that (i) X is a subject who at time t is exposed
to sentence token s in context C and sincerely assents to it and (ii) if X had been exposed to a token
s′ of the sentence type A rather than to the token s, in a context C′ which is otherwise like C, then
X would not have assented to s′; if so, s has a cognitive significance that no token of A could have
had in C′. But I shall try to avoid a recourse to this additional part of the principle.
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3.7 The Classical Descriptivist Theory of Proper Names
The co-reference and no-reference data suggest that proper names express a descrip-
tive content, but it is not entirely satisfactory to use this point as an argument in
favour of a descriptivist account of proper names, if one does not answer the follow-
ing question: what kind of descriptive content is actually associated (as pragmatic
meaning) to a proper name token? Accordingly, Frege (1892, 1918) and Russell
(1918) tried to answer this question and in doing it they came up (rather consis-
tently from some point onward of their philosophical careers) with essentially the
same idea (apart from details that we may skip for present purposes), i.e., what
we might call the Frege-Russell theory of proper names. According to this view, any
proper name N is synonymous with a pure definite description, “the F”, wherein “F”
is a predicate expressing a contingent property commonly attributed to the bearer of
N. More precisely, since the same expression can be used ambiguously as a name
for different individuals, as “John Smith” paradigmatically witnesses, the idea is
that any proper name N, in one way of interpreting it, is synonymous with a definite
description, “the F”. Thus, for example, “ Thales “, interpreted as the name of a
certain philosopher, would be synonymous with a description such as “The ancient
Greek philosopher who believed that everything is made of water”.
Frege and Russell realized that, in their perspective, for a typical proper name
there appear to be various very different descriptions with equal claims to provide
the meaning of the name in question. For instance, according to an example by
Frege (1892, note 2), “Aristotle”, as uttered by a certain person in a certain con-
text, could express the same descriptive content as “the pupil of Plato and teacher
of Alexander the Great”, while as uttered by someone else it could express the same
descriptive content as “the teacher of Alexander the Great, born in Stagira” (where
the proper names “Plato”, “Alexander” and “Stagira” occurring in these definite
descriptions must themselves be assumed to go proxy for some definite descrip-
tion or other). Russell provides similar examples, for instance, in The Problems of
Philosophy (1912). In the light of this, both Frege and Russell seem content with
accepting the idea that the idiolects of different speakers of one language such as
English might differ as to the meaning of proper names and that there may be no
truth of the matter as to which idiolect is right in this respect. Thus, for example,
for Tom (a philosopher) “Kripke” could have the same meaning as “the author of
Naming and Necessity” and for Mary (Kripke’s neighbour) as “the neighbour who
lives at such and such an address”, and there is no truth of the matter as to who is
right. In other words, in this subjectivist approach, the pragmatic meaning of a given
token of a proper name is the same as the linguistic meaning of a definite description
(of the kind illustrated by the above examples) that the speaker somehow associates
to the token in uttering it.
Searle 1958 and Strawson 1959 found this subjectivism unappealing and there-
fore proposed a theory according to which the meaning of a proper name is
somehow derived from the descriptions that the various users of a name in a com-
munity associate with the name. According to Searle, the meaning of a proper name
N is provided by a definite description such as “the individual which has most (or
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a sufficient number) of these properties: P1, . . ., Pn”, where each “Pi” expresses a
contingent property commonly attributed to the bearer of N. Similarly, according
to Strawson (1959, pp. 191–192), the meaning of a proper name is provided by “a
composite description incorporating the most frequently mentioned facts” (see the
discussion in Donnellan 1970, p. 361).
A quite different way to avoid the subjectivist line proposed by Frege and Russell
was put forward by Quine (1953, Chapter 1), who proposed the introduction of arti-
ficial predicates derived from the proper names themselves. For example, from the
proper name “Pegasus”, we could introduce a predicate such as “pegasizes”, which
would allow us to claim that the meaning of the name is the same as that of the
description “the one who pegasizes”. The problem with this approach is that it is
not clear which meanings should be attributed to these artificial predicates, and
presumably for this reason the proposal has never gained much consensus. Thus,
we could say that the classical descriptivist theory of proper name is an approach
according to which the linguistic meaning of a proper name (in one of its interpre-
tations) is the same as that of a definite description of the kind suggested by either
Frege, Russell, Searle or Strawson. This definite description, we might say, provides
the linguistic meaning of the name in one of its interpretations. One might add that
in this approach the pragmatic meaning of a certain token of a proper name N in a
given context coincides with the linguistic meaning of a certain definite description,
the one that provides the linguistic meaning of the name, given the interpretation
which is appropriate in the context in question. For example, in a context in which
we are discussing philosophy the pragmatic meaning of a token of “Aristotle” is
likely to be the same as the linguistic meaning of, say, “the teacher of Alexander the
Great, born in Stagira”, rather than “the second husband of Jacqueline Kennedy”.
We may consider the Frege-Russell variant as the subjectivist version of the classical
approach.
The existence of this classical approach might have contributed for a while to
support descriptivism, but then, as we shall see in detail, it has also provided an
easy target for referentialists.
3.8 Frege, Russell and Reichenbach on Indexicals
Just as for proper names, in order to fully exploit the co-reference and no-reference
data in an attempt to support descriptivism, so also the following question should be
satisfactorily addressed: what kind of descriptive content is actually associated (as
pragmatic meaning) to an indexical token? In this case, Frege and Russell provided
two different answers.
According to Frege, the descriptive content expressed by an indexical is pure, i.e.,
it does not involve any individual as constituent, but, at least if the indexical is the
first-person pronoun, it may well be a sense that can be grasped by only one person,
the one who uses the indexical. In fact, Frege distinguishes in Der Gedanke (1918)
between a token of the first-person pronoun used in a soliloquy, which expresses as
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sense an incommunicable, “private”, self-concept (by means of which the speaker
“is presented to himself in a particular and primitive way, in which he is presented to
no one else”), and a token of a first-person pronoun used to communicate with other
people, which somehow expresses a sense that can be intersubjectively grasped (cf.
Dummett 1981 and Harcourt 1999). Thus, consider a token of
(1) I am wounded,
uttered by Lauben, as in Frege’s famous example in Der Gedanke. If the token is
used by Lauben in a soliloquy and, say, |the Linternal| is his self-concept, then this is
the sense of the “I” token and the expressed proposition is
(1a) |the Linternal is wounded|.
But if the token is used by Lauben to communicate to somebody else that he is
wounded, then the expressed proposition is something like
(1b) |the Lexternal is wounded|,
where |the Lexternal| is the intersubjective descriptive content expressed as sense by
the “I” token. In both cases the sense determines as referent the speaker, but in
both cases it is also true that the nature of the sense in question is not quite clear,
apart from the fact that it is pure. Similarly, for other indexical tokens, it is not
quite clear how Frege conceives of their senses, apart from the fact that he takes
them to be pure and to determine the appropriate referents. Thus, for Frege a token
of “today” expresses as sense a pure meaning that determines the day of utterance
as its referent. Probably only for tokens of “I” is Frege willing to admit that the
expressed sense can be private.19 Yet, this is sufficient to say that, according to
Frege, the idiolect of a given person does not completely coincide with a shared
intersubjective language.20
19It is open to debate precisely what motivations Frege had for his distinction between the “I” of
soliloquy and the “I” of communication and whether he admitted something similar for the other
indexicals. According to Evans (see Harcourt 1999, p. 348), Frege’s account of the first-person
pronoun shows that he knew the irreducibility of “I” and other indexicals (see Chapter 4 below on
this) fifty years before Castañeda made it explicit for us all. Harcourt, on the contrary, provides
strong evidence that “I” is given by Frege a distinctive treatment, which is not to be generalized
to other indexicals, and that Frege’s reasons for this treatment of “I” have nothing to do with the
irreducibility of indexicals, of which he was not aware. This is not the place to disentangle this
historical controversy.
20For fuller accounts of Frege’s views on indexicals see Künne 1992 and Perry 1977. These authors
disagree on important points in their interpretations of Frege’s views, but on the essential aspects
which we have touched upon here they are both in line with what is normally attributed to Frege,
which is what I have reported above.
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Russell is more explicit than Frege in characterizing the nature of the descriptive
contents expressed by indexicals. Before dwelling on this, let us recall that, accord-
ing to Russell, an indexical can be a directly referential term, a “logically proper
name”, in his terminology. But this can be so only to the extent that a speaker uses an
indexical in order to refer to a sense datum (privately) occurring in his field of con-
sciousness, i.e., we may say, a certain mental particular. More specifically, Russell
thinks that a token of “this” can be used in such a way that it directly refers to the
mental particular which is the focus of attention for the speaker (Farrell Smith 1989,
p. 129). On account of this, we could say that Russell embraces weak descriptivism,
according to which for a limited class of items, which does not include ordinary
objects, there are terms that can directly refer to such items. However, according
to Russell, an indexical cannot directly refer to an ordinary object and thus Russell
cannot be classified as a referentialist (at least, in my use of this term). Apart from
indexicals that directly refer to sense data, an indexical expresses, according to
Russell, a descriptive content, in particular when the referent is an ordinary object.
This content is impure in that it involves a sense datum as constituent. For example,
if Tom points at a chair and says:
(2) this is brown,
the expressed proposition is something like:
(2a) |the individual which is presented by d is brown|,
where d is the mental particular which is the focus of attention in Tom’s perceptual
field (a sense datum, Russell would say, at least in certain phases of his philosophical
development), a particular with which he is acquainted. However, this is so only
from Tom’s perspective. For we cannot assume that d itself is also found, say, in
the perceptual field of his interlocutor, Mary. She could rather be acquainted with
a different mental particular d′, similar to d, which results from the way in which
the chair interacts with her sense organs. If so, for Mary the expressed proposition
would be:
(2b) |the individual which is presented by d′ is brown|.
The two sense data are private, i.e., only Tom is acquainted with d and only Mary is
acquainted with d′. Consequently, the two propositions are similarly private and so
are the two descriptive contents embedded in them, namely |the individual which is
presented by d| and |the individual which is presented by d′|.
For another example, suppose that Tom utters
(3) I am happy.
According to Russell, the expressed proposition is, for Tom, something like
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(3a) |the individual who is experiencing d is happy|,
where d is the mental particular which is the focus of attention for Tom, as he utters
his token of (3). Clearly, if Mary is listening to Tom, the expressed proposition for
her must be different. Something like:
(3b) |the individual who is presented by d′ is happy|,
where d′ is the mental particular which is the focus of attention for Mary. Thus, in a
conversation involving an indexical token, we always have two distinct descriptive
contents (one for the speaker and one for the hearer), both of which should be taken
to be (official) meanings of a given indexical token.
Clearly, Russell’s account of indexicals is subjectivist in pretty much the sense
in which his account of proper names is so. For Russell (and Frege), two tokens
of “Socrates”, despite being uttered in the same context, say in a discussion about
ancient Greek philosophy, may have two distinct meanings, because the correspond-
ing speakers associate them to two descriptions with different meanings (say, “the
teacher of Plato” and “the philosopher who drank the hemlock”). Similarly, for
Russell, two tokens of “this” uttered in the same context by different speakers who
point at the same object should be taken to have distinct meanings, say |the individ-
ual which is presented by d|, and |the individual which is presented by d′|, where d
and d′ are two distinct mental particulars with which the two speakers are, respec-
tively, acquainted. It should be noted that both Russell’s and Frege’s accounts are
subjectivist in another sense: for the reasons that we have just given above, they
allow for meanings that cannot be intersubjectively grasped.21
An alternative, well-known, descriptivist account of indexicals was provided by
Reichenbach 1947.22 He claims that (i) there is (or at least one can introduce) a
special indexical, “this token”, such that any token t of it directly refers to t, and
(ii) any other indexical can be defined in terms of it. For example, “I” expresses the
same meaning as “the utterer of this token”, “here” expresses the same meaning as
21Apart from details that need not concern us here, the view of indexicals that I have attributed
to Russell can be detected throughout most of his career (see his 1910, 1912, 1918, 1940, 1948),
in spite of changes in his ontology or epistemology. It should be noted however that the above
account of sentences involving “I”, such as (3) above, should presumably be attributed to Russell
only in those phases in which he did not admit acquaintance with one’s self, something which is at
least tentatively acknowledged in his 1912. Depending on the phase, we may say for instance that
the mental particulars in our example, which Tom and Mary are acquainted with, present the chair
in that the chair is something like a bundle of sensed and unsensed sense data, two of which are the
mental particulars in question. Or, we may say that the chair is something like a Lockean substance
which causes the presence of the two mental particulars in Tom’s and Mary’s mind, respectively.
For a thorough account of Russell’s conception of indexicals, in relation to his ontological and
epistemological views, see Farrell Smith 1989.
22Interestingly, in a note added at the end of Chapter 7 of his 1940, Russell suggests that
Reichenbach’s approach is not alternative, but rather complementary to his own. I shall not
investigate here what Russell could have had in mind in saying this.
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“the place of the utterer of this token”, and similarly for other indexicals. In effect,
this amounts to saying, as I understand Reichenbach, that an indexical token is a
constituent of the very meaning that it expresses, but in different ways, depending
on the linguistic meaning of the indexical. That is, the pragmatic meaning of a token
i of “I” is |the utterer of i|, the meaning of a token h of “here” is |the place of the
utterer of h|, and so on. Thus, for example, a token of (1) expresses as meaning a
proposition involving a certain “I” token, i, namely,
(1c) |the utterer of i is wounded|.
It should be noted that Reichenbach’s acceptance of a directly referential indexi-
cal such as “this token” does not make him a referentialist (at least in my sense
of the term), since the tokens of this indexical can only refer to themselves and
thus to linguistic entities and never to ordinary objects. However, his approach,
just like Russell’s, grants that there are descriptive contents and propositions with
particulars as constituents, as the above examples illustrate. In Russell’s case they
are mental particulars (sense data), whereas in Reichenbach’s case they are (objec-
tively existing) linguistic tokens.23 Inasmuch as Reichenbach admits that such items
can be directly referred to (by tokens of “this token”), he is, like Russell, a weak
descriptivist.
It can hardly be said that any of these approaches has ever become standard.
However, their existence has contributed to provide support for descriptivism, for
they seem to show that in one way or another a descriptivist is in a position to
provide a characterization of the descriptive contents that indexicals are supposed
to have, given descriptivism. As we shall see, however, these approaches have been
subject to serious attacks by referentialists such as Kaplan and Perry.
3.9 Linguistic Descriptivism
When referentialists attacked descriptivism in the 1970s, they typically had in mind
a form of descriptivism according to which, roughly, an indexical or proper name
token expresses as pragmatic meaning a descriptive content coinciding with the
linguistic meaning of some pure definite description (not involving proper names
or indexicals).24 Any such definite description, if it exists, is, as we may say, a
matching description (relative to a given indexical or proper name token occurring
23A view of indexicals analogous to that of Reichenbach is outlined in Burks 1948/1949. It should
also be said that Russell ’s view of time involves an account of tense à la Reichenbach that predates
Reichenbach 1947.
24Of course, there could have been, and there probably were, among the targets philosophers who
were descriptivists with respect to indexicals but not to proper names, or vice versa. But I shall
ignore this possibility for the sake of a simpler exposition, since nothing crucial for our purposes
will hinge on this.
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in a certain context). We can call this version of descriptivism linguistic descrip-
tivism, according to which there are such matching descriptions. Wettstein (1979,
pp. 92–93) attributes a view such as this to “Frege, Quine and Katz (among others)”
and then criticizes it from a referentialist perspective. As part of linguistic descrip-
tivism it was more generally assumed that any tensed statement s expresses in a
context C the same meaning that could have been expressed in C by some tenseless
statement s′ (a token of an “eternal sentence”, as is often said) wherein the tense and
any indexical or proper name of s have been replaced by an appropriate date and by
a matching description, respectively. By “date” we understand in this context a def-
inite description expressing a descriptive content that determines a time; thus “(the
time) March 23, 1969, 3:05 p.m. Greenwich time” is a date.25
To illustrate linguistic descriptivism, consider this example adapted from Katz
(1972, p. 125).26 Suppose a token of (1) below is uttered on March 23, 1969, 3:05
p.m. Greenwich time, while pointing at a place at latitude x and longitude y in a
context that makes the former president of the USA, Lyndon B. Johnson, the referent
of “Lyndon”.
(1) Lyndon is sitting there now.
From the point of view of linguistic descriptivism, the token in question should be
taken to express the very same proposition expressed by an eternal sentence such as
the following:
(1a) The person bearing the name “Lyndon Baines Johnson” who was born near
a place bearing the name “Stonewall, Texas”, on August 27, 1908, who was
the son of parents called “Samuel Ealy” and “Rabekah (Baines) Johnson”, and
who married a lady called “Bird Johnson” sits in the place at latitude x and
longitude y at the Greenwich time 23/3/69, 3:05 p.m.
As a matter of fact, there may be aspects of Frege’s semantic theory that suggest
something like this approach27 and, as is well known, Quine 1960 (see pp. 193 and
194, in particular) is quite explicit in proposing a reduction of proper names and
indexicals to definite descriptions along these lines (although of course he would put
things in terms of sentences rather than propositions). Katz (1972, p. 126) is simi-
larly explicit in following Quine in this respect (except for translating Quine’s talk of
25See Q. Smith 1993 for a discussion of the view that tense could be “translated” into a date and
many references to supporters of this idea.
26After his 1972, Katz has modified his views. For example Katz 1990 appears to buy a form of
referentialism by allowing a proper name to contribute its referent to the proposition expressed by
the sentence in which the name occurs, although the latter is taken to be associated to a descriptive
condition.
27On behalf of this claim about Frege, Wettstein mentions his own Ph.D. dissertation (Wettstein
1979, note 7 ). See also the section on Frege in Forbes 2003.
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sentences into talk of propositions). We can perhaps add Goodman28 and Carnap29
to the list. Russell himself seems to endorse a version of linguistic descriptivism in
his 1940 and 1948. As Farrell Smith (1989, p. 119) puts it, “in IMT [1940], appar-
ently influenced by Carnap, Russell provides an analysis that claims to eliminate
what he calls ‘egocentric particulars’ (‘I,’ ‘this,’, ‘here,’ ‘now’), and he concludes
that they are ‘not needed in any part of the description of the world, whether phys-
ical or psychological’ (IMT, 108) . . . In HK [1948] Russell still wishes to replace
indexicals by objective space-time coordinates”.
But Farrell Smith 1989 also makes it clear that, at least in his 1948, Russell
considered indexicals as indispensable (p. 123)30 and says something similar about
Frege (p. 134). Thus, it is not clear that linguistic descriptivism can be ascribed to
Frege and Russell. To be sure, this is not clear for Goodman, Carnap, Quine and
Katz, as well. For one thing, Goodman, Carnap and Quine were mainly concerned
with an ideal language, more specifically with a rational reconstruction of knowl-
edge acquisition by means of an ideal language for science and it is far from obvious
that what they say in this connection was meant to be valid for natural language
in its everyday use. As regards Katz, he was certainly interested mainly in natu-
ral language, but his position is more articulated than the above crude exposition
of linguistic descriptivism might suggest. For example, he holds that an “occasion
sentence” such as (1), beside being “expandable” into an “eternal sentence” such
as (1a), also expresses an “occasion proposition” conveyable by a sentence with
“indexical elements” (which, for Katz 1972, include proper names) corresponding
to “token indexical elements” (p. 125), whose nature is not specified, but which are
said to belong in the occasion proposition in question.31
Turning back to Frege and Russell, they were concerned with natural language,
but they too were also concerned with constructing an ideal language for science
and it is not always clear what level of language they are discussing when they seem
to endorse linguistic descriptivism (see Farrell Smith 1989, p. 128). Be that as it
may, it is rather plain, as can be deduced from § 3.7 above, that Frege and Russell
accepted something like linguistic descriptivism with respect to proper names, but,
as regards indexicals, the issue is more controversial. Frege, as we have seen in
§ 3.8 above, thinks that the first-person pronoun may be used to express a private
28See Goodman 1951, p. 27 for the suggestion that proper names can be replaced by descriptions
and p. 263ff. for the elimination of indexicals.
29See p. 24 of his Aufbau (1928) for Carnap’s acceptance of the thesis that proper names are to be
understood as definite descriptions and pp. 25–30 for the elimination of indexicals from an ideal
language of science (see p. 27 in particular).
30Although in Russell 1940 the analysis of indexicals is pretty much as in 1948, it is stated therein
that “this”, the indexical to which all others are reduced, can in the end be eliminated by assuming
a proper name “W” for the complex of qualities that one happens to denote by “this”. In this way,
Russell claims, what is learnt from perception “is ready for incorporation in impersonal science”
(1940, Chapter 7, p. 121). Thus, we seem to have in 1940 a thesis about the dispensability of index-
icals that is later rejected in 1948, which is not discussed in Farrell Smith 1989 (see her note 2,
p. 135). Kaplan criticizes the dispensability thesis of Russell 1940 in Kaplan 1989, p. 557.
31For Katz’s later views on proper names see e.g. Katz 1979 and 1990.
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incommunicable self-concept, i.e. it may be used in such a way, one could surmise,
that there is no matching description for it.32 Russell, on the other hand, as hinted
in § 3.8 as well, also proposes an analysis of indexicals according to which they can
express descriptive contents involving mental particulars, and which should then be
similarly considered as private and incommunicable, and thus are such that there
is no matching description for them. And this is why, it seems, he calls indexicals
“egocentric particulars” (1940, Chapter 7; 1948, Part II, Chapter 4). Certainly, he
thinks that this subjectivity can be scarcely tolerated by science, and thus tries to
show that indexicals can in principle be replaced by “neutral public terms:” “I”
by a proper name, “now” by a date, “here” by a term such as “the place at latitude
such and such and longitude so and so” (1948, Part II, Chapter 4, p. 85). Along these
lines, we could also obviously propose that “this” could be replaced by a description
involving the notions of latitude and longitude. Russell, however, also claims that,
although any such replacement of indexicals might do for the practical purposes of
science, it cannot count as an analysis of the meaning of indexicals, for “when we
examine closely the meanings of our scientific terms we find that the subjectivity
we sought to avoid has not been wholly banished” (1948, Part II, Chapter 4, p. 86).
In sum, perhaps linguistic descriptivism was only the view of a straw man. But
it was undeniably a popular view nonetheless, which was attributed, as Wettstein’s
1979 paper witnesses, to the most influential thinkers in the analytic tradition. There
appear to be three main, closely interconnected, motivations for wanting to hold a
view like linguistic descriptivism. These motivations explain its popularity and thus
in part the popularity of descriptivism in general and the fact that it was felt as domi-
nant up to the early 1970s (when referentialists started mounting their attack). First,
it allows to stick to the Fregean idea that propositions are tenseless and endowed
in an atemporal way with a truth value. Note in fact that the present tense “sits” of
(1a) is meant to express lack of tense, rather than presentness (given the convention
proposed in § 1.9 it should be “sits#”). Second, it is in line with Frege’s convic-
tion that to communicate is essentially to share, to jointly grasp, the very same
proposition (see the Frege passage quoted in Katz 1972, p. 121). If (1) and (1a)
32Of course, it also seems clear that Frege treats all indexicals as capable of expressing public
senses, i.e. senses that may be shared, grasped by different thinkers, albeit such that their senses
may vary on the different occasions on which indexicals are used. More precisely, he puts mat-
ters as if an indexical and a context of utterance jointly produce a hybrid expression capable of
expressing a certain sense (cf. Künne 1992). For example, he claims that we must use the indexi-
cal “yesterday” in order to express today the sense expressed yesterday by means of the indexical
“today”. The publicness attributed to these senses, their capacity of being grasped by different
minds, follows on the one hand from Frege’s conviction that to communicate is essentially to
share, to jointly grasp, the very same proposition, and, on the other hand, from Frege’s commit-
ment to the objectivity and timelessness of propositions (Harcourt 1999). It seems also clear that,
according to Frege, indexically expressed senses, to the extent that they have a public nature, can
in principle be expressed by non-indexical expressions (apart from the “I” of soliloquy, as opposed
to the “I” of communication; see § 3.7 above). Thus, for example, uses of “today” on May 3, 2003
and “yesterday” on May 4, 2003 can convey the one sense expressed by the definite description
“the day May 3, 2003”.
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express the same proposition, one can communicate something to someone else by
uttering (1) in the sense of “transferring” from her mind to the hearer’s mind the
proposition expressed by (1a) or something like that, regardless of the fact that the
speaker’s use of (1) may be tied to subjective perceptual representations connected
with her use of “there” and unavailable to the hearer. Such subjective elements in
fact play no role with respect to (1a). Third, it supports the ideal of an exact lan-
guage for science, a “canonical language”, in Quine’s terminology, with which we
can in principle express perspicuously, unambiguously and intersubjectively what-
ever we can express, ambiguously, less perspicuously and subjectively (by means of
proper names and indexicals), in ordinary language (or at least whatever we need to
express for scientific purposes). This ideal is well synthesized by these words from
Carnap 1928: “within any object domain a unique system of definite descriptions
is in principle possible, even without the aid of ostensive definitions . . . Any inter-
subjective, rational science presupposes this possibility” (quoted by Farrell Smith
1989, p. 119). In spite of all this, as we shall see, linguistic descriptivism cannot
stand, in the light of data, put forward by Castañeda and others, which show the
indispensability of indexicals (cf. § 4.2 below).
Chapter 4
Why Referentialism Is So Successful
4.1 Premise
In this chapter we shall present arguments that have been put forward against certain
descriptivist approaches, such as linguistic descriptivism, the classical descriptivist
theory of proper names or Reichenbach’s account of indexicals. These arguments
have cast discredit on descriptivism in general and have contributed to promote
referentialism to the role of standard theory. This is so also because some of
these arguments rely on data that appear to be handled straightforwardly from
a referentialist standpoint. In Chapter 8, we shall consider the extent to which
these arguments are ultimately telling and whether the data that they put forward
can be accommodated by the descriptivist theory, CD, to be presented in due
course.
This current popularity of referentialism might appear unmotivated in the light
of the arguments, reviewed in Chapter 3, that seem to favour descriptivism, in par-
ticular the fact that, given the co-reference and no-reference problems, the latter
doctrine is better off in dealing with the attribution of propositional attitudes. But
there have been clever referentialist attempts to tackle these problems (see, e.g.,
Salmon 1986, 1998, Recanati 1993, Perry 2001, Soames 2002) and presumably
this has contributed to the continuing success of referentialism (arguably more
than Wettstein’s proposal to ignore them). Moreover, as we shall see, Kripke has
put forward an argument which can be viewed as an attempt to show that puz-
zles in the attribution of propositional attitudes may arise independently of any
commitment to referentialism, for they depend on principles that both descrip-
tivists and referentialists should (at least prima facie) accept, independently of
the pro-descriptivist data that support the co-reference problem. An argument of
this kind of course may appear to tip the balance in favour of referentialism,
since it seems to minimize the advantage the descriptivist has when it comes
to the issue of propositional attitudes. Kripke’s argument will be considered in
this chapter (§ 4.12), since it presents data that any successful theory must take
into account. We shall instead examine at the end of Chapter 8 the strategies
that the referentialists have advanced to tame the issues of co-reference and
no-reference.
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4.2 The Indispensability of Indexicals
By means of well-chosen examples, Castañeda (1966, 1967) has brought forcefully
to our attention a thesis, which we may call the thesis of the indispensability of
indexicals.1 It can be stated as follows:
II. Indispensability of Indexicals. There are propositions that can be expressed
only by statements containing indexicals.2
It may be thought that every proposition expressed by an indexical statement s
can also be expressed by some non-indexical statement which is co-referentially
equivalent to s. But appropriate stories can be concocted to show that this is false
and that accordingly II is well-supported. For instance, that II holds for the first-
person pronoun can be seen by considering a typical Castañedian situation such as
the following. Suppose that Oscar, a standard speaker, utters in a context C a token
of
(1) I am a millionaire.
Suppose that P is the “first-person” proposition constituting the meaning of this
token. We can consider a non-indexical singular term, say, “the editor of Soul ”, and
construct a story wherein, even though Oscar is the editor of Soul, a certain token of
(2) the editor of Soul is a millionaire
(uttered in C or in an appropriately similar context) can hardly be taken to express P
as well. Suppose that Oscar, unbeknownst to him, has just been appointed (unique)
editor of Soul. He has no reason to believe that the editor, whoever he is, is a million-
aire. Thus, he sincerely dissents when someone utters a token of (2), which happens,
let us suppose, just when he utters his own token of (1). Imagine that the latter token
1This is, for example, Kaplan’s terminology (1989, pp. 557–558). In the terminology of Perry 1979
we could say “the essentiality of indexicals”. Both authors accept the thesis just like Castañeda.
For earlier defences of it, see Burks 1948–1949 and Bar-Hillel 1954. See also Burge 1977. The
references in Burge 1983, p. 81, are also worth mentioning. It should also be noted that, although
Castañeda argued against linguistic descriptivism, he accepted, I would say, a descriptivism of
sorts, to the extent that his guises are viewed as doing the job of descriptive contents (see note 6 in
Chapter 1, above).
2More precisely we could say this: There can be a context C in which a token s(i) of a sentence
S(I), containing a token i of an indexical I, such as “I”, “here”, etc., expresses a meaning M such
that, for any non-indexical sentence S(I/T), which results from replacing the indexical term I with
a non-indexical term T, the following holds. If a token s(i/t) of S(I/T) (involving a token t of T) is
uttered in C together with s(i), s(i/t) expresses a meaning different from M, even in those cases in
which i and t are co-referentially equivalent. And if a token s(i/t) of S(I/T) had been uttered [instead
of s(i), or in addition to s(i)] in an otherwise identical context, it would have expressed a meaning
different from M, even in those cases in which t has the same referent as i.
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was uttered by Oscar with sincere assent, since Oscar knows that he∗ is a rich man
(he runs a well-established business). In this situation, it seems that the proposition
P expressed by the token of (1) has a property, being believed by Oscar, which is not
possessed by the meaning of the token of (2) and thus the two meanings must be dif-
ferent, although expressed by two co-referentially equivalent statements. Similarly,
suppose now that Oscar does not believe that he∗ is rich. He has uttered his token
of (1) jokingly, with no sincere assent, to refer with some irony to the fact that his
business is a failure. Oscar however knows that whoever is appointed editor of Soul
is also bequeathed a fortune. Thus, in response to the fact that someone happens
to utter a token of (2), just when he utters his token of (1), he sincerely assents. In
this case, it is the meaning of the token of (2) which happens to have a property,
being believed by Oscar, that the token of (1) does not have. But then again the two
meanings cannot be identical, in spite of the fact that they are expressed by two
co-referentially equivalent statements.
Clearly, whatever non-indexical term we consider instead of “the editor of Soul ”,
we can construct analogous stories. This suggests that II true. Indeed, by drawing on
the possibility of total amnesia, we need not construct a new story for any new can-
didate non-indexical term. For a totally amnesiac subject X could sincerely assent
to a token of “I am F ” without being in a position to sincerely assent to a token
of any sentence of the form “T is F ”, where T is a non-indexical singular term, a
token of which refers to X. For example, to adapt to present purposes the vicissitudes
of Castañeda’s (1968) military hero Quintus, suppose that Quintus becomes com-
pletely amnesiac, because of his head injury. While being taken care of, he sincerely
assents, let us imagine, to his own (inner speech) token of
(3) I have a terrible headache.
Yet, if at the same time he hears a nurse saying:
(4) The soldier Quintus has a terrible headache,
he may, because of his amnesia, fail to sincerely assent to the nurse’s token. And the
result would not have been different, whatever non-indexical singular term referring
to Quintus had the nurse used, instead of her token of “the soldier Quintus”.
Kaplan (1989, p. 536) has considered a story which can be used to show that II
holds for “here” and “now” just as the above Quintus story proves the case for “I”.3
It regards a kidnapped heiress who, after a long trip in the trunk of a car, with no
knowledge of her whereabouts, utters:
(5) it is quiet here now.
3Kaplan’s main purpose in proposing the story is to show that “ignorance of the referent does not
defeat the directly referential character of indexicals” (Kaplan’s (1989, p. 536) corollary 2). As I
see it, Kaplan’s example is best seen as a way to support II.
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She sincerely assents, we are to assume, to her own token of (5), but she could
hardly assent to a token of a corresponding non-indexical sentence such as
(6) it is quiet at the place with geographical coordinates x, y at the time 3.30 p.m.,
Eastern Time, March 20, 1977.
(where the place with geographical coordinates x, y and the time 3.30 p.m., E.T.,
March 20, 1977, are the place and time of her utterance, respectively). Similar
stories could of course be provided for other indexicals.
These examples are sufficient to support II. Yet, it is interesting to consider
Perry’s (1979) well-known story of the sugar spiller, for it speaks in favour of II
in a different way.4 Here it is. Perry is spilling sugar in a grocery store without
realizing it. He says something like:
(7) The person who is spilling sugar is making a mess.
When he realizes that he∗ is spilling sugar, he utters:
(8) I am making a mess!,
and accordingly starts cleaning up the mess. This case might perhaps be described
at a deeper level as follows. The proposition P expressed by Perry’s token of (8) is
not only believed by Perry, but is also involved in a belief state of Perry’s which is
causally responsible for Perry’s intentional action of cleaning up the mess. In con-
trast, the proposition expressed by the token of (7), P′, although still believed by
Perry when he believes P, we can assume, is not similarly involved in an action-
causing belief state of Perry’s. Accordingly, there is a property that P has and that
P′ does not have, which leads us to say that P and P′ are not the same proposi-
tion. Of course, if someone in the store had yelled another token of (7), while Perry
was uttering (8), we should say that the expressed proposition would have been P′
and not P. And, if some other fitting non-indexical term, say “John Perry”, or “the
(future) author of ‘the Essential Indexical’ ”, had been uttered instead of this new
token of (7), we should presumably say that the expressed proposition would still
lack, like P′, the property of being involved in the action-causing belief state of
Perry’s and thus could not be P. For there is a strong intuition that the indexical ele-
ment present in (8) is needed in order to express a proposition, such as P, involved in
the causation of an intentional action. And thus Perry’s example appears to support
II. Analogous examples with “now”, “here” and other indexicals could also be used
to support II (Castañeda 1989, Chapter 7, Kaplan 1989, pp. 532–533). For example,
a token of
4The point forcefully made by Perry with this example was in essence conveyed also by his exam-
ple based on the sentence “a bear is about to attack me” in Perry 1977, or by Kaplan’s example
based on “my pants are on fire” (Kaplan 1989, p. 533).
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(9) the meeting starts now
can be taken to express a proposition involved in a belief state of Nelson,
which causes his intentional action of going to the meeting. But the same cannot
presumably be said of a token of
(10) the meeting starts at the time 8:00 p.m. E.T., June 15, 1990.
even though the time of utterance for the token of (9) is in fact 8:00 p.m. E.T., June
15, 1990.
Similarly, a token of
(11) there are wild tigers here
can be taken to express a proposition involved in a belief state of Tom, which causes
his intentional action of loading his gun. But the same cannot presumably be said of
a token of
(12) there are wild tigers in Oak Valley,
even though Oak Valley is the place where Tom happens to be.
The truth of thesis II clearly condemns linguistic descriptivism, for according
to this doctrine any proposition expressible by means of an indexical statement s
should be expressible by means of a corresponding non-indexical statement involv-
ing complete non-indexical definite descriptions at those places where s contains
indexicals. This is something that II clearly forbids. Accordingly, nowadays lin-
guistic descriptivism appears to be a dead end with no supporters. However, II is
problematic for descriptivism in general, since it might be taken to suggest that the
meaning of an indexical token is not a descriptive content. For if it were, it seems we
should be able to characterize this descriptive content somehow, and yet this seems
impossible, if we cannot find, as II might appear to suggest, a definite description,
not even an incomplete one, capable of expressing this alleged content.5 It should
be noted that II is compatible with the descriptivist accounts of indexicals offered
by Frege, Russell and Reichenbach, for they do not claim that all indexicals are dis-
pensable, and indeed these theories can be seen as attempts to address these issues.
However, as we shall see, they have been criticized on other grounds.
5For the view that linguistic descriptivism is defeated by arguments due to Castañeda, Perry,
and Kaplan, see, e.g., the papers mentioned in Burge 1983, p. 81; see also Burge 1977 and Bar-
Hillel 1954. We shall see, however, that although these arguments, or at least some of them, are
effective against linguistic descriptivism, they are ineffective against the quite different version of
descriptivism that I try to support in this book.
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4.3 The Wide Scope/Narrow Scope Objection
It is commonly held that definite descriptions give rise to scope ambiguity, when
occurring in intensional contexts (such as modal, temporal, or belief contexts).
Consider the following sentences:
(1) the president of Italy might be bald.
(2) The president of Italy will be bald.
(3) Tom believes that the president of Italy is bald.
The scope ambiguity of these sentences can be conveyed by noting that, depending
on how they are interpreted, they could be paraphrased in at least two non-
equivalent ways. For example, as regards (3) we can provide the following de dicto
interpretation:
(3a) Tom believes that the president of Italy (whoever is uniquely identified by the
property of being president of Italy) is bald.
And we can also provide this de re interpretation:
(3b) of the actual president of Italy, Tom believes that he is bald.
Or, equivalently,
(3c) to the actual president of Italy, Tom believingly attributes the property of being
bald.
If we assume the first paraphrase we give narrow scope to the definite description
and conversely broad scope to the intensional expression “believes”. If we assume
the second paraphrase, we give broad scope to the definite description and con-
versely narrow scope to the intensional expression. As is well known, if we assume
a de dicto interpretation, (3) does not imply that there actually is a president of Italy,
but simply that Tom believes that there is (a bald) one. In contrast, by assuming a
de re interpretation, (3) implies that there is a president. Moreover, in spite of the
fact that such a president is not only the president of Italy but also the only person
born in Leghorn who is called “Carlo Azeglio Ciampi”,6 (3) does not imply the
proposition expressed by
(3’) Tom believes that the only person born in Leghorn who is called “Carlo
Azeglio Ciampi” is bald,
6This example was formulated when Carlo Azeglio Ciampi was the president of Italy.
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(where (3’) is also interpreted de dicto). Intuitively, when belief is involved, a de
dicto interpretation is meant to tell us which singular term sense occurs “within”
the attributee’s belief.7 In our example the attributee is Tom and the sense is one
that can be conveyed by “the president of Italy”, but not by “the only person born
in Leghorn who is called Carlo Azeglio Ciampi” (Tom might fail to know that the
only person born in Leghorn who is called Carlo Azeglio Ciampi is the president of
Italy). Mutatis mutandis, something similar can be said about examples such as (1)
and (2).
Now, it is often alleged that indexicals and proper names cannot have a descrip-
tive content as definite descriptions do, for unlike descriptions they do not exhibit the
potential for a similar scope ambiguity. For example, Kaplan tells us that “indexicals
always take primary scope” and that, if there were an “operator” that contradicted
this claim, it would deserve to be called a “monster” (1989, pp. 510–511). And
he also speaks of “the inevitability of so-called de re constructions in indirect dis-
course languages which contain indexicals” (1989, p. 538). In other words, the idea
is that indexicals always take, as it were, largest scope, if we should say that they
have a scope at all. And we usually find the same opinion as regards proper names
(Castañeda 1977, p. 140, 1989, pp. 100–105).
I shall concentrate on the case for indexicals here, since the arguments are more
convincing as regards them. One might argue as follows. Consider a token of (4)
uttered by Mary.
(4) Tom believes that I am happy.
It seems, prima facie, that (4) can be interpreted only along the lines of (3b)–(3c):
(4’) to me (= Mary), Tom believingly attributes the property of being happy.
A paraphrase along the lines of (3a) seems impossible, for it would have to be a
paraphrase that somehow indicates that the singular term sense that occurs in Tom’s
belief is a sense conveyable by using “I”, as if Tom had a belief that he could express
7Thus, Castañeda (1980a, 1989, Chapter 5) prefers to use “internal” rather than “de dicto” and
“external” rather than “de re”. As noted above, a de re interpretation of a sentence such as (3)
is taken to involve the attribution to the speaker of an existential commitment (in our example,
a commitment to the existence of a president of Italy). In contrast, Castañeda uses “external” in
a way that does not involve such an attribution. For example, given the common knowledge that
The Bible asserts that Moses is the person who received the ten commandments on Mt. Sinai, we
can accept an external interpretation of a token of “Tom believes that Moses is a Jew” (imagine
that Tom is known to have said: “the person who received the ten commandments on the Mt.
Sinai is a Jew”). However, that the token is so interpreted does not imply attributing to Tom a
commitment to the existence of Moses. Castañeda’s internal/external distinction is thus meant to
be more general and versatile than the traditional de dicto/de re distinction and accordingly I have
myself appealed elsewhere to the former rather than to the latter (e.g., in Orilia 1994, 1994a). But
for present purposes, we may stick to the better-known de dicto/de re distinction.
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by saying “I am happy”. But obviously Mary can hardly be taken to attributing to
Tom such a belief.
4.4 The Modal, Epistemic and Semantic Arguments
Kripke 1980 (see also 1971) famously attacked the classical descriptivist theory
of proper names with three main arguments known as the modal, epistemic and
semantic arguments (Soames 1989, Salmon 2003, etc.).8 According to the classical
descriptivist theory of proper names, let us recall, the linguistic meaning of a proper
name (in one of its interpretations), or the pragmatic meaning of a proper name
token, coincides with the linguistic meaning of a pure definite description “the F ”.
Here “F ” expresses a contingent property such as being a philosopher who drank
the hemlock, or being a man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic (or
being an individual of which most, or a sufficient number, of P1, . . ., Pn are true,
where P1, . . ., Pn are properties of that kind). Thus, we may suppose for present
purposes, “Gödel” has the same linguistic meaning as “the man who discovered the
incompleteness of arithmetic” (Kripke 1980, p. 83). Given this, a sentence such as
(1) below expresses a necessary, indeed and analytic, truth:
(1) if Gödel exists, Gödel discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic.9
Moreover, the following counterfactual sentence should be taken to express a false
proposition:
(2) Gödel might not have discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic.
However, we have a clear intuition that (1) expresses a contingent truth, a propo-
sition that could have been false. Accordingly, we take (2) to express a true
proposition, contrary to what the classical descriptivist theory of proper names leads
us to believe. This is the so-called modal argument. As regards the epistemolog-
ical argument, its basic point is that, if (1) expressed a necessary analytic truth,
we should be able to know a priori that the proposition expressed by (1) is true.
However, it seems clear that (1) expresses a proposition that can only be known
a posteriori, by empirical investigation.
Let us finally turn to the semantic argument. It is conceivable that (1) is false.
Suppose then that (1) is false and that someone other than Gödel, the unknown math-
ematician Schmidt, discovered that arithmetic is incomplete. Schmidt wrote down
the incompleteness theorem and Gödel stole the manuscript. It would still be the
case that a token of “Gödel” would refer to Gödel, rather than to Schmidt. But the
8Similar attacks can be found in Donnellan 1970.
9For the explicit recourse to an existential clause of the kind, “if X exists”, in stating Kripke’s
argument (“if Gödel exists” in the example we are discussing here) see, e.g., Donnellan 1979,
p. 48 and Soames 2005.
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classical descriptivist theory would predict that it would refer to Schmidt, because
Schmidt would be the one who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic. A sim-
ilar point has been made by Donnellan (1970, p. 373) with an example based on
“Thales”. Suppose, following the classical descriptivist approach, that the definite
description that provides the meaning of this name is “the ancient Greek philoso-
pher who held that all is water”. We assume we know, from Aristotle and Herodotus,
that Thales held that all is water. But Aristotle and Herodotus might have got it all
wrong and it could turn out that the person they referred to never believed this doc-
trine. He was a well digger who uttered some Greek words which wrongly gave the
impression he had that sort of belief. Perhaps nobody ever believed that all is made
of water or perhaps it is a thesis (fortuitously) held by an unknown Greek hermit,
contemporary of Thales. We have a strong intuition that, in either cases, it would still
be true that a token of “Thales” refers to Thales, the person Aristotle and Herodotus
talked about (and who happened to be, unbeknownst to us, a well digger). But the
classical descriptivist theory predicts that it refers to nobody in the former case and
to the hermit in the latter case. The argument can be put, in general, as follows.
According to the classical theory of proper names, any token of a proper name has
a certain descriptive content (of the kind proposed by Frege, Russell, etc.), |the F|,
as its meaning, a meaning that determines an object, x, when x is unique in hav-
ing property F. Thus, in the counterfactual situation in which y is unique in having
property F, a token of the name refers to y. Similarly, in the counterfactual situation
in which nothing has the property F, a token of the name refers to nothing. In either
case, a token of the name fails to refer to x. Yet, we have the intuition that in both
cases a token of the name in question still refers to x.
In view of these arguments, as is well known, Kripke and Donnellan have pro-
posed a causal theory of proper names, according to which the referent of a token
of a proper name is provided by what I would call a nominal-causal chain. This
chain connects the token to a “baptism” in which the name is bestowed on an osten-
sively given individual (alternatively, as we shall see, in the baptism there may be
no ostensively given object and a description is used to “fix the reference of the
name”; more on this below.) The idea is that a token of a name has as its referent the
baptized individual, which is, so to speak, the source of this nominal-causal chain
that leads to the token. This account is typically associated by the referentialist with
the idea that the referent in question coincides with the pragmatic meaning of the
name token. Accordingly, we can speak of a referentialist causal theory of proper
names (which is often taken to date back to J. S. Mill and is therefore also often
called Millian).
4.5 The Modal Argument About Indexicals
Castañeda (1967, p. 87) has criticized Reichenbach’s account of indexicals and more
generally any account which, like Reichenbach’s, proposes that the descriptive con-
tent of an indexical token uttered by a certain person could have been expressed by a
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definite description, “the F ”, where F is a contingent property (such as the property
of uttering such and such a token). To this end, Castañeda has deployed modal argu-
ments analogous to those used by Kripke for proper names (similar arguments can
also be found in Kaplan 1989). The basic idea is this. According to Reichenbach’s
approach, it would seem that a token of sentences such as the following expresses
an analytically false proposition:
(3) I am uttering nothing.10
Accordingly, any token of
(4) necessarily, it is not the case that I am uttering nothing
should express a truth. Yet, intuitively, the property of uttering nothing is a contin-
gent property that any of us could fail to have at any moment and thus a token of (3)
should at most express a contingently false proposition and consequently a token
of (4) should express a falsehood. More generally, as regards “I”, Castañeda notes
that, for any predicate “F ” expressing a contingent property, any token of “I am F ”
should express a contingent proposition, since it entails the contingent proposition
that the speaker could have expressed by uttering “I exist”. This proposition is con-
tingent, because in turn the proposition that the speaker could have expressed by
uttering “I might have not existed” is true. Accordingly, any token of “I am non-F ”
is also contingent. Castañeda also notes that something similar can be said for other
indexicals such as “this” or “here”. We can now see how this is not only a criti-
cism of Reichenbach’s position, but an implicit attack on the Russellian approach
to indexicals. According to the latter, any token of (5) below should express an
analytically true proposition.
(5) I am thinking.
For a token of (5) expresses, according to Russell, a proposition such as |the indi-
vidual who is experiencing d is thinking|, where d is a certain mental particular,
and (in a broad sense of “think”) experiencing a mental particular entails thinking.
Yet, thinking is a contingent property and thus a token of (5) can at most express a
contingently true proposition. Similarly, we can add, a sentence such as
(6) I am an utterer
can be deployed against Reichenbach. In fact, according to Reichenbach, a token
of (6) expresses a proposition along the lines of |the utterer of i is an utterer|,
where i is the token of “I” uttered by the speaker in question. Since the property
10According to Reichenbach’s analysis, the expressed proposition is something like |the individual
uttering token i is uttering nothing|.
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of being utterer of i entails that of being an utterer, it might seem that any token
of (6) expresses an analytically true proposition. Yet, being an utterer is a contin-
gent property, which may lead us to think that any such token can at most express a
contingently true proposition. To reinforce this point we may notice that any token
expressed by
(7) I might have uttered nothing
(uttered by a typical speaker) expresses a truth.
4.6 Necessary A Posteriori and Contingent A Priori Statements
As is well known, on the basis of his arguments against the classical descriptivist
theory of proper names, Kripke presents the view that proper names are rigid desig-
nators: if a proper name refers to an object x in this world, then it refers to the same
individual x in every possible world in which x exists. Moreover, Kripke urges that
a name (typically) refers to an object as a result of a baptism ceremony where the
object is ostensively given and not because the name expresses a descriptive con-
tent that happens to determine the object. It seems natural to say that in this view a
statement such as a token of
(1) Cicero is Tully
expresses a necessary truth, for it expresses a proposition of the form x = x. Yet, this
seems in conflict with the intuition that the proposition expressed by the statement
can only be known a posteriori, for we need empirical information to determine
that the two name tokens in question can be traced back to the same individual.
Kripke has however argued, by appealing to the idea that objects can have both con-
tingent and essential properties, that there is no real conflict here, for the necessary
and the a priori do not always go hand in hand. As Soames (2005, p. 423) puts
it, “Some properties — e.g. the property of being made of molecules, the property
of being a human being, and the property of being not identical with me — are
essential to anything that has them. We know this a priori about many properties,
even though we can know of a particular that it has one of these properties only
a posteriori. If P expresses such a property and o is an object that has it, then the
proposition expressed by If x exists, then x is P relative to an assignment o to ‘x’
will be necessary but knowable only a posteriori”.
Actually, in line with Kripke, we can say that, from the referentialist’s perspec-
tive, if P is an essential property and o is an object that has it, then the proposition
|Po|, without the existential clause |o exists|, is a necessary proposition, in the sense
that it is true with respect to every possible world in which o exists. It is thus,
we might say, necessary1. We might want to distinguish here, between contingent
beings and necessary beings, where the former exist only in some possible worlds
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and the latter exist in all possible worlds. Hence, if o is contingent, |Po| is not, we
could add, necessary2, as we define necessity2 as truth with respect to (in, at) all
possible worlds (we assume that the possible worlds in which o does not exist are
such that |Po| is not true at them).11 In this perspective, a token of (1) may, for all
we know, be false, in that the two proper name tokens involved in the statement
may fail to be traced back to the same individual (or may fail to be traced back to
anything at all). In this sense, the statement is knowable only a posteriori. However,
if true, this can only be so, in the referentialist perspective, because it expresses a
necessary1 proposition (we take Cicero to be a contingent being, of course), namely
(1a) |cicero = cicero|,
a proposition that attributes to Cicero, one may say, the property, essential for
Cicero, of being identical to Cicero. In this sense, the token of (1) expresses a nec-
essary a posteriori proposition. Sentence (1) then provides, according to Kripke, an
example of a necessary a posteriori truth, for it can be used to attribute an essential
property, self-identity, to a certain object, Cicero.
Kripke’s view of proper names seems also in conflict at first glance with the
observation that sometimes a name, N, is explicitly introduced not by the baptism
of an ostensively given object, but, we may say, by a different kind of baptism (or
naming ceremony), a baptism whereby a description, “the F ”, fixes the reference of
a proper name N. This is so when a speaker declares, as in a definition, that N is
the F (or when a whole community somehow accepts that N is the F, as if it were a
definition), where F is a property, possibly a contingent one, which a certain object
is assumed to be unique in possessing. Under these circumstances, the descriptive
content, |the F|, expressed by the reference-fixing description, is associated in some
way with the name, but does not constitute its meaning. It would seem that in this
case a token of “if N exists, then N is F ”12 expresses a proposition that can be known
a priori.13 For example, since the existence of Neptune was postulated by Le Verrier
11Suppose we take, as I am inclined to do, a possible world to be something like a maximally
consistent conjunction of propositions. Accordingly, let us say that a proposition is true at a world
when it is entailed by the world in question. Intuitively, certain entities, such as Clinton or Paris are
contingent, in that they may fail to be constituents of some gigantic conjunction of propositions, w,
that counts as a possible world, in which case we may say that the entity in question does not exist in
w (vice versa, if it is a constituent of w we say that it exists in w). Consider now a proposition P(x1,
. . ., xn) where x1, . . ., xn are all the contingent entities that the proposition contains as constituents.
We can say that P(x1, . . ., xn) is necessary1 if and only it all the possible worlds that contain x1,
. . ., xn entail it. For example, any proposition of the form |Fx ∨ ¬Fx|, where x is a contingent
entity, is necessary1 because any world in which x exists entails it (if we assume classical logic).
But it is not necessary2 because a world without x as constituent fails to entail it.
12The clause “if N exists” is not explicitly provided by Kripke (1980, p. 14), but, we can assume,
it is presupposed by him.
13At least by the speaker who introduced the name, in virtue of the very fact that she introduced the
name in that manner. Strictly speaking, the speaker makes recourse to the a posteriori knowledge
that she introduced the name in the way indicated, but let this pass, since this is neglected in
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precisely to account for the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus, we might say that
for the name “Neptune”, as Le Verrier used it, the description “the cause of the
perturbations in the orbit of Uranus” fixes the reference of the name. Accordingly,
it seems that a token of
(2) if Neptune exists, then Neptune causes the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus,
uttered by Le Verrier, can be taken to express an a priori truth.
However, according to Kripke, the expressed proposition is something like
(2a) |if neptune exists, then neptune is an object that causes the perturbations in the
orbit of uranus|,
a proposition with |neptune|, the planet itself, as constituent (if we are allowed to
combine Kripke’s explicit views on the matter with Kaplan-style referentialist talk).
Now, proposition (2a) appears to be contingent, since the property of causing
the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus is a contingent property that Neptune might
have failed to have. Since being contingent and being a priori have traditionally
been felt to be conflicting properties, someone might suspect that at least in a case
like this, the proper name expresses a descriptive content, |the object that causes the
perturbations in the orbit of Uranus|, so that the expressed proposition would be the
necessary one:
(2b) |if the object that causes the perturbations in the orbit of uranus exists, then
the object that causes the perturbations in the orbit of uranus is an object that
causes the perturbations in the orbit of uranus|.
This would explain why the proposition can be known a priori. But Kripke has been
very convincing in arguing against this, on the ground that there can be contingent a
priori propositions (famously appealing to the sentence “the standard meter is one
meter long”) and that (2a) would be a case in point. He thus grants that a description
can fix the reference of a name such as “Neptune”, when it is used to introduce a
name in the above manner, in such a way that the speaker who introduces the name
knows a priori, by the very fact that he has performed the naming ceremony, that the
proposition expressed by (2) is true.14 But this does not mean that the description
that fixes the reference also provides a descriptive content expressed by the name.
current discussions of the matter; we can still grant that we are using “a priori ” here in a less
stringent sense. Yet, according to Kripke’s view, this sentence may very well express a contingent
proposition (if F is a contingent property; cf. Kripke 1980, p. 14).
14Actually, it is not clear, given Kripke’s account, that any proposition is expressed at all, let alone
known a priori to be true, if F fails to be (uniquely) exemplified. And it can hardly be taken for
granted that the speaker knows a priori that F is (uniquely) exemplified. But let this pass at this
juncture.
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And thus the proposition expressed by (2) is (2a) and, despite being a priori true, is
contingent.
As we shall see below in more detail, Kaplan has claimed that sentences such as
(3) I am here now
or even simply
(4) I exist
can provide other examples of propositions which are contingent a priori and has
provided a powerful model-theoretic semantics to substantiate this claim. As a result
of Kripke’s arguments, many believe that sentences such as (1) and (2) furnish
examples of necessary a posteriori truth and contingent a priori truth, respec-
tively.15 Similarly, as a result of Kaplan’s arguments, many accord the status of
contingent a priori truths to propositions that can be expressed by tokens of (3),
(4) and the like.16 And there is the widespread opinion that referentialism is sup-
ported by the fact that it can account for these intuitions. We have seen above how it
accounts for the intuitions regarding (1) and (2) and we shall see below how it can
account, in Kaplanian fashion, for the intuitions regarding (3) and (4). A respectable
descriptivist theory should then deal with these issues and describe in a convincing
manner the modal-epistemological status of the propositions expressible by using
such sentences.
4.7 Kaplan’s Semantics for Indexicals
In view of the modal argument for indexicals and other data such as those pro-
vided by sentences (3) and (4) of the previous section, Kaplan has constructed his
well-known referentialist account of indexicals. It deploys a sophisticated model-
theoretic semantics that addresses the modal status of these and related sentences.
More generally, Kaplan’s semantics tries to shed some light on the logical status of
sentences and arguments involving indexicals. Though not all the judgments about
logical truth and validity it leads to have gained consensus, its elegance and power
have contributed to the success of referentialism. I shall now informally sketch
Kaplan’s semantics, in order to see which judgments it leads to in some cases of
particular interest. A good descriptivist theory will have to provide its own verdict
on these cases in a way that agrees with Kaplan’s, whenever he provides correct
assessments on the basis of his framework.
15Some referentialists such as Salmon and Soames however do not agree that proper names can be
used to provide examples of contingent a priori truths. See Soames 2005, p. 424.
16Kaplan also thinks that “Dthat” can provide examples of contingent a priori propositions;
Donnellan discusses this in his 1979, p. 56.
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The models used by Kaplan involve a set of possible worlds, a set of abstract
places (“positions”, common to all worlds) and a set of times (represented by inte-
gers and common to all worlds). This is as in well-known treatments of intensional
logic in the tradition of Montague. In addition, each of Kaplan’s model contains a
set of contexts in order to deal with indexicals.
Before outlining how this works, it must be recalled that Kaplan presupposes a
type-oriented, rather than token-oriented approach to meaning (cf. § 1.10 above).
Thus Kaplan assumes that sentence types and their constituents have as linguistic
meaning a character, i.e. a function from contexts to contents. A content could be
either an individual or a PRP, as we shall see with some examples.17 A context is
understood as a set including a possible world, the speaker of the context, the place
of the context and the time of the context (Kaplan 1989, p. 543, #3). This is a min-
imal characterization intended to account for “I”, “here” and “now”. But as Kaplan
notes (p. 552), other components could be added in order to account for other index-
icals. And thus I shall assume (as in Braun 2001, p. 5) that a context may include a
demonstratum, i.e., an object demonstrated by the speaker of the context. A content
is a property or relation such as being Italian or being located at, if the expression
type is a predicate like “Italian” or “located”, an individual such as Clinton or Paris,
if the expression type is a singular term, a proposition if the expression type is a sen-
tence. In particular, the proposition is a singular proposition, e.g., |ciampi is Italian|,
if the expression is a sentence involving an indexical such as “I am Italian”. As this
example illustrates, the content of a sentence is determined compositionally on the
basis of the contents of the sentence components. Non-indexical expressions have a
stable character, i.e. a character which assigns them the same content with respect
to every context of a given model. For example, the character of “Italian” assigns to
it the same property in every context of a model. In a “standard” model, as we may
call it, in which English predicates are understood the way we understand them in
English, this property would be the property of being Italian.
Indexical expressions on the other hand have characters which assign them dif-
ferent contents from the standpoint of different contexts of a model. For example,
the characters of “I”, “here” and “this” are the functions which, given a context c,
assign as contents, respectively, to “I” the speaker of c, to “here” the place of c
(which is the place where the speaker of c is located), to “this” the demonstratum
of c, if any, i.e. the object demonstrated by the speaker of c.18 The indexical “now”
17When Kaplan presents his approach informally the contents of sentences and predicates are
indeed characterized as PRPs (just as I have characterized as PRPs the pragmatic meanings of
sentence and predicate tokens). However, in the model-theoretic framework he describes these
contents as intensions, understood as functions from circumstances (pairs of possible worlds and
times) to extensions (e.g., sets of objects or truth-values). Like Braun 2001, I shall follow the
former option in outlining Kaplan’s formal framework, since it makes for an easier presentation
and nothing crucial for our purposes is missed in proceeding in this way. It should also be noted
that in the informal presentation of his theory Kaplan describes characters as rules that allow one
to associate contexts to contents.
18I am simplifying a bit, since Kaplan proposes that in the case of “this” what is endowed with
a character is not just the expression, but the expression with the accompanying demonstration,
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is treated like a modal operator that applies to sentences; for simplicity’s sake, we
may ignore how it works (see Forbes 2003 for details).
On the basis of this, the contents of sentences involving indexicals will vary,
depending on the context. Consider a standard model M with a context c1 in which
the speaker is Ciampi and a context c2 in which the speaker is Clinton. Then, the
content of “I” is |ciampi| in the first case and |clinton| in the second. Similarly, the
content of
(1) I am Italian
is
(1a) |ciampi is Italian|
in the first case and
(1b) |clinton is Italian|
in the second case.
Given that M is standard, assume further that in it the content of “hand” is the
property of being a hand and consider, for another example,
(2) this is hand.
Suppose (2) is evaluated from the point of view of M in a context c involving an
object x demonstrated by the speaker of c. In this case the content of the sentence is
(2a) |x is a hand|.
Given a model, a proposition can be true or false at a time and world of the model,
in other words, with respect to a circumstance, i.e. a pair constituted by a possible
world and a time19 (of the model). For example, in the above-mentioned standard
model M, (1a) and (1b) are, respectively, true and false at the present moment in
the actual world. Sentences are said to be true or false in a context c (of a given
model). This depends on (i) which content the character of the sentence delivers,
given the context c, and (ii) the circumstance of the context c. For example, in the
i.e., a pointing by the speaker at an object (Kaplan 1989, p. 527). Moreover, in Kaplan 1989a (p.
582) he suggests that the role assigned to demonstration in 1989 should be given to the “directing
intention” of the speaker. Kaplan also says that when there is no demonstratum in a given context
c, then “this” in that context refers to nothing (1989, p. 527). In his framework this means that it
stands for a certain designated “alien object” (p. 544, # 8 (ii)), which is like the null object assumed
in certain systems of free logic. For present purposes, these details are immaterial.
19This is what we might want to say in describing the formal framework (Forbes 2003), but Kaplan
actually allows for a more articulated notion of circumstance (1989, p. 502).
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above-mentioned standard model M, given context c1, the character of (1) delivers
(1a) as content. Suppose the circumstance of c1 is constituted by the actual world
at the present moment. Then, (1) is true in c1. If, however, the circumstance of c1
were a possible world wherein Ciampi is not Italian at the present moment, then (1)
would be false in c1.
The framework grants a special status to the predicates “exist” and “located”.
They are taken to correspond in all models to the property of existence and the
relation of being located and for all models the following holds: if s, p, t, w are the
speaker, the place, the time and the world of a context c, then the proposition |s
is located at p| is true at t in w. Moreover, for every individual x in the domain of
a model, |x exists| is true at some time in some world. And if, for some location
p, |x is located at p| is true at a certain time t and world w, then |x exists| is also
true at t and w. As regards “now”, for present purposes, we may explain how it is
understood as follows. Its character can be taken to deliver the property of obtaining
at the time of the context. Thus, given a context wherein the time is t, the character
of “now” determines the property of obtaining at t, which a certain proposition may
or may not have with respect to a certain possible world and time. The idea is that,
if a proposition P is true at time t in world w, then the proposition that attributes the
property of obtaining at t to P will be true at every time in world w.
A sentence is said to be logically true if and only if it is true in every context of
every model. Similarly, an argument consisting of a set of sentences P1, . . ., Pn as
premises and of sentence C as conclusion is (logically) valid if and only if for every
model M and context c in M for which P1, . . ., Pn are true, C is true in c in M.
Kaplan’s semantics allows us to evaluate for logical truth and validity sentences
and arguments involving indexicals. For example,
(3) if I am hungry, then I am hungry
turns out to be logically true. In fact, given any model M and context c, (3) gets as
content a tautological proposition:
(3a) |x is H ⊃ x is H|.20
Similarly, the following argument is valid from the perspective of Kaplan’s seman-
tics (Braun 2001, § 3.3):
(4) This is a hand. If this is a hand, then I am not a brain in vat. Therefore, I am not
a brain in a vat.
20It is assumed of course that “if . . ., then ..”. corresponds to the material conditional, ⊃, and that
|x is H ⊃ x is H| is a proposition involving the material conditional and the proposition |x is H|
(taken twice) as constituents.
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In fact, for any model M and context c, the contents assigned to the sentences in
(4) are such that (4) correspond to a logically valid sequence of propositions of this
form:
(4a) | h is H|, | h is H ⊃ i is not B| ∴ |i is not B|.
From the perspective of a token-oriented semantics, one could perhaps question
the idea that we should speak of validity with respect to sentences in a context
rather than with respect to sentence tokens and, in any case, we might want to take
logical truth and validity as applying primarily to propositions and sequences thereof
(Garcia-Carpintero 1998). However, when confronted with examples such as (3) and
(4), we should acknowledge as data assertions like the following:
ILT. Indexicals and Logical Truths. If one speaker utters a statement such as a
token of “if I am hungry, then I am hungry” in a reasonable amount of time,
the speaker somehow conveys a proposition classifiable as logical truth.
IVA. Indexicals and Valid Arguments. If one speaker utters a sequence of state-
ments such as a token of “This is a hand. If this is a hand, then I am not a
brain in vat. Therefore, I am not a brain in a vat” in a reasonable amount of
time, while pointing at the same object, then the speaker somehow conveys
a sequence of propositions constituting a valid argument.
Clearly, even following a referentialist approach based on a token-oriented per-
spective (preferred in this book) data of this sort can be easily captured. For, as
regards (3), the referentialist can say that the relevant speaker, S, conveys a tauto-
logical proposition simply by virtue of the fact that the pragmatic meaning of the
statement uttered by S is a tautological proposition of the form (3a) (where x is the
speaker in flesh and blood). And, as regards (4), a referentialist can of course pro-
vide a similar account. It remains to be seen how a descriptivist theory can handle
such data.
4.8 Self-Supporting and Self-Defeating Sentences
In Kaplan’s framework,
(1) I am an utterer
is not logically true, for there are models M with a context including a speaker s, a
possible world w and a time t such that s is not speaking in w at t. Similarly,
(2) I say nothing
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is not logically false. This is in line with what we noted in section 4.5 above, i.e., that
these sentences can be taken to express contingent propositions, whenever uttered.
Accordingly, Kaplan’s framework is devised in such a way that the necessitations of
(1) and (2) are false in all models in all contexts. What I have called necessitations
of (1) and (2) are, respectively,
(3) necessarily, I am an utterer
and
(4) necessarily, I say nothing.
(This use of necessitation can of course be generalized in the obvious way).
Sentences (3) and (4) can be taken to express false propositions, whenever uttered,
in support of the intuition that “I might have been a non-utterer” and “I may not say
nothing” can be used to tell the truth.
However, there are in Kaplan’s framework sentences which are logically true and
yet are such that their necessitations are false. For instance, a sentence such a
(5) I am here now
turns out to be true in every context in every model and is thus logically true in
Kaplan’s semantics, whereas
(6) necessarily, I am here now
is false from the standpoint of some context in a model and thus is not logically true.
Intuitively, the idea is that the “I am” of (5) is understood as “I am located at” and,
in view of the special status accorded to the predicate “located” (see the preceding
section), (5) turns out to be true in every context in every model. This of course also
depends on technical aspects of the character of “now”, which we have neglected for
simplicity’s sake, which in turn affects the character of (5). Roughly, the character of
(5), given a context c involving a time t and a world w, always delivers as content a
proposition P which is true at t in w. For (6) to be true in c, however, it should be the
case not only that P is true at t in w, but also that it is true at t in any possible world.
But this of course may not obtain. For example, t could be the present moment and
P could be the proposition that Clinton is located in his bedroom, which may be
true at the present moment in some worlds, but false at the present moment in some
other worlds. For similar reasons,
(7) I exist
is logically true, whereas
(8) necessarily, I exist
is false.
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According to Kaplan, this is as it should be. The logical truth of (5) and (7)
captures the intuition that, whenever one utters a sentence such as these, one cannot
fail to express a truth, indeed one knows a priori that the expressed proposition is
true. On the other hand, the fact that (6) and (8) are not logically true captures the
intuition that where a speaker is located at a certain time, or whether he exists at all,
are contingent matters (thus Kaplan claims he has provided further examples of the
contingent a priori).21
We must admit that, from the perspective of the token-oriented account of mean-
ing that we are pursuing here, there are corresponding intuitions which are as
follows: the pragmatic meanings of tokens of (5) and (7) are always true propo-
sitions, at least if uttered in a typical context, which the utterer can know a priori
to be true, in virtue of the very fact that she utters them. In contrast, tokens of (6)
and (8) can be taken to express false propositions, inasmuch as being in a certain
place at a certain time, and existence are contingent properties. The proviso “at least
if uttered in a typical context” takes into account matters such as these: in view
of the answering machine example and the like (to be discussed below), the prima
facie intuition that the pragmatic meaning of tokens of (5) is always true must be
revised. Moreover, there can be, as we have seen in Chapter 3, non-referring tokens
of “I”, which suggests that a token of (7) might express a false proposition. But
we can grant as a datum that in typical situations of oral speech (oral monologues,
or ordinary face-to-face conversations), typical contexts, as we may call them, the
pragmatic meanings of tokens of (5) and (7) are true propositions.
More generally, we can say that sentences such as (5) or (7) are contingently self-
supporting sentences. Before explaining what this amounts to, it is appropriate to
distinguish two senses in which a proposition may be contingent, just as we have
distinguished above between necessary1 and necessary2 proposition. For a (true)
proposition P to be contingent2 the existence of a possible world in which P is not
true suffices.22 On the other hand, for a (true) proposition P to be contingent1, we
require that there is some possible world in which x1, . . ., xn exist and in which
P is not true, where x1, . . ., xn are all the contingent beings that occur as con-
stituents in P. (For false propositions, we can similarly define contingently1 false
and contingently2 false in the obvious way.) For example, any proposition of the
form |Fx ∨ ¬Fx|, where x is a contingent entity, is contingent2, because not true in
21It must be noted that, as regards (7) and (8), Kaplan is trading on the intuition that utterers are
contingent beings: they exist, but might have failed to exist. From his perspective an individual x
exists insofar as it is spatiotemporally located in our actual world, but it may fail to exist in that it
may fail to be spatiotemporally located in some other world. I am inclined to view possible worlds
as maximally consistent conjunctions of propositions, as mentioned above. From this point of view,
a contingent being x is a being that may fail to occur as constituent of a gigantic proposition w that
counts as a possible world. Such a proposition w fails to entail the proposition |x exists|.
22As already noted, I would take a possible world to be something like a maximally consistent
conjunction of propositions. From this perspective, that P is not true in possible world w means
that w fails to entail P. Moreover, that x exists in w means that x is a constituent of w.
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any world in which x does not exist. But it is not contingent1, because, for no world
w in which x exists, it is the case that it is not true in w (if we assume classical logic).
On the other hand, if F is a contingent property such as being white, and x an entity
such as Clinton, |Fx| is contingent in both senses, for there may be a possible world
w in which x exists such that |Fx| is not true in it: Clinton in w is, e.g., black rather
than white.
We can now say that, in general, a sentence S of the form “a is F ”, “somebody
is F ” (or the like) is contingently self-supporting when: If any token of it is uttered
in a typical context, it expresses a true proposition in virtue of the very fact that
it has been uttered, and yet (i) the proposition attributes a contingent property F,
a property such that whatever has it could have failed to have it. Moreover, (ii) it
expresses a contingent1 proposition. And thus: (iii) had a token of the necessitation
of S (i.e., “necessarily, S ”) been uttered in its stead, the expressed proposition would
have been false; and (iv) had a token of the anti-necessitation of S ( i.e., “a might
have been a non-F ”, “somebody might have been a non-F ”, etc.) been uttered in its
stead, the token would have expressed a truth.
We should take it as a datum that there are such sentences and the challenge for
a semantic theory is to show that it handles them correctly in that it predicts that
any token of them uttered in a typical context has the above-mentioned features. It
should be noted that in fact (1) is clearly a contingently self-supporting sentence,
in spite of the fact that it is not put in the same class as (5) and (7) by Kaplan (a
fact lamented by Forbes 2003, note 21, p. 111).23 It is clear that in a token-oriented
referentialist approach all such sentences are correctly classified as contingently
self-supporting. For example, a token of (1) uttered by x in a typical context would
be the contingently true proposition |x is an utterer|. We shall check whether my
descriptivist approach can meet the challenge of also correctly classifying them
as such.
Just as (1) is contingently self-supporting, Kaplan’s well-known example (2) can
be classified as contingently self-defeating. In general, a sentence S of the form “a
is F ”, “somebody is F ” (or the like) is such when, if any token of it is uttered
in a typical context, it expresses a false proposition in virtue of the very fact that
it has been uttered, and yet (i) the proposition attributes a contingent property F,
a property such that whatever fails to have it could have had it. Furthermore, (ii)
the token expresses a contingently1 false proposition. Thus: (iii) had a token of
the necessitation of S been uttered instead of the token in question, the expressed
proposition would have been false; and (iv) had a token of the anti-necessitation
of S been uttered instead of the token in question, it would have expressed a truth.
23Another example of self-supporting sentence is “If I exist, then I am an utterer”. The following
sentences are also contingently self-supporting: “either a token has existed now, or it has existed in
the past, or it will exist in the future” and “something either exists now, has existed or will exist”.
They have been provided by Predelli 2006 in an effort to show that a type-oriented approach is to be
preferred to a token-oriented approach, in that the former can correctly classify them as expressing
contingent propositions in any given context, whereas the latter is forced to say that any token of
them expresses a necessary proposition.
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As (2) shows, there are such sentences. And clearly a token-oriented referentialist
approach handles them correctly. For example, a token of (2) uttered by x in a typ-
ical context would be the contingently1 false proposition |x says nothing|. We shall
have to see whether my descriptivist approach can correctly handle these sentences
as well.
4.9 Kaplan’s Twin Argument Against Frege’s Theory
of Indexicals
We have seen arguments against Reichenbach’s and Russell’s theory of indexicals.
Does the referentialist also have an argument against Frege’s approach? Kaplan
has provided an argument against Frege’s account of indexicals, which we may
call Kaplan’s twins argument (Kaplan 1989, pp. 531, 534).24 It is an adaptation of
Putnam’s (1975) famous Twin Earth argument (about natural kind terms) to the issue
of indexical reference. Kaplan presents it in the context of an attack to Frege’s idea
that his senses can be at the same time cognitive significances (thereby accounting
for the co-reference and no reference problems) and reference determinants (thereby
accounting for the thesis that meaning determines reference). It is true that some of
the principles that could be questioned in the light of this argument are typically
Fregean. However, as we shall see, they tend to be accepted not just by Fregeans,
but by descriptivists in general, and so it is very important to be clear about what
exactly the argument shows. It can have of course many variants (see, e.g., Segal
2000). Here we shall reconstruct the original one, which involves two identical
twins, Castor and Pollux, who are assumed to be mentally indistinguishable, i.e.,
they are qualitatively indistinguishable at least as far as their mental life goes (for
they have the same genetic make-up, they were raised by giving them the same
stimuli, etc.) At some point they both sincerely utter:
(1) My brother was born before I was.
We thus have two tokens of (1), call them 1-c and 1-p, the former involving Castor’s
token of “I”, i-c, which refers to Castor, and the latter involving Pollux’ token of “I”,
i-p, which refers to Pollux. Clearly, one of the two twins, say Pollux, speaks falsely
and the other, Castor, speaks truly. Hence, by the Fregean principle that meaning
determines reference (cf. MDR and MDSR in § 2.9, above), (i) the meaning of
the token i-c, sense(i-c), which determines Castor, differs from the meaning of the
token i-p, sense(i-p), which determines Pollux. Moreover, (ii) the true proposition
expressed by 1-c, sense(1-c), differs from the false proposition expressed by 1-p,
sense(1-p). Presumably, these two propositions differ in that one involves sense(i-c)
as constituent where the other involves sense(i-p), but are otherwise identical.
24A similar example involving a person who believes he is David Hume is provided in Perry 1977,
p. 13.
4.9 Kaplan’s Twin Argument Against Frege’s Theory of Indexicals 129
Now, Frege may be understood as accepting not only the principle that meaning
determines reference, but also the following theses (Putnam 1975, pp. 218 and 219):
NM. Narrowness of Meanings. Any mental state of grasping a meaning is nar-
row and more generally any mental state involving a meaning as content is a
narrow state.
MSDM. Mental State Determines Meaning. If the mental state of grasping the
meaning of an expression, E1, is narrow and is identical to the grasping of the
meaning of some (other) expression, E2, then the meaning of E1 is identical
to the meaning of E2. More generally, if the state of having an attitude, A, to
the meaning of an expression, E1, is narrow and is identical to the state of
having the same attitude, A, to the meaning of E2, then the meaning of E1 is
identical to the meaning of E2.
To illustrate, suppose Tom is in the mental state of grasping the meaning of a
certain token, t1, and Mary is in the mental state of grasping the meaning of another
token, t2. In that case, these two states are narrow. Moreover, if we know that they
are identical, then we can infer that the meaning of t1 is identical to the meaning of
t2 (e.g., Tom and Mary are two standard English speakers and t1 and t2 are tokens
of “snow is white”). Similarly, if Tom is in a state which is a believing relation to
the meaning of t1 as content and Mary is also in a state which is a believing relation
to the meaning of t2, then the two states are narrow. Moreover, if they are the same
state, the meaning of t1 is identical to the meaning of t2 (e.g., they both believe that
snow is white).
Kaplan appears to take for granted a principle implicitly accepted by Putnam in
his Twin Earth argument:
PP. Putnam’s Principle. If X and Y are two mentally qualitatively indistinguish-
able subjects, and X is in a certain narrow state, s1, then there is state, s2, of
Y such that s1 is identical to s2.
Since Castor sincerely assents to the sentential token 1-c and accordingly believes
sense(1-c), we should certainly say that somehow he grasps both the meaning of 1-c
and the meaning of i-c. That is, he is in two mental states characterizable as the
grasping of sense(1-c) and the grasping of sense(i-c), as well as in a mental state
which is the believing of sense(1-c). By NM, these three states of Castor are narrow.
Since Castor and Pollux are mentally indistinguishable, by PP, these states should
be the same as three corresponding narrow states of Pollux’. The obvious candi-
dates are: the grasping of sense(1-p), the grasping of sense(i-p) and the believing of
sense(1-p) (what other candidates could there be?). These are states that we should
attribute to Pollux for reasons analogous to those that led us to attribute the above-
mentioned three states to Castor. However, by MSDM, it follows that sense(1-p)
is identical to sense(1-c), and that sense(i-c) is identical to sense(i-p), which is
impossible. We saw in fact that sense(i-p) and sense(i-c) are different, because they
determine different individuals (Castor and Pollux, respectively), and that sense(1-c)
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and sense(1-p) also differ, because the former is a true proposition, whereas the lat-
ter is a false one. Moreover, we have reason to say that the former is a proposition
believed by Castor and not by Pollux, whereas the latter is a proposition believed by
Pollux and not by Castor.
For a referentialist like Kaplan it is quite obvious that the conundrum should
be solved by dropping the Fregean theses NM and MSDM. This makes room for
taking sense(i-c), sense(1-c), sense(i-p) and sense(1-p) to be broad content, which
in turn preempts an appeal to PP of the kind that we have just seen. This is in
line with the referentialist thesis that indexicals are directly referential, i.e., that the
meaning of an indexical coincides with the referent of the indexical. For, in view of
this thesis, sense(i-c) and sense(i-p) are broad simply because they are Castor and
Pollux themselves and, analogously, sense(i-p) and sense(1-p) are broad, because
they are two propositions involving Castor and Pollux in flesh and blood, respec-
tively, as constituents.25 What a descriptivist should say in the face of this argument
is not similarly obvious. For one thing, NM and MSDM are not accepted only by
Fregeans. For example, they can also be attributed to Russell, and indeed they might
seem to be implicitly involved in the descriptivist’s way of accounting for the co-
reference problem. Thus, if a descriptivist decides to sacrifice them, she must do
it with care, without giving up the descriptivist idea that indexicals always mean
descriptive contents and never ordinary objects like Castor and Pollux.26
25Someone might say that a content involving Castor as constituent is narrow as long as the subject
of the content is Castor himself (and similarly for Pollux and any other subject). This would be so
if we define “narrow content” as a content that does not involve the existence of any worldly entity
beside the subject of the content (rather than simply the mind or mind-brain of the subject, as we
saw in § 1.8). But we can develop an argument analogous to Kaplan’s, involving “this” rather than
“I”. Say, Castor and Pollux utter “this is a spider” when both are facing a spider-like shape except
that Castor is experiencing a real spider and Castor a fake one. The referentialist can react to this
by dropping MN and MSDN and taking Castor’s and Pollux’ tokens of “this” to have as meanings
the real spider and the fake spider, respectively.
26Kaplan (1989, pp. 512ff.) also proposes the following problem for the Fregean account of
indexicals. He asks us to consider
(a) he now lives in Princeton, New Jersey,
on the assumption that (a) has been uttered while pointing at Paul, who indeed lives in Princeton,
NJ. Clearly in this case the expressed proposition is true, because the relevant token of “he” refers
to Paul. Kaplan then proposes for our attention the counterfactual situation that is exactly as before
except that the demonstrated person is now Charles, who does not live in Princeton, has disguised
himself as Paul and looks exactly like him. In this case, Kaplan claims, the expressed proposition
is false, because the token of “he” refers to Charles. Yet, Kaplan goes on, the Fregean should still
say that even in the counterfactual situation the expressed proposition is true. The reason is that, in
Frege’s view, the token of “he” should still be taken to refer to Paul, for it must be taken to have the
same sense as in the real situation and thus it must have the same referent. The argument is difficult
to assess, because Frege is not explicit about the nature of the senses of indexicals such as those
involved in this example. Yet, it must be admitted that, given the abstract nature of Fregean senses,
and given the fact that things appear the same in the two situations, it is hard to imagine how the
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4.10 Misdescription and Pronominal Contradiction
In his famous paper “Reference and Definite Description” (1966), Donnellan
brought to the fore a phenomenon that could be called (speaker) reference despite
misdescription.27 He focuses on the sentence
(1) Smith’s murderer is insane
and considers two different situations in which it could be uttered. In one, it is
uttered by a detective who has just discovered Smith’s mutilated body and has no
clue as to who killed him. In the other, Jones has been convicted for Smith’s murder
and is behaving “insanely” during his trial in court. In this latter context a speaker
convinced of Jones’ guilt, call him Tom, says (1) to someone, call her Mary, who is
also convinced that Jones is guilty (assume also that both know each other’s belief).
In the former case, says Donnellan, the detective uses a description attributively; he
might have as well said: “Smith’s murderer, whoever he is, is insane”. In the latter
case, he is using a description referentially; he wants to say of Jones in particular that
he is insane. Now, Donnellan urges that Tom does succeed in referring to Jones even
though it later turns out that Jones is in fact not a murderer. Donnellan is right in that
we have a pre-theoretical intuition here that Tom does refer to Jones, despite having
misdescribed him as the murderer of Smith. This reference despite misdescription
to Jones cannot be explained by appealing to the fact that Tom has uttered a token of
a description, “the F ”, such that F uniquely identifies Jones, for this is not the case.
How should we explain it? Donnellan accounts for the phenomenon by postulating
a semantic ambiguity in a definite description (and thus in the definite article) as a
result of which in a certain context, where the speaker uses it attributively, a token
of the description can express, in line with Russell, a descriptive content, whereas
in another context, where the speaker uses it referentially, it can directly refer to an
object. If Donnellan is right, descriptivism is wrong and thus the descriptivist must
find another account of reference despite misdescription.
Donnellan’s point can be reinforced by focusing on the related phenomenon of
pronominal contradiction,28 which we can illustrate as follows. Suppose now that
Mary does not share Tom’s belief that Jones is the murderer. We can then imagine
that she replies to him by saying
(2) he is not the murderer.
sense of the “he” token in the latter case could be different from the sense of the “he” token in the
former.
27There were other authors who, shortly before Donnellan’s paper, raised issues and provided
answers very similar to those discussed therein. See Neale 1990, p. 63, for references.
28This terminology is from Neale 1990, p. 201. Neale refers to Donnellan 1978 and Strawson 1952
in discussing this issue.
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Intuitively, Mary has referred to Jones, just like Tom immediately before her. She
has done this by using an anaphoric pronoun that traces back to the token of “Smith’s
murderer” uttered by Tom. Thus, if this token, t, expressed a descriptive content, |the
murderer of smith|, we should be led to think that Mary has expressed the blatant
contradiction |the murderer of smith is not a murderer|. Yet, we have no reason to
assume that Mary is irrationally putting forward a contradiction.
The phenomenon of reference despite misdescription and the related problem
of pronominal contradiction can arise not only with definite descriptions but with
indexicals as well, as already noted by Whitehead 1920, Chapter 1. Whitehead con-
siders a case along these lines. Tom is facing a building that he takes to be a church,
but that is in fact a house. He says to Mary:
(3) that church is beautiful.
Mary, who knows better, replies:
(4) it is not a church, but a house.
According to Whitehead, the reply suggests that the token of the indexical “that
church” uttered by Mary is directly referential. The descriptivist will have to provide
a different account.
4.11 The Problems of Choice, Ignorance and Error
Donnellan’s argument based on misdescriptions is closely related to three problems
that can be raised against certain descriptivist accounts of incomplete descriptions,
proper names and indexicals. Following Devitt and Sterelny (1999, p. 107), we can
label them the problem of choice, the problem of ignorance and the problem of error.
Let us consider definite descriptions first. As is well known, Strawson 1950
attacked Russell’s theory about them concentrating on incomplete ones such as a
token t of “the table” resulting from an appropriate utterance of
(1) the table is covered with books.
Clearly, notes Strawson, it is not true that a description like t refers to an object by
virtue of the fact that its descriptive content identifies the object in question: there
are too many tables for this to be true. Yet, as many have noted, the descriptivist
can reply with what could be called a (descriptivist) ellipsis theory (of descriptions,
in this case). This claims that the pragmatic meaning, M, of an incomplete descrip-
tion, could in principle be specified by a corresponding complete description whose
linguistic meaning is M. In sum, the token of “the table” refers to a table because,
given the context, it can be associated to a descriptive content |the table such and
such|, which identifies a specific table.
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The problems of choice, ignorance and error are raised in Donnellan 1968, 1978
and further developed by Wettstein 1981 in order to counter this move. Let us
illustrate them by a variation on the theme of an example by Wettstein.
Suppose Tom utters (1) in a context in which it is clear that the token of “the
table” uttered by Tom refers to a certain table, the only table with precise geo-
graphical coordinates <a, b, c>, the only table in room 201 in the Department of
Philosophy of the University of Iowa, where the only Canadian philosopher in this
department, Richard Fumerton, the author of Metaphysical and Epistemological
Problems of Perception is sitting. Clearly, there are many complete descriptions
which could be considered as candidates to provide the pragmatic meaning: “the
table with geographical coordinates <a, b, c>”, “the table in room 201 in the
Department of Philosophy of the University of Iowa”, “the table at which the
Canadian philosopher of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Iowa
is sitting”, etc. How are we going to choose one? An appeal to the speaker’s inten-
tions is problematic. Whatever we choose, say “the table in room 201 . . . ”, we can
imagine that Tom might disagree by saying that he did not intend to refer to the
table as the table in room 201, etc. (he wasn’t paying attention to the room num-
ber). Hence, the objection concludes, since we cannot determine which complete
description is the right one, we should not claim that there is such a right one. This
is the problem of choice for the descriptivist.
The problems of ignorance and error reinforce the point by further urging that
an appeal to the speaker’s intentions is problematic. As regards the former, it might
be the case that, in spite of the abundance of candidates, Tom might be unable to
provide, upon being asked, any complete definite description by means of which
he could have referred to the table. Thus, if the ellipsis approach were correct, we
should say that he has expressed no proposition, contrary to the obvious intuition
that he has expressed a truth. Finally, as regards error, the speaker, upon being asked
to provide a complete description by means of which he could have referred to
the table, might provide a definite description which in fact does not refer to the
table, but to something else (or to nothing, for that matter). Say, Tom is under the
mistaken impression of being in room 203 and provides the description “the table
in room 203”. Suppose the table in 203 is not, unlike the one in 201, covered with
books. Then, if it were true that the meaning expressed is |the table in room 203 is
covered with book|, the speaker would have expressed a falsehood about the table
in room 203, contrary to our intuition according to which he expressed a truth about
the table in room 201.
Most famously, these three problems were raised by Kripke 1980 against the
classical descriptivist theory of proper names discussed above in Chapter 3. Indeed,
this approach is also an ellipsis theory, according to which the pragmatic meaning,
M, of a proper name, could in principle be specified by a corresponding complete
description whose linguistic meaning is M. Consider a token of a proper name,
e.g., “Socrates”. Following the classical approach, we might assume that a definite
description such as “the philosopher who drank the hemlock” or “the teacher of
Plato” provides the descriptive content which constitutes its pragmatic meaning.
But then the problem of choice arises: how are we going to decide which specific
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description expresses this meaning? It seems that both “the philosopher who drank
the hemlock” and “the teacher of Plato” are good candidates and many other good
candidates could be proposed, e.g., “the philosopher who claimed that he knew only
that he did not know anything”. If we try to solve the problem by appealing to the
speaker’s intentions, objections analogous to those that we have seen in the case
of incomplete descriptions can be brought forward. Moreover, as with incomplete
descriptions, the problems of ignorance and error also arise.
The account of indexicals provided by linguistic descriptivism, discussed in §
3.9, is also an ellipsis theory in claiming that the pragmatic meaning, M, of an index-
ical, could in principle be specified by a corresponding complete (pure) description
whose linguistic meaning is M. Accordingly, it is also susceptible to the problems
under discussion in this section. For example, imagine a situation in which Tom
knows that Mary is (generically) looking for a CD-ROM and says to Mary, while
pointing at object x, which he takes to be a CD-ROM:
(2) this is a CD-ROM.
Mary picks up the object x. Clearly, the “this” token refers to x. Now, one might
argue that there many different descriptions that express a descriptive content that
uniquely identifies x, all of which are equally good candidates. For example, “the
object pointed at by the only person called Tom who is speaking to a person called
Mary”, “the object with the spatial coordinates such and such”, etc. And, the argu-
ment goes, there is no principled way to decide which description is the right one.
Moreover, in spite of the fact that there are these available candidates, we might
easily imagine that Tom is not able to provide a complete description that refers to
x. Or we might imagine that he would provide, upon being questioned, a description
that does not refer to x. For example, Tom might say that in using “this” he wanted
to refer to the only CD-ROM in the room. But x is in fact, let us suppose, a DVD.
4.12 Kripke’s Pierre and Paderewski Puzzles
The referentialist account of proper names, at least if taken at face value, implies
that co-referential proper names are mutually substitutable in intensional contexts,
since they have the same meaning. Yet, as we have seen, the co-reference prob-
lem suggests that they are not, for if we grant substitutivity we end up attributing
an inconsistent belief, P & ~P, to someone we have no reason to consider irra-
tional or even end up asserting the contradiction that someone both believes and
does not believe P, for some proposition P, expressible by using a proper name.
Hence, one might think that, in spite of all the arguments for referentialism that
we have seen, descriptivism must be right after all. Kripke 1979 presents a puzzle
that is designed to show that this conclusion is unwarranted, because we can reach
the same result quite independently of any referentialist assumption about proper
names. (Kripke would not put it exactly like that, for, as we have seen, he refuses
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to consider himself a referentialist). The idea is that, once we join Kripke’s puzzle
to the co-reference problem, we should come to see not so much that referentialism
is wrong and descriptivism is right (as the co-reference problem taken in isolation
might suggest), but that notions such as belief and content of someone’s statement,
i.e. of the proposition expressed by the statement, are not clear enough “to draw any
conclusion, positive or negative, about substitutivity” (Kripke 1979, p. 269). Thus,
as noted in § 4.1 above, Kripke’s puzzle has served the purpose of supporting the
popularity of referentialism in spite of the co-reference problem.
We might call it the Pierre puzzle. Let us see what it amounts to. Kripke 1979
recounts to us the story of a certain Frenchman, Pierre, who sincerely assents to
(1) Londres est jolie,
although he has never been in London. He then moves to an ugly suburb of London,
learns English, and sincerely assents to
(2) London is not pretty.
We are to assume that in the process he has not come to know that the city where he
now lives is the city that the French call “Londres”. There is thus no reason to think
that his beliefs are inconsistent, since, for all we know, Pierre simply lacks some
factual knowledge. Yet, by using two prima facie plausible principles, Kripke shows
how one can infer from these assumptions that Pierre believes both that London is
pretty and that it is not pretty. The problem is compounded by observing that we thus
have grounds to also assert that it is not the case that Pierre believes that London is
pretty.
The principles in question are:
PT. Principle of Translation. If a sentence of one language expresses a truth in
that language, then any translation of it into any other language also expresses
a truth (in that other language) [Kripke (1979, p. 250)].
KDP. Kripke’s Disquotational Principle (for English). A normal English
speaker who is not reticent will be disposed to sincere reflective assent to “p ”
(if and) only if he believes that p (provided “p ” contains no indexical and,
if it contains ambiguities, it is understood in one way in all its occurrences)
[Kripke (1979, p. 248 and, for the biconditional version, p. 249)].29
The principle KDP is here stated for English but we could state a parallel version
of it for any other language such as French (Kripke 1979, p. 250). The parentheti-
cal remark “provided ‘p’ contains no indexical and, if it contains ambiguities, it is
understood in one way in all its occurrences” is inserted in the light of what Kripke
29Kripke’s disquotational principle, here labelled “KDP”, is of course rather similar to the
disquotation principle DP appealed to in § 3.2.
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says at p. 249, after stating the principle, and in note 22, p. 276. Kripke provides
an obvious example to explain why indexicals should be avoided: “If he [a normal
English speaker] assents to ‘You are wonderful,’ he need not believe that you — the
reader — are wonderful” (p. 249). As regards ambiguities not involving indexicals,
we can surmise he has in mind something like this: if a speaker assents to “all banks
are financial institutions” while taking a business exam, it should not be inferred
from this that she believes that all river banks are financial institutions.
The puzzle goes as follows. Since, after moving to London, Pierre is still disposed
to assent to (1), we can infer the following by the French version of KDP: Pierre
croit que Londres est jolie (Pierre believes that London is pretty). Then, by PT,
we infer that Pierre believes that London is pretty. However, since he is now also
disposed to assent to “London is not pretty”, we can infer by the English version
of KDP that he believes that London is not pretty. Hence, it appears that Pierre has
inconsistent beliefs. Moreover, we can assume that Pierre is not disposed to assent
to “London is pretty”. Hence, by the biconditional version of KDP, we can infer that
it is not the case that Pierre believes that London is pretty. And thus we get a plain
contradiction.
In order to support the claim that no amount of fussing with the notion of “correct
translation” really solves the Pierre puzzle, Kripke also proposes (1979, p. 265) what
he seems to take to be just another version of it, a version which however does not
require PT. Let us call it the Paderewski puzzle. It goes more or less like this. Peter
(a normal English speaker) knows that someone called “Paderewski” was a famous
pianist and is thus disposed to sincerely assent to
(3) Paderewski had musical talent.
“Later, in a different circle”, as Kripke puts it, Peter comes to know that someone
called “Paderewski” was a Polish statesman. Since he is sceptical of the musi-
cal abilities of politicians, he infers that there are (at least) two people called
“Paderewski”. Now, Kripke tells us, “Using ‘Paderewski’ as a name for the states-
man, Peter assents to ‘Paderewski had no musical talent’” (although in fact the
pianist and the statesman are one and the same).
The puzzle consists in the first place of the fact that, by KDP, we should infer
on the one hand that Peter believes that Paderewski had musical talent and on the
other hand that Peter believes that Paderewski had no musical talent. Moreover, by
the biconditional version of KDP, we should even infer both that Peter believes that
Paderewski had musical talent and its denial.
Chapter 5
Definite Descriptions and Proper Names
5.1 Premise
In this chapter I shall propose a form of descriptivism, Contextual descriptivism
(CD, in brief). As explained in the introduction, CD relies on “contextualized prop-
erties” of the form F@t, where “@” is the contextualization sign, whose meaning is
elucidated in §§ 5.3-5.4. Very roughly speaking, and given the default option that we
shall pursue (according to which t is a linguistic token), CD can be seen as a sort of
generalization to proper names and incomplete determiner phrases (including def-
inite descriptions) of Reichenbach’s (1947) token-reflexive approach to indexicals.
According to CD, indexicals and proper names are (in typical cases) incomplete
(truncated) definite descriptions, and thus the descriptive contents which constitute
their pragmatic meanings should be characterized by relying first on an auxiliary
account of the pragmatic meaning of incomplete definite descriptions. Since, as
we have seen, descriptions can be incomplete just like other members of the more
general class of determiner phrases to which they belong, it follows that this auxil-
iary account should be extracted from a more sweeping theory about the pragmatic
meaning of incomplete determiner phrases. The next few sections will then be
devoted to this preliminary issue in a way that involves, for generality’s sake, a
discussion of complete determiner phrases as well. After this, I shall try to charac-
terize the pragmatic meaning of various kinds of singular terms from the point of
view of CD.
Before we go ahead, however, it might be worth addressing a potential worry.1
To see what the worry is consider the following point. Since linguistic tokens are
objectively existing particulars, a descriptivism that relies on token-reflexive mean-
ings will have to admit broad contents, or at least this is so for descriptivism as I
understand it. For example, as we shall see in detail, the meaning of a token of “the
table is dirty” may well be, according to CD, a proposition such as |the table@t is
dirty|, where t is a certain linguistic token, and this very proposition may in turn
be a belief of a certain person. Since this belief contains as constituent an objec-
tively existing particular, i.e. the token t, it is a wide content. Similarly, to the extent
1This worry was raised in correspondence by Garcia-Carpintero.
137F. Orilia, Singular Reference: A Descriptivist Perspective, Philosophical Studies
Series 113, DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-3312-3_5, C© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010
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that a referentialist admits that the meaning of, say, a token of “Cicero is an ora-
tor” is a belief of a certain person, the referentialist is committed to wide contents.
For (as noted in § 1.8) the referentialist ipso facto admits that a proposition with
an objective particular as constituent, |cicero is an orator|, is a belief. Now, clearly,
the troubles encountered by referentialism in confronting the co-reference problem
have to do with the fact that this doctrine is committed, at least prima facie, to such
wide contents. The worry then is that CD, because of its acceptance of wide con-
tents, is similarly entangled in the co-reference problem. However, to see that this
is not the case, we need only reflect on the different ways in which wide contents
are acknowledged by the referentialist who takes |cicero is an orator| as a wide con-
tent and by the supporter of CD. The former does this while allowing a particular
responsible for a certain content’s being wide, say, Cicero in flesh and blood, to be
what is expressed as meaning by different terms such as “Cicero” and “Tully” (or
tokens thereof, understood as directly referential). In contrast, the latter explicitly
forbids this. It is not possible, according to CD, that a certain entity, t, functions as
meaning of two different terms that refer to it in a directly referential fashion, even
if t is a linguistic token. To illustrate, suppose that in an effort to give rise to the
co-reference problem, we introduce two proper names for token t, say “Tex” and
“Tix”, and then consider which propositions are expressed by tokens of
(1) Tex is a consonant
and
(2) Tix is a consonant.
Now, whereas for the referentialist the proposition expressed is always the same,
|t is a consonant|, this is not so for the supporter of CD. For such theorist, despite
acknowledging that t can be a constituent of a proposition (and thus of a belief),
qua constituent of a descriptive content of the form |the F@t|, will have to say
that a token of (1) expresses a proposition that differs from the one expressed by a
token of (2). For the former expresses |the Tex@x is a consonant| and the latter the
proposition |the Tix@y is a consonant|, where x and y are tokens of “Tex” and “Tix”,
respectively, and |Tex| and |Tix| are two nominal properties, properties whose nature
will be discussed in § 5.8 below. In other words, being a form of descriptivism, CD
claims that any singular term token, even one that purports to refer to a linguis-
tic token, expresses as its meaning a descriptive content, thereby setting aside any
worry concerning the co-reference problem. Relatedly, the no-reference problem is
similarly defused, since the descriptive content is always granted as meaning, even
when a singular term that purports to refer to a linguistic token happens to be empty.
5.2 The Relation PRAG
The existence of conceptual strengthenings such as those that we saw in discussing
conversational impliciture in § 2.3 suggests the following. There must be a rela-
tion of “pragmatic correspondence” that, on the basis of the contextual complex
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for a certain non-anaphoric token t, somehow links a somewhat generic property F,
working as (constituent of) the contextualized linguistic meaning of t, to a corre-
sponding more specific property G. When t, F and G are so related to each other we
can indicate this as PRAG(t, F, G) and we can also say that t implicitly expresses G
(via F). Recall for instance the example of § 2.3 wherein a token b of
(1) every table is dirty
is uttered by a waiter as he starts a dialogue with another waiter in the restaurant
Spanò in Palermo. In this case, there is a token y of “every table” with |every table| as
contextualized linguistic meaning. Moreover, the token y has also |every table in the
restaurant Spanò in Palermo| as conceptual strengthening. This is a denoting concept
that involves the property component |table in the restaurant Spanò in Palermo| as
constituent. This indicates that PRAG(y, |table|, |table in the restaurant Spanò in
Palermo|) holds.2
In Chapter 2 we also saw an example based on a token a of the sentence
(2) steel is not strong enough.
In the example in question, given the meaning |strong enough| of the relevant token
x of “strong enough”, there is a corresponding conceptual strengthening |strong
enough to build a 500-storey building|. In this case we can assume that PRAG(x,
|strong enough|, |strong enough to build a 500-storey building|) holds.
The above examples tell us that we can distinguish at least two cases in which
PRAG(t, M, C) can hold: (a) t has a contextualized linguistic meaning of the form
|det M| and thus it occurs as determiner phrase (possibly a truncated one), as illus-
trated by example (1); (b) t has M itself as contextualized linguistic meaning, as
illustrated by example (2). Intuitively, in this case, t works as a predicate.3 There
is one additional case to be considered, which has to do with whole statements and
how we should understand at the pragmatic level the meaning corresponding to the
tense element in the verb of a statement. How the relation PRAG should be taken
2As far as we are concerned here, the relation PRAG is a primitive notion, just as the meaning
relation that links an expression to its semantic meaning(s). Although no complete analysis of
PRAG is provided, it is implicitly, albeit partially, characterized by various principles, such as
P1-P3, listed below. The fact that PRAG is taken to be primitive here does not rule out that it
can be analyzed at a different deeper level, say, from the point of view of a naturalization project
(although I am sceptical about it). The same goes of course for the meaning relation. (Thanks to
Aldo Frigerio for prompting me to insert this note as a reply to one of his queries.)
3More precisely, we may then want to say that PRAG is a four-term relation, involving as an
additional “grammatical” parameter G: PRAG(t, G, M, C) (similarly, we might want to introduce
this parameter for the relation COMPL, to be discussed below). The idea is that G is a grammatical
category that t somehow contributes to “realize” to the extent that it contributes to convey the
contextualized meaning M. For instance, as regards the example based on (2), G would be the
predicate category and as regards the example based on (1), it would be the determiner phrase
category. However, for present purposes, we can neglect this further parameter.
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to work in this case depends on whether we uphold temporalism or eternalism. We
shall discuss this in Chapter 7. For the time being, let us simply record that there
is a third case in which PRAG(t, M, C) can obtain: (c) t is a statement and M is a
concept somehow expressed by a tense component in the verb occurring in t.4
Intuitively, when we have a situation of kind (a), (b) or (c), the contextual com-
plex for the token t in question may determine, on the basis of the pragmatic module,
that the concept M counts as “specific enough”, i.e., not in need of being associated
to a corresponding conceptual strengthening. We can express this fact as COMPL
(t, M). Clearly, if COMPL(t, M) holds, then, for no C it is the case that PRAG
(t, M, C). In practice, if t is a token used as determiner phrase and COMPL(t, M)
holds, then t is a complete determiner phrase. If, on the other hand, COMPL(t, M)
does not hold, t is an incomplete determiner phrase. Consider, e.g., a token of (3)
below, uttered in a typical mathematical context:
(3) the positive square root of four is even.
In this case there is no conceptual strengthening of |positive square root of four|
with respect to the token of “the positive square root of four” in question, which we
may call t. Thus, COMPL(t, |positive square root of four|) holds and consequently,
for no C, it is the case that PRAG(t, |positive square root of four|, C).
In effect, when we know that t is used as determiner phrase or predicate and that
PRAG(t, M, C) holds, we know that (i) the contextualized linguistic meaning M has
been somehow expressed (in a typical case, by a standard speaker) by virtue of the
fact that t has been uttered and yet M has not been expressed to denote generically
all objects with the property M, but only those among them that are, as we may
say, “relevant with respect to t”5 (t-relevant, for short), and (ii) having the property
C renders t-relevant an object that has the property M (so that the class of C’s and
the class of t-relevant objects coincide). That is, in a sort of performative fashion,
because t has been uttered in the appropriate way in a certain context, being a C
somehow makes an object with property M a t-relevant object. Correspondingly, the
class of C’s comes to coincide with the class of the t-relevant items. We can call
M a source property relative to t and C a target property relative to t. Thus, in our
restaurant example, the relation PRAG links the token y, the source property |table|
and the target property |table in the restaurant Spanò in Palermo|: PRAG(y, |table|,
|table in the restaurant Spanò in Palermo|). Given that this holds, we can say that
whatever is table and y-relevant is a table in the restaurant Spanò in Palermo and
vice versa. Similarly, in our second example, the relation PRAG links the token x,
the source property |strong enough| and the target property |strong enough to build
4In case (c), the grammatical parameter discussed in the previous note would be the grammatical
category tense. Specifying this additional parameter may be useful if we think that a statement
as a whole may have a conversational impliciture other than the one it has in relation to its tense
component.
5If we are to take into account the grammatical parameter discussed in note 3 above we should say
something like “relevant with respect to t and G”, where G is the grammatical category in question.
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a 500-storey building|: PRAG(x, |strong enough|, |strong enough to build a 500-
storey building|). Given that this holds, we can say that whatever is x-relevant and
strong enough is strong enough to build a 500-storey building and vice versa.
Thus, in general:
P1. PRAG principle 1. (t is used as determiner phrase or predicate & PRAG
(t, M, C)) ↔ ∀x(t-relevant(x) ≡ C(x)).
(Recall that I use “↔” to indicate an equivalence that holds at the conceptual level,
and “≡” for a material biconditional. Correspondingly, I use “→” to indicate an
entailment at the conceptual level and “⊃” for a material conditional.)
Moreover, the above examples suggest that we should assume:
P2. PRAG principle 2. (t is used as determiner phrase or predicate & PRAG
(t, M, C)) → ∀x(C(x) ⊃ M(x).
For example, PRAG(y, |table|, |table in the restaurant Spanò in Palermo|) can
be taken to hold because all the tables in the restaurant Spanò in Palermo are
(obviously) tables. Similarly, PRAG(t2, |strong enough|, |strong enough to build a
500-storey building|) can be taken to hold because |strong enough| is a very generic
property (roughly, being strong enough to do something or other; see Cappelen and
Lepore 2005, p. 97), possessed by every object that is strong enough to build a
500-storey building.
We noted in Chapter 2 that several different conversational implicitures can be
associated to the same contextualized linguistic meaning of a given token, which
suggests that, for two different properties C1 and C2, both PRAG(t, M, C1) and
PRAG(t, M, C2) may hold. We saw there an example in which a token of “some stu-
dent”, with contextualized linguistic meaning |some student|, could be associated
to two different conversational implicitures, |some student in the class of school S
taught by a teacher of school S called Lucy| and |some student in the intermediate
Latin class of school S|. This is so however only because the two properties, |student
in the class of school S taught by a teacher of school S called Lucy|, and |student in
the class of school S taught by a teacher of school S called Lucy|, are co-extensional.
Or consider the case of a client who upon sitting at a table in a restaurant says to
the waiter: “the table is dirty”. We could admit that, roughly speaking, there is a
conceptual strengthening of |the table| that the client may express by saying “the
table at which I am sitting”. But equally well we could admit that there is another
conceptual strengthening that the waiter may express with something like “the table
at which the client who is complaining to me is sitting”. But again, as in the pre-
vious example, these two different conceptual strengthenings involve two property
components that are co-extensional. All this suggests the following principle:
P3. PRAG principle 3. (PRAG(t, M, C1) & PRAG(t, M, C2)) → ∀x(C1(x) ≡
C2(x)).
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5.3 The Pragmatic Meaning of Basic Determiner Phrases
On the basis of what we saw in § 2.4 (see principle DPCB in particular), a token
t used as basic (non-anaphoric) determiner phrase has a contextualized linguis-
tic meaning of the form |det M| where det is a certain determiner meaning, e.g.,
|the|, |thepl|, |every|, etc. and M a property. What about the pragmatic meaning of
a token with a contextualized linguistic meaning of this kind? Intuitively, this must
depend on the contextual complex for the token and the pragmatic module. We
should distinguish two cases: (i) t has a contextual complex that informs us that t
is complete, i.e., COMPL(t, M); and (ii) t has a contextual complex that informs us
that t is incomplete, i.e., for some C, PRAG(t, M, C). As far as complete tokens are
concerned, there seems to be no reason to say that the pragmatic meaning is any
different from the contextualized linguistic meaning. As regards incomplete tokens
the story is more complicated and we now turn to it.
I would like to propose that the pragmatic meaning of an incomplete non-
anaphoric determiner token t with contextualized linguistic meaning |det M| is the
following “token-reflexive” meaning: |det M with respect to t|. The locution “with
respect to” is used in a technical way that will be clarified in a moment. For the
time being, let us record that for convenience I use the contextualization sign, “@”,
as a formal device to represent the (relational) notion that the locution in question
is intended to convey. Accordingly, we can say that the pragmatic meaning of an
incomplete determiner phrase t is |det M@t|, on the assumption that |det M| is the
contextualized linguistic meaning of t. Thus, for example, the pragmatic meaning
of an incomplete token t of “the table” (with a primary contextual complex) is |the
table@t|.
In sum, we should accept:
DPPB. Determiner phrases: Pragmatic meaning when they are used
as Basic. If t is used as a basic (possibly truncated) determiner
phrase and thus, in accordance with DPCB, has a denoting con-
cept, |det M|, as its contextualized linguistic meaning, then the fol-
lowing holds. (A) Complete basic DP. If t is complete [i.e., COMPL
(t, M)], then the pragmatic meaning of t is the same as its contextualized
linguistic meaning, i.e., |det M|. (B) Incomplete basic DP. If t is incomplete
[i.e., for some C, PRAG(t, M, C)], then the pragmatic meaning of t is |det
M@t|.
5.4 The Relation @
From a formal point of view we are to conceive of our language as allowing for
the dynamic creation of ever new predicates of the form “M@t”, where t is a token
that has just been uttered and “M” is a predicate (not involving “@”) that is already
part of the language. Thus, for example, when one utters a token, t, of “the table”,
the new predicate “table@t” is adjoined to the already existing predicate “table”, as
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well as to the other already existing predicates.6 The concept expressed by this new
predicate, and thus an understanding of which items fall under it, are provided by a
set of axioms governing the relational concepts @ and PRAG. In other words, we
can understand the relation @ and thus an attribution of a property of the kind M@t,
in the light of the following further principles regarding the PRAG relation:
P4. PRAG principle 4. M@t(x) ↔ ∃C(PRAG(t, M, C) & C(x)).
Given P4, we can show that the following also holds:
P5. PRAG principle 5. PRAG(t, M, C) → ∀x(M@t(x) ≡ C(x)).
To see this, suppose that there is a primary contextual complex for a token t by virtue
of which PRAG(t, M, C) holds. If an item x has the property M@t, then by P4, for
some F, (PRAG(t, M, F) & F(x)). Thus x has property F. Since, by P3, F and C are
co-extensive, then x has also property C. On the other hand, if we assume that x has
property C, since we already assumed PRAG(t, M, C), we trivially get ∃F(PRAG(t,
M, F) & F(x)). And thus, by P4, M@t(x) is the case.
Moreover, given P2 and P4, the following also holds:
P6. PRAG principle 6. t is used as a determiner phrase → (M@t(x) ⊃ M(x)).
To illustrate these principles, let us go back to the restaurant example of Chapter 2
(reproposed in § 5.2 above), based on a token s of
(1) every table is dirty.
We can assume by DPPB that a certain token, t, of “every table”, embedded in
s, has the pragmatic meaning |every table@t| and that consequently the pragmatic
6The assumption that a new predicate “M@t” has become part of the language can be seen as
presupposing that t, understood as if it were a singular term directly referring to itself, has in turn
become part of the language. By taking advantage of the lambda operator discussed in note 25
of § 1.7, a predicate of the form “M@t(x)” can be understood as short for “[λy @(M, t, y)]”. By
the principle of lambda conversion, “[λy @(M, t, y)]” is equivalent to “@(M, t, x)”. This makes
it clear that @ is a relation, more specifically a triadic relation that can be true of a property, M,
a linguistic token, t, and an item of whatever nature, x. If we take into account the grammatical
parameter discussed in note 3 above, however, we should rather speak of properties expressed by
predicates of the form “[λy @(M, t, G, y)]” (or, in shorter form, “M@<t, G>”), thus viewing @
as a tetradic relation. Here “G” stands for a certain grammatical category, intuitively a category to
which t, qua linguistic item, belongs. By the principle of lambda conversion, M@<t, G>(x) would
be equivalent to “@(M, t, G, x)”. Moreover, instead of P4 above, we would need: M@<t, G>(x) ↔
∃C(PRAG(t, G, M, C) & C(x)).
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meaning of s is: |every table@t is dirty|. By P5, the meaning in question is materially
equivalent to the proposition |every table in the restaurant Spanò in Palermo is dirty|,
a conversational impliciture of the statement s in question. Moreover, P6 grants that
whatever has the property table@t also has the property table.
Note that, given that there is a token t and a property F, for purely combinatorial
reasons, so to speak, there exists the property F@t. However, this property F@t may
fail to be exemplified for a variety of reasons. In particular, it might be the case that,
for no G, PRAG(t, F, G) holds. This could happen either because F is not a source
property with respect to t, or the contextual complex for t is not primary or it is
not informative enough to deliver a target property G, given the source property F
and the pragmatic module. For example, consider a context in which some people
are comparing college A (where all students have a room in a dorm) and college B
(where some students live off campus). Suppose that a token of
(2) every student lives off campus
is uttered in this context, in such a way that it is not clear whether the statement is
about college A or college B. Then, the contextual complex for the relevant token t
of “every student” is not informative enough to grant the truth of any proposition of
the form PRAG(t, |student|, C). In fact, PRAG(t, |student|, |student of college A|)
and PRAG(t, |student|, |student of college B|) have an equal claim to correctness,
but, by P3, they cannot both be true. Hence, |student@t| fails to be exemplified
and the proposition |every student@t lives off campus| (the pragmatic meaning of
the token of (2) in question) is uninformative. This holds because, when F is not
exemplified, all propositions of the form |every F is G| are vacuously true, given
how we understood |every| in § 1.7, i.e. without existential presuppositions; if we
understand |every| as giving rise to an existential presupposition we could regard
the proposition |every student@t lives off campus| as false.
5.5 Genuine Singular Terms
Let us finally focus on singular terms from the standpoint of CD. As a descriptivist
theory, CD treats all genuine singular terms as (possibly truncated) active definite
descriptions and thus as active determiner phrases. As already noted, given this per-
spective, we may want to call proper names and indexicals (qua types) non-standard
DPs (definite descriptions) to differentiate them from those DPs (definite descrip-
tions) standardly classified as such. By taking into account all that we have said
about determiner phrases, in particular the principles DPL, DPCB, DPCA, DPPB,
our theory CD thus assumes the following further principles:
STL. Singular Terms: Linguistic meaning. An integral definite description with
P as predicate component can be assumed to have a denoting concept, |the
P|, as linguistic meaning, where |P| is one of the linguistic meanings of the
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predicate P. For example, on the assumption that “bank” mean both |shore-
bank| and |financial-bank|, the linguistic meanings of “the bank” include
|the shore-bank| and |the financial-bank|. A truncated definite description,
P, where P is a predicate, can be assumed to have the property |P| as linguis-
tic meaning, where |P| is one of the linguistic meanings of P. For example,
the Latin “homo” is a truncated DP that enjoys as linguistic meaning |the
man|, since |man| is one of the meanings of “homo”, qua predicate. Proper
names or singular indexicals are non-standard, truncated,7 definite descrip-
tions and thus should be viewed as a predicates having properties as linguistic
meanings (whose nature is to be clarified). For example, “Peter” and “here”
can be assumed to have properties such as |Peter| and |here|, as linguistic
meanings.
STCB. Singular Terms: Contextualized linguistic meaning when used as Basic.
Any token t used as basic singular term is used as a (possibly truncated)
definite description. That is, in accordance with DPCB, its contextualized
linguistic meaning is a descriptive content, |the M|, such that: (i) if t is not
truncated and thus involves a token d of a definite article (“the”, in English)
and a token p of a predicate (“man”, “round table”, etc.), then |the| is one of
the linguistic meanings of the article and |M| one of the linguistic meanings
of the predicate; and (ii) If t is truncated, so that t is the token of a predi-
cate, then |the| is a zero realized determiner component and M is one of the
linguistic meanings of the predicate.
STCA. Singular Terms: Contextualized linguistic meaning when used
Anaphorically. Any token, t, used as anaphoric singular term is used as a
(possibly truncated) anaphoric definite description. That is, in accordance
with DPCA, t has a descriptive content, |the M|, as contextualized linguistic
meaning, where |the M| is the proxy denoting concept for t (as specifiable by
the proxy paraphrase for t). Constraint: A token, t2, used as singular term and
having as linguistic meaning |Q| or the descriptive content |the Q| (depend-
ing on whether or not t2 is a truncated definite description), is anaphoric on
another term, t1, having as linguistic meaning |P| or the descriptive content
|the P| (depending on whether or not t1 is a truncated definite description)
only if P conceptually entails Q or vice versa.
STPB. Singular Terms: Pragmatic meaning when used as Basic. If t is used as
a basic singular term and thus, in accordance with STCB, has a descriptive
content, |the M|, as its contextualized linguistic meaning, then the following
holds. (A) Complete basic singular term. If t is complete [i.e., COMPL(t,
M)], then the pragmatic meaning of t is the same as its contextualized lin-
guistic meaning, i.e. |the M|. (B) Incomplete basic singular term. If t is
7Since I focus on English, I ignore for simplicity’s sake the fact that in some languages, e.g.
ancient Greek, proper names and indexicals may be used with a definite article and thus should be
regarded, at least in a descriptivist perspective, as integral (untruncated) descriptions at the level
of contextualized linguistic meaning.
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incomplete [i.e., for some C, PRAG(t, M, C)], then the pragmatic meaning of
t is |the M@t|.
The pragmatic meaning of anaphoric genuine singular terms will be treated, as part
of a general account of the pragmatic meaning of anaphoric DPs, in § 5.11 below.
We can distinguish three main cases of genuine singular terms: (a) the definite
description tokens par excellence, classified as such by both descriptivists and
referentialists, e.g., tokens of “the table” or truncated definite description tokens
such as tokens of “Tom’s brother”; (b) tokens classified as genuine proper names
by both descriptivists and referentialists, but which are also genuine (truncated,
non-standard) definite descriptions according to a descriptivist, e.g., expressions
such as “Paris”, “John Smith” or “Aristotle;” (c) tokens classified as genuine
indexicals by both descriptivists and referentialists, but which are also genuine
(truncated, non-standard) definite descriptions according to a descriptivist, e.g.,
tokens of “I”, “here” or “this man”. We shall turn now to definite descriptions and
proper names. Indexicals will be considered in the next chapter. This chapter will
close with an account of the pragmatic meaning of determiner phrases and singular
terms in § 5.11.
5.6 Definite Descriptions
From the above principles about singular terms, we get, rather trivially, these
expected results about definite descriptions used as singular terms:
DDL. Definite Descriptions: Linguistic meaning. In accordance with DPL and
STL, an integral definite description with P as predicate component can be
assumed to have a denoting concept, |the P|, as linguistic meaning, where
|P| is one of the linguistic meanings of the predicate P. A truncated definite
description, P, where P is a predicate, can be assumed to have the prop-
erty |P| as linguistic meaning, where |P| is one of the linguistic meanings
of P.
DDCB. Definite Descriptions: Contextualized linguistic meaning when used
as Basic. The contextualized linguistic meaning of a token, t, used as basic
definite description is, in accordance with DPCB and STCB, a descriptive
content, |the M|, such that: (i) if t is not truncated and thus involves a token
d of a definite article and a token p of a predicate, then |the| is one of the
linguistic meanings of the article and |M| one of the linguistic meanings of
the predicate; if (ii) if t is truncated, so that t is a token of a predicate, then
|the| is a zero realized determiner component and M is one of the linguistic
meanings of the predicate.
DDCA. Definite Descriptions: Contextualized linguistic meaning when used
Anaphorically. The contextualized linguistic meaning of a token, t, used as
anaphoric definite description is, in accordance with DPCA and STCA, a
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descriptive content, |the M|, where |the M| is the proxy denoting concept for
t (as specifiable by the proxy paraphrase for t). Constraint: A token, t2, used
as definite description and having as linguistic meaning |Q| or the descrip-
tive content |the Q| (depending on whether or not t2 is a truncated definite
description), is anaphoric on another token, t1, having as linguistic mean-
ing |P| or the denoting concept |the P| (depending on whether or not t1 is a
truncated definite description) only if P conceptually entails Q or vice versa.
DDPB. Definite Descriptions: Pragmatic meaning when used as Basic. If t is
used as a definite description and thus, in accordance with STCB and DDCB,
has a descriptive content, |the M|, as its contextualized linguistic meaning,
then the following holds. (A) Complete basic definite description. If t is com-
plete [i.e., COMPL(t, M)], then the pragmatic meaning of t is the same as its
contextualized linguistic meaning, i.e. |the M|. (B) Incomplete basic definite
description. If t is incomplete [i.e., for some C, PRAG(t, M, C)], then the
pragmatic meaning of t is |the M@t|.
The pragmatic meaning of anaphoric genuine definite descriptions will be
treated, as part of a general account of the pragmatic meaning of anaphoric DPs,
in § 5.11 below. In that section, the above principle DDCA will be relevant. Here
we shall not further discuss it, as we concentrate on definite descriptions used as
basic. In particular, we shall now verify that the relevant claims provided above
yield the expected results about the singular reference of definite descriptions used
as basic singular terms, by testing the claims against the intuitions provided by
some simple non-controversial examples. (More controversial examples are pro-
vided by those cases in which a referentialist would say that a definite description
is being used as a directly referential term. We shall discuss such cases in the light
of CD in Chapter 8.) Let us start with a straightforward case of a complete definite
description. Suppose that in a typical mathematical context Tom initiates a talk by
saying:
(1) the positive square root of four is even.
Clearly, Tom’s token of “the positive square root of four”, call it t, can be consid-
ered a genuine singular term and definite description that refers to the number two.
Moreover the proposition pragmatically expressed by Tom’s statement, s, is true.
Let us now verify that CD complies with this datum. Since t is not used anaphor-
ically we should look at DDCB, to see what its contextualized linguistic meaning
is supposed to be. In line with DDCB, the descriptive content |the positive-square-
root-of-four| can be considered the contextualized linguistic meaning of t. Note that,
since t is a genuine singular term, then, by DPST of § 2.5, it is also an active deter-
miner phrase. Hence, by A/N1 of § 2.4, |the positive-square-root-of-four| occurs as
an active denoting concept in the proposition counting as the contextualized linguis-
tic meaning of the whole statement s. This proposition can then be assumed to be
(1a) below.
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(1a) |{the positive-square-root-of-four} is even|.
We can further assume that the (primary) contextual complex for t tells us that it,
beside being basic, is also complete. Hence, by DDPB (A), |the positive-square-
root-of-four| is also the pragmatic meaning of t. Then, t refers to the unique entity
with the property |positive-square-root-of-four|, i.e., the number two, as expected.
Moreover, by A/N2 of § 2.4, (1a) is also the pragmatic meaning of s. In the light of
what was said about example (2) in § 1.7, (1a) is equivalent to the true proposition
(1b) |∃1x(positive-square-root-of-four(x) & even(x))|.
In other words, (1a) is true just in case the item determined by |the positive-square-
root-of-four|, i.e. two, has the property of being even, which is the case. In sum, the
pragmatic meaning of the token s of (1) is a true proposition, as expected.
Let us now consider incomplete definite descriptions. Suppose John and Mary
are discussing Italian politics and John says to her:
(2) the prime minister is a professor.
Pre-theoretically, since Professor Romano Prodi is the current Italian prime minis-
ter,8 John’s token of “the prime minister”, t, is a genuine singular term that refers
to Prodi. Since he is a (retired) professor of economics, John’s statement, s, is true.
We now want to verify that CD complies with this datum. As in the previous exam-
ple, we can assume that the contextualized linguistic meaning of t is a descriptive
content, in this case |the prime-minister| (in line with DDCB), and that there is a
primary contextual complex for t. Since t is a definite description used as singular
term, then, by DPST of § 2.5 and A/N1 of § 2.4, |the prime-minister| occurs as
active in the contextualized linguistic meaning of s, namely:
(2a) |{the prime-minister} is a professor|.
This time we must admit that the contextual complex for t tells us that t is incomplete
and thus we should turn to DDPB (B) to know about its pragmatic meaning. In
accordance with this principle, the pragmatic meaning of t is |the prime-minister@t|
and thus the proposition expressed by John’s statement s is
(2b) |{the prime-minister@t} is a professor|.
Note that A/N2 of § 2.4 grants that |the prime-minister@t| occurs actively in (2b).
Since s was uttered in a discussion about Italian politics, we should admit that this
PRAG relationship holds:
8This example was formulated when Romano Prodi was the prime minister of Italy. Other
examples involving Prodi dating to that period will occur in the following.
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(3) PRAG(t, |prime-minister|, |Italian-prime-minister|).
Given (3), the property |prime-minister@t| is materially equivalent, by P4, to the
property |Italian-prime-minister| and thus the proposition pragmatically expressed
by s, i.e. (2b), is equivalent to
(2c) |{the Italian-prime-minister} is a professor|,
which in turn is equivalent (in the light of § 1.7) to
(2d) |∃1x(Italian-prime-minister (x) & professor (x))|.
Note that, since the property |Italian-prime-minister| is uniquely exemplified by
Prodi and this property is materially equivalent to |prime-minister@t|, this lat-
ter property is also uniquely exemplified by Prodi. Accordingly, (2b) is true as
expected, for (2b) is true just in case there is a unique entity with the property
|prime-minister@t|, a role fulfilled by Prodi, and this entity is a professor, some-
thing which Prodi is. Moreover, |the prime-minister@t| determines Prodi and since
this descriptive content is, as we saw, the pragmatic meaning of t, it follows that t
refers to Prodi, in line with our pre-theoretical intuition that this is the case.
Let us illustrate the fact that, according to CD, as it should be, truncated definite
descriptions have descriptive contents as meanings, just like untruncated ones. It
might be worth doing this by recourse to a language, Latin, where definite descrip-
tions are typically truncated. When the Latin speaker Priscilla says the equivalent in
her language of “the horse is black”, in order to attribute the property of being black
to the horse in her yard, she utters, let us assume, a token, s, of
(4) equus nigrus est,
a token with no component corresponding to the English definite article. In spite
of this, it is appropriate to assume, in accordance with DPCB of § 2.4 and DDCB
above, that Priscilla’s token of “equus”, e, is a genuine determiner phrase, in par-
ticular a genuine definite description wherein |the| is zero realized. Hence, the
contextualized linguistic meaning of e is |the horse|. Thus, the contextualized
linguistic meaning of the token s of (4) is (in the light of DTST, A/N1):
(4a) |{the horse} is black|.
We may assume here that the contextual complex for e tells us that e is both basic
and incomplete. Hence, by STPB (B), the pragmatic meaning of e is |the horse@e|.
Consequently, the pragmatic meaning of Priscilla’s statement is (in the light of
A/N2):
(4b) |{the horse@e} is black|.
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As in the above example, we can imagine that an appropriate PRAG relation,
PRAG(e, horse, G) holds, where G is a property that uniquely identifies the horse in
question, in such a way that Priscilla’s token s refers to it and her statement is true,
if the horse is indeed black.
5.7 Proper Names in General
Let us now turn to proper names. CD is committed to the view, recorded in STL
above, that a proper name, qua type, has a linguistic meaning. To the extent that
a name does not involve a definite article, as it happens in English, this meaning
should be regarded as a property and the proper name as a predicate, a proper name
predicate, we may say. In other words, an expression type N standardly classified
as proper name (such as “Aristotle” or “John Smith”) is in a sense a common noun.
Hence, in the light of STCB, part (ii), above, a proper name token n used as basic
singular term, and more specifically as a proper name, is a truncated definite descrip-
tion. It thus has a descriptive content, |the H|, as contextualized linguistic meaning,
where H is a certain property, namely the linguistic meaning of the proper name
predicate, N, of which n is a token. According to CD, this is a special property,
which I call a nominal property. This is a property involved in the contextualized
linguistic meaning expressed by a token of N used as basic singular term. A nom-
inal property, like the properties expressed by typical common nouns, e.g., “cat”
or “table”, can be shared by different items. In our case, these are all the items
with a certain name.9 The nature of nominal properties and the reasons we have for
assuming them will be discussed below. For the time being let us record two theses
that descend from STL and STCB and the idea, just expressed, that for any proper
name predicate there is one corresponding nominal property, which is in play when
a token of the proper name is used as proper name. Here they are:
PNL. Proper Names: Linguistic meaning. In accordance with DPL and STL,
proper names are such that their tokens are treatable as truncated definite
descriptions at the level of contextualized linguistic meaning and thus should
9I regard an expression type that counts as a proper name predicate (as it expresses a nominal
property) as possibly ambiguous in that it could express other properties as well. For example,
“Miller” could express a nominal property but also the property of being a miller (more on this
below). Alternatively, rather that saying that there is ambiguity we may say that there are distinct
expression types. For example, there is a type “Miller” expressing a nominal property and a type
“miller” expressing the property of being a miller. For the main purposes of this book nothing cru-
cial hinges on this. As against the view that proper names are common nouns expressing properties
that can be shared by different objects, Leonardi 1990 pointed out that one can always append ever
new specifications (compare “Frederick I” and “Frederick II”) to a given proper name in an attempt
to force it to have just one object in its extension. But such embellishments of a given proper name
are best regarded as new proper names and, of course, there can be no absolute guarantee that
these new proper names have a singleton as their extension. That is, they should also be viewed as
common nouns (cf. Castañeda 1990a).
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be viewed as predicates, proper name predicates, having properties as lin-
guistic meanings. In particular, a proper name predicate, has exactly one
nominal property as linguistic meaning, possibly among other linguistic
meanings. For example, “John Smith” should be regarded as a proper name
predicate with one corresponding nominal property, the property of being
John Smith, we may say, as linguistic meaning, a property which we can
indicate as “|John-Smith|”. Similarly, for other proper names.
PNCB. Proper Names: Contextualized linguistic meaning when used as Basic.
Any proper name token used as basic proper name is used as a truncated def-
inite description. That is, the contextualized linguistic meaning of a proper
name token, n, used as basic proper name is, in accordance with DPCB and
STCB, a descriptive content, |the N|, where |N| is a linguistic meaning of
the proper name predicate of which n is a token. More precisely, the prop-
erty component |N| is the nominal property linguistically expressed by the
proper name predicate in question. For example, the contextualized linguis-
tic meaning of a token of “Socrates”, used as basic proper name, is |the
Socrates|.
As we shall see in detail, nominal properties, by their very nature, tend to be
shared by many objects and thus, given STPB (B) above, concerning the pragmatic
meaning of basic incomplete singular terms, we can safely assume the following:
PNPB. Proper Names: Pragmatic meaning when used as Basic. If n is used as
a basic proper name and thus, in accordance with PNCB, has a descriptive
content, |the N|, as its contextualized linguistic meaning, then the following
holds: n is incomplete and thus its pragmatic meaning is |the N@n|.
In the light of STCA and STPA, we should expect that proper names can also
be used anaphorically. How this can be the case will be discussed in § 5.11. For
the time being, let us record that STCA yields the following special case for proper
names:
PNCA. Proper Names: Contextualized linguistic meaning when used as
Anaphoric. Any proper name token, n, used as anaphoric proper name, is
used as a (truncated) anaphoric definite description. That is, n, in accordance
with DPCA and STCA, has a descriptive content, |the M|, as contextual-
ized linguistic meaning, where |the M| is the proxy denoting concept for t
(as specifiable by the proxy paraphrase for t). Constraint: A token, t2, used
as definite description and having as linguistic meaning |Q| or the descrip-
tive content |the Q| (depending on whether or not t2 is a truncated definite
description), is anaphoric on another token, t1, having as linguistic mean-
ing |P| or the denoting concept |the P| (depending on whether or not t1 is a
truncated determiner phrase) only if P conceptually entails Q or vice versa.
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As regards the pragmatic meaning of anaphorically used proper names, the
principle governing it is to descend from the general treatment of the pragmatic
meaning of anaphoric determiner phrases, which is forthcoming in § 5.11. Here we
concentrate on proper names used as basic singular terms.
Let us then focus on PNL, PNCB and PNPB and illustrate them with a specific
example. Suppose that Tom claims:
(1) Barry Smith is a philosopher.
By PNL, “Barry Smith” expresses exactly one nominal property, |Barry-Smith|.
Since, as we may assume, the token of “Barry Smith” uttered by Tom, call it b, is a
genuine basic singular term, then its contextualized linguistic meaning is, by virtue
of PNCB, |the Barry-Smith|. Accordingly, the contextualized linguistic meaning of
the token of (1) uttered by Tom, call it s, is (given DPST and A/N1):
(1a) |{the Barry-Smith} is a philosopher|.
Further, PNPB tells us that the pragmatic meaning of b is |the Barry-Smith@b|.
Hence, the pragmatic meaning of the statement s is (given A/N2):
(1b) |{the Barry-Smith@b} is a philosopher|.
5.8 Nominal Properties
The primary support for the thesis that the pragmatic meaning of a proper name is
a descriptive content comes from CO-REF and NO-REF, which were discussed in
Chapter 3. But why should special “nominal” properties like being a Barry Smith be
involved in such descriptive contents? And what are these nominal properties? Let
us tackle the first question. Note that proper names can be used as sortal common
nouns just like “tiger” or “chair” (cf. Cocchiarella 1977, 1984, 1989, Castañeda
1990). For instance, we can meaningfully (and sometimes truly) utter sentences such
as:
(1) there are two Barry Smiths;
(2) all Barry Smiths are philosophers;
(3) At least one Barry Smith is a philosopher.
Similarly, we can meaningfully (and sometimes truly) say
(4) there are three chairs in this room;
(5) all tigers are brown;
(6) at least one table is dirty.
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We typically assume that a sortal term like “tiger” corresponds to a class, the class
of tigers, by virtue of the fact that there is a property, being a tiger, which the term
expresses as linguistic meaning and which all and only the members of the class
exemplify. The above examples suggest that we should similarly assume that a
proper name such as “Barry Smith” corresponds to the class of Barry Smiths by
virtue of expressing a certain property as its linguistic meaning, a property which
all the members of the class share. Clearly, this property cannot be of the kind typ-
ically appealed to in the classical descriptivist theory of proper names, e.g., being a
philosopher who drank the hemlock, or being a logician who first proved the incom-
pleteness theorem. These are properties typically exemplified by just one object. In
contrast, we need a property exemplified by all the members of a certain class which
may well have many different members, intuitively the class of those who bear a
certain name N.
A nominal property is supposed to fill in this role. But how can we characterize
a nominal property? The first thing to note is that an abstract entity W (typically,
a sequence of phonemes, such as “Barry Smith” or “Aristotle”) becomes a proper
name if, via a representative token, it is used with the role of “label” in a “baptism”
(meaning by this a naming ceremony in a most generic sense, as we shall see). When
W thus becomes a proper name (and thus is a linguistic expression or, more gener-
ally, a sign), it also automatically comes to express a nominal property, a property
necessarily co-extensive with the property of being called W (bearing the proper
name W), or of being called W ′, where W ′ is any transliteration of W in another
language (consider, e.g., the English “London” and the French “Londres”).10
In sum, an entity can have a nominal property, e.g., being a Barry Smith, only by
being, more or less officially, baptized with a corresponding abstract entity, “Barry
Smith”. By virtue of a baptism wherein W is used as a label, an entity acquires the
10There is a city in South-Tyrol, a German speaking part of northern Italy, called “Vipiteno” in
Italian and “Sterzing” in German. Aldo Frigerio has pointed out in correspondence that there may
be a difficutly for my view of nominal properties, since the Italian sentence “Vipiteno è in Italia”
(Vipiteno is in Italy) and the German sentence “Stierzing ist in Italien” (Stierzing is in Italy) express
precisely the same proposition (for one is the translation of the other) even though “Vipiteno” and
“Stierzing” are not in a relation of transliteration (cf. Frigerio 2006). I object however to the idea
that the two sentences express the same proposition. The practice of translation may for good rea-
sons fail to preserve the proposition expressed in the original sentence, for the primary goal is to
maximize mutual understanding and this may sometimes be in conflict with preserving the propo-
sition. Sometime it may be better to choose an extensonally equivalent but different proposition.
This is a case in point. Two different but extensionally equivalent propositions are chosen, because,
we may assume, the same city was baptized independently and with two different names by the
Italian-speaking and the German-speaking communities. According to Frigerio, another difficulty
may be due to the fact that the view in question seems to imply that a speaker who hears a cer-
tain name N for the first time, while being told simply that precisely one individual bears this
name, is just as competent about N as the speaker is competent about the definite description “the
unique individual called N”. According to Frigerio, this is counterintuitive. But I think that it may
seem counterintuitive only if we confuse competence about a name and knowing who (or which
individual) the bearer of the name is (see § 7.6).
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metalinguistic property of bearing the proper name W (i.e., of being called W
by at least someone). Correspondingly, the entity also gets the correlated nominal
property linguistically expressed by W. For example, we can say that Barry Smith
has the property of being a Barry Smith, since there is the expression “Barry
Smith”, which, by way of a baptism, is a proper name such that Barry Smith
bears it. Similarly, one becomes a spouse or bound by a promise as a result of a
wedding ceremony or by a speech act of promising. In all such cases, typically, the
appropriate performative words must be used (as Austin and Searle have long since
taught us). Thus, nominal properties, just like the properties of being a spouse or
being bound by a promise, are, we may say, performative properties. It might be
wondered why we should differentiate between the property of being called W and
the correlated, necessarily co-extensive, nominal property of being N, expressed by
W. Could we not say that they are just identical? I think we should answer “no”.
For someone, e.g., a very young child, can use a proper name N without having the
capacity of mentioning a word and thus without mastering the metalinguistic notion
of bearing the name N. Such a child may very well be able to fulfil the request
“bring some bread to every John Smith in town” but not the request “bring some
bread to every person bearing the name John Smith in town”. This suggests that
a proper name may express as linguistic meaning a concept that does not involve
the relational notion of bearing a name, i.e., a nominal property. (Be that as it
may, my proposal could be easily modified by taking a nominal property and the
corresponding metalinguistic property as identical.)
An abstract entity such as a string of phonemes must be used in a baptism cer-
emony as label at least once, for it to become a proper name. An entity which
becomes a proper name, thereby acquiring a nominal property as its linguistic
meaning, is in typical cases already a sign, an expression with another independent
meaning (especially if etymology is taken into account). For example, “Aurora”
and “Flora” are Italian proper names which independently mean dawn and flora,
respectively. On the other hand, someone can make any string of phonemes without
previous meaning into a proper name, e.g. by calling her dog “Paf”. Accordingly,
“Paf” becomes a word which expresses the nominal property of being Paf and oth-
erwise has no other meaning. To make it clear that a certain linguistic meaning M
of a proper name N is a nominal property that N expresses by virtue of having been
used in a baptism ceremony we can, as usual, capitalize. For example, we can say
that “Flora” on the one hand linguistically means the nominal property |Flora|, pos-
sessed by all those who are called “Flora”, and on the other hand the non-nominal
property |flora|, possessed by trees, plants and the like.
We can summarize this discussion by adopting this principle:
PNBN. Proper Names: Baptism and Nominal properties. Suppose this propo-
sition P holds: W (typically a word) is being used or was used as a label
in a baptism in such a way that someone or something comes to be called
W (bears W as name) or W is the transliteration of some word used as
a label in a baptism. Then, necessarily, the following proposition Q also
holds: there is exactly one property N such that (i) N is a nominal property;
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(ii) W linguistically expresses N; and (iii) for any x, necessarily, x has prop-
erty N if and only if x is called W. Conversely, if Q holds, then, necessarily,
P also holds.11
Given that certain naming conventions are abided by in a given community, we
may want to assume this as well:
PNEN. Proper Names: Entailments of Nominal properties. Some nominal prop-
erties entail other properties such as being male or female. Or, given the
distinction between first name and surname, certain nominal properties may
be viewed as compound properties that entail their subcomponents. Thus, for
example, |John| entails |male| and |Mary| entails |female|. Moreover, |John-
Smith| entails both |John| and |Smith| and | Mary-Anderson| entails both
|Mary| and |Anderson|.
Note that, in principle, we might have, for instance, a community that uses “John”
as a male name and another that uses it as a female name. And we might of course
have a community that uses “John” in such a way that does not entail any gender
at all. Hence, to the extent that we accept PNEN, tokens of a proper name should
be taken to express different properties, depending on the community in which they
are uttered.
The descriptivist can admit a point on which the referentialist is keen to insist,
namely that, typically, a baptism is in praesentia, i.e., it takes place in the presence of
a baptized individual and gives rise, as the causal theory has it, to a nominal-causal
chain, as we may call it, that can connect this individual to a certain token, t, of the
proper name used in the baptism. As so-called causal descriptivists12 have noted,
however, the descriptivist may take advantage of the fact that, given the token t, there
is also a “nominal-causal” property that can be univocally attributed to the baptized
individual, i.e., we may say, the property of being the source of the nominal-causal
chain leading to t. As noted in Chapter 4 in discussing reference-fixing descrip-
tions, a baptism does not however require the presence of the baptized. We can have
a baptism in absentia, so to speak, which occurs simply because somebody (or a
community) links a certain proper name to a reference-fixing description, as in a
11It should be clear that, by accepting PNBN, my approach to proper names embeds elements of
the so-called metalinguistic theory of proper names, proposed in Kneale 1972 (p. 630), fallen in
disgrace after being criticized by Kripke (1980, pp. 68–70) and recently revived in various guises
by different authors (see, e.g., Loar 1976, Katz 1979, 1990, Recanati 1993, Garcia-Carpintero 1996
and Bach 2002).
12See Kroon 1987 and the references in footnote 1 of that paper, where Lewis 1984 is taken to
be the work where the term “causal descriptivism” is first used. Kroon there counts Loar 1976 as
defending causal descriptivism, but it is not clear to me that this is right. It may also be worth noting
that Lewis had in mind something like causal descriptivism at least since 1968; see his 1972, p.
215. See also Castañeda 1977, note 5 and Fumerton 1989.
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sort of definition. We have already seen the “Neptune” example. To further illus-
trate, we could perhaps admit that “Homer”, as a result of a baptism in absentia,
is conventionally used as a name for the person who wrote both the Iliad and the
Odyssey. This kind of baptism can also originate a causal chain that leads to a cer-
tain token n of a proper name, just like a baptism in praesentia. Accordingly, given
the token n, there is the nominal-causal property of being the source of the nominal-
causal chain leading to n, just as if n traced back to a baptism in praesentia. In the
former case, however, the chain, by tracing back to a baptism in absentia, terminates
with a certain descriptive content, |the F|, i.e. the descriptive content expressed by
the reference-fixing description. The nominal-causal property in question is then
exemplified just in case there is a unique individual with the property F. Thus, if
there is exactly one individual who wrote both the Iliad and the Odyssey, this indi-
vidual has the property of being the source of the nominal-causal chain leading to
a certain token h of “Homer” (uttered in a conversation about ancient Greek litera-
ture). If, on the other hand, there is no such individual, the property in question is
not exemplified.
It should be noted that, given PNBN, the following holds:
PNCC. Proper Names: Causal Chains. Necessarily, if (i) n is a token of a proper
name predicate which has the nominal property of being an N as its linguistic
meaning; and (ii) x has the property of being the source of the nominal-causal
chain leading to n, then x has the nominal property of being an N.
5.9 Causal Descriptivism
The point of causal descriptivism is to interpret the intuitions behind the causal
theory of proper names in a descriptivist framework, so as to give rise to a
descriptivist causal theory of names, as opposed to a referentialist causal theory
of names. From the point of view of CD, this can be done by assuming that
there is a pragmatic principle that contributes to further specifying the nature
of nominal properties, by telling us that, in the relevant context, they must be
linked to conversational implicitures of the nominal-causal kind. On the assump-
tion that the intuitions behind the causal theory of names are correct, I thus
propose the PRAG principle PNCD below, regarding how the pragmatic meaning
of a proper name is to be interpreted from the point of view of conversational
impliciture. I call this a PRAG principle, since it crucially deploys the relation
PRAG.
PNCD. Proper Names: Causal Descriptivist PRAG principle. Suppose that n is
a proper name token, with the nominal property |N| as linguistic meaning,
such that (i) |the N| is the contextualized linguistic meaning of n and (ii) the
contextual complex for n is primary. Then, the following holds: PRAG(n,
|N|, |source of the nominal-causal chain leading to n|).
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It should be noted that, thanks to PNCC, proposed at the end of the previous
section, the above principle PNCD complies with the PRAG rule P2 of § 5.2, which
requests that, given PRAG(t, M, C), it must be the case that all items with property
C also have property M (where t is used as DP or predicate). Indeed, by PNCC, if
PRAG(n, |N|, |source of the nominal-causal chain leading to n|) holds, it must also
be the case that whatever is source of the nominal-causal chain leading to n has the
property of being an N.
Let us illustrate with a paradigmatic example the CD approach to proper names
and, in particular, PNCD. Suppose that, on the basis of having read a newspaper
article on current Italian politics, which mentions the name “Prodi”, Tom says to a
friend:
(1) Prodi is a professor.
Clearly, Tom’s token of “Prodi”, call it t, is used as a basic singular term. Moreover,
it singularly refers to the current Italian prime minister. In fact, as the causal-
referentialist theory of names has it, this is so because Romano Prodi is the source
of the nominal-causal chain leading to t. Because Prodi is a professor, the expressed
proposition is true. Let us check that CD complies with all this. As with example (1)
of § 5.4, we can assume that the pragmatic meaning of t is |the Prodi@t| and that
the statement, s, uttered by Tom has the following pragmatic meaning:
(1a) |{the Prodi@t} is a professor|.
Now, by PNCD, we can assume that this holds: PRAG(t, |Prodi|, |source of the
nominal-causal chain leading to t|). It follows by P5 of § 5.4 that the property
|Prodi@t| is coextensive with the property |source of the nominal-causal chain lead-
ing to t|. Since Romano Prodi, the Italian prime minister, is the only item who is
source of the nominal-causal chain leading to t, it is the case that Romano Prodi
is uniquely identified by the property |Prodi@t|. Accordingly, |the Prodi@t| deter-
mines him and thus t singularly refers to him, as expected. For, as noted, t expresses
the descriptive content |the Prodi@t| as its pragmatic meaning. Moreover, given the
truth conditions for propositions which, like (1a), involve active descriptive contents
(see § 1.7), we should grant that (1a) is true just in case Prodi is a professor. Since
Prodi is indeed a professor, (1a) is true, as expected.
To further illustrate the present approach, let us reconsider the Neptune example.
Recall that Le Verrier introduced a certain use of “Neptune” by associating it in
a baptism to the reference-fixing description “the cause of the perturbations of the
orbit of Uranus”. Subsequently, let us imagine, a certain astronomer who accepts Le
Verrier’s explanation of the perturbations, states in discussing the solar system that
(2) Neptune is a small planet.
Intuitively, his token of “Neptune”, n, refers to the planet Neptune, actually observed
at some point when appropriate telescopes became available. For this planet is in
fact the cause of the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus (as we may assume). Let us
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verify that CD complies with this. According to CD, the meaning of n is the descrip-
tive content |the Neptune@n|. Moreover, by PNCD, it is the case that PRAG(P,
|Neptune|, |source of the nominal-causal chain leading to n|). Now, the token n
traces back to a baptism based on the reference-fixing description “the cause of the
perturbations of the orbit of Uranus”. The planet Neptune is the object determined
by the descriptive content expressed by the reference-fixing description. Hence, the
property |source of the nominal-causal chain leading to n| is uniquely exempli-
fied by Neptune. By P5 of § 5.4, the property |Neptune@n| is then also uniquely
exemplified by Neptune and accordingly the token n refers to it.
5.10 Objections to the Causal Theory of Names
Clearly, PNCD provides a sort of descriptivist version of the referentialist causal
theory of names. It thus faces certain problems that have been brought to our atten-
tion in critical discussions of the latter, e.g., by Evans 1973 and Searle 1983. I shall
now consider the most significant of these and try to show that they do not definitely
tell against the causal theory of names and thus against PNCD.
Consider first the Kingston case imagined by Gareth Evans (1973,
p. 9). G. E. “learns” that Kingston is the capital of Jamaica from someone who
was in fact referring to Kingston-upon-Thames in saying
(1) Kingston is the capital of Jamaica,
for the sake of a making a racist remark. Thus, later on, G. E. offers a token of (1)
in a quiz show where he is required to name a capital city. Evans urges that in this
case G. E.’s token of “Kingston” refers to Kingston, Jamaica and not to Kingston-
upon-Thames. If this is correct, it might seem that we should, from the perspective
of CD, accept something like PRAG(k, |Kingston|, |capital city in Jamaica called
Kingston|), rather than PRAG(k, |Kingston|, |source of the nominal-causal chain
leading to k|), where k is the token of “Kingston” uttered by G. E. at the quiz show.
For if we accept the latter, it seems that k refers to Kingston-upon-Thames, since
there appears to be a nominal-causal chain having G. E.’s token, k, as last link
and the token of “Kingston”, k ′, uttered by the man who made the racist remark,
as penultimate link. But perhaps the causal theorist might bite the bullet here and
accept that G. E.’s tokens, k, refers to Kingston-upon-Thames after all. For note that
the intuition that k refers to Kingston, Jamaica rests simply on the fact that G. E. is
taken to have performed successfully as far as the quiz show goes. The attribution of
a successful performance depends on having uttered a statement that sounds as if it
expressed a true proposition, by virtue of the fact that there are tokens of “Kingston”
that trace back to Kingston, Jamaica. But since in fact the token in question traces
back to Kingston-upon-Thames, G. E.’s statement is false. This is compatible with
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saying that, after G. E. has interacted at the quiz show with people who use tokens
of “Kingston” to refer to Kingston, Jamaica, his subsequent tokens of this word may
well trace back to Kingston, Jamaica.
Alternatively, the causal theorist might argue that it is not the case that the token
k uttered by G. E. refers to Kingston-upon-Thames. For given the context in which
G. E. uttered k, a context in which people attempt to name capital cities, and given
the fact that G. E. is certainly talking about Jamaica, it could be said that k traces
back to previous tokens of “Kingston” (e.g. in English geography books) uttered
in order to speak about Jamaica. And therefore, it could be said, k traces back to
Kingston, Jamaica and not to Kingston-upon-Thames, after all (of course, even if
this is correct, it remains true that G. E. came to believe a true proposition about
Jamaica, the one expressed at the quiz show, by relying fortuitously on a quite differ-
ent, false, proposition, the one expressed by the racist guy, which wrongly attributes
the property of being the capital of Jamaica to an object, Kingston-upon-Thames,
uniquely identified by a property such as being source of the nominal-causal chain
leading to the token k ′).
Another puzzling case considered by Evans (1973, p. 11) is that of Marco Polo,
who apparently misinterpreted some reports of Arab sailors and came to think that
“Madagascar” was used as name for a certain island off the African coast, rather than
for a certain part of the African mainland, as in fact it was. As a result “Madagascar”
became a name of the island in question. As Evans notes, something similar happens
if two infants, A and B, are inadvertently exchanged by a nurse after A has been
baptized, e.g., as “Jack”. Let us then concentrate on this case in order to draw a
moral that applies to the Madagascar example as well. According to Evans, the
causal theory has the wrong consequence that any token of “Jack” uttered after the
exchange, still refers to A, even if uttered in contexts in which it clearly refers to B.
For example, suppose that two years after the exchange, A’s natural mother, Mary,
who has been unaware of the exchange all along, says to her husband:
(2) Jack is hungry.
Intuitively, her token, j, of “Jack” refers to B, yet it might seem that according to
the causal theory it traces back to A’s original baptism, when he was named “Jack”,
and thus it should refer to A. But I think this negative verdict results from taking
the relevant notion of baptism too strictly or formally. Less strictly, any action that
somehow bestows a proper name on an individual for the first time can be considered
a baptism. We need not add the requirement that the author of the action is aware
of doing this first-time bestowing. Imagine that A’s mother says “this is Jack” soon
after the exchange, upon showing a child who is in fact B to some relatives of hers.
Given the non-strict notion of baptism that I am assuming, we can say that by doing
this A’s mother has baptized B as “Jack” and henceforth has made room for the
possibility that subsequent tokens of “Jack” refer to B. Since presumably B had also
been baptized before the exchange, say as “John”, he comes to have two names
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(although of course nobody is now aware that B is also called “John” and thus this
name comes to lose currency as name of B).13
In a similar vein, we can perhaps say that we have a baptism even when the asso-
ciation of a name with a certain description provided by a certain user of the name
comes to be regarded in such a way that the description is viewed by a community as
a reference-fixing description (even if the user of the name in question is not aware
that his/her use of the name will have this effect). Perhaps, the use of “Thales” by
Herodotus, when, roughly speaking, he associated this name with the description
“the Greek philosopher called Thales who held that all is water” can be regarded in
this fashion.14 If this is the case and Donnellan’s story of the well digger is true, then
a token of “Thales” should be considered either as referring to the unknown hermit
who happened to believe the doctrine that all is water (if by chance he also hap-
pened to bear the name “Thales” or, more precisely, the Greek version of it), or as
non-referring (if nobody really fits the description). On the other hand, Herodotus’s
token of “Thales” could be regarded, as Donnellan in effect suggests, not as a token
used by Herodotus to baptize (although unintentionally) someone with the name
“Thales” by means of a reference-fixing description, but just as one more link in
a chain that traces back to a certain ordinary baptism of the man whom Herodotus
meant to talk about but who, unbeknownst to Herodotus, was a well digger who
never held that all is water, given Donnellan’s hypothetical story. In this case, a
token of “Thales” may well refer to the well digger, if Donnellan’s story is true.
Searle (1983, p. 253) notes the following in talking about sentences involving
“Thales:” “I can think of sentences where I would be inclined to say that I was
referring to the well digger and other sentences in which I would be inclined to
say that I failed to refer to anyone because there was no such person as Thales the
philosopher”. The above account based on PNCD, I think, explains why Searle sees
the matter in this way, for, depending on whether we see the use of “Thales” in
Herodotus as a sort of baptism or not, the account makes room for seeing tokens of
“Thales” as either denoting the hermit (if called “Thales”) or non-denoting (given
the first option) or denoting the well digger (given the second option). Searle (1983,
p. 252) also provides a variation on the theme of Donnellan’s story. It goes like this
(with some details that I add to make it more explicit). Herodotus hears some croak-
ing noises near a house which he interprets as the Greek words for “all is water”.
He says this to the owner of the house, who answers in reply “oh well, it is Thales
13Evans 1973 also claims that a threat to the causal theory is posed by “deferential” uses of proper
names in which one uses names “with the overriding intention to conform to the use made by them
by some other person or persons” (p. 21; see his “Louis” example, at pp. 6 and 21). But it seems to
me that, even if a subject has such an intention in using the token n of a proper name, this should
not undermine the fact that n refers to the source of the nominal-causal chain that leads to n.
14Similarly, we can perhaps regard in this fashion the hypothetical story by Evans in which the
name of a scribe, “Ibn Khan”, is associated by the mathematical community to the mathematician
who proved certain theorems. The idea is that the member of the mathematical community who
started using a token of “Ibn Khan” to refer to whoever proved the theorems realized a new baptism
of the latter by means of a reference-fixing description of the kind “the mathematician who proved
such and such”.
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who said that”. This is how, we are to suppose, Herodotus becomes convinced that
there is a Greek philosopher called “Thales” who believes that all is water, which
leads to his use of “Thales” in his chronicles. But in fact the croaking noises came
from a pet frog named “Thales”. Searle claims that, if a story such as this were
true, we should regard our tokens of “Thales” as non-denoting, because “Thales”
was used by Herodotus in a way radically different from that in which it was used
by the owner of the house, from whom Herodotus inherited the name. In particu-
lar, it was used by Herodotus as a name for a person, rather than as a pet name. In
contrast, according to Searle, the causal theory predicts that our tokens of “Thales”
refer to the frog. However, if Searle’s intuition about the non-denoting status of our
tokens of “Thales” is correct, we can make the causal theory compatible with it as
follows. We can assume that when a speaker inherits a proper name from someone
else, but associates it to a radically mistaken description, then we have in fact a bap-
tism in absentia, albeit an untypical one, in which the mistaken description works
as a reference-fixing description. In Searle’s story, Herodotus associates “Thales”
to the radically mistaken description “the Greek philosopher who holds that all is
water”. This is radically mistaken, because the token of “Thales” originally heard
by Herodotus does not refer to a person, let alone a philosopher.15 In the light of
this, Herodotus (unbeknownst to him) uses a token of “Thales” in his chronicles in
such a way that he performs a baptism in absentia, based on the reference-fixing
description “the Greek philosopher who holds that all is water”. Since this descrip-
tion is non-referring, so also are our tokens of “Thales” (if Searle’s story happens
to be true and if we are to give credit to his intuitions regarding radically mistaken
descriptions).
Other reactions to these and analogous puzzling cases are possible. For exam-
ple, Evans’ reaction (1973) is as follows. Setting aside the fact that proper names
may be ambiguous (in the sense that there is Aristotle the philosopher and Aristotle
Onassis), he proposes that a proper name is associated in a community with a body
of information which may be causally linked to more than one individual. However,
this body of information will always be “dominantly of ” only one of them (1973,
p. 16) called “the dominant source”. A token of the name then refers to the domi-
nant source in question (when the token is used by someone who intends to conform
to the usage in the community; Evans allows for “deferential” uses in which one
intends to use the name as some other specific person or group does). Another ver-
sion of the causal approach is by Devitt (1981), who defends it by arguing that the
use of a name is “grounded” in numerous perceptual confrontations with its bearers
after the initial baptism, some of which might cause a reference change (Reimer
2003). In both approaches, in the case of the swapped twins the mother who uses a
token of “Jack” some time after the exchange has taken place refers to B (the child
she did not really give birth to) rather than to A (the child she actually gave birth to).
15The point made here has some analogy to Devitt’s claim (1981) that a successful act of naming
requires that the namer correctly conceptualizes the baptized item as belonging to a certain category
(expressed by a predicate).
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Clearly, these and other modified versions of the original Kripkean causal account
of names can be used to yield appropriate modifications of PNCD, if my way of
defending it is deemed unsuccessful. But at least for the purpose of showing that a
version of descriptivism is viable and not inferior to referentialism, I think we can
stay content with PNCD. (Alternatively, if my defence of PNCD has not been con-
vincing, this principle could be regarded as circumscribed to certain kind of contexts
and it should be assumed that there must be different principles for contexts of other
kinds.16)
5.11 The Pragmatic Meaning of Anaphoric Determiner
Phrases and Singular Terms
A secondary contextual complex C, we should assume, not only informs us that
a certain determiner phrase token t (possibly truncated) is anaphoric, but, given the
pragmatic module, it also tells us how to assign to t the appropriate pragmatic mean-
ing on the basis of the fact that t happens to have a certain contextualized linguistic
meaning |det F|. I propose that this pragmatic meaning is |det F ′|, where F ′ is the C-
enriched version (C-enrichment) of F. I shall characterize what a C-enriched version
of a property component F is (where C is the contextual complex for the relevant
token) by appealing to some paradigmatic examples.
Consider a token, s, of
(1) John bought a donkey and Tom vaccinated the donkey.17
On the basis of the treatment of anaphoras in § 2.7 and what was proposed above
about proper names, the contextualized linguistic meaning is:
(1a) |{the John} bought {a donkey} and {the Tom} vaccinated {the [x such that x
is a donkey and {the John} bought x]}|.
16For example, PNCD could be circumscribed to “inheritance contexts” as follows:
PNCDR. Proper Names: Causal Descriptivist PRAG principle, Restricted version. Suppose
that n is a proper name token, with the nominal property |N| as linguistic meaning, such
that (i) |the N| is the contextualized linguistic meaning of n; (ii) the contextual complex
for n is primary; and (iii) n occurs in an inheritance context. Then, the following holds:
PRAG(n, |N|, |source of the nominal-causal chain leading to n|).
An inheritance context typically involves names of historical figure or places or notable individuals
with whom the speaker is not personally acquainted and with respect to whom he has very impov-
erished knowledge. A context in which people are discussing philosophy and the name “Thales” is
used provides an obvious example.
17Perhaps a sentence such as “John bought a donkey and a horse and Tom vaccinated the donkey”
illustrates better than (1) the option of using a standard determiner phrase like “the donkey” as an
anaphoric term that does essentially the same job of a pronoun (e.g., “it”). However, for simplicity’s
sake, I shall deal with (1).
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Suppose that j, d1 and d2 are, respectively, the tokens of “John”, “a donkey” and “the
donkey” embedded in the sentence token s. As (1a) is the contextualized linguistic
meaning of s, the contextualized linguistic meanings of the other tokens in question
are |the John|, |a donkey| and |the [x such that x is a donkey and {the John} bought
x]|, respectively. We are interested in clarifying what the C-enrichment of the prop-
erty component in the latter is, where C is the (secondary) contextual complex for
d2. This depends on the pragmatic meanings of j and d1 and more specifically on
whether they are complete or not. We can take for granted that j, as proper name,
is not complete and that its pragmatic meaning is accordingly |the John@j|. In con-
trast, d1 may or may not be complete. Let us deal first with the simplest option,
namely, that it is complete. This may happen in a situation in which the focus is not
on a specific subclass of the class of donkeys. In this case, the pragmatic meaning is
simply |a donkey|. Under such assumptions, the C-enriched version of the property
component we are interested in, namely [x such that x is a donkey and {the John}
bought x], is [x such that x is a donkey and {the John@j} bought x]. Let us now turn
to the more complex case in which d1 is incomplete. We may assume, for example,
that, in spite of the fact that vaccination practices in Coralville Farm are routine,
some animals have fallen sick. In order to find an explanation, the interlocutors are
trying to determine who was in charge of vaccinating the ones that are now sick
and in particular they are now reviewing the animals bought in a certain fair, say
the Sycamore Fair of March 23, 2007. The speaker utters (1) in this context. Under
such circumstances, we may assume that the focus is not on all donkeys but only on
those purchased for Coralville Farm at the Sycamore Fair of March 23, 2007. The
contextual complex for d1 thus determines that this token is incomplete and more
specifically that something like this holds: PRAG(d1, |donkey|, |donkey purchased
for Coralville Farm at the Sycamore Fair of March 23, 2007|).18 Since d1 is incom-
plete, its pragmatic meaning is |a donkey@d1|. In this case, the C-enriched version
of our property component is [x such that x is a donkey@d1 and {the John@j}
bought x].
Let us now turn to this example:
(2) every novel is loved by the person who has written the novel.
In line with what explained in § 2.7, a token, t, of (2) can be taken to have this
contextualized linguistic meaning:
(2a) |{every [x such that x is a novel]} is loved by {the [y such that y is a person
and y has written {the [z such that z is a novel and z is identical to x]}|.
18Let us assume, for our illustrative purposes, that “Coralville Farm” is a predicate corresponding
to a property that uniquely identifies a certain Farm, namely the one where the John and the Tom
of our example work.
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Here we are interested in the property component in the contextualized linguistic
meaning of the relevant token of “the novel”, call it n2. As is clear from (2a), this
meaning is: |the [z such that z is a novel and z is identical to x]|. In a typical case, I
would say, the token t of (2) is such that the contextual complex for the embedded
token of “every novel”, call it n1, determines that this token is complete. If so, the
C-enriched version of our property component, namely [z such that z is a novel and
z is identical to x], is nothing but itself (it is assumed here that C is the (secondary)
contextual complex for n2). There is, in other words, no transformation. However,
if, for some reason, n1 is incomplete (say, it is clear from the context that the focus
is just on French novels), this in turn affects the pragmatic meaning of n2. Due to
this incompleteness, the pragmatic meaning of n1 is |every novel@n1|. Accordingly,
the C-enriched version of the property component [z such that z is a novel and z is
identical to x] is now [z such that z is a novel@n1 and z is identical to x].
Let us now move to an example in which the anaphoric determiner phrase does
not express a descriptive content but rather a denoting concept of some other kind:
(3) any man who has some pet vaccinates each pet.
The contextualized linguistic meaning of a token, s, of (3) is something like
(3a) |{every [x such that x is a man and x has some pet] vaccinates {every [y such
that y is a pet and y belongs to x]}|.
The token of “some pet” embedded in s, call it p1, has the contextualized linguistic
meaning |some pet|. In turn, the contextualized linguistic meaning of the relevant
token of “each pet”, call it p2, is |every [y such that y is a pet and y belongs to
x|. We are interested in the C-enrichment of the property component of the latter,
i.e. [y such that y is a pet and y belongs to x], where C is the contextual complex
for p2. This depends on whether p1 is complete or not. Suppose it is. Then, the
C-enrichment is the property component itself, namely [y such that y is a pet and y
belongs to x]. Suppose now that the context makes it the case that p1 is incomplete
(say, something like this holds: PRAG(p1, |pet|, |pet and mammal|), so that the
pragmatic meaning of p1 is |a pet@p1|. Then, the C-enriched version is: [y such that
y is a pet@p1 and y belongs to x].
As we have seen in § 2.7, when a singular term occurs more than once in a
sentence (or more generally in a text of a manageable length), or when there is
an impoverished or embellished version of the predicate component of a preceding
singular term, a certain singular term token may well be taken to be anaphorically
dependent on a previously occurring singular term token, to the extent that they are
taken to be co-referential. Let us consider these examples:
(4) When Tom met the American president and the British prime minister, Tom
recognized the president but not the prime minister.
(5) The table and the chair were broken and John repaired first the broken table and
then the broken chair.
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In a token of (4), involving the two tokens, t1 and t2, of “Tom” (occurring in that
order), t2 can be taken to be anaphorically dependent on t1 (more on anaphoric
proper names below). Similarly, the “impoverished tokens”, p and m, of “the pres-
ident” and “the prime minister” can be considered as anaphorically dependent on
the tokens, a and b, of “the American president” and “the British prime minister”.
Furthermore, in a token of (5), the “embellished tokens”, b1 and b2, of “the bro-
ken table” and “the broken chair” can be viewed as anaphorically dependent on
the tokens, c and t, of “the chair” and “the table”. The contextualized linguistic
meanings are, respectively, as follows:
(4a) |When {the Tom} met {the (American & president)} and {the (British &
prime-minister)}, {the Tom} recognized {the (American & president)} but not
{the (British & prime-minister)}|.
(5a) |{the table} and {the chair} were broken and {the John} repaired first {the
(broken & table)} and then {the (broken & chair)}|.
Let us assume that the contextual complexes for the antecedent tokens decree that
they are incomplete. This means that t1, a, b, t, c have, respectively, the following
pragmatic meanings: |the Tom@t1|, |the (American & president)@a|, |the (British
& prime-minister)@b|, |the table@t|, |the chair@c|. We then get, in relations to
the anaphoric tokens at play, these C-enriched versions of the property compo-
nents (where C is the relevant secondary contextual complex): Tom@t1, (American
& president)@a, (British & prime-minister)@b, (broken & table@t), (broken &
chair@c). The pragmatic meanings of the statements in question are then as follows
(upon assuming that j is the relevant token of “John”):
(4a) |When {the Tom@t1} met {the (American & president)@a} and {the (British
& prime-minister)@b}, {the Tom@t1} recognized {the (American & presi-
dent)@a} but not {the (British & prime-minister)@b}|.
(5a) |{the table@t} and {the chair@c} were broken and {the John@j} repaired first
{the (broken & table@t)} and then {the (broken & chair@c)}|.
I trust that the notion of a C-enriched version of the property component of
a contextualized linguistic meaning is sufficiently clear. Let us then record this
principle:
DPPA. Determiner Phrases: Pragmatic meaning when used Anaphorically.
Suppose that t is a genuine determiner phrase such that (i) |det M| is the
contextualized linguistic meaning of t, (ii) the contextual complex, C, for t is
secondary and thus t is used anaphorically. Then, the pragmatic meaning of t
is |det M ′|, where M ′ is the C-enriched version of M.
To see that DPPA works properly, let us go back to our first example. We con-
sidered two options, namely that the basic token, d1, of “a donkey” is complete, and
that it is not. By applying DPPA to the first option we get this pragmatic meaning for
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our anaphoric token, d2 (a token of “the donkey”): |the [x such that x is a donkey and
the John@j bought x]|. Accordingly, the pragmatic meaning of the whole statement,
s, is:
(1b) |{the John@j} bought {a donkey} and {the Tom@t} vaccinated {the [x such
that x is a donkey and the John@j bought x]}|.
Let us suppose that the token, j, of “John” traces back to a baptism in which a certain
baby, John, was baptized as “John”. Thus, j refers to John. Similarly, let us suppose
that the relevant token, t, of “Tom” refers to Tom. Then, our statement s can be taken
to be true, on the assumption that the token, d1, of “a donkey” is complete, just in
case there is exactly one donkey, call it Pippo, such that John bought Pippo and Tom
vaccinated Pippo. Now, since the causal descriptivist principle about proper names,
PNCD, grants that the properties |John@j| and |Tom@t| uniquely identify John and
Tom, (1b) has exactly this truth condition, given what we said about active denoting
concepts in § 1.7 and given the above assumptions about the proper name tokens j
and t. Hence, DPPA, it can be claimed, does the right job.
Let us now move to the other option, according to which the token, d1, of “a
donkey” is incomplete. By applying DPPA to this second option, we get this prag-
matic meaning for our anaphoric token d2: |the [x such that x is a donkey@d1 and
the John@j bought x]|. Accordingly, the pragmatic meaning of the whole statement,
s, is:
(1c) |{the John@j} bought {a donkey@d1} and {the Tom@t} vaccinated {the [x
such that x is a donkey@d1} and {the John@j} bought x]|.
Given the above assumptions about the relevant proper name tokens and about the
fact that the focus is on the donkeys purchased for Coralville Farm at the Sycamore
Fair of March 23, 2007, s is true just in case there is exactly one donkey, Pippo,
purchased for Coralville Farm at the Sycamore Fair of March 23, 2007 by John,
where Tom is such that he vaccinated Pippo. We shall now verify that (1c) has
this truth condition, relative to the assumptions in question. As noted above, we
may assume that this holds: PRAG(d1, |donkey|, |donkey purchased for Coralville
Farm at the Sycamore Fair of March 23, 2007|). By P5 of § 5.4, the properties
|donkey@d1| and |donkey purchased for Coralville Farm at the Sycamore Fair of
March 23, 2007| are equivalent. By virtue of this, and given that PNCD grants that
the properties |John@j| and |Tom@t| uniquely identify John and Tom, respectively,
(1c) has precisely the relative truth condition that we have just associated to s, given
what we said about active denoting concepts in § 1.7. This suggests again that DPPA
does the expected job.
The other examples of this section can be reviewed in the same fashion, thereby
similarly suggesting that DPPA works properly. And other examples, I trust, should
confirm this.
The principle DPPA applies in general to all determiner phrases, not only to
singular ones. Since the focus of this book is singular reference let us however record
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that, in the light of how CD treats singular terms, the following principle about
anaphoric singular terms descends from DPPA:
STPA. Singular Terms: Pragmatic meaning when used Anaphorically. Suppose
that t is a genuine singular term such that (i) |the M| is the contextualized
linguistic meaning of t, (ii) the contextual complex, C, for t is secondary and
thus t is used anaphorically. Then, the pragmatic meaning of t is |the M ′|,
where M ′ is the C-enriched version of M.
More specifically, the following principles about anaphoric uses of definite descrip-
tions and proper names follow:
DDPA. Definite Descriptions: Pragmatic meaning when used Anaphorically.
Suppose that t is a genuine definite description such that (i) |the D| is the
contextualized linguistic meaning of t, (ii) the contextual complex, C, for t is
secondary and thus t is used anaphorically. Then, the pragmatic meaning of t
is |the D ′|, where D ′ is the C-enriched version of D.
PNPA. Proper Names: Pragmatic meaning when used Anaphorically. Suppose
that t is a genuine proper name such that (i) |det N| is the contextualized
linguistic meaning of t, (ii) the contextual complex, C, for t is secondary and
thus t is used anaphorically. Then, the pragmatic meaning of t is |det N ′|,
where N ′ is the C-enriched version of N.
Since the preceding discussion about the pragmatic meaning of anaphoric deter-
miner phrases already implicitly illustrates DDPA, let us focus at this juncture just
on PNPA. Consider for example a token, s, of
(5) if Tom is hungry, then Tom will want to eat.
This token may well be interpreted in such a way that the two occurrences of
“Tom”, call them t1 and t2, are co-referential and thus t2 may be viewed as anaphor-
ically dependent on t1. In view of STPA, the pragmatic meaning of t2 is then: |the
Tom@t1|. Accordingly, the pragmatic meaning of s is:
(5a) | if {the Tom@t1} is hungry, then {the Tom@t1} will want to eat|.
Chapter 6
Indexicals
6.1 Indexicals in General
In this chapter we shall see the account of indexicals provided by CD. As regards
these, CD proposes a story very similar to the one submitted above for proper names.
Indexicals such as “I”, “here”, “now”, “this” are in the first place general terms with
very generic peculiar properties as their linguistic meanings (and can thus be con-
sidered indexical predicates). Thus, for example, “here” has the property |here| as
linguistic meaning. Moreover, when indexical tokens are used as indexicals they
are used as determiner phrases. In particular, if they are used as singular indexicals,
and thus as singular terms, they are used as truncated incomplete definite descrip-
tions.1 Let us concentrate for the time being on indexicals used as basic and leave
the discussion of anaphoric indexicals to the final part of this chapter.
Consider for illustration the case of Tom, who starts a conversation by uttering a
token of
(1) Milan is 4 miles from here.
The “here” sub-token, h, somehow involves a zero realization of |the| and therefore
it is, as it were, a token of “ø here”. Moreover, the contextualized linguistic mean-
ing of h is |the here| and its pragmatic meaning is |the here@h|. Accordingly (and
neglecting details about the use of the name “Milan”, which are irrelevant at this
juncture), the propositions constituting the contextualized linguistic meaning and
the pragmatic meaning of the token of (1) uttered by Tom are
1On the use of indexicals as general terms, see Cohen 1980 and Castañeda 1989, 1990b. The thesis
that indexicals are general terms is around at least since Hegel (1807, A, Chapter 1) and Bradley
(1883, p. 63). As far as I understand them, these philosophers claim that indicators are just general
terms (see Voltolini 1996, for problems in their view). I less drastically claim that they can function
both qua general terms and, by being used as definite descriptions, qua singular terms (as we shall
see in detail below). My position must also be distinguished from Nunberg’s (1993) proposal,
according to which indexicals, qua singular terms, are sometimes definite descriptions (when they
are used “descriptively” as opposed to “referentially”). In my view, indexicals qua singular terms
are always definite descriptions.
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(1a) |Milan is five-miles-away-from {the here}|
and
(1b) |Milan is five-miles-away-from {the here@h}|,
respectively. The property of being a here, or |here|, occurring as constituent in (1a)
and (1b), might be called an indexical property. Similarly there are, according to
CD, other indexical properties, such as being an I, a this, a that, a now, etc., which
are linguistic meanings of other indexicals (“I”, “this”, “that”, “now”, etc.) and can
occur as constituents of the propositions expressed by statements involving tokens
of such indexicals. Some indexicals may be ambiguous in that they linguistically
express more than one indexical property; “you” is a case in point, since it is used
both as singular and plural, as we shall see in more detail. The indexicals mentioned
as examples so far are, as stated in §1.3, simple. In contrast, some indexicals are
complex, e.g., “this man” or “that cow”. In such cases an indexical property, |this|
or |that|, is somehow part of the linguistic meaning. For instance, “this man” has
|this man| as its linguistic meaning.
There are plural indexicals such as “we” and “they”. In view of them, we could
call indexical properties like |here| and |I| singular, in order to distinguish them
from plural indexical properties, e.g., |we| and |they| or, perhaps more perspicu-
ously, |member of a we-class|, |member of a they-class|. A plural property can be
possessed by an entity only if there are other entities that possess it. An obvious
example of a plural property is the property of being different from something. As
we have seen in Chapter 2, we can distinguish between indexical tokens used as
indexical singular terms and indexical tokens which are not so used, and we can
similarly distinguish between indexical tokens used as plural indexical terms and
indexical tokens that are not so used. For example, a token of “we” is used as a plu-
ral indexical term if Tom says to Mary: “we love each other”. But it is not so used
if Tom says “we is a pronoun”. Just as a token of “I” used as singular term should
be taken to have |the I| as contextualized linguistic meaning, we can assume that
|thepl we| is the contextualized linguistic meaning of a token of “we” used as plural
indexical term. Similarly, the determiner |thepl| is at play, we may assume, as far as
the other plural indexicals are concerned.
Thus, in general, by analogy with the theses PNL, PNCB, PNPB, about proper
names, we may adopt:
INL. INdexicals Linguistic meaning. In accordance with DPL and, when
appropriate, STL, singular (plural) indexicals are such that their tokens
are treatable as truncated definite descriptions (plural descriptions) at the
level of contextualized linguistic meanings and thus should be viewed as
predicates, indexical predicates, having singular (plural) indexical prop-
erties as their linguistic meanings. For example, “I” should be regarded
as a predicate and we can indicate as “|I|” the corresponding indexical
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property, the property of being an I, we may say; similarly for other index-
icals such as “here”, “this” or “they”. As regards complex indexicals, the
corresponding indexical predicates are complex predicates with correspond-
ing complex indexical properties as their linguistic meanings. For example,
“this bank” should be regarded as a complex predicate, having as its lin-
guistic meanings the complex properties |(this & shore-bank)| and |(this &
financial-bank)| (where |this| is a linguistic meaning of “this”, an indexical
property, and |shore-bank| and |financial-bank| are linguistic meanings of
“bank”). Similarly for other complex indexicals such as “this table” or “that
winged horse”.2
INCB. INdexicals: Contextualized linguistic meaning when used as Basic. (A)
Singular Indexicals. Any indexical token used as basic singular indexical is
used as a truncated definite description. That is, the contextualized linguistic
meaning of an indexical token, d, used as basic singular indexical is, in accor-
dance with DPCB and STCB, a descriptive content, |the D|, where |D| is an
indexical property which is a linguistic meaning of the indexical predicate of
which d is a token. More precisely, the property component, |D|, is a singu-
lar indexical property (possibly a complex one) linguistically expressed by
the indexical predicate in question. For example, the contextualized linguis-
tic meaning of a token of “I”, used as basic indexical, is |the I|. (B) Plural
Indexicals. Any indexical token used as basic plural indexical is used as a
truncated plural description. That is, the contextualized linguistic meaning
of an indexical token, d, used as basic plural indexical, is, in accordance with
DPCB, a denoting concept, |thepl D|, where |D| is a indexical property which
is a linguistic meaning of the indexical predicate of which d is a token. More
precisely, the property component, |D|, is a plural indexical property (pos-
sibly a complex one) linguistically expressed by the indexical predicate in
question. For example, the contextualized linguistic meaning of a token of
“these tables”, used as basic indexical, is |thepl (these & table)|.
INPB. INdexicals: Pragmatic meaning when used as Basic. If d is used as
a basic indexical token and thus, in accordance with INCB, has a descrip-
tive content, |the D| (or a denoting concept, |thepl D|), as its contextualized
linguistic meaning, then the following holds: d is incomplete and thus its
pragmatic meaning is |the D@d| (|thepl D@d|).
It should be clear how, in the light of the above principles, the token of (1) uttered
by Tom in the above example, comes to have (1a) as its contextualized linguistic
meaning and (1b) as its pragmatic meaning.
2Expressions involving indexicals other than “this”, “that” or “those”, such as “you who are a good
boy” or “I, an Italian philosopher” may perhaps be taken to be complex indexicals (Orilia 2003).
For simplicity’s sake, I have disregarded them in formulating the semantic principles governing
“I”, “you”, etc. in the following. But these principles can be easily modified, if one wishes, by
analogy with those for “this” and “that”, which take into account the fact that they can be used to
give rise to complex indexicals.
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6.2 Indexical Properties
This account presupposes that each simple indexical expresses a certain generic
property as its linguistic meaning. But why should we think so? Setting pronom-
inal contradiction aside for the time being, we must recognize that one typically
uses an indexical in an attempt to refer to an object, only on the assumption that
the object falls into a certain specific category. If an item is referred to by a token
of “here”, it must be a location, if by “now”, a time interval, if by “he”, a male,
if by “I” a speaker or utterer, or, more generally, a contextual utterer, and so on.
In other words, for each indexical word, there is a corresponding reference cate-
gory, as we may call it: being a contextual utterer for “I”, being a time for “now”,
being a place for “here”, etc. Intuitively, we may perhaps conceive of the refer-
ence category for a given indexical word as a property that an object must possess
for it to be a potential or actual referent of (a token of) that indexical word (or
a corresponding one in another language). This suggests the following analogy.
In using “the table” I somehow focus on a generic property that all tables share
and yet, given favourable circumstances, I somehow succeed in singularly refer-
ring to one specific table. Similarly, in using “here” I somehow focus on a very
generic property, a property co-extensional with the reference category |place|, i.e.
such that all locations have it, and yet, if all goes well, I somehow succeed in sin-
gularly referring to one specific location. Mutatis mutandis, similar analogies can
be provided for the other indexicals. This is sufficient to support the claim that
some sort of property is conveyed by an indexical at the level of linguistic mean-
ing. But how can we characterize the indexical properties? I propose a two-fold
story.
On the one hand, just as a nominal property |N| (e.g., |Tom|) is conceptually cor-
related to one corresponding metalinguistic property |called “N”| (|called “Tom”|)
in such a way that an individual, x, has property |N| if and only if, necessarily, x
has the property |called “N ”|, so we should specify that each indexical property is
necessarily co-extensive with a certain reference category (where the necessity in
question is conceptual).
On the other hand, just as each nominal property obeys the PRAG principle
PNCD (cf. § 5.9), each indexical property H must be governed by its own spe-
cific PRAG principle, a principle granting that a token with H as linguistic meaning
succeeds in singularly referring to the appropriate object (or to something like a
class of objects if H is a plural property), given the right circumstances. For exam-
ple, the property of being an I must obey a principle granting that the token of “I”
uttered in a typical context by an English speaker who says “I am tired” refers to
the speaker in question, given that |I| is the linguistic meaning of “I”. Similarly,
the property of being a this must obey a principle granting that the token of “this”
uttered in a typical context by an English speaker who points at an object refers to
the object pointed at by the speaker, given that |this| is the linguistic meaning of
“this”. I shall propose later on in this chapter PRAG principles for many important
indexicals, such as “I”, “you”, “he”, etc. For the time being, I shall focus on the
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reference categories for them. I shall not deal in this chapter with “now” and other
temporal indexicals, which raise issues closely related to the stand that one takes on
tense and the temporalism/eternalism dispute outlined in Chapter 3. Accordingly, I
shall discuss them in the next chapter, which also deals with tense.
As far as “I” and “you” (understood as singular) are concerned, it seems plain, in
the light of the discussion on contextual parameters in Chapter 2, that the reference
categories are |contextual-utterer| and |contextual-hearer|. We thus assume:
IRC. I: Reference Category. x is an I ↔ x is a contextual utterer.
YRC. You: Reference category. x is a you ↔ x is a contextual hearer.
Roughly, these principles say that a contextual utterer is a potential or actual
referent of a first-person singular pronoun such as the English “I” and vice versa
and, similarly, that a contextual hearer is a potential or actual referent of a second-
person pronoun such as the English “you” and vice versa. Moreover, they tell us that
being an I or you are relational properties: one is an I or you in relation to something
else, namely the token(s) with respect to which one is a contextual utterer or hearer
(similarly, someone is a father in relation to his offspring).
A similar story can be offered for the plural personal pronouns, but first we
need some technical details. To begin with, let us adopt the following abbreviatory
definition for the plural indexical properties:
PL.Df. x is a pluralized F = Df x is an F and there is an F different from x
(where F is any property).
Moreover, we can take advantage of these other more specific abbreviations:
WE.Df. x is a pluralized contextual utterer/hearer of z =Df z is a linguistic
token such that x is a contextual utterer of z and there is a y different from x
that is a contextual hearer of z, or there is a y different from x such that y is a
contextual utterer of z.
YOUpl.Df. y is a pluralized contextual hearer of z =Df z is a linguistic token
such that y is a contextual hearer of z and there is a w different from y such
that w is a contextual hearer of z.
We can then assume the following on analogy with IRC and YRC:
WRC. We: Reference Category. x is a we ↔ x is a pluralized contextual
utterer/hearer.
YPRC. You Plural: Reference Category. x is a youpl ↔ x is a pluralized
contextual hearer.
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As regards the other personal pronouns, “he”, “she” and “it”, we must assume
that there are the corresponding reference categories |male|, |female| and |neuter|3
and thus we get:
HRC. He: Reference Category. x is a he ↔ x is male.
SRC. She: Reference Category. x is a she ↔ x is female.
ITRC. IT: Reference Category. x is an it ↔ x is neuter.
It seems to me that in principle anything whatsoever can be referred to by means
of “this”, or “that”, which suggests that that the reference category for |this| and
|that| is simply |item|. Similarly, the reference category for “they”, “these” and
“those” seems to be |pluralized item|, since in principle any group involving more
than one entity can be referred to as “they”, “these”, or “those”. We thus assume:
TRC. This: Reference Category. x is a this ↔ x is an item.
TTRC. ThaT: Reference Category. x is a that ↔ x is an item.
TYRC. TheY: Reference Category. x is a they ↔ x is a pluralized item.
TERC. ThEse: Reference Category. x is a these ↔ x is a pluralized item.
TORC. ThOse: Reference Category. x is a those ↔ x is a pluralized item.
As regards the locative pronouns, “here” and “there”, it seems clear that the
reference category for both of them is |place| and thus I submit:
HRRC. HeRe: Reference Category. x is a here ↔ x is a place.
TRRC. TheRe: Reference Category. x is a there ↔ x is a place.
As far as these principles tell us, the properties |this| and |that| do not differ.
Similarly, |they|, |these| and |those|, on the one hand, and |here| and |there|, on
the other hand, do not differ. As we shall see, however, these notions can be dis-
tinguished at the level of the PRAG principles. Perhaps, this is too simplistic. For
example, if in certain cases it is more appropriate to use anaphorically “that” rather
than “this” (or vice versa), more may have to be done to capture the difference
between |this| and |that|, for the PRAG principles have nothing to do with anaphora.
But I shall not further investigate this issue, since nothing crucial regarding the
dispute between descriptivists and referentialists hinges on this matter.
3For present purposes we can assume that “male”, “female” and “neuter” are understood in line
with the traditional usage, according to which “he” and “she” are restricted to human beings
and other entities assumed to be persons, so that “male” coincides with “person of male sexual
gender”, “female” with “person of female sexual gender” and “neuter” with “inanimate, plant
or non-human animal” (or something like that). From a more general perspective, “male” and
“female” are attributable to any entity somehow characterizable (perhaps even metaphorically) as
having male or female sexual gender, respectively, and “neuter” to any entity to which a precise
sexual gender is not attributable (because it lacks one or because it is unknown or irrelevant in the
context).
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6.3 The First-Person and Second-Person Pronouns
To understand the nature of a specific indexical property, H, we must collect data
regarding typical cases in which an indexical token that linguistically expresses H
succeeds, or fails, in referring to a corresponding entity. By means of such data
we can in fact uncover the indexical-pragmatic principle obeyed by H. We shall
start with the indexical properties expressed by the first- and second-person English
pronouns. Let us then consider the indexical property of being an I, i.e., the linguistic
meaning of the first-person pronoun of a given natural language, “I” in English. We
may call it a first-person singular indexical property to distinguish it from third-
person indexical properties, such as being a here, a this or a he, second-person
indexical singular and plural properties, being a you and being a youpl, and the
first-person plural indexical property, i.e., being a we.
It is often claimed that a token of “I” always refers to the utterer of the token.
This is not strictly speaking true, for the simple reason that tokens of indexicals can
occur in quotation marks or as general terms in philosophical prose, as we have seen
in Chapter 2. These tokens of “I” however are not, we said, used as I-indexicals, let
alone as singular terms. However even if we concentrate simply on indexical tokens
used as I-indexicals (and thus as singular terms), such as those uttered by John when
he says
(1) I am American
in an ordinary conversation, this claim is not quite true. For as we already saw in
Chapter 3, there are cases in which “I” tokens fail to refer, because no item counts
as unique utterer of the relevant token.
It is undeniable however that in a typical circumstance in which there actually
and presently is a unique utterer of an “I” token (used as basic singular term and
I-indexical) this token refers to the utterer of the token (we may call this the basic
datum of first-person singular reference). Suppose, for example, that Tom says
(2) I am tired
during an ordinary conversation. Then there is a token of “I” that cannot but refer to
Tom. And this token achieves this with a special precision, so to speak, a precision
that tokens of expressions such as “the speaker” or “this speaker” do not possess.
For although these expressions may be used to refer to oneself, they do not allow for
this in some contexts in which “I” does. Suppose for example that, during a series
of lectures by different professors, when it comes to professor Smith’s turn, Tom
whispers to a friend next to him:
(3) this speaker is tired
or
(4) the speaker is tired.
176 6 Indexicals
In either case, he would be (correctly) interpreted by his friend as referring to
professor Smith. That is, Tom’s token of “this speaker” (or of “the speaker”) would
not refer to its utterer, Tom. Obviously, had Tom whispered instead a token of (2),
he would have referred to himself.
The latter point tells us that |I| cannot be identified with the property of being
a speaker. Moreover, since, as we have seen in § 2.10, a token of “I” can refer to
an inanimate object, |I| cannot be identified with the property of being a thinker,
either. In order to comply with all the data, it seems that we should rather assume
that “I” expresses as linguistic meaning a property, |I|, presumably a primitive one,
governed by the following PRAG principle:
IPP. I: PRAG Principle. Suppose that i is an indexical token, with the indexical
property |I| as linguistic meaning, such that (i) |the I| is the contextualized
linguistic meaning of i; and (ii) the contextual complex for i is primary. Then,
the following holds: PRAG(i, |I|, |contextual utterer of i|).
It is easy to see that, once we assume IPP, a token of “I” (used qua basic
I-indexical) refers to its unique utterer, when there is one, in compliance with the
basic datum of first-person reference. For example, consider the case in which Tom
utters (1) or (2) in an ordinary conversation. He will then have produced a token of
“I”, i, which refers to himself. We want to verify that CD underwrites this. Note first
that, in accordance with INCB above, i has |the I| as its contextualized linguistic
meaning, and, by INPB, |the I@i| as its pragmatic meaning. Moreover, by IPP, it
is the case that PRAG(P, |I|, |contextual utterer of i|). Hence, by P5 of § 5.4, the
property |I@i| is co-extensive with the property |contextual utterer of i|. Since Tom
is the only one with the property of being contextual utterer of i, it follows that |I@i|
identifies Tom. Hence, |the I@i| determines Tom and since this descriptive content
is the pragmatic meaning of i, this token singularly refers to Tom, as expected.
On the other hand, CD is in line with the observation that, if an “I” token does not
have a corresponding unique utterer, then it fails to refer, despite being used as basic
I-indexical. Reconsider the case of Chapter 3 in which a group of people co-author
a letter in order to deceive the guerrilla leader Jack Smith. Suppose a token of
(5) I am a tall bearded man
occurs in the letter. In this case the token of (5) contains a certain token, i, of “I”.
The pragmatic meaning of this token is |the I@i|, where the property |I@i| is co-
extensive with |contextual utterer of i|. But since in this case there is no unique
contextual utterer of the token i, the property |I@i| fails to identify one entity in
particular and thus |the I@i| does not determine anything. Hence, the “I” token in
question refers to nothing.
The singular “you”, the plural “you” and “we” can be treated in the same spirit
by assuming these rules:
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YPP. You: PRAG Principle. Suppose that y is an indexical token, with the index-
ical property |you| as its linguistic meaning, such that (i) |the you| is the
contextualized linguistic meaning of i; and (ii) the contextual complex for
y is primary. Then, the following holds: PRAG(y, |you|, |contextual hearer
of y|).
YPPP. You Plural: PRAG Principle. Suppose that y is an indexical token, with
the indexical property |youpl| as its linguistic meaning, such that (i) |thepl
youpl| is the contextualized linguistic meaning of i; and (ii) the contex-
tual complex for y is primary. Then, the following holds: PRAG(y, |youpl|,
|pluralized contextual hearer of y|).
WPP. We: PRAG Principle. Suppose that w is an indexical token, with the
indexical property |we| as linguistic meaning, such that (i) |thepl we| is the
contextualized linguistic meaning of i; and (ii) the contextual complex for w
is primary. Then, the following holds: PRAG(w, |we|, |pluralized contextual
utterer/hearer of w|).
6.4 Saliency and the Interdoxastic Domain
Before turning to other indexicals, it is appropriate to consider a notion that will
play a crucial role in my account of some of them, namely saliency. This notion
has often been appealed to in order to characterize what an indexical refers to. For
example, Neale (1990, p. 106) takes the referent of a demonstrative pronoun to be an
object “made salient”, either by a demonstration or “in some other way”. Recanati
(2004, p. 67) notes that it is often assumed that a demonstrative “refers to the object
which happens to be demonstrated or which happens to be the most salient in the
context at hand”. Similarly, Cappelen and Lepore (2005, p. 145) take an indexi-
cal token of “she” to refer to “the contextually salient female” and Frigerio 2003
(p. 282) sees “that F” as referring to “an F salient in the context”.4 Dolcini 2006
has even tried to argue that every indexical token refers to the object which “satis-
fies a certain descriptive content” (e.g., being a speaker, if the indexical is a token
of “I”, being a place, if the indexical is a token of “here”, being near the speaker,
if the indexical is a token of “this”, etc.) and which is the “most salient” in the
“perceptual context” of the indexical token in question (p. 158; see also her 2009,
p. 135). Roughly, the “perceptual context” is the set of items that are perceptually
available to all the interlocutors involved in the communicative exchange wherein
the indexical in question occurs.
Neale (1990, p. 106) provides this example to make the point that the salient
object referred to by a demonstrative is not necessarily an object demonstrated by
the speaker (by means of a pointing gesture or the like). The Pope, after having
taken a long trip, faints in the middle of a sermon, and S.N. says to a friend:
4See also the token-reflexive rule for “he” in Garcia-Carpintero 2000, p. 120 and the rule for “this”
in Loeffler 2001, p. 231.
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(1) He must be exhausted by all that travelling.
In spite of the fact that S.N. does not demonstrate the Pope in any way, his token
of “he” refers to the Pope, because the fainting makes him salient. Dolcini 2006 has
emphasized similar examples, inter alia in order to criticize Kaplan’s rigid distinc-
tion between pure indexicals and demonstratives and his appeal to demonstration
or demonstrative intentions in describing the character of demonstratives. Consider
this version of one of her examples. While Tom and Mary are on the peak of a
mountain, a sudden loud thunder is heard. Tom says:
(2) that was scary.
Clearly, the “that” token refers to the thunder, in spite of the fact that Tom did not do
any pointing. Moreover, it does not seem that Tom’s intention to refer to the thunder
plays a crucial role in this. According to Dolcini, the token refers to the thunder,
because (i) its sudden loudness makes it the most salient object in the percep-
tual context, and (ii) the thunder “satisfies a certain descriptive content” somehow
associated to “that” (it is far from the speaker or something like that).
Convincing as examples such as these may be, there are problems with Dolcini’s
saliency-based account of all indexicals. First, an appeal to saliency in characteriz-
ing the referent of some kinds of indexical tokens, in particular tokens of “I”, seems
useless. Consider a group of pupils who say in unison “I want to answer”, when the
teacher asks during a class whether anybody would like to answer a certain ques-
tion. Clearly, each token of “I” uttered in this situation refers to the corresponding
speaker, yet none of the speakers is the most salient in the perceptual context (which
we may assume is the same for every such token) (Perry 2001, p. 40, uses a simi-
lar example, but for different purposes). The pupils are all equally salient, if salient
at all (see Dolcini’s reaction to this point of mine in her 2006, § 5.3.1 and 2009,
§ 5.3.2). Second, consider this variation on the theme of the above thunder example.
This time, as the thunder occurs, Tom says:
(3) it is getting cold here.
Clearly, the token of “here” refers to the place where Tom and Mary are located,
the peak of the mountain. Yet, this is not the most salient object in the perceptual
context, for, as noted before, the thunder has this role. The point is that the token of
“here” refers to the peak, not because it is a place and the most salient object, but,
presumably, because it is the most salient place. Third, often indexical tokens refer
to objects that are not in the perceptual context. Indeed, this is typical with “here”.5
Suppose that Tom is in Milan and is talking on the phone to her friend Mary in
5Dolcini 2006 recognizes this in her § 5.2.4 and as a reaction appeals to the notion of “communica-
tive context” (p. 203), rather than to that of perceptual context. The communicative context is not
precisely characterized, but this appeal to it seems to be a withdrawal of her general thesis about
indexicals considered above (but see also Dolcini 2009, § 5.2.4).
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Palermo. He utters (3) and thus produces a token of “here” which may well refer to
his location. But this place is not part of the perceptual context, since Tom’s inter-
locutor cannot perceive it. Even a token of a demonstrative can be used as indexical
to refer to an object that is not in the perceptual context. Neale (1990, p. 106) uses
the following example to make this point. A loud boring man dominates the con-
versation at a party. As soon as he leaves (and thus is no longer in the perceptual
context), S. N. utters a token of
(4) I’m glad he’s gone.
The token of “he” uttered by S.N. refers to the boring man. This is so, we might
say, because his previous performance at the party and his having just left make
him appropriately salient at the moment of S.N.’s utterance. (Of course, the sense in
which he is appropriately salient should be clarified.) We can make the same point
in relation to “that” and “this”. Imagine for example that Tom and Mary are looking
at a series of paintings displayed in different rooms at an exhibition. They have just
seen a Picasso painting in room C, the only Picasso painting in that room, and they
are now moving on to room D, when Tom says:
(5) Picasso painted that after his cubist phase.
Clearly the “that” token refers to the Picasso painting, even though it is no longer in
sight and thus is not in the perceptual context. This reference to the painting occurs,
because a complex of facts (including the painting’s being the last one seen by the
interlocutors before their leaving room C, its being the only Picasso painting in that
room, Tom’s having used “Picasso”) makes it appropriately salient, in a sense to be
clarified. For further illustration, imagine that Tom and Mary are observing a fight
between A and B. At some point A hurls a plastic cup at B and then a knife, which
flies very close to B’s forehead and disappears into a nearby bush. Tom says to Mary:
(6) the cup was not dangerous, but this could have killed him.
Clearly, Tom’s token of “this” refers to the knife, made appropriately salient by its
role in the fight. Yet, it does this despite the fact that the knife is no longer in the
perceptual context.
In sum, the point of this discussion is that the notion of saliency is important in
characterizing the meaning of at least some indexicals, but we must do some more
work to explain its role more precisely. To begin with, we should probably invoke,
rather than the perceptual context, something which we could call the inderdoxas-
tic domain of a given indexical token t used in a linguistic exchange. This is a set
of items somehow correlated to t. The idea is that in participating in a linguistic
exchange (involving an indexical token t) all the interlocutors somehow mobilize a
set of tacit beliefs that are relevant in order to understand the statements constituting
the exchange in question. These tacit beliefs typically involve perceptual presenta-
tions of objects as well as descriptive contents determining objects. Because of this,
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there is a set of objects all of which are (tacitly) thought of (but not necessarily
perceived) by all the interlocutors. This set of objects is the interdoxastic domain
of the indexical token (which occurs at some point in the linguistic exchange). The
objects in an interdoxastic domain may of course be thought of by the interlocutors
in different ways. For example, the Eiffel tower and Romano Prodi may belong in
an interdoxastic domain as follows. Interlocutor A has a belief involving a certain
perceptual presentation g1 and interlocutor B involving presentation g2, but both g1
and g2 present the same object, say the Eiffel tower, e.g. from different visual per-
spectives (more on perceptual presentation below). Thus, the Eiffel tower is thought
of by both A and B. Or interlocutor A has a belief involving the descriptive content
|the Prodi@p| (where p is a certain token of “Prodi”), whereas interlocutor B has
an analogous belief involving |the Italian prime minister|, but both descriptive con-
tents determine the same individual, namely Romano Prodi. Accordingly, Prodi is
thought of by both A and B.
Saliency enters the picture in that the interdoxastic domain, D, of a certain
token, t, is, at least in typical cases, quasi-ordered by a relation which we could
characterize as “x is more salient than y, as regards the interpretation of t ”, or
more in brief, “x is more salient than y, with respect to t ” (Dolcini 2009 provides
useful insights for specifying precisely how such a relation works). That is, typi-
cally, some members of an interdoxastic domain are more salient (with respect to
a token t)6 than others (as the above examples illustrate), although it can be the
case that two or more members are equally salient. A most salient member in the
domain is a member that is not less salient than some other member. There might
or might not be the most salient member of the domain. A member of the domain
may be a most salient member (or even the most salient member) in a subset of
the domain even though it is not a most salient member, let alone the most salient
member, of the domain as a whole. For instance, as the variation on the theme of
the thunder example [based on (3) above] illustrates, it might be the case that in
the subset, P, comprising all places in a certain interdoxastic domain, D, there is
one item more salient than any other in P. This is the most salient place in D
(but not necessarily the most salient item in D). We shall see these ideas at work
below.
6.5 Demonstrative Indexicals
Let us now consider demonstratives in the light of the above discussion. These are
indexicals such as “this”, “that”, “this dog”, “that man”, “he”, “she”, “it”, “they”. It
is acceptable to call them demonstratives, because in typical cases they are used in
conjunction with a demonstration that points at an item (or group of items) in what
I would call the intersubjective perceptual domain (IPD, in short) of t, i.e., we may
6I shall usually leave the token parameter as implicitly understood in talking about the saliency
relation.
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say, the set of items that are perceptually available to the utterer of t and to his/her
interlocutor(s) (and possibly to appropriately placed bystanders) to the extent that
they have normal perceptual capacities and are attentive enough in exercising them
(this is more or less what Dolcini 2006 calls “the perceptual context”). As we saw,
however, these items can be successfully referred to by a demonstrative without
any demonstration. A demonstration can be viewed as a tool that a speaker can take
advantage of in order to make an object in a certain class more salient than any other
object in the same class. By means of this tool, a speaker can successfully refer via
a demonstrative token t to an item in the IPD of t.
For example, by pointing at Botticelli’s Primavera hanging on a wall in the Uffizi
Gallery in Florence, Tom could say to Mary (who is also looking at the painting):
(1) this is a painting of a great artist.
Clearly, the “this” token, t, refers to the painting in question and this is possible,
inter alia, because the painting is in the IPD of t and thus Tom can point at it,
thereby making it the most salient item among those that belong in the interdoxastic
domain of t.
In order to fully grasp the linguistic meaning of “this”, we must take into account
its contrast with “that”. We know that the former is typically used in relation to an
object near the speaker and the latter with respect to an object far from the speaker.
Thus, it is often said that a token of “this” refers to an object near the speaker and a
token of “this” to an object that is not near the speaker.7 But perhaps we should
put things in terms of proximity, or lack thereof, with respect to the contextual
place (and time) of the relevant indexical token. Let us imagine for example this
extravagant way in which a famous painter, Pierre Le Maitre, advertises one of his
paintings, Les Mademoiselles, at an exhibition. Near the painting there is a button,
which the visitors are encouraged to press. The button is connected to the appropri-
ate electronic devices in such a way that, when the button is pressed, the painting is
conspicuously illuminated and immediately afterwards a tape recorder is activated.
As a result, the following message by Pierre Le Maitre is reproduced:
(2) this is one of my most beautiful paintings.
Clearly, when this message is reproduced, there is a certain token, t, of “this” which
refers to the painting Les Mademoiselles. Yet we cannot say that the painting is near
the speaker, namely Pierre Le Maitre. Pierre is, we may suppose, in Paris, while the
exhibition and the painting are in London. However, the contextual place of t can be
taken to be the place that t occupies when it is heard by the person who pressed the
button (and by nearby visitors) and clearly the painting is near that place. Similarly,
7What exactly counts as “near” is rather vague and for present purposes we can leave it open. It
should be noted however that this vagueness has nothing to do with the fact that we can use “near”
in different ways in relation to a given goal (New York is near Boston, if we go by plane, but not so
if we walk). When we use “this”, the goal is always the same, namely to refer to a certain object.
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in the more standard previous example based on Tom who points at Botticelli’s
Primavera, the contextual place of Tom’s token of “this” is the one it occupies at
the moment of its production and clearly this place is near the referred item, namely
Botticelli’s painting. We can imagine a variation on the theme of Pierre Le Maitre’s
example, in which the contextual place of the token is inside the object referred to.
For example, a car could be advertised by means of a recorded message, a token of
(3) this is a beautiful car,
which comes from a tape recorder placed into the car.
In sum, I would say that a token, t, of “this”, used as a basic indexical, refers
to the most salient among the items in the interdoxastic domain of t that either
(i) are near the contextual place of the token; or (ii) contain the contextual place of
the token (if there is such most salient item). Similarly, a token, t, of “that”, used
indexically, refers to the most salient among the items in the interdoxastic domain
of t that (i) are not near the contextual place of the token; and (ii) do not contain the
contextual place of the token (if there is such most salient item).
We should not forget that “this” can be used as part of a “complex demonstrative”
such as “this dog”, “this chair”, etc. In the light of this and the above discussion, we
can perhaps characterize the indexical property, |this|, expressed by “this”, by means
of the following PRAG principle:
TPP. This: PRAG Principle. Suppose that t is an indexical token, with the index-
ical property |this| (or |this F|, where F is a property such as |chair|, |dog|,
etc.) as its linguistic meaning, a property such that (i) |the this| (or |the this
F|) is the contextualized linguistic meaning of t; and (ii) the contextual com-
plex for t is primary. Then, the following holds: (a) if the contextualized
linguistic meaning is |the this|, then PRAG(t, |this|, |most salient among the
items in the interdoxastic domain of t that either (i) are near the contextual
place of t; or (ii) contain the contextual place of t|); (b) if the contextualized
linguistic meaning is |the this F|, then PRAG(t, |this|, |most salient among
the items with the property F in the interdoxastic domain of t that either (i) are
near the contextual place of t; or (ii) contain the contextual place of t|).
Let us focus on the example based on (1) above in order to illustrate how TPP
works. In this case, Tom utters a token, s, of (1), while pointing at Botticelli’s
Primavera, in a conversation with Mary at the Uffizi Gallery. Clearly, he uses a
token, t, of “this” as indexical, in such a way that t refers to the Primavera and, we
may assume, the proposition pragmatically expressed by s is true. We can admit in
this case that (i) the contextual place of t is the place, p, that it occupies when uttered
by Tom and heard by Mary; and (ii) Tom’s demonstration renders the painting in
question specifically salient. In particular, it makes it the most salient object among
the items in the interdoxastic domain of t that are near p. Accordingly, the painting
uniquely exemplifies the property |most salient among the items in the interdoxas-
tic domain of t that either (i) are near the contextual place of t; or (ii) contain the
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contextual place of t|. By P5 of § 5.4 and TPP, this property is co-extensive with the
property |this@t| and thus the painting also uniquely exemplifies this property. By
INCB and INPB, the pragmatic meaning of t is |the this@t|. By virtue of what we
have just noted, this descriptive content determines the Primavera and thus t refers
to it. Furthermore, the pragmatic meaning of s is (in the light of A/N2 of § 2.4):
(1a) |{the this@t} is a painting of a great artist|.
Since |the this@t| occurs actively in (1a), this proposition is true just in case the
Primavera exemplifies the property |painting of a great artist|, which we take to be
the case. And thus we have shown that CD complies with the expectations we have
about the statement s uttered by Tom and the token of “this” embedded in it.
By analogy with TPP, we can characterize the indexical property |that| as follows:
THPP. THat: PRAG Principle. Suppose that t is an indexical token, with the
indexical property |that| (or |that F|, where F is a property such as |chair|,
|dog|, etc.) as its linguistic meaning, a property such that (i)|the that| (or |the
that F|) is the contextualized linguistic meaning of t; and (ii) the contextual
complex for t is primary. Then, the following holds: (a) if the contextualized
linguistic meaning is |the that|, then PRAG(P, |that|, |most salient among the
items in the interdoxastic domain of t that (i) are not near the contextual place
of t; and (ii) do not contain the contextual place of t|); (b) if the contextualized
linguistic meaning is |the that F|, then PRAG(t, |that|, |most salient among
the items with the property F in the interdoxastic domain of t that (i) are not
near the contextual place of t; and (ii) do not contain the contextual place
of t|).
The indexical properties expressed by “he”, “she”, and “it”, can be characterized
in a similar vein:
S/HE/ITPP. S/HE/IT PRAG principle. Suppose that t is an indexical token, with
the indexical property F as its linguistic meaning, where F may be (a) |she|,
(b) |he|, (c) |it|, and F is a property such that (i) |the F| is the contextualized
linguistic meaning of t; and (ii) the contextual complex for t is primary. Then,
the following holds: PRAG(t, |F|, |most salient among the items with the
property G in the interdoxastic domain of t|), where G is |female| in case (a),
|male| in case (b), |neuter| in case (c).
As regards the plural indexical property expressed by “they” the following PRAG
principle could be proposed:
TYPP. TheY: PRAG principle. Suppose that t is an indexical token, with the
indexical property |they| as its linguistic meaning, such that (i) |thepl they|
is the contextualized linguistic meaning of t; and (ii) the contextual complex
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for t is primary. Then, the following holds: PRAG(t, |they|, |pluralized item
that is most salient among the items in the interdoxastic domain of t|).8
We leave to the interested reader the task of characterizing the plural indexical
properties expressed by “these” and “those”, in a way that takes into account that
these expressions can also be used as complex demonstratives.
6.6 The Locative Pronouns
Let us consider some data regarding the locative pronoun par excellence, i.e., in
English, “here”. It is often assumed that any token of this singular term refers to the
location of the speaker. Even if we concentrate on genuine indexical tokens this is
not generally true, because of the well-known example of the answering machine.
Tom can leave a recorded message in an answering machine in his apartment in
Milan which says
(1) I am not here now, please call at some other time.
If the machine is triggered by an incoming phone call when Tom is in Paris, a token
of “here” that does not refer to the location of the speaker, Tom, is brought into
existence. In order to address this issue some prefer to say that a token of “here”
refers to the location of the token itself. But even this is not quite correct. Consider
an example such as this. Tom could write a letter from Milan to his friend Mary in
Palermo (say on Monday), a letter with a token of
(2) it is cold here,
a token that Tom writes while offering his impressions of Milan. When Mary reads
the letter (say on Wednesday) the “here” token is in Palermo, but in fact it should be
taken to refer to Milan. In the example based on (1) we can say that the contextual
place of the token of “here” is the one it occupies when the activation of the answer-
ing machine causes it to exist. In the example based on (2), on the other hand, the
contextual place of the token of “here” is the one it occupies when Tom makes it
exist, while writing his letter in Milan.
All this might suggest the following further option: a “here” token refers to the
contextual place of the token. This will not do either. Consider two tokens, s1 and
s2, of (2). Token s1 is uttered by Tom in a context in which he is comparing the
weather in the city where he lives, Milan, with the weather of the city, Palermo,
of his visiting friend Mary. Token s2 is uttered by Tom in a context in which he is
8The recourse to saliency in the pragmatic principles of this section bears some analogy to how
Garcia-Carpintero 2000 relies on saliency in sketching an account of singular terms such as “he”
or “that car” from a two-dimensionalist perspective.
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complaining to his wife because she does not want to turn up the heating in their
apartment. In both cases, the contextual place of the token in question is the one it
occupies when Tom produces it, a place contained in Tom’s apartment and in Milan
as well. However, in the former case the token of “here” refers to Milan, while
in the latter case the other “here” token refers to Tom’s apartment. This seems to
depend on the fact that in the former case Milan is more salient than the apartment,
whereas the opposite is true in the latter case. And it seems that when no place has
the appropriate saliency a token of “here” may fail to refer. For example, consider a
group of friends who are travelling around during a vacation and end up in a hotel
that they do not particularly like in a city that they are not enjoying very much. They
are now in their hotel room discussing whether they should move to another hotel
in the same city or to a different city altogether. A survey of opinions is taken and
when it is Mary’s turn she comes up with a token of (2). Tom replies by asking: “Do
you mean we should leave this hotel because it is not well heated or we should leave
this city because its weather is bad?” We may say that the contextual place of Mary’s
“here” token coincides, as in the previous examples, with the place occupied at the
moment of its production. But in this case the token fails to refer to something and
only when Mary replies by saying “I mean we should go away from here because the
heating does not work well”, she succeeds in producing a “here” token that refers to
the hotel.
It seems to me that all these data are taken into account by the hypothesis that
the indexical property |here| works pretty much like |this place|. We can then go for
it and appropriately model the PRAG principle for |here| on the one for |this|, i.e.
TPP, above. We thus get:
HRPP. HeRe: PRAG principle. Suppose that h is an indexical token, with the
indexical property |here| as linguistic meaning, such that (i) |the here| is the
contextualized linguistic meaning of h; and (ii) the contextual complex for h
is primary. Then, it is the case that PRAG(h, |here|, |most salient among the
places in the interdoxastic domain of t which either (i) are near the contextual
place of h; or (ii) contain the contextual place of h|).
To illustrate, let us go back to the earlier examples. As regards the conversa-
tion between Tom and his visiting friend Mary, we might assume that both Milan
and Tom’s apartment are in the interdoxastic domain of Tom’s token of “here”, h.
Moreover both places contain the contextual place of h. Yet, given the topic of their
conversation, Milan is more salient than the apartment (and of any other place in the
interdoxastic domain near or containing the contextual place of h). Accordingly, h
refers to Milan. In the other example in which Tom is talking to his wife, Milan and
the apartment are again in the interdoxastic domain of the token of “here” uttered by
Tom (or so we may assume). However, in this case it is the apartment that is more
salient than Milan and all other places in the interdoxastic domain (near or contain-
ing the contextual place of h). Thus, the token in question refers to the apartment.
In the answering machine example, we may assume that the apartment where the
machine is located, i.e., Tom’s apartment in Milan, is most salient among the places
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in the interdoxastic domain near or containing the contextual place of the relevant
token of “here”. And thus the token refers to the apartment, despite the fact that
Tom is in Paris. In the case of the letter written by Tom in Milan and read by Mary
in Palermo, we can assume that Milan is the most salient place in the interdoxastic
domain near or containing the contextual place of the token of “here”. Hence, the
token of “here” refers to Milan, despite its being in Palermo. Finally, consider the
hotel example in which Mary fails to refer with her token of “here”. This happens,
because two places in the interdoxastic domain, a city and a hotel in the city (both
near or inside the contextual place of the token), are equally salient. Hence, we fail
to get the most salient one. Thus, the token fails to refer.
Let us verify that HRPP delivers what is expected by considering one example in
closer detail. Let us focus on the case of Tom when he utters (1) in talking to Mary
and thereby uses a token, h, of “here” that refers to Milan. In the light of INCB,
the contextualized linguistic meaning of h is |the here|. Given HRPP, it is the case
that PRAG(h, |here|, |most salient among the places in the interdoxastic domain of h
which either (i) are near the contextual place of h, or (ii) contain the contextual place
of h|). For brevity’s sake, let us call H the target property in this PRAG relationship.
Now, INPB tells us that the pragmatic meaning of h is |the here@h|. We can assume
that the property H is uniquely exemplified by Milan. By P5 of § 5.4, this is also
true of the property |here@h|. Accordingly, |the here@h| determines Milan, which
is thus what the token h refers to, as expected.
Let us now see how HRPP grants the possibility that a token of “here” refers
precisely to the location of the speaker. To see this, consider this example (a similar
one is discussed in Dolcini 2006). A kid is lost in the woods on a dark night and
the mother is looking for him. She keeps screaming: “where are you?” She knows
of course that if the kid hears her and replies, she can locate him by following the
direction of the sound of his words. When the kid finally hears her voice, he yells in
reply:
(3) I am here!
Clearly, in this case the contextual place of the token of “here” uttered by the kid
is the one occupied by the token, when produced. Moreover, the most salient place
near this contextual place is the location of the speaker, namely the kid himself, for
the main purpose of the communicative exchange is to allow the mother to locate
precisely that place.9 Clause (i) of HRPP grants that the token in question refers to
the location of the kid.
9It is hardly imaginable that the kid should reply “I am in this place” instead of “I am here”, which
might lead one to suspect that the meaning of “here” is not analyzable in terms of the meaning of
“this place”, in spite of the fact that |here| and |this place| are pretty much the same property. But
perhaps the reply “I am in this place” seems unnatural simply because it violates Grice’s maxim
of mode (be concise!), as when one says “Mary is the daughter of my parents” instead of “Mary is
my sister”.
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Since we have not appealed so far to clause (ii) of HRPP, it might be worth noting
that it is not idle. Consider a token, s, of
(4) tomatoes are on sale here,
posted inside a grocery store. Clause (ii) grants that the token of “here” embedded
in s refers to the store.
The indexical “there” can be treated by analogy with “here”. It can be taken
to express the indexical property |there|, understood pretty much as |that place|.
Accordingly, we can assume this principle:
TRPP. TheRe: PRAG Principle. Suppose that (i) t is an indexical token, with the
indexical property |there| as linguistic meaning, such that (i) |the there| is the
contextualized linguistic meaning of t; and (ii) the contextual complex for t is
primary. Then, the following holds: PRAG(t, |there|, |most salient among the
places in the interdoxastic domain of t which (i) are not near the contextual
place of t; and (ii) do not contain the contextual place of t|).
6.7 Anaphoric Indexicals
Let us finally analyze how indexicals are used as anaphoras. In the light of
our descriptivist perspective, according to which indexicals work like determiner
phrases, and in particular like definite descriptions when they are used as singular
terms, we have to look at the principles concerning the anaphoric uses of determiner
phrases, i.e., DPCA, DPPA.10 By relying on them, we thus get:
INCA. INdexicals: Contextualized linguistic meaning when used Anaphori-
cally. Any indexical token, d, used as an anaphoric indexical, is used as a
(truncated) determiner phrase. That is, d, in accordance with DPCA, has a
denoting concept, |det M|, as contextualized linguistic meaning, where |det
M| is the proxy denoting concept for d (as specifiable by the proxy paraphrase
for d).11 Constraint: A token, t2, used as determiner phrase, is anaphoric on
another token, t1, having as contextualized linguistic meaning the property
|P| or the denoting concept |det1 P| (depending on whether or not t1 is a trun-
cated determiner phrase) only if t2 has as linguistic meaning a property |Q|
10Since tokens used as anaphoric indexicals may not be used as singular terms, it is inappropriate
in this case to look back at the principles STCA and STPA, concerning anaphoric singular terms.
11Frigerio has expressed in correspondence the worry that, since “det” here may correspond to
various determiner components (e.g., |the| or |every|, as illustrated by the examples below), the
present account does not grant, as promised, the same meaning for both anaphoric and basic index-
icals. But this worry should be put aside, since the determiner component is zero realized and the
meaning of the indexical is always the same: |that|, |he|, etc., as the case may be.
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or a denoting concept |det2 Q| (depending on whether or not t2 is a truncated
determiner phrase) such that P conceptually entails Q or vice versa.
INPA. INdexicals: Pragmatic meaning when used Anaphorically. Suppose t
is a genuine indexical such that (i) |det M| is the contextualized linguistic
meaning of t, (ii) the contextual complex, C, for t is secondary and thus t is
used anaphorically. Then, the pragmatic meaning of t is |det M ′|, where M ′
is the C-enriched version of M.
To clarify how these principles work, I shall focus on the following example:
(1) John bought a donkey and Tom vaccinated it.
Let us assume that that s is a certain token of (1), a token which involves the tokens
j, t, d and i of “John”, “Tom”, “a donkey” and “it”, respectively. For our illustra-
tive purposes we can imagine that s is uttered in a situation analogous to the one
described in § 5.11 in order to discuss an example similar to (1), namely “John
bought a donkey and Tom vaccinated the donkey”. Let us then assume the following
facts. On Coralville Farm some animals have fallen sick in spite of the vaccination
procedures and the speaker is trying to understand why. In this process, when he
utters s, he is reviewing what happened to the animals bought at the Sycamore Fair
of March 23, 2007. Moreover, let us assume, the tokens j and t of “John” and “Tom”
refer to John and Tom, two farmers working in Coralville Farm (the tokens j and t
have nominal-causal chains that trace back to them). Under these circumstances, the
statement s is true just in case there is precisely one donkey, say Pippo, bought by
John for Coralville Farm at the Sycamore Fair of March 23, 2007, and Tom is such
that he vaccinated Pippo. We want to see that our rules assign to s as its pragmatic
meaning a proposition with this truth condition.
Since the relevant token of “it”, i, is used as an anaphoric indexical, we must
appeal to INCA to determine its contextualized linguistic meaning. INCA tells us
that this is the proxy denoting concept for i, i.e., we can assume, |the [x such that
x is an it and x is a donkey and {the John} bought x]|. Note that the Constraint in
INCA is respected since, by DPL, the token d of “a donkey” has |a donkey| as its
linguistic meaning and, by INL, the token i of “it” has |it| as its linguistic meaning.
This is fine as far as the constraint in question is concerned, since |it| is a property
conceptually entailed by |donkey|, for, given ITRC and note 3 in § 6.2, to have the
property |it| one must be inanimate, plant or (like donkeys) a non-human animal.
In the light of the above, and after taking into account DPA/N1, the contextual-
ized linguistic meaning of the whole statement, s, is:
(1a) |{the John} bought {a donkey} and {the Tom} vaccinated {the [x such that x
is an it and x is a donkey and {the John} bought x]|.
The rule regarding the pragmatic meaning of proper names used as basic singu-
lar terms, PNPB, grants that the pragmatic meanings of the names j and t are |the
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John@j| and |the Tom@t|, respectively. Moreover, given the assumptions about the
context which we are presupposing, the token d of “a donkey” is incomplete. In fact,
something like this can be taken to hold: PRAG(d, |donkey|, |donkey purchased
for Coralville Farm at the Sycamore Fair of March 23, 2007|). Accordingly, the
pragmatic meaning of d is |a donkey@d|. Hence the contextual complex C for i
should determine, in line with INPA above, that the pragmatic meaning of i is: |the
[x such that x is an it and x is a donkey@d and {the John@j} bought x]|. In sum, the
pragmatic meaning of s is:
(1b) |{the John@j} bought {a donkey@d} and {the Tom@t} vaccinated {the [x
such that x is an it and x is a donkey@d and {the John@j } bought x]}|.
We shall now verify that (1b) has the expected truth condition. Since PRAG(d1,
|donkey|, |donkey purchased for Coralville Farm at the Sycamore Fair of March 23,
2007|) holds, by our rule for the relation @, P5 of § 5.4, the properties |donkey@d|
and |donkey purchased for Coralville Farm at the Sycamore Fair of March 23, 2007|
are equivalent. By virtue of this, and given that the PRAG principle for proper
names, PNCD, grants that the properties |John@j| and |Tom@t| uniquely identify
John and Tom, respectively, (1b) is true, as expected, under these circumstances:
there is precisely one donkey, say Pippo, bought by John for Coralville Farm at the
Sycamore Fair of March 23, 2007, and Tom is such that he vaccinated Pippo.12
For further clarification, let us now turn, more briefly, to some other examples.
To begin with, consider:
(2) Any farmer who buys a donkey vaccinates it.
(3) Any man who meets some beautiful women admires them.
As regards (2), the determiner component in the proxy denoting concept of the rele-
vant token of “it”, i, could be either |the| or |every|, depending on which determiner
meaning we take as zero realized in i.13 In other words, in the light of INCA, the
contextualized linguistic meaning of i could be either |the [y such that y is a donkey
12It should be noted that the relevant token of (1) in our story is compatible with John’s having
bought more than one donkey. For example, he could have bought another donkey in 2006, before
buying the one in question at the 2007 Sycamore Fair. Similarly, perhaps, a token of “Socrates
owned a dog and it bit Socrates” can be literally true even if Socrates has more than one dog,
contrary to what Evans 1977 claims (see Sainsbury 2005, p. 133, for a discussion). This intuition
has been seen as problematic for the paraphrase approach to anaphora. My account can however
take care of it, by assigning the following pragmatic meaning to a given token of this sentence
(involving a token d of “a dog” and a token s of “Socrates”): |{the Socrates@s} owns {a x such that
x is dog@d} and {the x such that x is dog@d and {the Socrates@s} owns x} bit {the Socrates@s}|.
13As mentioned in note 15 of Chapter 2, these two options are considered by many authors, includ-
ing Parsons and Cocchiarella, and there is the further option, proposed by Neale, according to
which the determiner component is |whe|. For present purposes, as already mentioned, we can
neglect Neale’s proposal.
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and x buys y]| or |every [y such that y is a donkey and x buys y]| and, correspond-
ingly, we have these two choices regarding the contextualized linguistic meaning of
a given token of (2) (on the assumption that “a” can be understood as either |a| or
|some|):
(2a) |{every [x such that x is a farmer and x buys {a donkey}]} vaccinates {the [y
such that y is an it and y is a donkey and x buys y]}|.
(2b) |{every [x such that x is a farmer and x buys {some donkey}]} vaccinates
{every [y such that y is an it and y is a donkey and x buys y]}|.
As regards (3), the zero realized determiner component, relative to the relevant
anaphoric indexical token, is clearly |thepl| and therefore we get the following at
the level of contextualized linguistic meaning:
(3a) |{every [x such that x is a man and x meets {somepl [y such that y is a beautiful
woman]}]} admires {thepl [z such that z is a they and z is a beautiful woman
and x meets z]}|.
Some sentences suggest that the zero realized determiner component may even
be |some|, as in this example from King 2006:
(4) some woman who owns a donkey beats it.
For a token of (4) can perhaps be given, in line with INCA, the following
contextualized linguistic meaning:
(4a) |{some [x such that x is a woman and x owns {some donkey}] beats {some
[y such that y is an it and x owns y]}|.
Given an interpretation along these lines of a token of (4), the contextualized lin-
guistic meaning of the relevant token of “it” is |some [y such that y is an it and x
owns y]| with |some| as determiner component.
Let us now consider an example involving c-command:
(5) every novel is loved by the person who has written it.
In line with what we said in §§ 2.7 and 5.11 in discussing a similar example, the
contextualized linguistic meaning is as follows:
(5a) |{every [x such that x is a novel]} is loved by {the [y such that y is a person and
y has written {the [z such that z is an it & z is a novel and z is identical to x]}|.
Let us conclude with an example in which we have first a pronoun used as an
indexical and then another pronoun that traces back anaphorically to the former. Let
us imagine that, while pointing at a passerby, Tom says to Mary:
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(6) that man is an actor.
(7) He is famous.
In this case, the contextualized linguistic meaning of Tom’s token of (6) is
(6a) |{the (that & man)} is an actor|.
Let t and h be the relevant tokens of “that man” and “he”. Since h is anaphoric
on t and t has |the (that & man)| as contextualized linguistic meaning, the proxy
denoting concept for h is |the (he & (that & man))|. Hence, in accordance with
INCA, the contextualized linguistic meaning of Tom’s token of (7) is:
(7a) |{the (he & (that & man))} is famous|.
In the light of the principle INPB, concerning the pragmatic meaning of indexicals
used as basic, the pragmatic meaning of t is |the (that & man)@t|. By applying
INPA, we get the following as pragmatic meaning of Tom’s token of (7):
(7b) |{the (he & (that & man)@t)} is famous|.
Chapter 7
Tense, Temporal Indexicals
and Other Miscellaneous Issues
7.1 The Eternalist Version of CD
In discussing our examples I have typically neglected tense, for simplicity’s sake.
But we should now reconsider the eternalist and temporalist approaches to tense in
the light of CD. Let us start with eternalism. For illustration, we concentrate on the
same examples of § 1.9, namely:
(1) Bush is a president
and
(2) Bush was a student.
It was suggested that, in a descriptivist perspective, a token of (1), s, expresses a
proposition of the following form:
(1a) |at({the F}, B is# a president)|.
It was assumed that B and |the F| are two descriptive contents occurring as con-
stituents in this proposition. B corresponds to the proper name “Bush” and |the F|
determines the time at which s is uttered. The proposition is true if and only if
the untensed proposition |B is# a president| is true at the time determined by the
descriptive content |the F|. From the perspective of CD, the descriptive content B is
(at the level of pragmatic meaning) |the Bush@b|, where b is the token of “Bush”
embedded in s. But what kind of descriptive content is |the F|? In answering this
question, let us recall something I anticipated in Chapter 5, namely that a relation-
ship PRAG(t, M, C) can obtain when t is a statement and M is an abstract notion
somehow conveyed by the tense component of the statement. I would like to sug-
gest that, from the point of view of eternalism, this abstract notion is something
that we may call “statement-time” and which is governed by the following PRAG
principle:
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STPP. Statement-Time: Pragmatic Principle. Suppose that s is a statement with
a contextualized linguistic meaning of the form |tense(the statement-time,
A)|. Then, it is the case that PRAG(s, |statement-time|, |contextual time of
s|).
The idea is that, if a statement is understood at the level of contextualized linguistic
meaning as involving a tensed verb, then its contextualized linguistic meaning is
of the form |tense(the statement-time, A)|, where “tense” stands (in the simplest
cases) for |at|, |at-past|, or |at-future| (depending on whether the tense is present,
past or future; the notions |at-past| and |at-future| will be discussed below). Thus,
for example, the contextualized linguistic meaning of a certain token, s, of (1), from
the point of view of eternalist CD, is:
(1b) |at({the statement-time}, the Bush is# a president)|.
The descriptive content |the statement-time| is to be viewed as if it were a descrip-
tive content contributed by an incomplete determiner phrase (expressible, given
my terminology, as “the statement-time”) somehow encoded in the verb because
it is tensed, rather than untensed. (“is” as opposed to “being” or “to be”, in this
case). At the pragmatic level, a descriptive content of this kind must be enriched
in such a way that it determines the contextual time of the whole statement. The
principle STPP ensures this. Once this is granted, we can take the descriptive
content |the F| of (1a) to be |the statement-time@s|. More generally, the claim
is that a tensed statement, a, has a contextualized linguistic meaning of the form
|tense({the statement-time}, A)| [as illustrated by (1b)] and a corresponding prag-
matic meaning |tense({the statement-time@a}, A∗)| (where A∗ is the pragmatic
meaning corresponding to the contextualized linguistic meaning A). To illustrate,
the pragmatic meaning of the token, s, of (1), corresponding to the contextualized
linguistic meaning (1b), is:
(1c) |at({the statement-time@s}, the Bush@b is# a president)|.
To see how this approach works, suppose that s is uttered during an ordinary
conversation at a time, t, in 2006, in a context in which it is clear that the token,
b, of “Bush” embedded in s is used as a basic singular term in such a way that it
refers to the current US president. Intuitively, s expresses a truth, since Bush is# a
president at t. Let us verify that the proposed approach complies with this. Since |the
statement-time@s| occurs actively in (1c), this proposition is logically equivalent to
(1d) there is exactly one time, x, with the property |statement-time@s| and at(x, the
Bush@b is# a president).1
1By taking advantage of lambda abstracts, proposition (1c) can be represented more precisely
as follows: [λp ∃1x(statement-time@s(x) & at(x, p))]([λ [λf ∃1x(Bush@b(x) & f(x)](president)]).
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Thus, (1a) is true if the untensed proposition |the Bush@b is# a president| is true at
the time (if any) uniquely exemplified by the property |statement-time@s| (i.e., the
time determined by the descriptive content |the statement time@s)|). Now, by P5
of § 5.4 and STPP above, the property |statement-time@s| is coextensive with the
property |contextual time of s|. In an ordinary conversation, the contextual time of a
statement can be taken to coincide with the time of utterance (see § 2.10), i.e., in this
case, t. Hence, the property |contextual time of s| is uniquely exemplified by t and
so is |statement-time@s|. In sum, the descriptive content |the statement-time@s|
determines t and (1c) and (1d) are both true just in case the untensed proposition
|the Bush@b is# a president| is true at t. By appealing to PNCD of § 5.9 and P5
of § 5.4, we can see that the property |Bush@b| is co-extensive at time t with the
property |nominal-causal source of b|, where b is the relevant token of “Bush”.
Since this property is uniquely exemplified at time t by an individual with the
property of being president (namely, by the current US president, Bush), then
the property |Bush@b| is also uniquely exemplified at time t by an individual
with the property of being president.2 Thus, the untensed proposition |the Bush@b
is# a president| is true at t. In sum, (1d) is true and such is (1c), as desired.
Tensed sentences with past or future tenses should be dealt with in the same way,
except that they involve the relational notions |at-past| or |at-future|, instead of |at|.
Suppose for example that a token s of (2) is uttered in 2006 in a context in which
the token b of “Bush” in it refers to the current US president. Clearly, s expresses a
truth. This truth is, according to eternalist CD, the proposition:
(2a) at-past({the statement-time@s}, the Bush@b is# a student).
This proposition must be understood as logically equivalent to
(2b) there is exactly one time t such that t has the property |statement-time@s| and
there is a time t′ such that t′ is before t and at(t′, the Bush@b is# a student|).3
Given lambda conversion, this is logically equivalent to ∃1x(statement-time@s(x) & at(x, [λ [λf
∃1x(Bush@b(x) & f(x)]( president)])), which I take as a more formal way to represent (1d). It is
appropriate to assume that logical laws, and thus in particular lambda conversion, hold, so to speak,
within times, i.e. inside the scope of the relation expressed by “at”. Hence, we can take this more
formal representation of (1d) as equivalent to ∃1x(statement-time@s(x) & at(x, [λ ∃1x(Bush@b(x)
& president (x))])).
2In the light of what was said in the previous note, (1d) can be seen as ∃1x(statement-time@s(x)
& at(x, [λ [λf ∃1x(Bush@b(x) & f(x)](president)])). Given that t is the unique time with property
statement-time@s, we can then assume: at(t, [λ [λf ∃1x(Bush@b(x) & f(x)](president)]). Since
logical laws hold within times, and at time t the properties Bush@b and nominal-causal-source-of-
b are co-extensive, we can also assume the following: at(t, [λ [λf ∃1x(nominal-causal-source-of-b
(x) & f(x)](president)]).
3By using lambda abstracts, we take (2a) to be [λp ∃1x(statement-time@s(x) & ∃y(time(y) &
before(y, x) & at(y, p))]([λ [λf ∃1x(Bush@b(x) & f(x)](student)])). By lambda conversion, this is
equivalent to this more formal representation of (2b): ∃1x(statement-time@s(x) & ∃y(time(y) &
before(y, x) & at(y, [λ [λf ∃1x(Bush@b(x) & f(x)](student)])).
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Similarly, consider now a token s of
(3) Bush will be a former president.
If the relevant token of “Bush” is b, then this statement should be taken to express
as pragmatic meaning
(3a) at-future({the statement-time@s}, the Bush@b is# a former president),
logically equivalent to
(3b) there is a exactly one time t such that t has the property |statement-time@s|
and there is a time t′ such that t′ is after t and at(t′, the Bush@b is# a former
president|).4
7.2 The Temporalist Version of CD
Let us go back to the sentence
(1) Bush is president.
In a temporalist perspective, we can assume that a token s of (1) uttered at time t has
the following contextualized linguistic meaning:
(1a) |present(the Bush is# president)|.
What about its pragmatic meaning? The temporalist might insist that this pragmatic
meaning is a proposition with a changing truth-value, one that will be false when
Bush ceases to be president. In this perspective, the pragmatic meaning is simply
(1b) |present(the Bush@b is# president)|,
where b is the relevant token of “Bush”. For reasons explained in § 1.9, this
proposition can be seen as equivalent to
(1c) |there is a time x such that A-present(x) & at(x, the Bush@b is# a president)|.
4With recourse to lambda abstracts, (3a) becomes [λp ∃1x(statement-time@s(x) & ∃y(time(y) &
after(y, x) & at(y, p))]([λ [λf ∃1x(Bush@b(x) & f(x)](former-president)])). By lambda conversion,
this is equivalent to this more formal representation of (2b): ∃1x(statement-time@s(x) & ∃y(time(y)
& after(y, x) & at(y, [λ [λf ∃1x(Bush@b(x) & f(x)](student)])).
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But one can have the intuition that in at least certain cases the pragmatic mean-
ing of a token of a sentence such as (1) may well have a fixed truth-value. The
temporalist supporter of CD can account for this intuition by taking the relevant
token of (1) to be, we may say, temporally fixed, where this means that the token in
question has an appropriate conversational impliciture, in the way that I shall now
explain.5
In general, the idea is that something like these two principles hold:
FSPM. Fixed-time Statement: Pragmatic Meaning. Suppose that s is a tempo-
rally fixed statement with a contextualized linguistic meaning of the form
|tense(A)|, where |tense| is a temporal property such as |present|, |past| or
|future|. Then the pragmatic meaning of s is |tense@s(A)|.
FSPP. Fixed-time Statement: Pragmatic principle. Suppose that s is a tempo-
rally fixed statement with a contextualized linguistic meaning of the form
|tense(A)|, where |tense| is a temporal property such as |present|, |past| or
|future|. Then, it is the case that PRAG(s, |tense|, H), where H is one of
these properties: (i) |being an untensed proposition P such that at({the con-
textual time of s}, P)|; (ii) |being an untensed proposition P such that there
is a time t before {the contextual time of s} and at(t, P)|; or (iii) |being
an untensed proposition P such that there is a time t after {the contextual
time of s} and at(t, P)|, depending on whether |tense| is |present|, |past| or
|future.|.6
As a matter of fact, these principles need be enriched to take into account the
full varieties of tenses, but for present purposes we can neglect these complications.
Suppose now that s is the token of (1) in question, a token uttered at t, a time which
we can take to be the contextual time of s. Suppose further that the contextual com-
plex for s, on the basis of the pragmatic module, tells us that s is to be understood
as a temporally fixed statement. Then, FSPM applies and the pragmatic meaning of
s is
(1d) |present@s(the Bush@b is# president)|,
where b is the relevant token of “Bush”. By FSPP above and P5 of § 5.4, (1d)
is equivalent to a proposition which predicates of the untensed proposition |the
Bush@b is# president| the following property: |being an untensed proposition P
5What I propose here is probably in line with a suggestion made in Richard 2003 (note 18, p. 45,
which relates to what is said at his pp. 39–40).
6More formally, the properties (i) |being an untensed proposition P such that at({the contextual
time of s}, P)|; (ii) |being an untensed proposition P such that there is a time t before {the contextual
time of s} and at(t, P)|; and (iii) |being an untensed proposition P such that there is a time t after
{the contextual time of s} and at(t, P)|; can be seen as (i) [λp ∃1x(contextual-time-of-s(x) & at(x,
p)]; (ii) [λp ∃1x(contextual-time-of-s(x) & ∃y(before(y, x) & at(y, p))]; and (iii) [λp ∃1x(contextual-
time-of-s(x) & ∃y(after(y, x) & at(y, p))].
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such that at({the contextual time of s}, P|. Let us indicate with “H” the latter
property. Then, the proposition in question is:
(1e) |H(the Bush@b is# president)|.
Clearly, (1e) is equivalent to
(1f) at({the contextual time of s}, the Bush@b is# president).7
Now, since the contextual time of s is t, it follows that this proposition is true just in
case the following is true:
(1g) at(t, the Bush@b is# president).8
Proposition (1g) is not a proposition with a fluctuating truth-value. It is stably true
over time as long as it exists. Accordingly, such is the proposition, (1d), which was
taken to be the pragmatic meaning of the token s of (1).
Let us take another example. Focus on a token, s, of
(2) Bush was a student,
uttered at a time, d, in 2006. Here the contextualized linguistic meaning is
(2a) |past(the Bush is# a student)|.
According to temporalism, in line with what we saw in § 1.9, the proposition
expressed by s as pragmatic meaning may be taken to be
(2b) |past(the Bush@b is# a student)|,
where b is the relevant token of “Bush”. Proposition (2b) is equivalent to
(2c) there are times t and t′ such that A-present(t) and t′ precedes t and at(t′, Bush
is# a student)|.
7Given what we said in the previous note, the proposition (1e) should be understood as [λp
∃1x(contextual-time-of-s(x) & at(x, p)]([λ [λf ∃1x(Bush@b(x) & f(x)](president)]), which is equiv-
alent, by lambda conversion, to this more formal way of seeing (1f): ∃1x(contextual-time-of-s(x)
& at(x, [λ [λf ∃1x(Bush@b(x) & f(x)](president)]).
8More formally, (1g) is at(t, [λ [λf ∃1x(Bush@b(x) & f(x)](president)]), which we can take as true,
given the truth of (1f) and the fact that t uniquely exemplify the property of being the contextual
time of s.
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Proposition (2b) has a changing truth-value, since it is equivalent to a proposition,
(2c), which involves the property A-present. However, by assuming that the contex-
tual complex for s decrees that this is a fixed time statement, s should be taken to
express, in line with FTPM, a proposition with an unchanging truth-value, i.e.:
(2d) |past@s(the Bush@b is# student)|.
Given FTPP, (2d) is equivalent to a proposition that predicates |being an untensed
proposition P such that there is a time t before {the contextual time of s} and at(t,
P)|, which we abbreviate as “H”, of the proposition |the Bush@b is# student|, i.e.,
(2e) |H(the Bush@b is# student)|.
In turn, (2d) should be understood as equivalent to
(2f) there is a time t such that t is before {the contextual time of s} and at(t, |the
Bush@b is# president|).9
7.3 The Temporal Pronouns
Let us now turn to the temporal pronouns. We shall concentrate on the temporal
pronoun par excellence, namely, in English, “now”. By analogy with the principle
HRRC of Chapter 6 regarding |here|, it seems appropriate to assume the following:
NRC. Now: Reference Category. x is a now ↔ x is a time.
And it also seems that the analogy with |here| should continue in the following
sense. We saw in Chapter 6 that a singularly referring token of “here” always
refers to a place whose spatial extension depends on the context (e.g., it could be a
room or a city). Similarly, as is often urged, a singularly referring token of “now”
always refers to a time interval whose temporal extension depends on the context.
For instance, this point of view is supported by Napoli (1992, p. 414), by way of
contrasting these two sentences:
(1) Men spend a lot of money on cosmetics now.
(2) Time flies inexorably: now there are ten seconds to the end of the meeting, now
nine, now eight . . .
As Napoli tells us, the token of “now” involved in a typical context in which (1)
would be uttered refers to a lengthy period of time “with no precise limits”, as
9From a more formal point of view, (2e) and (2f) can be understood by analogy with the formal
treatment of (1e) and (1f) provided in note 7.
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he puts it, which however includes the time of utterance of the whole statement
(for present purposes we need not investigate how exactly the locution “with no
precise limits” should be understood). In contrast, each of the various tokens of
“now” involved in a typical context in which (2) would be uttered refers to the very
moment at which the token is uttered. For another example (adapted from Garcia-
Carpintero 1998, p. 532), contrast
(3) it is warmer now than it was in the 18th century
and
(4) it is warmer now than it was in the morning.
In a typical token of (3) the occurrence of “now” should be taken to refer to a lengthy
period of time, something like a century in extension, whereas, as regards (4), the
relevant occurrence of “now” picks up a much shorter interval, just a portion of a
single day. Finally, turn to
(5) the time at which the lecture starts is now.
Since the starting times of lectures are usually indicated by selecting a one-minute
long segment of a certain day (e.g., 11:30 a.m., April 23, 2008), the occurrence of
“now” in a typical token of (5) should be taken to refer to the minute (as conven-
tionally identified) that includes the moment at which the occurrence in question is
tokened.
In sum, it seems we should say, in the present perspective, that a token, n, of
“now”, used as an indexical, refers to a time, t1, with the feature of comprising
the contextual time, t2, of the token, where t1 can be characterized as more salient
than any other time, with the feature in question, in the interdoxastic domain of n.
Accordingly, I propose we assume that the indexical property |now| expressed by
“now” is characterized by the following PRAG principle:
NPP. Now: PRAG Principle. Suppose that n is an indexical token, with the
indexical property |now| as linguistic meaning, such that (i) |the now| is the
contextualized linguistic meaning of n; and (ii) the contextual complex for n
is primary. Then, it is the case that PRAG(n, |now|, |most salient among the
times in the interdoxastic domain of n which comprise the contextual time of
n|).10
10It might be doubted that this alleged analogy between “here” and “now” really holds, for perhaps
an indexically-used token of “now” can always be taken to refer to the contextual time of the token,
which typically coincides, as we saw in Chapter 2, with the moment at which the token is uttered.
For example, consider a context in which a group of people are discussing cultural changes that
started in the 1980s and that still affect us. This is a typical context in which (1) could be uttered,
a context with respect to which we may prima facie be inclined to think that the relevant token
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Let us focus on a token, s, of (5) to illustrate NPP. Imagine that Tom utters the
token, n, of “now” involved in s at a moment, t, occurring in the minute 11:30
a.m., April 23, 2008. Say, he does this in reply to Mary who had asked him about
the starting time of professor Wilson’s weekly lecture at Colby College. It can be
assumed that n refers to the minute 11:30 a.m., April 23, 2008. We want to verify
that the proposed approach is in line with this. In the light of INPB of Chapter 6, the
pragmatic meaning of n is |the now@n|. Hence, we want to verify that the property
|now@n| uniquely identifies the minute 11:30 a.m., April 23, 2008. We are dealing
with a standard case in which the contextual time of the uttered token coincides
with the very moment at which the token is uttered. Hence, the contextual time of
n is t itself. Moment t is comprised in various intervals which could be seen as
members of the interdoxastic domain of n, such as the year 2008, the day April 23,
2008, and the minute 11:30 a.m., April 23, 2008. Since in the context in question the
focus is on a lecture and lecture starting times are normally indicated by reference
to a certain minute of a day (rather than to a whole day, let alone a year), we can
say that the most salient time in the interdoxastic domain of n which comprises
the contextual time of n is precisely the minute 11:30 a.m., April 23, 2008. Hence,
this latter minute is identified by the property |most salient time in the interdoxastic
domain of n which comprises the contextual time of n|. By NPP and rule P5 of §
5.4, this property is equivalent to |now@n|. Hence the latter property also identifies
the minute in question, as desired.
Let us now consider the indexical properties |today|, |yesterday| and |tomorrow|.
To characterize them, it is convenient to first state these definitions:
TODAY.Df. x is a current day with respect to token y = Df there is a time, t,
such that y is a token with t as contextual time and x is a day comprising t.
YESTERDAY.Df. x is an immediately previous day with respect to token
y = Df there is a time, t, such that y is a token with t as contextual time and
there is a z such that z is a day comprising t and x is a day that immediately
precedes z.
of “now” refers to a long period starting in the 1980s and including the time of utterance. But on
second thoughts, we could say that the speaker is attributing to men, at the moment of the utterance
of the token of “now” (the contextual time of the token) a cosmetics-buying tendency. It could be
conversationally implicated that men did not have this tendency in some past period, and that they
will stop having it at some future moment and we might need contextual information to determine
(approximately) when this past period starts and when the future moment in question will arrive,
but this does not make the token of “now” a token that fails to refer to its contextual time at the
moment at which it is uttered. If so, one should say that the indexical property |now| expressed by
“now” is characterized, not by NPP, but rather by the following principle:
NPPV. Now: PRAG Principle (Variant). Suppose that n is an indexical token, with the index-
ical property |now| as linguistic meaning, such that (i) |the now| is the contextualized
linguistic meaning of n; and (ii) the contextual complex for n is primary. Then, it is the
case that PRAG(n, |now|, |contextual time of n|).
Of course, a descriptivist can fall back on NPPV, while retaining the essentials of CD, if desired.
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TOMORROW.Df. x is an immediately next day with respect to token y = Df
there is a time, t, such that y is a token with t as contextual time and there is a
z such that z is a day comprising t and x is a day that immediately follows z.
Next, we can assume the following principles regarding the reference category
for |today|, |yesterday| and |tomorrow|:
TDRC. ToDay: Reference Category. x is a today ↔ x is a day.
YSRC. YeSterday: Reference Category. x is a yesterday ↔ x is a day.
TMRC. ToMorrow: Reference Category. x is a tomorrow ↔ x is a day.
Further, as regards |today| we can propose the following PRAG principle:
TDPP. ToDay: PRAG principle. Suppose that t is an indexical token, with the
indexical property |today| as linguistic meaning, such that (i) |the today| is
the contextualized linguistic meaning of t, and (ii) the contextual complex
for n is primary. Then, it is the case that PRAG(t, |today|, |current day with
respect to t|).
Analogous principles for |yesterday| and |tomorrow| can be offered by appealing to
the properties |immediately previous day with respect to token t| and |immediately
next day with respect to token t|, where t is the token in question (by appropriately
relying on the definitions YESTERDAY.DF and TOMORROW.DF, just as TDPP
above relies on TODAY.DF).
7.4 The Relation on
It is worth having a look at how the temporal relation |on| works from the point of
view of CD. I mean the relation expressed by “on”, as it occurs in sentences such as
(1) Bush was jogging on April 23, 2006.
I shall focus on temporalist CD for the sake of illustration. Let us consider a state-
ment, s, of (1). We can take the relevant token of “April 23, 2006” to express a
descriptive content, |the D|, which uniquely determines a certain time. With this
in mind, and on the assumption that s is interpreted as a fixed time statement, the
pragmatic meaning of s is (in the light of FTPM) as follows:
(1a) on({the D}, past@s(the Bush@b is# jogging)),
where b is the relevant token of “Bush”.
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Upon reflection, it seems that the relation |on| in question obeys the following
principle:
ONMP. ON: Meaning Postulate. on({the F}, tense@s(P)) ↔ at({the F}, P) and
{the F} is tense-related to s),
where (i) |tense| could be |present|, |past| or |future|; (ii) s is a certain statement;
and (iii) “tense-related” could stand for “present-related”, “past-related” or “future-
related”, which express notions understood along the lines of PRR, PSR and FTR,
below. Things are of course more complicated because of the existence of tenses
other than the simple present, past and future, but for our illustrative purposes we
can neglect these complications here.11
PRR. PResent-Relatedness. {the F} is present-related to s iff there is exactly
one time t that exemplifies F and t is the contextual time of s or is comprised
in the contextual time of s.
PSR. PaSt-Relatedness. {the F} is past-related to s iff there is exactly one time
t that exemplifies F and t is before the contextual time of s.
FTR. FuTure-Relatedness. {the F} is future-related to s iff there is exactly one
time t that exemplifies F and t is after the contextual time of s.
In the light of this, we can see that the proposition (1a) is equivalent to:
(1b) There is exactly one time, t, with the property D and at(t, the Bush@b is#
jogging) and t is before the contextual time of s.12
Consider now a token, s, of
(2) Bush is jogging now.
By analogy with the previous example, we can take the pragmatic meaning to be
(2a) on({the now@n}, present@s(the Bush@b is# jogging),
where n and b are the relevant tokens of “now” and “Bush”. We can assume in this
case that the most salient time among those in the interdoxastic domain of n is the
contextual time of n. Hence, by virtue of NPP, Proposition (2a) is equivalent to
11To deal with such complications, something along the lines of Reichenbach’s (1947, § 51)
distinction of the points of speech, event and reference might prove appropriate.
12I trust that, by analogy with the discussion of previous examples in preceding notes, the interested
reader can provide a formal rendition, based on lambda abstracts, of (1a) and (2a) and of the related
propositions on which we focus in this section for illustration.
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(2b) There is exactly one time, t, with the property contextual time of n and t is the
contextual time of s or is comprised in the contextual time of s and at(t, the
Bush@b is# jogging).
It is worth noting that, similarly, a token, s, of the odd sentence
(3) Bush was jogging now
may be taken to express a proposition equivalent to
(3a) There is exactly one time t with the property contextual time of n & t is before
the contextual time of s and at(t, the Bush@b is# jogging),
where n and b are the tokens of “now” and “Bush” embedded in s. For (3a) to be
true the contextual time of n should come before the contextual time of the whole
statement, s, in which n is embedded. But clearly we should take the contextual time
of s to be the time, t1, at which s is uttered. Similarly, the contextual time of n is
the time, t2, at which n is uttered. And since t1 comprises t2, (3a) cannot be true.
As this example suggests, any statement of the form “a was F now” must express
a false proposition and this can be taken to explain why it sounds odd or ungram-
matical (something similar can of course be said for statements of the form “a will
be F now”).13 It seems to me that on a referentialist perspective, in which a token
of “now” directly refers to a certain time rather than expressing a descriptive con-
tent, an explanation of the oddness of these statements is harder to find. Similarly,
it is harder for the referentialist than it is for the descriptivist to explain why, e.g.,
it is odd to use a token of “she is nice” in pointing at a boy, given that for the for-
mer “she” is directly referential, whereas for the latter “she” expresses a descriptive
content. These considerations of course do not in themselves constitute a conclu-
sive argument against referentialism and I shall not further dwell on them in the
following. But certainly they are something the referentialist should take care of.
7.5 Quasi-indicators and the De Dicto/De Re Distinction
The main purpose of this section is to explain how quasi-indicators can be under-
stood from the point of view of CD, but in order to do this it will be necessary
to reconsider the well-known distinction between de dicto and de re attributions
13Even if we take the most salient time among those in the interdoxastic domain of n to be a time,
x, that properly comprises the contextual time of n, since this time x must comprise the contextual
time of n and the latter in turn must be comprised in the contextual time of s, it follows that time x
cannot precede the contextual time of s (for this can only be either comprised in x or overlapping
with x).
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of intentional contents. I shall focus on the special case of belief and the quasi-
indicators “he∗”, but I am confident that what I shall propose can be easily
generalized to all the relevant cases.
As I see it, there is a most basic believing relation, which connects a subject to a
proposition that the subject is entertaining with assent. For example, when someone
rehearses in her mind that 2+2=4 she is connected by this basic relation to the
proposition that 2+2=4. Let us say in this case that this person actively (de dicto)
believes that 2+2 = 4. It is worth noting that this is the notion involved in all the
examples that we discussed in Chapter 3 in relation to the co-reference problem.
Presupposing this basic concept of believing, we can define dispositional belief, by
appealing to a notion of dispositional (psychological) possibility relative to a given
subject x:
DB. Dispositional Belief. x dispositionally believes P if and only if it is
dispositionally possible (relative to x) that x actively believes P.
Roughly, that it is dispositionally possible for a certain subject, x, that x actively
believes P can be understood along the following lines: Given that x has a goal
that requires her to make up her mind as to whether P or its denial is the case,
x comes to actively believe P within the time bounds set by the goal in question.
To consider a simple example, if Tom would answer correctly, were he required
to say on a quiz show whether or not Rome is the capital of Italy, then it is dis-
positionally possible, relative to Tom, that Tom actively believes that Rome is the
capital of Italy (see Orilia 1994a for an account of dispositional belief along these
lines).
To capture the idea that we can attribute a de re belief to an agent, we should
admit that attributions of both active and dispositional beliefs can be, so to speak,
“adverbially modified” so as to transform them into attributions of de re beliefs.
This idea is conveyed by the biconditionals ADRB and DDRB below. To under-
stand them, note that I use “P(|the F|/|the G|)” to indicate the proposition which
is exactly like P except that, if |the F| occurs as constituent in P, then |the G|
replaces it. For example, if P is the proposition |the winged horse is white|, then
P(|the winged horse|/|the black stallion|) is the proposition |the black stallion is
white|.
ADRB. Active De Re Belief. x actively believes P de re with respect to |the F| if
and only if (i) P contains |the F| as constituent; (ii) there is exactly one entity,
y, which exemplifies F; and (iii) there is a property, G, such that y uniquely
exemplifies G and x actively believes P(|the F|/|the G|).
DDRB. Dispositional De Re Belief. x dispositionally believes P de re with
respect to |the F| if and only if (i) P contains |the F| as constituent; (ii) there
is exactly one entity, y, which exemplifies F; and (iii) it is dispositionally pos-
sible, relative to x, that there is a property G such that y uniquely exemplifies
G and x actively believes P(|the F|/|the G|).
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To illustrate ADRB, suppose that Tom is entertaining with assent the propo-
sition |the morning star appears in the morning|, so that he actively believes this
proposition. In this case, there is an object, y (i.e., Venus), that uniquely exempli-
fies |evening star|. Moreover, there is another property, |morning star|, such that (i)
y uniquely exemplifies |morning star|; and (ii) Tom actively believes |the morning
star appears in the morning|. Hence, Tom actively believes de re, with respect to
|the evening star|, the proposition |the evening star appears in the morning|. Note
that Tom is linked by this relation to the proposition in question, even though he
happens to be ignorant about astronomy and does not know that the morning star
and the evening star are one and the same. Analogously, as regards DDRB, suppose
that it is dispositionally possible, for Tom, that he actively believes the proposition
|the morning star appears in the morning|. In this case, the properties |morning star|
and |evening star| are such that: there is exactly one entity, y, (i.e., Venus) which
exemplifies |evening star| and it is dispositionally possible, relative to Tom, that
y uniquely exemplifies |morning star| and Tom actively believes |the morning star
appears in the morning|. Thus, Tom dispositionally believes de re with respect to
|the evening star| the proposition |the evening star appears in the morning|.
The idea that there is a quasi-indexical “he∗” is essentially the idea that attri-
butions of de re active or dispositional beliefs can be further embellished in such a
way that they are also, we may say, de se attributions (adapting David Lewis’ (1979)
well-known terminology):
ADSB. Active De Se Belief. x actively believes P de se with respect to |the
F| iff (i) P contains |the F| as constituent, (ii) x uniquely exemplifies F and
(iii) there is a token, i, such that x uniquely exemplifies |I@i| and x actively
believes P(|the F|/|the I@i|).14
DDSB. Dispositional De Se Belief. x dispositionally believes P de se with
respect to |the F| if and only if (i) P contains |the F| as constituent; (ii) x
uniquely exemplifies F; and (iii) it is dispositionally possible, relative to x,
that there is token, i, such that x uniquely exemplifies |I@i| and x actively
believes P(|the F|/|the I@i|).
As I see it, the notion of belief conveyed by the natural language expression
“believe” is a very generic one. It can be used to correctly attribute a proposition,
P, as belief to an agent, to the extent that the agent is linked to P by a more specific
notion of belief, e.g., one of the notions that we considered above.15 Thus, for exam-
ple, it may be correct to say that Tom believes that the evening star appears in the
14It is perhaps worth emphasizing that, although, given this definition, a de se belief requires the
presence of a linguistic token, it does not follow that a subject who is unable to speak cannot have
a de se belief, for the token in question may be an inner speech token.
15The notions of belief considered above are not exhaustive. Consider for instance this case (for
a discussion of a similar one, attributed to James Pryor, see Garcia-Carpintero 2008, p. 87). John
claims that all philosophers are smart and accordingly we attribute to him the belief that Putnam is
smart (although John is not very knowledgeable about philosophy and has never heard of Putnam).
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morning, because Tom actively (de dicto) believes that the evening star appears in
the morning. But it may also be correct, e.g., because Tom dispositionally believes
that the evening star appears in the morning in a de re fashion with respect to |the
evening star|. In the light of this, to say, for instance, that “he” is used as quasi-
indicator in a token, s, of “the editor of Soul believes that he is happy” is to say
something like: the proposition expressed by s is true, because the editor of Soul
believes the proposition |the editor of Soul is happy| in a de se way, with respect to
|the editor of Soul| (whether actively or dispositionally).
To illustrate, let us reconsider the totally amnesiac military hero Quintus, already
encountered in Chapter 4. Suppose that Quintus, before coming to learn his name
again, says to the nurse that he is confident that he will recover, because he is a
strong man. Accordingly, the nurse reports to the doctor about him as follows:
(1) Quintus believes that he is strong.
We can assume that the token of “he” uttered by the nurse has a secondary contextual
complex, so that it anaphorically traces back to the token of “Quintus”, q, occurring
in the nurse’s statement. Using “BEL” to indicate the most generic notion of belief
expressed by the English “believe”, the pragmatic meaning is as follows:
(1a) |BEL({the Quintus@q}, {the he & Quintus@q}is strong)|.
This proposition can be true only if there is a corresponding true proposition involv-
ing a more specialized notion of belief. In the case at hand, we may say that there is
such a proposition, namely:
(1b) BELd-de-se-with-respect-to-the-Quintus@q({the Quintus@q}, {the he &
Quintus@q}is strong),
where “BELd” stands for “dispositionally believes”. Proposition (1b) thus says that
the individual uniquely exemplified by |Quintus@q|, i.e., Quintus, believes disposi-
tionally, in a de se fashion, with respect to |the he & Quintus@q|, the proposition
|{the he & Quintus@q}is strong|. Since, roughly speaking, the second occurrence
of |the Quintus@q| is active in (1b), this proposition is equivalent to
(1c) there is exactly one entity, x, such that Quintus@q is uniquely exemplified by
x and BELd-de-se-with-respect-to-the-Quintus@q(x,{the he & Quintus@q}is
strong).
By DDSB, (1c) is equivalent to
There is a sense in which the attribution is correct, although the belief in question is not clas-
sifiable in any of the ways I have considered. For example, it is not de re with respect to |the
Putnam@p| (where p is a token of “Putnam”). Clearly, refinements are needed, but they need not
be our immediate concern.
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(1d) there is exactly one entity, x, such that Quintus@q is uniquely exemplified by
x and it is dispositionally possible, relative to x, that there is a token, i, such
that x uniquely exemplifies |I@i| and x actively believes {the I@i} is strong.
Under the imagined circumstances, this is a true proposition, and so we may say
that the nurse said something true. That the token of “he” used by the nurse is a
quasi-indicator essentially means, in this perspective, that propositions such as (1c)
and (1d) are involved, in the way we have illustrated, in the fact that the nurse’s
statement is true. Since (1c) and (1d) have the role in question, it is appropriate to
use Castañeda’s asterisk and say that the nurse’s statement is, as it were, a token of
(1e) Quintus believes that he∗ is strong.
7.6 Knowing Who the Referent Is
It is often claimed that in order to understand the proposition expressed by a state-
ment involving a singular term token, t, at least when t is a term that would be
considered as directly referential by a referentialist, one must be able to identify the
referent of t, or, as it is alternatively put, one must know who (or which individual)
the referent of t is. For example, Recanati (1993, p. 15) claims the following: “To
understand the utterance ‘Ralph Banilla is a midget’ involves knowing who Ralph
Banilla is, but to understand the sentence only involves knowing that the term is
referential, that there is an individual that must be identified for an utterance of this
sentence to be understood”.16 (Recanati is a referentialist and for him a “referential
term” is a directly referential term, i.e., in his view, a proper name, an indexical or
a referential description in Donnellan’s sense. Moreover, just as I have been doing
in this book, by “sentence” he means an expression type, to which we can assign a
linguistic meaning, but not a pragmatic meaning).
For generality’s sake, I shall use “wh-know” and similar expressions rather than
“know who”, “know which” and the like. To put it generally, we may then say
that Recanati’s Claim is the following: if a subject, X, is exposed to a statement,
s, involving a token, t, of a singular term that the referentialist would classify as
directly referential, then X grasps the meaning of s only if X wh-knows x qua m,
where m is the pragmatic meaning of t and m determines x (assuming referentialism,
m and x coincide; otherwise m is a descriptive content that determines x). We may
16Similarly, Neale (1990, p. 18) endorses a principle that he calls “(R1)” and that goes as follows:
“if ‘b’ is a genuine referring expression (singular term) [a proper name or indexical working as a
directly referential term], then for a (monadic) predicate ‘ _ is G’, it is necessary to identify the
referent of ‘b’ in order to understand the proposition expressed by an utterance u of ‘b is G’ ”.
Something along these lines is endorsed in Perry 2000, Jackson 1998 and, famously, in Evans
1982 under the name “Russell’s principle”. This name is still used in Garcia-Carpintero 2000,
where, however, Evans is criticized as regards this issue in a way which I find congenial, as will be
clear in a moment to a reader familiar with Garcia-Carpintero’s paper.
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find supporters of this point of view who are not referentialists; see, e.g., Brinck
1997 (p. 46, where the above passage by Recanati is quoted, and p. 171).
To bring my approach to sharper focus, it is important to realize that, according to
it, Recanati’s Claim is false. To see this, consider the following examples (involving
standard speakers of English). Tom overhears voices from a nearby street. Someone,
A, begs for mercy and someone else, B, replies with the words: “don’t expect any
mercy”, followed by a token of
(1) I am a cruel man.
The sound of a gun ensues and it is later discovered that B was killed. It seems to
me that, given Tom’s knowledge of English, we should say that he understands the
token of “I am a cruel man” in the sense that he grasps and entertains the proposition
it expresses. In fact, he even believes, we may assume, this proposition. According
to CD, the proposition in question is
(1a) |the I@i is a cruel man|,
where i is the token of “I” uttered by A. Yet, in a case like this, we tend to say that,
when Tom is exposed to A’s statement (wherein i is embedded), he does not wh-
know the referent of i as m, where m is the meaning of i (i.e., |the I@i|, according
to CD). In other words, we tend to say that Tom does not know who the referent
of i is. We tend to say so, because we can imagine, for example, that, were Tom
presented by the police with a picture of a suspect which happens to be a picture of
A, he could not answer “yes” to a question such as “is this the man you heard saying
‘I am a cruel man’ before hearing a gunshot?” Thus, according to Recanati’s claim,
we should say that Tom does not grasp (1a). Yet, I see no reason to say this.
For a further example, reconsider the case of the child lost in the woods who yells
to her mother (who is not seeing him):
(2) I am here.
It seems obvious to me that the mother grasps the proposition expressed by the
child’s statement. In fact, one may say, her believing this proposition has a causal
role in determining her action of walking toward the source of the sound. According
to CD, the proposition is
(2a) |the I@i is located in the here@h|,
where i and h are the tokens of “I” and “here”, respectively, uttered by the
child. This is a proposition which may well be grasped by both the mother and
the child. Given Recanati’s Claim, however, whether the two protagonists of this
little story actually grasp the proposition depends on whether they wh-know the
referent of i as m and the referent of h as m′, where m and m′ are the pragmatic mean-
ings of i and h. Recanati might perhaps say that the mother has this wh-knowledge
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relation to her child, but it is not clear to me what Recanati’s position would be
regarding the place referred to by h. I suspect, however, that he would deny that
the mother has the required wh-knowledge relation to the place, given, as we may
assume, that the mother has never been there, does not know what it looks like, etc.
Similarly, Recanati might perhaps say that the child has wh-knowledge of himself,
but can hardly say that he has wh-knowledge of the place, since he is lost in the
woods.
In sum, either CD or Recanati’s Claim is wrong. To see how things stand, we
must agree on a reasonable account of what it is for someone to have wh-knowledge
of x qua m, where m is a possible pragmatic meaning of a singular term token that
determines x. It seems to me that whether X wh-know x qua m depends on a goal
or interest that we have in mind or that we attribute to X. Roughly speaking, given a
goal, it is as if we could assign degrees of wh-knowledge. The degree is higher to the
extent that there are propositions, known by X17 and involving m as constituent, the
knowledge of which can have a positive role in fulfilling the goal in question; con-
versely, the degree is lower to the extent that there are false propositions, believed
by X and involving m as constituent, such that believing these propositions can hin-
der the realization of the goal. When the degree is sufficiently high, X wh-knows
x qua m, relative to the goal in question. In contrast, when the degree is below a
certain threshold (because of the negative role played by the false beliefs), it may
be appropriate to say, not only that X does not wh-knows x qua m, but even that
X misidentifies x qua m, relative to the presupposed goal. Let us clarify this, by
reconsidering the above examples.18
Consider again the case of Tom’s hearing a killer who utters (1). Here we may
presuppose the goal of convicting the killer. Tom might have helped in this, let us
assume, only if, while hearing the killer’s voice, he had seen the killer (the voice
17For present purposes, we need not agree on a definite account of what knowledge precisely
amounts to. Roughly speaking, we can say, as is often done, that X knows proposition P when P is
true, X justifiedly believes P, and whatever requirements needed to take care of “Gettier cases” are
fulfilled.
18In following this picture, I am accepting the widespread view that wh-knowledge is relative to
a goal or to an identification standard (see, e.g., Loar 1976, p. 363 and Boër and Lycan 1986),
which I have already adopted in Orilia 1994. See references therein and in Braun 2006 for other
proponents of this stance (in various guises). Braun 2006 argues against this view, proposing an
account according to which a subject, S, can be said to know, in an absolute sense, who a certain
individual, x, is, to the extent that S is able to answer correctly a question about x, even though
the answer does not satisfy the inquirer. In Braun’s view, it is a rather trivial matter to be in the
wh-knowledge relation to something (as he puts at p. 24, “Getting to know who a person is may
be easier than you think”). Indeed so trivial that someone could have a lot of false beliefs about
an individual, x, and still be said to have wh-knowledge of x. Consider someone who, upon being
questioned, correctly answers that Einstein is a physicist. By Braun’s standards, he knows who
Einstein is in spite of the fact that he may believe that Einstein was Indian, that Einstein considered
Newtonian physics to be fully correct, etc., etc. Thus, I am not convinced by Braun. In any case, it
is interesting here to see that Recanati’s Claim is false from a standpoint that makes wh-knowledge
more difficult to achieve than Braun is disposed to admit. And thus for present purposes we may
well stick to the view that takes wh-knowledge to be goal-relative.
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was not, we may assume, distinctive enough for Tom to associate it with a specific
subject). In that case, he would have come to know a proposition such as |the I@i is
the individual presented by v|, where i is the killer’s token of i and v a certain visual
image of the killer that occurs in Tom’s mind, thereby presenting the killer to him
(see the discussion in Gestaltist terms of mental images and presentation, below).
In other words, he would have known a proposition involving the meaning of i as
constituent, namely |the I@i|, on the basis of which we could have said that Tom
wh-knows A (the killer) as |the I@i|, for the knowledge of this proposition would
have helped in pursuing the killer (it would have played a causal role in enabling
Tom to correctly select a picture shown to him by the police as a picture of the
killer). But since this is not the case, Tom does not have wh-knowledge of A as
|I@i| (he does not know who A is). Note that Tom may very well know propositions
involving |I@i| as constituent, e.g. the propositions |the I@i is an utterer of i| or |the
I@i is an utterer of s|, where s is the whole statement uttered by the killer that Tom
hears. But knowledge of these propositions is irrelevant for the goal of convicting
the criminal.
Consider now a variation on the theme of the above story. After the gunshot, Tom
sees a man, C, running away and clearly sees C’s face. He becomes so convinced
that this man is the killer that he claims to the police that he actually saw the scene
of the crime and the killer’s face. When a policeman shows a picture of C to Tom
and asks him: “Is this the killer?”, he answers: “Yes”. Accordingly, the police arrests
C. But, unfortunately, the killer is not C, but A. In this case, we should say not only
that Tom does not know who the killer is, but even that he misidentified the killer.
On my approach, the pragmatic meaning of the token of “the killer”, k, uttered by
the policeman is |the killer@k| and thus we should say, more precisely, that Tom
misidentified A qua |the killer@k|, with respect to the goal of convicting the killer.
For the fulfilment of the goal is hindered by Tom’s false belief that, as we may put
it, |the killer@k| determines the individual of whom he saw a picture.
Turning now to the case of the mother who is looking for her child lost in the
woods, we may presuppose the mother’s goal of finding the child. With this in mind,
we may say that the mother wh-knows the referent of i qua |the I@i| and the referent
of h qua |the here@h| [i and h are the tokens of “I” and “here” uttered by the child
when he yells (2)]. In other words, she knows both who the referent of i is, her child,
and which place the referent of h is, the place where her child is. For the mother
knows, we may assume, propositions that we could roughly represent as follows:
|the I@i is my son|, |the here@h is the place where my son is|, |the here@h is the
place where the sound of my son’s voice that I just heard comes from|. And knowing
these propositions is relevant for the mother’s goal of finding the child.
7.7 Phenomenal Entities and Thinking Individuation
There is a problem that Castañeda (1983, p. 24) and more recently Kapitan (1999,
2001, 2006) have raised, which I would call the problem of pre-linguistic identifi-
cation. We are interested in it here inasmuch as it appears to affect token-reflexive
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approaches to the meaning of indexicals such as Reichenbach’s and my own CD.
According to Reichenbach, the meaning expressed by an indexical statement, s(i),
containing the indexical token i, is a proposition containing i as constituent. For
example, if Tom utters “I am happy”, the proposition expressed is something like
|the utterer of i is happy|, where i is the token of “I” uttered by Tom. Similarly, if
Tom says “this is a chair”, the meaning is |the object demonstrated by the utterer
of t is a chair|, where t is the token of “this” uttered by Tom. As should be clear by
this point, in my approach the meanings are |the I@i is happy| and |the this@t is a
chair|. The problem is the following.
In a typical case in which a speaker utters an indexical sentence and thereby
attributes a property F to an indexically referred item which is somehow cur-
rently perceived (the properties are being happy or being a chair in our exam-
ples), she wants to refer by means of the indexical in the sentence to the
item and verbally classify it as F, after she has already somehow identified it
and classified it as F in his mind, so to speak. This identification and clas-
sification cannot have been achieved by virtue of the indexical token, for it
has taken place before the token comes into existence by being uttered by the
speaker. For example, suppose that Mary says “be careful”, and continues by
uttering
(1) this is a snake,
because she wants to inform Tom of a certain dangerous presence. In order to do
this, we might surmise, she must have identified the object referred to by her “this”
token and must have classified it as a snake, before uttering the token. Hence, she
has not identified the object by using an indexical that singularly refers to it, but in
some other way. According to Kapitan (2006, §3), this problem shows that indexical
types are systematically ambiguous in that they have (adapting his terminology) an
executive meaning, which guides the uttering by the speaker of the corresponding
tokens and an interpretative meaning that guides the interpretation by the hearer of
such tokens. Correspondingly, as I understand Kapitan, an indexical token has two
(truth-functionally equivalent and “coordinated”, but distinct) pragmatic meanings,
an executive and an interpretative one.
It seems to me that this Kapitan’s Ambiguity Thesis, as we may call it, need
not be accepted, but I shall come back to this point below. Certainly, however, the
problem indicates that a token-reflexive account of the meaning of indexicals must
be complemented with an account of the pre-linguistic identification of the rele-
vant items, which precedes their being indexically referred to by means of indexical
tokens. The best way to address this issue is, I believe, by appealing to how items
in external reality are presented to our minds. We thus need a little detour into this
topic.
In the above example, we may hypothesize that a “snake-like image” occurs
in Mary’s visual field, which presents a snake to her, as a result of her seeing
the snake. In the terminology of Gestalt psychologists, the image in question is
a specific gestalt, a visual one in this case, a phenomenal object which occurs
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along with many other phenomenal entities in a mind, more precisely, we may
say, in the field of consciousness (or phenomenal field) of a (conscious) subject,
namely, in this case, Mary. What occurs in the field of consciousness of a subject
is what she (directly) experiences, what she is acquainted with, what is consciously
before, or in, her mind. The (subjective) field of consciousness of a given subject,
S, should be distinguished from (objective) external reality, in which S is physically
located. In the terminology of the Gestalt psychologist Koffka (1999), the distinc-
tion is conveyed with the following terminology: there is the behavioural world
on the one hand and the geographical world on the other hand.19 Phenomenal
objects occur in a field of consciousness as endowed with qualities and (typ-
ically) as linked to other phenomenal objects by connections. In our example,
there is a gestalt endowed with a quality (or collection thereof) that makes it
“snake-like”.
To further illustrate, we could think of a gestalt with a specific shade of “phenom-
enal red”, a quality we might experience by looking at a red tomato under standard
lighting conditions;20 or we could think of two gestalts linked by a connection char-
acterizable, e.g., as “phenomenal being on”, a being on that we experience when we
see, say, a vase on a table. When an object is endowed with (exemplifies) a quality, or
when objects are linked by a connection, there are states of affairs.21 It so happens
then that qualities, connections and state of affairs (type II PRPs) also occur in a
phenomenal field. We may collectively call phenomenal entities the objects and the
type II PRPs that occur in a phenomenal field. Since the phenomenal states of affairs
in question involve qualities and connections rather than concepts, and yet occur in
a mind, they can be characterized as “non-conceptual contents” or “proto-beliefs”
(Bermudez 1998, p. 118).
Phenomenal qualities and connections, qua universals, can be taken to occur in
different fields of consciousness at the same time. But we have to account for the
intuition that different people, even twins in qualitatively identical mental states
like Kaplan’s Castor and Pollux, have numerically different fields of consciousness.
This suggests that phenomenal objects should be viewed as mind-dependent private
19Actually, Koffka’s behavioural world includes not only what I have called the phenomenal field,
the items of which the subject is conscious of, but also other mental items that play some role in
the subject’s behaviour but of which the subject is not conscious. In the terminology of Chalmers
1996, we may say that the subject is aware of them, but not conscious of them. At any rate, we can
neglect this point for present purposes.
20Note that a “tomato-like” gestalt is not red or a “snake-like” gestalt is not “snake-like” in the
sense in which an external physical object may be red or “snake-like”. To say otherwise would be
akin to committing the so-called sense-datum fallacy (see, e.g., Chisholm 1969, p. 101).
21Perhaps in some cases it may be more appropriate to speak of events rather than of states of
affairs, but for simplicity’s sake I use “state of affairs” as a catch-all term for states of affairs and
events.
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particulars,22 which cannot occur in the fields of consciousness of two different sub-
jects at the same time.23 Similarly, assuming something like Armstrong’s doctrine
of the “victory of particularity” (1978, vol. I, p. 115), according to which states
of affairs involving particulars are themselves particulars, the phenomenal states of
affairs involving such private objects should be viewed as (mind-dependent, private)
particulars.
As noted in the example of Mary’s seeing a snake, a phenomenal object can
present an item in external reality, such as an ordinary object. Indeed, this is the
typical case, which occurs to the extent that the subject is perceiving veridically. For
another example, consider the visual image, v, that occurs in Fred’s phenomenal
field as a result of the fact that Fred is observing the Mona Lisa at the Louvre.
Fred’s visual image v is then a gestalt that presents Leonardo’s Mona Lisa.24 It
should be noted however that a phenomenal object may also be the result of dreams,
hallucinations or the like, in which case it presents nothing, although of course the
subject who experiences it may think otherwise. But what does it mean to say that a
phenomenal object, p, presents an item in external reality, e? From the perspective
of naive realism, this may be taken to mean that p is identical to e. Although, as we
shall see, it may be true in one specific case that presentation coincides with identity,
this is not in general true, for well-known reasons. For example, even granted that
a visual perception is veridical, it discloses at most part of the perceived object and
not the whole of it (the backside and the interior remain hidden). Thus, in a typical
22The existence of these particulars depends on a certain mind’s being in a certain conscious state
at a given time. This is compatible with their being material (neurophysiological) entities existing
in objective external reality from the point of view of other minds. Despite this, many philoso-
phers have reservations about admitting mental entities such as those I have taken for granted
here. According to Crane’s (2005) recent overview on perception, there are at least three current
approaches that try to do without them, namely disjunctivism, intentionalism and adverbialism.
Supporters of these views are likely to object to my account of phenomenal fields and their occu-
pants by saying that I “reify” them excessively. I can see the appeals that these alternative options
may have and well-argued defences of them can undoubtedly be found (see, e.g., Pendlebury’s
account of adverbialism in his 1998). Despite this, it seems to me that the best option is still to take
the phenomenal evidence at face value and grant the existence of mental particulars. Be that as it
may, this is a side issue for the main purposes of this book. Presumably, my way of speaking in
terms of mental particulars, phenomenal entities and the like can be “translated” into adverbialist,
disjunctivist or intentionalist talk, so as to offer an account equivalent to my own of the problem of
pre-linguistic identification (and related issues to be seen below), which is my main concern here.
23Of course, this is not an official part of Gestalt psychology, but simply my personal view. There
are other ways to account for the intuition in question, but I have tried to argue elsewhere that this
is the best one (see Orilia 2009).
24Phenomenal objects need not be (simply) visual as in these examples. They may be tactual
“images” resulting from the grabbing of an object, acoustic “images” caused by the perception of
a sound, the integration of tactual and visual images resulting from grabbing an object that we also
see, etc.
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case, when p presents e, p is an entity distinct from e, but somehow capable of
re-presenting e, whatever this precisely means.25
The presence of phenomenal entities in a field of consciousness allows for what
Castañeda calls thinking reference (1977, 1981, 1989; see also Kapitan 1999). This
is, as I see it, the phenomenon of focusing on one or more items present in one’s field
of consciousness, for the purpose of entertaining a proposition that has such items as
constituents. This does not require (singular, indexical) terms which (directly) refer
to the items in question. Accordingly, I would like to avoid the term “reference”
to talk about it. In fact, following standard practice, I use this word in this work
primarily to indicate a relation between a linguistic item and a corresponding refer-
ent. Perhaps the best term is thinking individuation. It should be noted that, given
the above-mentioned privacy of phenomenal particulars, the propositions involv-
ing them as constituents, grasped by recourse to thinking individuation, should be
regarded as similarly private.26 In other words, they can be entertained only by the
subject who has such particulars in her field of consciousness.
For example, suppose that the “snake-looking” gestalt s is what presents a snake
to Mary. Then, by thinking individuation, she can focus on s and entertain a propo-
sition that somehow asserts that s presents an external object that is a snake. In other
words, she entertains a proposition that we may represent as follows:
(1a) |s reveals snake(-hood)|.
25We leave it open here whether, when p re-presents e, p is an entity wholly distinct from e, as
in causal/representationalist theories of perception, or is somehow partially identical to e, as in
realist theories of perception. It is clear that the relation of presentation, which in turn, as we
have seen, might be taken to involve that of re-presentation, is a concept fit for philosophical
analysis and empirical investigation. For example, a philosopher might try to analyze it in terms of
causality and say that a phenomenal object, p, presents an external object, e, only if e is causally
responsible for the presence of p in the phenomenal field of the thinking subject in question. To a
philosopher of realist orientation, that a mental particular, g, presents an item, x, may mean that g
is identical to x, or at least to a part of it (B. Smith 1988). And empirical investigation may reveal
that presentation requires the presence of such and such neurophysiological properties in the brain
of the thinking subject. But all these issues are irrelevant for us. Independently of them, it can be
assumed that the notion of presentation is a concept that can be possessed and tacitly exercised
(i.e., not in a conscious way) by subjects who possibly are totally unaware of such complicated
philosophical and scientific issues. Essentially, that one masters this concept is shown simply by
one’s awareness of the distinction between veridical perception on the one hand and dreams and
hallucinations on the other hand. Similarly, someone can possess and exercise the notion of circle
(e.g., by telling circles from squares and by drawing circles with compasses) without knowing that
it can be analysed as: surface bounded by a locus of points equidistant from a certain point.
26These private propositions are thus not expressible in natural language, understood as a tool for
communication, although presumably nothing prevents us from using in inner speech linguistic
tokens in a non-standard way so as to label these private entities (in a directly referential way).
The linguistic tokens may well be tokens of indexicals. But indexicals, when standardly used, are,
like other words, tools of communication (possibly with oneself in inner speech). Hence, in my
view, they must contribute to express propositions which are “official” (intersubjective) meanings
of sentence tokens, rather than private propositions involving phenomenal items as constituents.
See Orilia 2007a for more details on this.
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This is a proposition that we take to be equivalent to
(1b) |there exists exactly one object, x, such that s presents x & x is a snake|.
We can assume that, in experiencing s, Mary also experiences a state of affairs
involving s as exemplifying a specific way of looking snake-like: snake-like-s. We
may depict this state of affairs as follows:
(1c) ∗s is snake-like-s∗.
However, the existence of (1c) does not guarantee the truth of (1a), since, e.g., s
may result from a hallucination or from what happens to be a toy snake. Proposition
(1a) is true only if the presence of s in Mary’s field of consciousness is due to the
existence of a real snake, x, in the external environment. In other words, the truth
of (1a) depends on the existence of an appropriate state of affairs in the external
environment, ∗x is a snake∗, as (1b) makes it clear. However, Mary can relate to s
in an epistemologically more modest way. She can focus on s so as to entertain a
proposition that links s to the concept |snake|, not by means of the concept |reveals|
(somehow expressible by “is really” or the like), but by means of another relational
concept, the concept |exhibits| (somehow expressible by appealing to verbs such as
“to seem”, “to look like” or “to appear”):
(1d) |s exhibits snake(-hood)|.27
This is now a proposition made true by the phenomenal state of affairs (1c).
Let us finally go back to the problem of pre-linguistic identification. I submit
that thinking individuation can be appealed to in order to address this issue. Let
us see how, reconsidering the example based on (1). Before Mary utters (1), she
can be assumed to have identified the snake in that she has a visual gestalt, s, as
of a snake, which happens to present the snake in question. More specifically, by
thinking individuation, she can then be taken to entertain (tacitly) a proposition such
as (1a). In view of what we said above, this is a private proposition, which only
Mary can entertain. But Mary can be assumed to have a desire to share with John
27Roughly, we may think of |exhibits| as a mechanism that, given a concept such as |snake| and a
phenomenal item such as s, checks whether or not s has phenomenal properties typically generated
in the field of consciousness of a human observer by the presence of a snake in her vicinity. We
may assume that s, by virtue of exemplifying being snake-like-s, counts has having such phenom-
enal properties. What we strictly speaking express by a verb such as “seem” is closely related to
|exhibits|, but is not quite the same thing. As I see it, in general, a proposition of the form |x seems
(to be) F| is true just in case there is a property that x exemplifies and that is typically exemplified
by an object that exemplifies F. For example, a cat seems a tiger insofar as it exemplifies the prop-
erty of being striped, which is typically exemplified by tigers. An item presented by a phenomenal
object, g, such that |g exhibits F| can be said to be an item that seems to be F, inasmuch as the item
in question has a specific property typically exemplified by an object which exemplifies F. This is
the property of being presented by a phenomenal object that exhibits F.
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an extensionally equivalent belief. Hence, the private belief (1a) has a causal role
in the uttering of her token of (1), which expresses a proposition that both she and
Tom can entertain and believe, namely, according to CD,
(1e) |the this@t is a snake|,
where t is the relevant token of “this”.
We could adjoin this approach to Kapitan’s Ambiguity Thesis. We could urge,
e.g., that the proposition (1a) entertained by Mary constitutes the executive mean-
ing of her token of (1), whereas the token-reflexive (1e) constitutes the interpretative
meaning of this very same token, which would then be ambiguous. In parallel, we
should add that (i) there is an interpretative meaning of the linguistic type “this”
(say, the one illustrated in the previous chapter), capable of guiding the association
of Mary’s token with the meaning (1e) entertained by the hearer Tom; and (ii) there
is an executive meaning of the indexical “this”, capable of guiding the association
of the token with the meaning (1a) entertained by the speaker Mary. But it seems to
me that this is not necessary and avoiding it has the advantage of not multiplying
meanings and of not complicating the theory of indexicals expounded in the previ-
ous chapters. We can simply say that, given her tacit knowledge of the context and
the linguistic meaning of “this”, and more generally of (1), Mary can plan to utter
a token with a meaning truth-functionally equivalent to the proposition (1a), which
she cannot communicate because of its private nature. There is a drawback, it must
be admitted, namely, that we must abandon the idea that (in all cases) the propo-
sition expressed by a statement is a proposition entertained by the speaker before
uttering the statement. For in a token-reflexive approach the proposition may fail to
exist before the statement is uttered. But when this is the case, as I have illustrated,
the speaker may well have in her mind an equivalent proposition.28
7.8 Self-Consciousness and Self-Knowledge
The phenomenal states of affairs that we discussed in the previous sections, such as
the one involving a certain “snake-like” gestalt, are somehow experienced as “exter-
nal”, as if they belonged in objective reality. But in a field of consciousness there
may occur states of affairs of a quite different nature. They can be described as “my
feeling of pain”, “my being in state of anxiety”, “my seeing red”, etc. To the “my”
in question there does not correspond a gestalt in the sense in which we can experi-
ence a gestalt as of an external ordinary object. This is connected to the following:
Gestalt psychology teaches us that the total phenomenal field of a thinking subject
28It should be noted that this consequence need not be drawn by an anti-presentist who believes
that a token-reflexive proposition exists even before its being uttered, although as containing a
future token; such an anti-presentist might perhaps urge that this proposition is entertained by the
speaker before he expresses it by a statement containing the token in question.
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can be “bipolar” (Koffka 1999, Chapter 8; Galli 1991, p. 55), i.e., in some way struc-
tured as having two “sides”, an “objective” one and a “subjective” one. The former
contains all the phenomenal “objectual” gestalts that in veridical perception present
to the subject external ordinary objects (or, more generally, that are experienced
as if they belonged in external reality, whether or not they in fact present external
objects). The latter, taken as a whole, may be called phenomenal ego or phenomenal
self (see also Metzinger 2003, p. 64, etc.).29 It can be seen as the “bearer” of phe-
nomenal qualities characterizable as proprioceptive feelings, pains, pleasures and
the like (where “bearer” needs to be elucidated).30 Although in our normal wak-
ing life our phenomenal field is typically bipolar, it seems we may have “egoless”
experiences, i.e., a phenomenal field without a phenomenal ego (cf. Koffka 1999,
Chapter 8, in particular the story of the mountain climber Eugen Guido Lammer).
If this is so, we may say that we are self-conscious only when a phenomenal ego is
in our phenomenal field. In any case, it seems clear to me that the typical case of a
bipolar phenomenal field testifies against Hume’s claim that we do not experience
any “idea of the self”.
The phenomenal ego is a particular that in its own peculiar way occurs in a
thinking subject’s phenomenal field. But is this particular analogous to an objec-
tual gestalt in the sense that it presents a subject, X, to herself just as an objectual
gestalt presents to X, in veridical perception, an ordinary object in the external envi-
ronment? In other words, is X’s phenomenal ego an entity different from X, but
capable of re-presenting X to X, just like the snake-looking gestalt of the previ-
ous section, s, is an entity different from a snake in the external environment, but
capable of representing the snake to the subject who experiences s? Or is the phe-
nomenal ego nothing but X herself, just as the snake-gestalt would be the snake
itself if “naive realism” were true? (to provide an answer amounts to clarifying the
notion of “bearer” employed above).31 To prefer the first horn of the dilemma would
be to embrace a Kantian perspective, according to which the phenomenal ego is a
29As I see it, the bipolarity of a phenomenal field is what leads Bermudez 1998 to propose that
some non-conceptual contents are “first-person” (p. 118). Bermudez bases on them his defence of
the thesis that self-consciousness does not require language. My phenomenal states of affairs with
a phenomenal ego as constituent, to be discussed below, can be taken to play a similar theoretical
role (see Orilia 2007).
30It is worth noting that among such qualities we may find a feeling such as that of a certain inner
speech token’s being uttered (say, a token of “I am thinking”); in peculiar cases, there may be very
few if any proprioceptive feelings of which a phenomenal ego is a bearer, but there may still be a
feeling of that kind. It might be so, e.g., in the case of Sacks’s (1970, Chapter 3) “disembodied lady”
or in the one imagined by Elizabeth Anscombe, in which she is in a state of “sensory deprivation”
(1981, p. 31).
31I am suggesting here that we can conceive of two ways in which it can be true that a phenomenal
particular, p, presents an item x. The first way is realized when x is an entity distinct from p but
in some appropriate sense is re-presented by p. The second way is realized when x is identical to
p. According to naive realism, a phenomenal particular is always identical to the item (in external
reality) that it presents, in line with the second way in question. What we are considering here is
whether this second way is realized in the special case in which the phenomenal particular is a
phenomenal ego.
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mere phenomenon, a representation and not an item in objective reality. Castañeda
1989 follows this line in considering the phenomenal self an “I-guise”. And recently
Metzinger 2003 has defended this view from within a rich interdisciplinary approach
that draws on cognitive psychology and neurophysiology. If we choose the second
horn of the dilemma, we embrace a more Cartesian perspective according to which
we can be acquainted with ourselves, a perspective found in Russell (1910–1911,
1912) and more recently in Chisholm 1969.
In an attempt to choose among these alternatives, let us focus on a specific sub-
ject, Tom, who is assumed to have in his phenomenal field a state of being in pain,
p-t. If e is Tom’s phenomenal ego, we can more perspicuously depict p-t, along
the lines of (1c) of the previous section, as a state of affairs that involves e as con-
stituent just as (1c) involves the snake-looking gestalt s. Moreover, we can depict p-t
as involving as constituent a specific pain quality, ∗in-pain-t∗, just like (1c) involves
the specific quality ∗snake-like-s∗. In sum, p-t is:
(1) ∗e is in-pain-t∗.
Now the question is: is this e which occurs in (1) an item different from Tom, but
capable of re-presenting Tom? It seems to me that the answer is in the negative and
we should rather say that e is identical to Tom. For, by hypothesis, it is the very
subject in whose field of consciousness (1) occurs who is in pain, i.e., Tom, and not
an item that merely represents Tom.
In other words, e cannot be just a gestalt that presents Tom to himself just as the
snake-looking gestalt s in the objective side of Mary’s phenomenal field presents
to Mary a snake in the external environment. For e occurs in the state of affairs as
exemplifying ∗in-pain-t∗, a property that can be exemplified by a sentient being and
not merely by a gestalt occurring in a sentient being. Accordingly, in order to let us
know that a state of affairs such as (1) is occurring, Tom could use equivalently the
following sentences:
(2) I am in pain,
(2a) I feel pain,
(2b) I seem to be in pain.
Now, if e is not a gestalt representing a sentient being, but it is a sentient being,
which sentient being is it? The obvious candidate of course is Tom himself. As
Chisholm (1969, p. 105) puts it: “in being aware of ourselves as experiencing, we
are, ipso facto, aware of the self or person – of the self or person as being affected
in a certain way”. In other words, according to Chisholm, the mere fact that we
directly experience, e.g., states of pain, shows that we also experience, contra Hume,
ourselves, for we ourselves and nothing else, beside the pain, are the constituents of
such states of affairs, we who undergo the pain.
Be that as it may, a subject can, by thinking individuation, focus on her phenome-
nal self and entertain a proposition with such a self as constituent. With reference to
the above-mentioned problem of pre-linguistic identification, we can then propose
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that a subject may well pre-linguistically identify herself (before uttering a first-
person pronoun that refers to her) in the sense that she can entertain a proposition
with her phenomenal ego as constituent. For example, on the assumption that e is
Tom’s phenomenal ego, Tom can entertain the proposition
(1a) |e exhibits pain|,
a proposition made true by the state of affairs (1) just as, with reference to the
previous section, (1d) is made true by (1c).32
The recourse to thinking individuation in relation to a phenomenal self may clar-
ify why one may be inclined to say that someone, X, who consciously uses a token,
i, of a first-person pronoun (e.g., to communicate that she is happy) knows who the
referent of i is, whereas someone else, Y, who hears i may not know who the ref-
erent is (see, e.g., Anscombe 1981, Evans 1982, Cassam 1994, Brinck 1997). The
idea is this. X can be assumed to have a phenomenal ego, e, in her phenomenal field.
Accordingly, she can be assumed to know a proposition such as
(3) |{the I@i} is identical to e|,33
where e and X are one and the same [if I am not correct about the special status of
the phenomenal self, the known proposition would be|{the I@i} is {the individual
presented by e}|, rather than (3)].34
32If what I have ventured to say above about the special status of phenomenal egos (as opposed
to other phenomenal particulars) is correct, proposition (1a) must be considered equivalent to |e
reveals pain|.
33Proposition (3) should be understood as equivalent to ∃1x(I@i(x) & x = e).
34According to Anscombe 1981, “I” is not a referring expression, since it is implausible to suppose
that there is a referent of which one can unfailingly have wh-knowledge – it would have to be a
Cartesian self. By arguing in this way, Anscombe generalizes a thesis found in Wittgenstein’s Blue
Book, the thesis that “I” is non-referring when used to self-ascribe phenomenal properties, as when
one uses a sentence such as (2) or (2a). According to Shoemaker 1968, Wittgenstein arrives at
this view by reflecting on a certain phenomenon, namely that sincere self-ascriptions of this kind
are, in Shoemaker’s terminology, “immune to error through misidentification” (in short, “IEM”).
Roughly, a belief is subject to an error of misidentification when one arrives to it on the basis of a
correct belief of the form |a is F| and an incorrect “identification” belief of the form |a is b|. For
example, if Tom believes |my aunt is wearing a red hat|, on the basis of the correct belief |that
woman is wearing a red hat| and the incorrect identification belief |that woman is my aunt|, then
Tom has a belief, |my aunt is wearing a red hat|, which is subject to an error of misidentification.
Shoemaker then argues that the phenomenon in question must be explained, at least in part, by
recourse to the fact that no identification belief is involved when one claims something like “I feel
pain”. In my opinion, however, an identification belief is involved, at least to the extent that the
statement involving the “I” token is taken to express a proposition that can be intersubjectively
grasped. Suppose, e.g., that Tom sincerely utters (2), as a result of the fact that the state of affairs
(1) occurs in his phenomenal field, so that he accordingly has the belief (1a). The idea is that Tom’s
token of (2) expresses the belief |{the I@i} exhibits pain|, derived (unconsciously) from (1a) and
the identification belief (3). However, the expressed belief is IEM, because the identification belief
cannot be wrong. Of course, the belief (1a) is not based on an identification belief and thus is IEM
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Whenever one uses “I” in the way X does, an implicit knowledge of a proposi-
tion along these lines can be considered as fundamental in one’s primary goal of
orienting oneself, in a most general sense, in the world; for this proposition “links”,
we may say, one’s “I” token to one’s phenomenal self, rather than to a gestalt that
presents some other person, say an interlocutor. On this basis, it seems appropriate
to say that X wh-knows X qua |the I@i| (by presupposing a primary goal, g, of the
kind that I have just mentioned), i.e., that X knows who the referent of the “I” token,
i, is (or by using Castañeda’s asterisk notation, that X knows who she∗ is), relative
to goal g. This is so, regardless of the fact that (i) X may know few if any other
propositions involving |the I@i| as constituent (perhaps she is totally amnesiac like
the military hero Quintus); and (ii) X may have many false beliefs involving |the
I@i| as constituent (perhaps she wrongly believes the proposition |the I@i is the
tallest woman on earth| (i.e., X wrongly believes that she∗ is the tallest woman on
earth). For we should admit that (i) and (ii) are irrelevant for the primary goal g.
(Of course (i) and (ii) may be relevant from the point of view of other goals and
thus the fact that X has wh-knowledge of X qua |the I@i| with respect to the pri-
mary goal g does not rule out that she may fail to have wh-knowledge of X qua
|the I@i| with respect to some other goal; this reflects the intuition, defended, e.g.,
by Strawson (1994, p. 210), according to which one can refer to oneself by using
“I” without any wh-knowledge of oneself). In contrast, the interlocutor, Y, cannot
know the proposition |the I@i is the individual presented by e|, for he does not have
access to X’s phenomenal ego e and thus we cannot say that he wh-knows X qua
|the I@i|, relative to goal g. Moreover, Y may well have many false beliefs such as
|the I@i is the tallest woman on earth| (he believes that the woman who uttered the
“I” token i is the tallest woman on earth). As a result, it may be appropriate to say
(presupposing some goal other than g) that Y not only fails to have a wh-knowledge
of X qua |the I@i| (he does not know who she is, who the referent of i is), but even
that he misidentifies X qua |the I@i|.
7.9 Extra-Meanings
CD, as presented so far, cannot do justice to two intuitions which may be considered
important. The first one underlies the temptation to claim that two co-referentially
equivalent statements may somehow express the same proposition. The second one
urges us to admit that the proposition expressed by a statement, s, involving an
indexical, a proper name or an incomplete determiner phrase is not as perishable
for the simpler reason suggested by Shoemaker. But as soon as Tom uses “I” in order to publicly
communicate about his being in pain by means of a token of (2), he does not express (1a), for the
phenomenal ego e is not publicly available. The expressed proposition is rather the token-reflexive
|{the I@i} exhibits pain| (see Orilia 2007 for more details on this point and Coliva 2003, 2006, for
recent discussions of IEM).
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as CD has it.35 According to CD, any such proposition is token-reflexive and thus
involves as constituent some constituent of s, e.g., some proper name token in s. Yet,
one might insist, the token-reflexive proposition lasts at most as long as the token
in question does, whereas the proposition expressed by s is eternal, or at least not
contingently dependent for its existence on whether a certain token happens to exist
or not. I would like to indicate how CD can accommodate these intuitions, if we
have to take them seriously. Let us start with the first one.
CD, qua descriptivist theory, denies that a Russellian proposition such as
(1r) |at(t, bush is# American)|
can be a pragmatic meaning. In contrast, according to referentialism, (1r) could be
the pragmatic meaning of two statements uttered at time t, e.g., two tokens, s and s′,
of
(1) Bush is American
and
(2) he is American,
respectively. However, the descriptivist need not deny that there are such propo-
sitions (she could try to explain them away, say by relying on states of affairs, at
a deeper level of ontological analysis, but this attempt will not be pursued here36).
Once their existence is granted, CD can admit that a statement may have, in addition
to its descriptivist pragmatic meaning, a corresponding “referentialist meaning”. For
example (avoiding some complications discussed above, which we may neglect for
present purposes), according to CD, the pragmatic meanings of the two tokens s and
s′ of (1) and (2) are
(1d) |at({the contextual time of s}, {the Bush@b} is# American)}|
and
35Something in this spirit is proposed, e.g., by Quentin Smith (1993, p. 109) in his defence of
presentism coupled with a referentialist standpoint (see p. 115 and pp. 124–129).
36We saw in § 1.8 that a distinction between propositions and states of affairs is appropriate. I am
inclined to accept states of affairs in my ontology and to assign to them the role of truthmakers of
sentences and propositions. Once this line is taken, rather than admitting Russellian propositions
as conditions for the truth of other (non-Russellian) propositions or as “referentialist meanings”
in the way suggested below, one could simply appeal to states of affairs as truthmakers and also
say that a certain statement, besides expressing a proposition as pragmatic meaning, may well
have a state of affairs as truthmaker. The states of affairs involve type II properties or relations
as constituents (universals à la Armstrong), whereas the Russellian propositions involve concepts
(type I properties or relations). Both however may involve concrete objects as constituents. For
present purposes we need not explore this line.
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(2d) | at({the contextual time of s′}, {the he@h} is# American)}|,
respectively, where b and h are the relevant tokens of “Bush” and “he”. However,
on the assumption that both descriptive contents, |the Bush@b| and |the he@h|,
determine |bush|, and that both descriptive contents, |the contextual time of s| and
|the contextual time of s′|, determine t, the supporter of CD can admit that (1r)
is a Russellian proposition corresponding to both (1d) and (2d) and hence to the
two statements, s and s′, expressing them. Proposition (1r) could then be called a
referentialist meaning of the statements in question. Of course, as the no-reference
problem certifies, not all statements have a corresponding Russellian proposition.
For instance, a token of “the winged horse flies” has none. However, as long as
there is one, the descriptivist can appeal to it, just as the referentialist can, in order
to account for the intuition that, in the appropriate contexts, two co-referentially
equivalent statements (such as s and s′ in our example) express “the same thing”.
It is important to note here that these Russellian propositions are not posited here
and elsewhere (cf. § 8.7) in an ad hoc manner, just to tame an otherwise more serious
problem that the referentialist, equipped from the start with Russellian propositions
for independent reasons, need not face. For independently of any such problem,
both the descriptivist and the referentialist in precisely the same manner may well
recognize a role for Russellian propositions when it comes to specifying the truth
conditions of sentences involving quantifiers. And clearly this role has nothing to
do with whether or not Russellian propositions are also used as pragmatic meanings
from a referentialist perspective.
To illustrate, consider “some electron has negative spin”. Both the referentialist
and the descriptivist may agree that (i) this sentence expresses the purely general
non-Russellian proposition |some x is such that x is an electron & x has negative-
spin|; and (ii) for this proposition to be true, there must also exist and be true at least
one pair of Russellian propositions of the form |e is an electron| and |e has negative-
spin|, where e is a certain electron. There is no requirement here of course, not even
for the referentialist, that the Russellian propositions in question be also meanings
of sentences involving singular terms, say proper names, that refer to the electron
in question (the electron may have never been baptized). Similarly, consider “the
first bear born in 2008 is white”. This expresses, we may all agree, the purely gen-
eral proposition |the first-bear-born-in-2008 is white|, a proposition which, for its
truth, requires (i) the existence and truth of two Russellian propositions |b is a first-
bear-born-in-2008| and |b is white|, where b is a certain bear; and (ii) the falsehood
of any proposition |c is a first-bear-born-in-2008| such that c = b. The descrip-
tivist and the referentialist part company of course when the referentialist will insist
that propositions such as |e is an electron| and |b is white| do not only exist and
are true (if the sentences in question are true), but may well also be pragmatic
meanings of tokens of sentences such as “Bud is an electron” (after an appro-
priate baptism) or “That is white” (uttered while pointing at b). The descriptivist
will of course object that the co-reference and the no-reference problems advise
against such moves, but this should not prevent her from appealing to the Russellian
propositions in question to account for certain intuitions that the referentialist may
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emphasize (as we are doing here and in § 8.7), given that these propositions have
already been admitted for quite different and independent reasons in the way just
explained.37
Let us now turn to the issue of the perishability of token-reflexive propositions.
Both descriptivists and referentialists agree that propositions are complex entities
made up of constituents, or so we have assumed here. Given this conception of
propositions, a proposition, P, cannot exist unless all of its constituents exist. This
may cause some conflict of intuitions when the proposition that we take to be
expressed by a sentence is allowed to contain perishable individuals such as ordi-
nary objects or linguistic tokens. For example, proposition (1r) will cease to exist
after Bush’s death (unless there is life after death or the anti-presentist metaphysical
position according to which all objects perdure38 in time is true; but we should let
our metaphysical views to interfere as little as possible with semantic issues and thus
we cannot take such things for granted). Yet, there is the intuition that the two state-
ments in question express truths (true propositions) that can outlive Bush. A similar
problem arises for the descriptivist who supports CD, inasmuch as she holds, like
Reichenbach, that some statements express token-reflexive propositions that contain
linguistic tokens among their constituents. For example, according to CD, the prag-
matic meanings (1d) and (2d) of s and s′ cannot outlive the death of the tokens b,
h, s and s′, contained in them. Nevertheless, we have the intuition that, by means of
s and s′, we express truths that are not as perishable as the tokens in question are.
This intuition might be accounted for to some extent by appealing to the idea that
these statements, beside having (1d) and (2d) as their pragmatic meanings, have the
Russellian proposition (1r) as their referentialist meaning. However, this is not quite
satisfactory, for, as noted, (1r) should be taken to exist only as long as Bush exists,
contrary to the intuition that these statements can express a proposition that outlives
not only the tokens in question, but even Bush. One can however capture this, by
assuming the following: (a) each linguistic token is in some way identified by a
“space-time pair” <t, p>, where p and t are, respectively, the location and the time
of the token at its birth, in the sense that, we may assume, it is the only linguistic
token that at time t occupies place p; and (b) in addition to its (perishable) pragmatic
meaning, P, a statement has a corresponding “eternal meaning”, which is obtained
from P by replacing each linguistic token, x, in P with the descriptive content |the
token identified by <t, p>|, where “identified” is understood as in (a) above and t
and p are the time and place of x’s birth (this holds, for tokens that do not count as
copies of archetypes, in the sense explained in Chapter 2; we shall briefly consider
copies of archetypes in a moment). With this in mind, we can propose, e.g., that the
statement s has the following eternal meaning corresponding to (1d):
(1d’) |at({the contextual time of the token identified by <t, p>}, the Bush@{the
token identified by <t′, p′>} is American|,
37Thanks to Garcia-Carpintero for urging me to be more explicit on this point.
38On the notion of perdurance and the related one of Perdurantism, see, e.g. Hawley 2008.
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where t and p are the time and place of s’birth and t′ and p′ of b’s birth. On the
assumption that times and places, qua abstract entities, are eternal,39 (1d’) is a
proposition that does not depend for its existence on perishable individuals. Since
the contextual time of the token identified by <t, p> is clearly time t itself, (1d’) is
to be considered equivalent to the following (true) proposition:
(1d’’) at(t, there is exactly one token, x, identified by <t′, p′> and there is exactly
one individual, y, with the property Bush@x and y is American).
Before closing this section, we still have to deal with the fact that some tokens
are copies of archetypes. Suppose for example that our token, s, of (1) is part of a
manuscript written by Tom for publication in a newspaper. When the manuscript
is printed, there are several tokens of (1) that count as copies of the archetype, s.
Clearly, we have not only the intuition that each such token expresses a proposition
that outlives the tokens in question, but also the intuition that all of them express
the same proposition. We can account for this, by defining eternal meaning in such
a way that, if a statement, sc, is a copy of an archetype, sa, then the eternal meaning
corresponding to sc is precisely the one that corresponds to sa. The idea then is that
all the tokens in question, archetypes and copies, express the same proposition in
the sense that they express the same eternal meaning.
In contrast with referentialism, my descriptivist position makes room for the
plausible requirement that, if two tokens, t and t′ have the same meaning, then a
competent speaker must know that. Hence, the Russellian and eternal propositions
discussed here are not, strictly speaking, meanings, according to my accounts of
what meanings are, for a competent speaker may fail to realize that two tokens cor-
respond to the same Russellian or eternal proposition. That is, Russellian and eternal
propositions are not the official pragmatic meanings that statements may have, but,
as we have seen, they can account for certain intuitions related to the pre-theoretical
notion of meaning. We can call them “extra-meanings”.
7.10 Metonymical and Metaphorical Uses of Indexicals
In his 1989 Quentin Smith has provided many interesting data which show that the
indexicals “now”, “here” and “I” can be used in such a way that a token of one of
them somehow refers to an item belonging to a kind quite different from the one we
would assign to it, on the basis of what is normally taken for granted in the literature
39Frigerio has pointed out in correspondence that the view that places and times are eternal may be
at odds with the idea, apparently widely-accepted in current physics, that there was no time and no
space before the Big Bang. I myself find assertions such as the latter metaphysically questionable.
But, in any case, if we have to take them seriously, we could at least speak of a “quasi-eternality”
of the relevant meanings, which may be enough to save the intuitions in question. And it should
be noted of course that the referentialist would be in the same boat. For Kaplan, for example, “it
is cold here now” expresses a proposition with a time and a place as constituents, a proposition
which is then not eternal, given the present worry.
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on indexicals.40 It is in fact typically assumed that a token of “now” always refers to
the time of the utterance, a token of “here” to the place of either the speaker or the
utterance and a token of “I” to the speaker. By contrast, Q. Smith’s data suggest, for
example, that sometimes a token of “now” refers to future times, to a past time or to
a point in an argument, a token of “here” to a point in a musical composition or to
a passage in a text; a token of “I” to an item in some special relation to the speaker,
e.g. something that she owns. On the basis of these data, Q. Smith criticizes many
current accounts of indexicals and proposes an alternative according to which the
meaning of each of the indexicals in question can be specified by a recourse to a
metarule. The metarule for a given indexical points to different rules governing the
various uses of the indexical in contexts of different sorts. For example, the metarule
for “now” tells us, inter alia, that in a “historical context” a token of “now” refers
to the historical time that “the speaker/writer wishes to emphasise” (rule (R1) in
§ 2), whereas in a “theoretical context” a token of “now” refers to “the point in
the argument at which it is tokened” (rule (R4) in § 4). Arguably, this appeal to
metarules is tantamount to saying that the indexical terms in question are ambigu-
ous. For, in the same way, e.g., rather than saying that “bank” has two meanings, we
could say that the meaning of “bank” is governed by a metarule that points to two
rules, one that tells us how to interpret “bank” in financial contexts, and one that
tells us how to interpret “bank” when we are discussing rivers, lakes and the like.
As Corazza 2004 points out (p. 156), we should prefer a theory of indexicals that is
simpler than the one proposed by Q. Smith in that it accommodates his data with-
out positing ambiguities. I would like to consider whether my approach succeeds in
this.
Let me deal first with Q. Smith’s argument purporting to show that a token of
“now” can refer to a future time. Q. Smith considers recordings done for the purpose
of a future broadcasting or for use in an answering machine. It suffices to ponder on
the latter to make the point. Suppose that at a certain time, t, Tom records a message
for his answering machine by saying:
(1) I am not at home now.
Let us say that n is the token of “now” used by Tom. Q. Smith claims that in a
context such as this the proposition expressed could be put as
(1a) I am not at home at the times when the reproductions of this token are heard.
In other words, according to Q. Smith, n expresses the “plural descriptive con-
tent” |thepl time at which a reproduction of n is heard| and therefore does not
singularly refer to any time in particular, let alone the time of utterance. Speaking
loosely, as Q. Smith does, we may say that it refers to the future times in which the
40Q. Smith, also discusses other indexicals beside “now”, e.g. “today”, but what I shall have to say
about his account of “now” can be applied mutatis mutandis to these other indexicals.
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reproductions of n are heard. If this is right, when Tom utters his sentence, he does
not say anything false even if he is at home during the recording. Moreover, any
reproduction of his sentence is a statement that expresses a true proposition (on the
assumption that Tom is never at home when the answering machine is triggered by
an incoming phone call). This may sound nice because it does not attribute to Tom a
falsehood at the time at which he records his message. As I understand Q. Smith, he
takes this as a good reason to claim that the proposition expressed by Tom’s token
of (1) must be as indicated above. But is seems to me that there is nothing wrong
in saying that Tom literally expresses a falsehood at the moment of the recording.
For we can many times speak falsely in a morally irrelevant sense when this is use-
ful for some practical purpose. For example, if Mary is rehearsing at night for a
conference that she will offer the morning after on a sunny day in a public garden,
she may say: “I am pleased to see that a beautiful sunshine is accompanying my
words”. What Mary says is literally false, but of course her purpose is not to say
something true at the moment at which she is talking, but simply to make sure that
she will effortlessly find the right words to say something true the day after. Just as
all that matters to Mary is the truth of her statement in the sunny garden, so what
is important for Tom is the truth of the various tokens of (1) brought about by the
activation of his answering machine. And given my flexible notion of contextual
time, all these tokens express true propositions at their respective contextual times
(if of course Tom is actually not at home), i.e., as explained in § 2.10, at the times
at which the activation of the answering machine bring them about.
All the other data discussed by Q. Smith could perhaps be dealt with by making
the notions of contextual speaker, place and time even more flexible than I have
assumed so far. For example, in order to deal with those cases, emphasized by
Q. Smith, in which tokens of “now” or “here” appear to refer to specific points
of arguments, texts or musical compositions, one could say that the notions of place
and time being appealed to are so abstract that they can apply to such points and
not only to ordinary (physical) places and times. Moreover, one could say that the
contextual time of a statement or a token within the statement may be a past moment
in contexts in which the speaker appears to use the so-called “historical present”.
However, an alternative strategy, which appeals to metaphor and metonymy, is
perhaps to be recommended. Consider for example the uses of “now” or “here” to
refer to points in arguments, as when one says, e.g., “here theorem A is crucial” or
(Q. Smith’s example) “now theorem A must be appealed to”. I don’t see anything
wrong in taking these uses to be metaphoric, in line, e.g., with Lakoff 1987 (p. 517).
In other cases considered by Q. Smith it is instead more appropriate to rely on the
notion of metonymy. Let me dwell on them more at length (what I shall have to say
can be transferred by and large to the cases involving metaphor).
We find in Q. Smith’s paper the well-known example of someone who utters
“here” while pointing at a spot in a map so as to refer to a certain geographical area
represented in the map. Say, Tom utters
(2) The statue of liberty is here,
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while pointing at a spot in the map that represents the city of New York. According
to Q. Smith, in a case like this the relevant token of “here”, h, refers to New York
and not to the place of the utterance. If this were correct, my rule HRPP for “here”
would be wrong for in line with it we should say that the referent of h is the spot
in the map pointed at by Tom, i.e., a place near the contextual place of the token,
rather than New York.
Moreover, we find in Q. Smith’s paper examples regarding “I” such as the one
attributed to William Vallicella and based on the sentence
(3) I am out of gas.
Consider the token, i, of “I” uttered by Tom when, as his car suddenly stops, he says
“I am out of gas”. According to Q. Smith (in line with Vallicella), in a case like this,
the token, i, of “I” fails to refer to the speaker, Tom, for it rather refers to Tom’s car.
If Q. Smith is right, my account of the meaning of “I” is problematic, since my rule
IPP for “I” predicts that i refers to Tom, given that he is the contextual utterer of the
token in question.
However, it seems to me that we do not have here real threats to my rules HRPP
and IPP. For in these cases, “here” and “I” are used metonymically just like “the ham
sandwich” in this example by Lakoff (see p. 77 of his 1987, which can be consulted
for details on how metonymy works):
(4) The ham sandwich just spilled beer all over himself.
We are to imagine that (4) is said by a waitress to another in order to comment
on something that a guest of the restaurant, Tom, has just done. We clearly have a
token, t, of “the ham sandwich” that in a sense refers to Tom, but not because the
meaning of “ham sandwich” is so complex and subtle that it can even allow us to
refer to people rather than to sandwiches. More simply, we may say, à la Grice, that
the proposition expressed (as pragmatic meaning) is literally false, but it points to a
conversationally implicated proposition such as this:
(4a) |the person who ordered a ham sandwich just spilled beer all over himself|.
In other words, although the token of “the ham sandwich”, t, literally means |the
ham sandwich| and thus cannot literally refer to Tom (it refers to a ham sandwich),
it metonymically points at the descriptive content |the person who ordered a ham
sandwich| and thus metonymically refers to Tom.
Similarly, in the map example the expressed proposition is literally false for the
token h of “here” literally refers to a spot in the map. However, a proposition such
as
(2a) |the statue of liberty is in the place represented by the here@h|
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is conversationally implicated, as the descriptive content |the place represented
by the here@h| is metonymically related to h, which can then be said to refer
metonymically to New York (or to the place occupied by New York). Analogously,
in the car example, we can assume that there is a conversationally implicated
proposition along the lines of
(3a) |the car owned by the I@i is out of gas|,
which allows us to say that the “I” token, i, metonymically refers to Tom’s car,
although it literally refers to Tom.
Q. Smith also argues that a token of “now” can refer to a past time or to an
imaginary time rather than to the time at which it is uttered in cases such as the
following ones. Consider a historian who during a lecture about Napoleon says:
(5) Napoleon’s troops are now advancing.
Or consider a theatrical performance in which there are frequent flashbacks to past
times. The two friends John and Tom are together in the audience and the latter
becomes confused as to whether the representation of a duel on stage at the moment
should be taken as a flashback or not. John understands that and puts his friend on
the right track by saying:
(6) the duel is taking place now.
According to Q. Smith, given the context and the historian’s use of the “historical
present“, his token of “now” refers to a past period of time, say, May 1812, rather
than to the time of utterance. Similarly, in Q. Smith’s opinion, the token of “now”
uttered by John does not refer to the time of utterance but to an imaginary time in
the story represented on stage.
According to my account of the meaning of “now”, however (whether in the
eternalist or temporalist version), these tokens of “now” should refer to the corre-
sponding contextual times, which in both cases coincide with the times at which
they are uttered. Hence, if Q. Smith is right, my approach is in trouble. In reply, I
am inclined to say that we can still appeal to metonymy to handle these cases. In
other words, I would like to suggest that the tokens of “now” in question in fact refer
to the respective contextual times, although, metonymically, they also refer to past
or imaginary times. As regards (4), we can say that the (false) literally expressed
proposition points to a proposition which we could express as follows:
(5a) |at the past time which we should consider as if it were the now@n, Napoleon’s
troops are# advancing|.
The idea then is that, literally, the token of “now” used by the historian, n, liter-
ally expresses, as usual, the descriptive content |the now@n|, but it metonymically
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expresses the descriptive content |the past time which we should consider as if it
were the now@n|.
Similarly, as regards (6), the (false) literally expressed proposition points to a
proposition which we could express as follows:
(6a) |at the imaginary time of the story represented by the now@n, the duel is#
taking place|.
Here the idea is that in a theatrical performance the real present time can be used
to represent the imaginary present of the story. Thus, John’s token of “now”, n,
succeeds in referring to an imaginary present by way of first literally referring to
the real present through the descriptive content |the now@n|. Since this descriptive
content is metonymically related to the descriptive content |the imaginary time of
the story represented by the now@n|, n also succeeds in metonymically referring to
an imaginary time (we need not dwell for present purposes on the issue of how the
imaginary times of fiction should in the end be understood).
Chapter 8
Conclusion: Accounting for the Referentialist
Data
8.1 Premise
We are now ready to show that a descriptivist approach to singular reference,
specifically the theory CD, can account for the data that have marked the emer-
gence of referentialism and the demise of descriptivism since the 1970s. These data
and the corresponding pro-referentialist and anti-descriptivist arguments have been
reviewed in Chapter 4. I shall now turn to them again, this time from the perspec-
tive of CD. At the end of this chapter, I shall dwell on how referentialists have
tried to account for the descriptivist data of Chapter 3 in order to underline the
theoretical burdens that they must face in addressing them. By putting these two
strands together, it will be seen, I hope, that descriptivism deserves more consider-
ation than it is nowadays usually accorded and perhaps even that it is preferable to
referentialism after all.
8.2 The Indispensability of Indexicals Revisited
We saw in § 4.2 that arguments by Castañeda, Perry and Kaplan suggest that the
principle of the indispensability of indexicals, II, is true. We also saw that lin-
guistic descriptivism for indexicals is incompatible with it. This does not imply
however that my CD is not compatible with II. In fact it is easy to see that it is. On
my approach, the proposition expressed by an indexical statement, s(i), containing
the indexical token i, always involves the linguistic meaning of the indexical i, an
indexical property, and the indexical token itself, and without these elements the
proposition can hardly be expressed. For example, if somebody utters a token, s, of
(1) I am a millionaire,
the proposition expressed by the token is
(1a) |the I@i is a millionaire|,
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where i is the token of “I” in question and |I| the indexical property constituting the
linguistic meaning of i (or, more precisely of the type “I” of which i is a token). CD
explicitly denies that a proposition of this kind could be expressed without tokening
(possibly in inner speech) a sentence involving a first-person pronoun such as (1).
Thus, in particular, a sentence such as
(2) the editor of Soul is a millionaire
could never express the proposition expressed by the indexical statement s. A token
of (2) may well be co-referentially equivalent to a token of (1), but, according to
CD, it cannot express the same proposition as the latter token, for a recourse to a
first-person pronoun is needed in order to express a proposition with a descriptive
content of the kind of |the I@i|. Something along these lines can be said in relation
to the other indexicals as well. In sum, according to CD, indexicals are indeed indis-
pensable or essential in that they can be used to express propositions that could not
be expressed otherwise. These propositions involve, according to CD, descriptive
contents contributed by the relevant indexical tokens.
Before closing this section, a remark on Perry’s case of the sugar spiller presented
in § 4.2 is perhaps in order. This example may be taken to suggest that only with a
first-person pronoun can a subject, X, express a publicly verbalizable belief with the
appropriate causal role in relation to a certain self-consciously willed action. From
the present perspective, we can say that the belief in question is a proposition of the
form |the I@i is F|, where i is the relevant token of the first-person pronoun uttered
by X. Note, however, that it is not enough that a proposition of this form be believed
by X for it to play the causal role in question. For a subject can believe a proposi-
tion of this form either as a result of uttering a certain first-person statement that
expresses it or as a result of assenting to a first-person statement uttered by some-
one else. In the former case, as we may say, the proposition is actively entertained,
whereas in the latter it is only passively entertained. To play the causal role in ques-
tion with respect to a self-consciously willed action the proposition of the form |the
I@i is F| must be actively entertained.
8.3 Indexicals with Narrow Scope
We saw in § 4.3 that a challenge for descriptivism arises from the widespread opin-
ion that indexicals always take wide scope. However, with appropriate examples, it
can be seen that indexicals can take narrow scope1 precisely in the sense in which
incomplete descriptions can. Consider this situation. A group of people, including
1A similar point is made by Craig (2000, p. 16ff.), who however draws from it the conclusion that
Castañeda’s distinction between indicators and quasi-indicators should be forsaken. I do not think
that this follows. For an extensive attack to the idea that indexicals cannot take narrow scope in
intensional contexts, see Schlenker 2003.
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Tom and Mary, are in a classroom where there is only one desk. For some rea-
son, Mary wants to attribute to Tom some beliefs that, given the context, can be
legitimately granted to him. Say, she is a professor of philosophy who needs some
examples in her discussion of the nature of psychological states. While addressing
everybody in the room (including Tom), Mary says:
(1) Tom believes that the desk is wooden.
(2) Tom believes that I am lecturing here now.
Consider (1). It is quite natural to take it as ascribing to Tom a belief involving a
descriptive content with |desk| as constituent, a content which is also the meaning of
the relevant token, call it d, of “the desk”. In fact the speaker need not be committed
to the idea that some other singular-term sense, different from the one expressed by
d, is involved in Tom’s belief. Indeed, as Mary utters her sentence, nothing prevents
us from assuming that the proposition expressed by the subordinate clause in it
is also a proposition entertained by Tom (and possibly believed by it). According
to CD, the meaning of d is |the desk@d| and thus (1) could be taken to have the
following de dicto interpretation:
(1a) Tom believes that the desk@d is wooden.
Similarly, (2) could be interpreted de dicto in such a way that Mary is taken to
attribute to Tom a belief involving the descriptive contents |the I@i|, |the here@h|,
|the now@n|, where i, h, n, are the relevant tokens of “I”, “here”, and “now”. For
in this case too, the speaker need not be committed to the idea that some other
singular-term senses, different from the one she expressed by “I”, “here” and “now”
(i.e., |the I@i|, |the here@h|, |the now@n|, according to CD), are involved in Tom’s
belief. Thus, by neglecting details that are irrelevant for present purposes, (2) could
be interpreted de dicto as follows:
(2a) Tom believes that at(the now@n, the I@i is lecturing in the here@h).
It should be noted that the truth of (2a) does not imply that Tom has a belief that
he would express by uttering “I am lecturing here now” and thus in particular by
using a token of “I”. It simply means that he has a belief involving the property of
being an I, which he must process somehow. We might surmise that he processes it
by “transforming” it into a belief that he could express by saying, e.g., “Professor
Mary Smith is lecturing . . .”.
We can also consider this other example (adapted from Neale 1990, p. 166). At
a party, a boring and loud guest has just left and Mary addresses Tom thus:
(3) You are glad that he’s gone, aren’t you?
It seems clear to me that we can legitimately give a de dicto interpretation to Mary’s
statement in such a way that the relevant token of “he” is given narrow scope.
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From the point of view of CD (neglecting immaterial details), we can say that Mary
expresses this proposition:
(3a) |the you@y is glad that the he@h has gone|,
where y and h are the relevant tokens of “you” and “he”. It should be noted that in
this proposition the descriptive content |the he@h| occurs within the scope of the
intentional relation |x is glad that P|.
Here is another example from Reimer 2003 (inspired by Nunberg 1993, where
a general case is made for descriptive uses of indexicals that open the way for de
dicto occurrences of them). Somebody knocks on the door and you assume it is your
mother, but in fact the visitor is a friend. Quite naturally, you may react by saying:
(4) I thought you were my mother.
It seems clear that the token of “you” in your statement is best given a de dicto
interpretation.
In the light of these examples, one may wonder why there is this widespread
opinion that indexicals always take wide scope in intentional contexts. I think this is
because attributing narrow scope to an indexical in an intentional context is easily
confused with the self-defeating task of viewing the indexical as if it conveyed an
indexical reference realized by the attributee rather than by the speaker. Suppose
Mary declares:
(5) I am happy.
I may then want to express the fact that Mary attributes happiness to herself and that
Mary did this by referring indexically to herself in the first-person way. However, if
I tried to do this by saying
(6) Mary believes that I am happy,
I would fail, because I would simply attribute to Mary a belief regarding my happi-
ness. In fact, the “I” token would convey an indexical reference realized by me, the
speaker, and not by the attributee, Mary. (This however does not show that (6) can-
not be interpreted de dicto, as saying that, roughly, according to Mary, I exploited
an indexical first-person self-reference in attributing happiness to myself.) It is also
clear why I would fail, from the point of view of CD. The pragmatic meaning of
the “I” token in question, call it i, would be |the I@i|, and, for reasons that we have
already explained at length, this descriptive content would determine the speaker.
To attribute an indexical reference to someone else, we must use quasi-indicators.
Instead of (6), I should say:
(7) Mary believes that she∗ is happy.
8.3 Indexicals with Narrow Scope 235
For the appropriate interpretation of (7) according to my approach, see § 7.5, above.
The thesis that indexicals can take narrow scope in belief contexts can be further
supported by appealing to Richard’s puzzle. This puzzle, put forward by Richard
1983, might suggest that co-referential terms can fail to be mutually substitutable
even outside intensional contexts (McKay and Nelson 2005, § 9). I shall draw, as we
shall see, a different moral (dismissed in Richard 1990, pp. 131 ff.). The problem
involves a man and a woman (whom I shall call Tom and Mary, respectively) and
can be put as follows. Tom is talking on the phone to Mary and, at the same time,
he is looking at a woman in a phone booth across the street who, unbeknownst to
him, happens to be Mary. All of a sudden Tom notices a run-away steamroller that
is bearing down upon the phone booth. He comes to believe that the woman is in
danger and waves at her. Mary notices this but not the steamroller and thus thinks
that she is safe. Without realizing that the man is her interlocutor, Tom, Mary says
to the latter over the phone: “there is someone waving at me who believes that I am
in danger” (giving the impression that there is no reason to think that she is really in
danger). As a result, we should admit that Tom is disposed to accept:
(8) the person waving at you [addressing Mary] believes that you [still addressing
Mary] are in danger.
On the other hand, he is not disposed to accept:
(9) I believe that you [addressing Mary] are in danger.
Let us assume for convenience that in talking to Mary Tom utters with assent a token,
t8, of (8) and jokingly (without endorsement) adds a token, t9, of (9). The problem
is that the token of “the person waving at you”, w, in t8 and the “I” token, i, in t9 are
co-referential and outside of any intensional context. Accordingly, t8 and t9 should
have the same truth-value. Yet, the former is true and the latter false. The problem is
solved, however, if we admit that an indexical can occur with either narrow or wide
scope with respect to a propositional attitude verb. For it then seems clear that t9 is
best seen as involving an occurrence of “you” with narrow scope, whereas t8, if to
be accounted as true, must be viewed as having its second occurrence of “you” with
wide scope. This must be so because the speaker cannot assume that the waving
person is thinking of the woman in the phone booth as of a “you” (at any rate not
as a you@y, where y is the token of “you” used by the speaker), when attributing to
her the property of being in danger.
From the point of view of CD, these are the propositions expressed by t8 and t9
(where y is the first tokens of “you”; I shall assume the other tokens of “you” are
anaphoric):
(8a) |the person waving at the you@y believes of the you@y that it is in danger|,
(9a) |the I@i believes that the you@y is in danger|.
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The former must be accounted as true and the latter as false. In view of the fact that
the two tokens i (of “I”) and w (of “the person waving at you”) are co-referential,
we must admit that (8a) is true just like
(9b) |the I@i believes of the you@y that it is in danger|.
However, this is not in conflict with the falsehood of (9a), for they are two different
propositions. The former attributes a de dicto belief (involving the descriptive con-
tent |the you@y| to the individual determined by | the I@i| and the latter attributes
to him a de re belief (turning on the assumption that some descriptive content (dif-
ferent from |the you@y|, albeit determining the same individual) is appropriately
employed by the attributee).2
As regards modal contexts, there is a well-known example due to Nunberg 1990,
derived from the movie The Year of Living Dangerously (discussed in Recanati
1993, § 16.2, p. 301). A reporter is looking for a shipment of arms that are set to get
to the local communists, who would kill him if they found out he is after them. The
reporter is trying to acquire relevant information from a warehouse manager, who
tells him to be careful and continues with:
(10) I might have been a communist.
Clearly, in this case the natural interpretation is a de dicto one, which, from the
perspective of CD would be roughly as follows (neglecting immaterial details):
(10a) it is possible that the I@i is a communist,
2There have been various responses to Richard’s puzzle. According to Crimmins’ and Perry’s
diagnosis (1989) it depends on the presence of a self-ascription made with the first-person pronoun
and according to Richard himself (1990) it is due to a context shift. However, according to McKay
and Nelson (2005, § 9), the use of “I” is not really essential (versions without it can be provided)
and it is not clear that any context shift is involved. Corazza provides an account based on logical
forms involving pronouns with different indexes (2004, p. 305). It seems to me that strategies such
as these are not needed once we appeal to the wide scope/narrow scope distinction. That this is
the key to the problem becomes clearer if we notice that we can have a version of the puzzle
that does not involve indexicals. Imagine that Smith has been murdered and that Mary knows that
Fred is the murderer (let us say she is an accomplice). One day Tom, Mary’s neighbour, sees Fred
acting kindly with a passerby thereby forming the conviction that Fred is a very nice guy. The
local newspaper, distorting an ironic remark by the police inspector in charge of Smith’s murder
investigation, writes as follows: “the inspector believes that the murderer of Smith is a very nice
man”. While reading this, as a joke, Mary says to Fred: “and Tom too believes that the murderer
of Smith is a very nice man”. Now, unbeknownst to Mary, Tom happens to be the inspector and
thus the two sentences, one might think, should have the same truth value. In fact this conclusion
is not forthcoming, for in the newspaper sentence “the murderer of Smith” should be taken to have
narrow scope, whereas in Mary’s sentence “the murderer of Smith” should be taken to have wide
scope. And thus the former may well be false and the latter true. It should be clear that this example
exactly parallels Richard’s original puzzle.
8.4 An Attempt to Reapply the Modal, Epistemic and Semantic Arguments 237
where i is the “I” token uttered by the warehouse manager.
As regards temporal contexts, we might consider the following variant of
Nunberg’s case. In a country full of communists, Oscar is afraid that communism
will take over and that everybody will be forced to declare himself a communist. He
is thus convinced that he himself will be considered a communist although in spirit
he will never be. He thus hides somewhere a note saying:
(11) I will be a fake communist,
in the hope that some future historian will realize that at least someone, whoever he
was, was not truly converted and had even predicted the forthcoming enforced mass
conversion to communism. The natural interpretation of Oscar’s token of (11), s, is
a de dicto one, which states that at some moment which is future with respect to the
time of utterance, the utterer of the “I” token in question, i, is# a fake communist. For
illustrative purposes, we can consider the proposition expressed by Oscar statement,
s, from the perspective of the eternalist version of CD:
(9a) |at-future(the statement-time@s, the I@i is# a fake communist)|.
8.4 An Attempt to Reapply the Modal, Epistemic
and Semantic Arguments
It should be clear that the traditional modal, epistemic and semantic arguments
against the classical descriptivist theory of proper names do not quite apply against
the approach to proper names invoked by CD, for CD does not claim that proper
names express descriptive contents that could more explicitly be expressed by
descriptions such as “the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic”,
or “the philosopher who drank the hemlock”, as the classical theory has it. To be
sure, CD claims that proper names express descriptive contents, but contents of the
form |the N@n| where N is a linguistic meaning of a proper name, e.g., the meaning
|Gödel| of the name Gödel, and n is a certain token of the name in question.
Nevertheless, one might wonder whether appropriate reformulations of these
arguments might work against CD. It is instructive to see that this is not the case.
Just as Kripke considered sentences such as
(1) if Gödel exists, Gödel discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic,
similarly the critic of CD could consider a token of
(2) if Gödel exists, Gödel is a Gödel,
as an attempt to express a proposition which (given the truth of |Gödel exists|)
attributes to Gödel a property such as being a Gödel or a property of the
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form |Gödel@g|, where g is the very token of “Gödel” used by the critic.
Now, from the point of view of the modal and epistemic arguments, the
charge would be that (2) expresses a contingent and a posteriori proposition,
whereas according to CD it expresses a necessary, and thus presumably a priori,
proposition.
As a matter of fact, according to CD, (2) can, depending on how it is interpreted,
be taken to express two propositions:
(2a) |if the Gödel@g exists, the Gödel@g is a Gödel|
and
(2b) |if the Gödel@g exists, the Gödel@g is a Gödel@g|
(where g is the first token of “Gödel” uttered by the speaker).
We may concentrate on (2a), since what I will say about it applies, mutatis mutan-
dis, to (2b) as well. Let us then examine the modal and epistemic status of (2a). Is
it contingent and a posteriori or necessary and a priori? To answer this question
more precisely, let us recall the distinction between contingency1 and contingency2
from Chapter 4. Clearly, since a linguistic token such as g is a contingent entity
that fails to exist in some world, (2a) is not true in any such world and thus (2a)
is contingent2. Accordingly, we can take (2a) to be true only a posteriori, in the
sense that knowing its truth requires knowing the empirical fact that g happens
to exist. On the other hand, it should be noted, (2a) is not contingent1. Take any
world, w, in which g exists. The antecedent may be true or false in it. If false
(e.g., g is not used in w as the token of a name), then (2a) is vacuously true. If
the antecedent of (2a) is true in w, then such is (2a), since, by principle P6 of §
5.4, any object with the property |Gödel@g| must also have the property |Gödel|.
Hence, (2a) is true in w. This piece of reasoning shows that there is a sense in
which (2a) is a priori: once the existence of g is taken for granted, then, by a pri-
ori reasoning, we come to know that (2a) is true. But this, I think, is as it should
be. It is a reflection of the fact that whatever is identified by a token of a cer-
tain proper name cannot fail to have the general property that the name expresses:
Gödel, if so called, cannot fail to be a Gödel, just like anybody who is called
Gödel.
There is an intuition, however, which is still not fully captured by these consider-
ations, and that a referentialist critic of CD may be after. The intuition is that there
may be a world, w, in which our Gödel, x, exists, but is not called Gödel and thus
fails to have the property |Gödel|. Now, (2a) is true in w, whereas the following
proposition is not:
(2c) |if x exists, then x is a Gödel|.
8.4 An Attempt to Reapply the Modal, Epistemic and Semantic Arguments 239
Clearly, this proposition is not only contingent2 but also contingent1, as the exis-
tence of w shows.3 Furthermore, it is certainly not knowable a priori, for its truth
depends on the empirical fact that x happens to be called Gödel. But this is a prob-
lem for CD, only if it assumed, as the referentialist critic may urge, that (2c), rather
than (2a), is the proposition expressed by (2). But to assume that (2) expresses (2c)
rather than (2a) begs the question against the descriptivist who supports CD. For the
latter can acknowledge that there is proposition (2c) and that it is contingent2 with-
out thereby accepting that it is expressed by (2) as its official meaning.4 If this were
accepted, referentialism would follow and we would have to face the co-reference
and no-reference problems, which a descriptivist theory such as CD can escape. But
the supporter of CD can simply say that the relevant token of (2) happens to have
(2c) as its referentialist meaning (cf. § 7.9 above).5
The critic might insist that CD does not capture the intuition that
(3) Gödel might not have been a Gödel
expresses a true proposition, just as the classical descriptivist theory of proper names
exhibits a similar failure with respect to a sentence such as
(4) Gödel might not have discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic.
But (4) can be interpreted either de dicto or de re and it is sufficient to focus on
the latter interpretation to account for the intuition that it can be taken to express
a truth. We can say the same as regards (3). Consider a token, s, of (3) involving
the token g of Gödel. We can give s a de dicto interpretation representable (leaving
aside irrelevant details) as:
(3a) |possibly, the Gödel@g is not a Gödel|.
This is a necessarily false proposition. But we can also give it a de re interpretation,
according to which it expresses a proposition representable along these lines:
3Everett 2005 (p. 109) in essence focuses, mutatis mutandis, on an analogous point in order to
criticize the descriptivist response to Kripke in Sosa 2001. I think Sosa could respond in the same
way (to be seen in a moment) in which I defend CD on this score, namely by pointing out that
Everett begs the question against descriptivism.
4For a related allegation that kripke begs the question against descriptivism, see Jacquette 2003.
5Frigerio, in correspondence, has urged me to also consider the intuition that a token of “Gödel is
Gödel” cannot be taken to be false. Again, we can deal with this by appealing to its referentialist
meaning. For we can assume that, since both tokens of “Gödel” refer to the same individual, x, the
sentence in question has a referentialist meaning, |x = x|, true in every possible world in which x
exists.
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(3b) |the Gödel@g is possibly not a Gödel|.6
This is a proposition which we should take to be equivalent to:
(3c) |there is exactly one entity, x, such that x has the property Gödel@g and
possibly, x does not have the property Gödel|.
Such a proposition is true, given the assumption that there is a possible world
wherein our Gödel, x, the one that in our world uniquely exemplifies |Gödel@g|,
is not called Gödel, a world in which (2c) is false.7
Let us turn now to the semantic argument. Suppose that our Gödel, x (called
Gödel), is an impostor who stole the proof of the incompleteness theorem from
Schmidt. The semantic argument insists on the intuition that a token of “Gödel”
would still denote x, the impostor. This is of course compatible with CD. For, by
PNCD of § 5.9, a token, g, of “Gödel” would express a descriptive content coexten-
sive with |origin of the nominal-causal chain leading to g|, a property exemplified
just by x, we may assume, regardless of whether or not he has a contingent property
such as |discoverer of the incompleteness theorem|. But, perhaps, in order to deploy
the semantic argument against CD, a referentialist critic might argue that the token
g of “Gödel” would still refer to x even though someone, y, other than x, and not
x, turned out to have the property |Gödel@g|. But not even a referentialist should
6More formally, (3b) is: [λf ∃1x(Gödel@g(x) & f(x))]([λy ♦¬Gödel(y)]), equivalent by lambda
conversion to ∃1x(Gödel@g(x) & ♦¬Gödel(x)), which we can take to be proposition (3c) below.
In essence, the point made here is line with Dummett’s (1973, 1981) and Loar’s (1976) replies
to Kripke, replies based on allowing that proper names can take wide scope in modal contexts.
Everett 2005 (note 3) distinguishes two strands in Dummett’s thought on the matter. One of them
grants that two sentences (e.g., one involving “Aristotle” and the other “the last great philosopher
of antiquity”) may have in some sense the same content and yet different truth values in different
possible worlds. This view is developed by Stanley (1997, 1997a, 2002) by way of distinguish-
ing between the “assertoric” and the “ingredient” meaning of an utterance (where the former is
gained à la Grice in a context). This is not by my standards a descriptivist position for, from the
point of view of ingredient content, which is the relevant one here, proper names are not treated
as descriptions. The other strand views proper names as descriptions that must always take by
linguistic convention wide scope, as in the view developed in Sosa 2001. Similarly, as in Nelson
2002a, proper names may be understood as rigid descriptions of the form “the actual F”, which
must take wide scope because of the rigidifying qualifier “actual”. For the reasons explained in
§ 8.3, I think that all singular terms can in principle take narrow scope and thus for me the wide
scope interpretation of proper names is not compulsory but one of the options.
7It is worth noting that the proposition |∃1x(Gödel@g(x) & ♦¬Gödel(x))| should also be taken as
true for the following reason: there may be a possible world, w, in which both our Gödel, x, and
the token g exist, but either x is not called Gödel in that world or g is not used to refer to x in it. In
the latter case, the token g and x are not linked in such a way that there is a nominal-causal chain
leading from the latter to the former (say, g has been uttered in this possible world by someone
who is randomly uttering German-sounding tokens in order to practice phonetics or by someone
in order to refer to someone else, y, who is called Gödel and who is unique in having the property
|Gödel@g|). If this is the case, proposition (2a) is true in w, but, intuitively, it is not our Gödel that
makes it true in w.
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admit this, for it would be like admitting that g refers to x even though y, rather than
x, is the source of the nominal-causal chain leading to g. The point is that the two
properties |Gödel@g| and |origin of the nominal-causal chain leading to g| must be
coextensive. In sum, it is just not possible that g refers to Gödel without Gödel’s
having the property |Gödel@g|.
8.5 The Modal Arguments About Indexicals Reconsidered
It is also the case that one cannot use against CD the modal arguments outlined
in § 4.5 in relation to Reichenbach’s and Russell’s accounts of indexicals. Indeed,
it seems to me that they are not good arguments even when deployed against
Reichenbach and Russell. But let us confine ourselves to CD and consider
(1) I am an utterer.
The charge would be that any token of this expresses a contingent proposition. Yet,
a critic could say that, according to CD, any such token expresses an analytically
true proposition. Let us see why one might suspect that this is the case. CD claims
that a token, s, of (1) uttered, say, by Tom, expresses the proposition
(1a) |the I@i is an utterer|,
where i is the token of “I” used by Tom. Given the meaning attributed to “I” by
CD in Chapter 6, and in particular given IPP of § 6.3, this proposition must be
equivalent to
(1b) |the contextual utterer of i is an utterer|,
and clearly the property of being contextual utterer of i entails that of being an
utterer. Thus, one might think that (1a) and (1b) must be true. But in fact (1a) and
(1b) may very well be false, for they are contingent2. To see this, just consider a
possible world where i does not exist. Moreover, they are also contingent1: consider
a world where i exists, but it has not been uttered by anyone (say, i is a sound
produced by a rolling stone). In this world the properties |I@i| and |utterer of i| fail
to be exemplified and accordingly (1a) and (1b) are false in the sense in which it is
false in our world that the winged horse is a horse.
A referentialist critic might insist that the real reason why the proposition
expressed by s is contingent is not captured by CD, for this reason has to do not
so much with what happens to the token i in worlds other than ours, as with the
simple fact that Tom fails to have the property of being an utterer in other worlds.
That is, the referentialist urges, the proposition
(1c) |tom is an utterer|
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is contingent1 and this is why s expresses something contingent. But this is just
to say that (1c) is the meaning of s, thereby begging the question against the
descriptivist. The latter may recognize that there is such a proposition and that it is
contingent, but she can say that it is simply a referentialist meaning that s happens
to have and not its official meaning.
Let us finally consider what the supporter of CD should say as regards a sentence
such as
(2) I might have uttered nothing.
As noted in § 4.5, a referentialist may want to insist that a token of (2) uttered by a
typical speaker expresses a truth. But, on analogy with what we said in relation to
(3) of § 8.4, this can be easily granted once we see that a token of (2) can be given a
de re interpretation, according to which it expresses a proposition along these lines:
(2a) |the I@i is possibly such that it utters nothing|,
where i is the relevant token of “I”. We should take (2a) to be equivalent to
(2b) |there is exactly one entity, x, such that x has the property I@i and possibly, x
has the property of uttering nothing|.8
8.6 Another Look at Necessary A Posteriori and Contingent
A Priori Propositions
We saw in § 4.6 that some referentialists insist that there are necessary a posteriori
and contingent a priori truths. It is instructive to see what we can say from the
point of view of CD on these matters. We shall start with those sentences involving
proper names which express, according to Kripke, necessary a posteriori truths or
contingent a priori truths. An example of the former is
(1) Cicero is Tully.
An example of the latter is
(2) If Neptune exists, then Neptune causes the perturbations of the orbit of Uranus,
where “Neptune” has been introduced in a baptism by relying on the reference-
fixing description: “the planet that causes the perturbations of the orbit of Uranus”.
As regards the former case, CD claims that it expresses a contingent truth (in
both our senses of “contingent”), for the proposition it conveys is |the Cicero@c is
8More formally, (2b) is: ∃1x(I@i(x) & ♦(x utters nothing)).
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the Tully@t|, where c and t are the relevant tokens of “Cicero” and “Tully”. This
explains very clearly why we can know this proposition only a posteriori. But the
intuition that it conveys a necessary truth, being an identity statement, can be saved
by noting that, on the assumption that the proposition is true, it can be taken to
point, so to speak, to a (necessary2) Russellian proposition, |x = x|, where x is
the individual determined by the two descriptive contents in question, namely |the
Cicero@c| and |Tully@t|.
As regards the latter case, CD can admit that the speaker who introduces the name
“Neptune” can know a priori the proposition expressed by a token of (2). Suppose,
for example, that Le Verrier utters one such token. Then, we have a statement that
means (by taking n and n′ to be the two occurrences of “Neptune” in the statement
and F to be the property of causing the perturbation of Uranus):
(2a) |if the Neptune@n exists, then the Neptune@n′ is F|.9
This proposition is equivalent, given the rule PNCD for proper names of § 5.9, to:
(2b) |if the source of the nominal-causal chain leading to n exists, then the source
of the nominal-causal chain leading to n′ is F|.
Now, the speaker can know this proposition a priori (in the non-stringent sense,
noted above in § 4.6, that requires a posteriori knowledge only of the fact that the
relevant baptism has been performed and that the given token or tokens trace back
to the baptism in question). This is so, because he has performed the (non-ostensive)
baptism ceremony to which both n and n′ trace back. Thus, as Le Verrier uses these
tokens, he knows a priori (in the non-stringent sense) that (i) the two properties
|source of the nominal-causal chain leading to n| and |source of the nominal-causal
chain leading to n′| are coextensive and at most exemplified by one individual
(Neptune) and (ii) this individual (if any) has property F. Hence, the proposition
expressed is knowable a priori (in the non-stringent sense). Yet, it can be considered
contingent2. Take, e.g., a world where the tokens n and n′ of the name “Neptune”
are linked by a nominal-causal chain to an object that has been ostensively baptized
as “Neptune” and which happens not to have the property F. From the perspective
of this world, the proposition (2b) is false.
We saw in Chapter 4 that, according to Kaplan, sentences such as “I am here
now” and “I exist” provide other examples of the contingent a priori. But we also
saw that they are better classified as contingently self-supporting. We shall thus
discuss them below in § 8.8.
9Alternatively, and perhaps more appropriately, by taking the second occurrence of “Neptune” to
be anaphorically dependent on the first one, the expressed proposition is |if the Neptune@n exists,
then the Neptune@n is F|. But nothing crucial hinges on this as regards the topic of this section.
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8.7 Logical Truth, Validity and Indexicals
Let us reconsider these examples from § 4.7:
(1) if I am hungry, then I am hungry.
(2) This is a hand. If this is a hand, then I am not a brain in vat. Therefore, I am not
a brain in a vat.
As we said in § 4.7, we should acknowledge ILT and IVA as data. We repeat them
here for the reader’s convenience:
ILT. Indexicals and Logical Truths. If one speaker utters a statement such as a
token of “if I am hungry, then I am hungry” in a reasonable amount of time,
the speaker somehow conveys a proposition classifiable as logical truth.
IVA. Indexicals and Valid Arguments. If one speaker utters a sequence of state-
ments such as a token of “This is a hand. If this is a hand, then I am not a
brain in vat. Therefore, I am not a brain in a vat” in a reasonable amount of
time, while pointing at the same object, then the speaker somehow conveys
a sequence of propositions constituting a valid argument.
Now, it might be thought that CD is in trouble with these data.10 Let us illustrate
this by focusing on ILT. CD seems forced to admit that a given token, s, of (1)
expresses as pragmatic meaning a proposition such as:
(1a) |if the I@ i1 is hungry, then the I@ i2 is hungry|,
where i1 a and i2 are the two tokens of “I” occurring in s. The problem is that (1a)
is not a logical truth, since |I@i1| and |I@i2| are two different descriptive contents
which may well determine different individuals. Thus, CD, it appears, must admit
that a speaker, in uttering s, cannot convey a logical truth by virtue of the fact that the
pragmatic meaning of s is a logical truth. Yet, intuitively, the speaker does convey a
logical truth by uttering s, which should lead us to suspect that (1a), contrary to what
CD asserts, is not the pragmatic meaning of s. For it is plausible to assume that the
speaker conveys a logical truth by virtue of the fact that s pragmatically expresses a
logically true proposition.
I see two ways of dealing with data such as these from the perspective of CD.
Let us concentrate on ILT for the purpose of illustrating the difference between these
two ways. The first way claims that the speaker in question succeeds in conveying
the relevant logical truth simply by virtue of the fact that a token of (1) can be taken
to have a logical truth as its pragmatic meaning. The second way appeals to the
notion of referentialist meaning. Let us begin with the first way.
10The problems to be faced here are analogous to those pointed out by Corazza and Dokic 1992 in
relation to Perry’s account of cognitive significance (Perry 1998, 2001).
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The idea here is to acknowledge that the token s of (1) expresses a logical truth to
the extent that the second occurrence of “I”, i2, is taken to be an anaphoric term that
traces back to the first occurrence of “I”, i1. If this is the case, in the light of INPA
(cf. § 6.7), the two occurrences in question have the very same pragmatic meaning,
namely |the I@i1|. Hence, the expressed proposition is the tautological
(1b) |if the I@i1 is hungry, then the I@i1 is hungry|,
rather than the non-tautological (1a). By similarly appealing to INPA and the idea
that, in a token of (2), the second occurrences of “this” and “I” are anaphoric, the
sequence of propositions expressed by a token of (2) may well be (where t and i are
the relevant tokens):
(2a) |the this@t is a hand|, |if the this@t is a hand, then the I@i is not a brain in
vat|, |the I@i is not a brain in vat|.
Clearly, this sequence constitutes a valid argument.
In the above examples, a singular term occurs more than once, but its tokens are
considered anaphoric after the first occurrence. Of course this need not always be
the case, which explains why a token of
(3) this is a hand if and only if this is not
may very well express a contingently true proposition rather than a contradiction.
Suppose a token of (3) is uttered by a speaker who points at two different hands, as
he produces two different tokens of “this”, t1 and t2. Clearly, in such a context there
is no reason to consider t2 as anaphoric. The expressed proposition is then
(3a) |the this@t1 is a hand if and only if the this@t2 is not a hand|.
As we saw in the introduction, Kaplan’s type-oriented approach has trouble with
these examples, whereas CD can handle them quite well, as just noted.
It is worth noting that sentences such as (4) and (5) below, which differ from
the previous examples in that their anaphoric term is not of the same type as the
antecedent, can also be handled successfully as expressions of logical truths:
(4) If this is a hand, it is a hand.
(5) If John is hungry then he is hungry.
Consider first a token, s, of (4). On the assumption that t is the token of “this”
occurring in s, we get this pragmatic meaning:
(4a) |if the this@t is a hand then the (it & this@t) is a hand|.
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For we can take |the (it & this)|, in line with INCA of § 6.7, as the contextualized
linguistic meaning of the relevant token, i, of “it” (since |it| entails |this|). Moreover,
since |the this@t| is the pragmatic meaning of t, |the (it & this@t)| counts, in line
with INPA of § 6.7, as the pragmatic meaning of i. Note further that |hand| entails |it|
and thus, if the antecedent of the proposition (4a) is true, then the object identified
by |this@t| is also identified by the conjunctive property |(it & this@t)|. Hence, if
the antecedent |the this@t is a hand| is true, so is the consequent |the (it & this@t)
is a hand|. In sum, (4a) is a logical truth.
Let us now move to consider (5), and in particular a certain token of it, s. Suppose
j is the token of “John” occurring in s. Then the pragmatic meaning is:
(5a) |if the John@j is hungry then the (he & John@j) is hungry|.
For we can take |the (he & John)|, in line with PNCA of § 5.7, as the contextualized
linguistic meaning of the relevant token, h, of “he” (since |John| entails |he|, given
PNEN of § 5.8). Moreover, since |the John@j| is the pragmatic meaning of j, |the
(he & John@j)| counts, in line with PNPA of § 5.11, as the pragmatic meaning of h.
Note further that, since |John| entails |he|, if the antecedent of the proposition (5a) is
true, then the individual identified by |John@j| is also identified by the conjunctive
property |he & John@j|. Hence, if the antecedent |the John@j is hungry| is true, so
is the consequent |the (he & John@j) is hungry|. In sum, (5a) is a logical truth.
This account presupposes that proper names and the first-person pronoun can be
taken to be anaphoric. But can they be so taken? Aldo Frigerio in correspondence
has objected to this idea on the ground that anaphoric tokens are not autonomous,
i.e., cannot be properly interpreted if not by relying on previous expressions,
whereas proper names and “I” tokens can always be interpreted autonomously. The
idea seems to be this. Suppose that Kevin says:
(6) if Barry Smith went out, it is because he wanted to breathe some fresh air.
In this case, the relevant token of “he” is anaphoric, because it cannot be properly
interpreted without linking it to the previously occurring token of “Barry Smith”; in
particular, if it is not so linked, one cannot understand to whom it refers. In contrast,
if Kevin says
(7) if Barry Smith went out, it is because Barry Smith wanted to breathe some fresh
air,
the second token of “Barry Smith” can be properly interpreted without linking it to
the previous token of “Barry Smith”. That is, one can understand whom the token
refers to. Similarly, if I say
(8) if I went out, it is because I wanted to breathe some fresh air,
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my second token of “I” can be properly interpreted without linking it to the first
token of “I”. In particular, it is clear, without so linking it, that it refers to me.
Although I can see the rationale behind this point, at least as regards proper
names, it seems to me clear that Frigerio is not right here. For, in a context in which
there are two Barry Smiths, the proper interpretation of Kevin’s second token of
“Barry Smith” may well require that it be linked anaphorically to the first token so
as to rule out that it does not refer to the Barry Smith who is not the target of Kevin’s
remark (imagine we are at a philosophy conference where Barry Smith, the editor
of The Monist, and the other philosopher Barry C. Smith and are both present). Or
consider this variant of (7):
(7’) if Barry Smith went out, it is because Barry wanted to breathe some fresh air.
It seems to me that the second token of “Barry”, to be properly interpreted as co-
referring with the token of “Barry Smith”, had better not be taken as autonomous,
but rather as anaphorically linked to the latter token (compare with “if the brown car
stopped, the car must have run out of gas”).
As regards “I”, the issue is certainly more controversial. For a token of “I” used
as singular term can always be understood as referring to the speaker, whether or
not the speaker has already uttered previous tokens of “I”. For example, the second
token of “I” in my statement of (8) can be interpreted as referring to me, indepen-
dently of the fact that I already uttered a token of “I” while saying “If I went out”. In
reply to this, it can be said however that understanding who the referent of a certain
term happens to be is not all there is to the proper interpretation of the term. Let
us focus on the case in which a logic professor utters (1) in order to provide to her
class an example of a tautology. In such a case, one might argue, a proper interpre-
tation of the second token of “I” requires not only that it be understood in such a
way that it refers to the speaker, but also in such a way that the statement in which
it is embedded can be taken to express a tautology. And this can be done (at least
given the present account) precisely by taking the token in question as anaphorically
linked to a previous token of “I” rather than as autonomous. This may not be fully
convincing and thus it is worth remarking that we may deal with the data in question
in this section, even if we grant Frigerio that tokens of “I” can never be anaphoric.
It is sufficient to modify the rule IPP of § 6.3 for “I” slightly as follows (in line with
Reichenbach 1947, p. 287): 11
IPP∗. I: PRAG Principle∗. Suppose that i is an indexical token, with the indexi-
cal property |I| as linguistic meaning, such that (i) |the I| is the contextualized
linguistic meaning of i; and (ii) the contextual complex for i is primary. Then,
the following holds: PRAG(i, |I|, |contextual utterer of s|), where s is the
token of the statement or sequence of statements in which i is embedded).
11If we take this road, it seems appropriate to modify the analogous rules for “you” and “we”.
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If we do this, the proposition expressed by the token s of (1) is the tautological:
(1c) |if the I@s is hungry, then the I@s is hungry|.
Let us now deal with the second approach, which appeals to the notion of ref-
erentialist meaning introduced in § 7.9. If one feels uncomfortable with accepting
the previous option (perhaps it might seem ad hoc to claim that, when a token is
anaphoric, the antecedent token, rather than the anaphoric token itself, comes to
be a constituent of the pragmatic meaning of the anaphoric token in question), this
other option should be resorted to. On the assumption that x is the speaker of the
token, s, of (1), we can admit that s has the following Russellian proposition as
referentialist meaning:
(1c) |if x is hungry, then x is hungry|.
This proposition is tautological in form. Accordingly, one can say that the speaker
of s succeeds in conveying a logical truth by way of uttering a statement, s, which
happens to have (1c) as referentialist meaning. Mutatis mutandis, (2) and IVA can
be handled in the same way.
It may be worth noting that by similarly resorting to referentialist meaning,
we can account for intuitions related to those we find enshrined in ILT and IVA.
Consider these two sentences:
(9) John is a bachelor.
(10) John is unmarried.
Suppose that, in two different places and contexts, at time t a token, s1, of (9) is
uttered by Tom and a token, s2, is uttered by Mary. Both statements contain tokens
of “John”. Let us say they are j and j′, respectively. If j and j′ happen to refer to
the very same person, |john|, we may have the intuition that Tom and Mary hap-
pened to convey two propositions such that the one logically entails the other.12
Now, according to CD, this intuition cannot be accounted for by appealing to the
pragmatic meanings of s and s′, for these are, respectively, as follows (assuming
eternalist CD):
(9a) | at({the contextual time of s1}, the John@j is# a bachelor)|
and
(10a) | at({the contextual time of s2}, the John@j′ is# unmarried)|.
12A similar point is made in Q. Smith 1993.
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However, CD can admit that there are two Russellian propositions corresponding,
qua referentialist meanings, to (9a) and (10a), respectively. These are:
(9b) |at(t, john is# a bachelor)|
and
(10b) |at(t, john is# unmarried)|.
Clearly, (9b) logically entails (10b) and this can be taken to account for the intuition
in question.13
8.8 An Account of Self-Supporting Sentences
Let us turn to those sentences involving indexicals, which, according to Kaplan,
show the existence of contingently a priori truths, sentences such as “I exist” or “I
am here now”. As noted in § 4.8, these sentences, contrary to what Kaplan himself
does, should be put in one class with sentences such as
(1) I am an utterer,
sentences that we have called “contingently self-supporting”. Recall that a sentence,
S, of this kind is such that, if any token of it is uttered in a typical context, it expresses
a true proposition in virtue of the very fact that it has been uttered, and yet (i) the
proposition attributes a contingent property, F, a property such that whatever has it
could have failed to have it; moreover, (ii) it expresses a contingent2 proposition, a
proposition that could have been false. And thus: (iii) had a token of the necessita-
tion of S (i.e., “necessarily, S”) been uttered in its stead, the expressed proposition
would have been false; (iv) had a token of the anti-necessitation of S (i.e., “a might
have been a non-F”, “somebody might have been a non-F”, etc.) been uttered in its
stead, it would have expressed a truth. We want to verify that CD classifies these
sentences correctly.
Let us concentrate on (1) and in particular, as in the previous section, on a token
of it, s, uttered by Tom and involving the token, i, of “I”. Clearly, s (uttered, as we
assume, in a typical context) expresses, according to CD, a proposition that is true
in virtue of the very fact that it has been uttered. For CD claims that the pragmatic
meaning is the proposition
13In should be noted that in this example one cannot appeal to the principle PNPA of § 5.11, for
that principle applies to tokens occurring in a single statement or at least in the course of the same
dialogue. The descriptivist who does not want to appeal to referentialist meaning can perhaps try
to explain the intuition in question by the fact that the proposition expressed by (5) can be inferred
from that expressed by (6), on the assumption that the two tokens of “John” are co-referring.
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(1a) |the I@i is an utterer|,
equivalent to
(1b) |the contextual utterer of i is an utterer|.
Now, (1b) is clearly a true proposition in virtue of the fact that s has been uttered.
For |the contextual utterer of i| determines a unique individual, Tom, who, by having
uttered s, and in particular its component i, is an utterer. In sum, s expresses a truth
by the very fact that it has been uttered. This truth is a contingent one. And, in fact,
had Tom uttered a token, s′, of
(2) I might have been a non-utterer,
involving a token, i′, of “I”, he could have expressed a truth. For s′ could have been
given a de re interpretation:
(2a) |the I@i′ is possibly a non-utterer|.
This can be viewed as a proposition which asserts of the individual determined by
the descriptive content |the I@i′|, i.e. Tom, that in some possible world this individ-
ual is uttering nothing. Accordingly, (2a) is a truth; for, clearly, uttering something is
a contingent property which Tom does not have in some possible world. And thus,
had s′ been uttered instead of s, it would have expressed a truth (as appropriately
interpreted). Moreover, had a token s′′ of
(3) necessarily, I am an utterer
been uttered by Tom instead of the token s of (1), this token, s′′, could have
expressed a falsehood (as the contingency of (1b) indicates). For this de re
interpretation would have been available:
(3a) |the I@i′′ is necessarily an utterer|,
where i′′ is the token of “I” occurring in s′′.
It can be similarly shown that CD handles correctly other examples of contin-
gently self-supporting sentences, such as “I exist” or Predelli’s (2006) example
“something either exists now, has existed or will exist”. A regards this sentence,
note that, when a token, s, of it is uttered, by this very fact, the proposition expressed
is true, because s has been produced. Yet, for reasons analogous to those invoked
in relation to (1), the proposition is still a contingent one. To conclude, let us note
that it can also be easily verified in the same fashion that CD correctly classifies as
contingently self-defeating sentences such as “I say nothing”.
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8.9 Kaplan’s Twins and the Need for Impure
Descriptive Contents
Recall Kaplan’s example from § 4.9, involving Castor and Pollux, who, though in
qualitatively identical mental states, believe two different propositions (one true and
the other false), corresponding to two different tokens, 1-c and 1-p, of
(1) My brother was born before I was.
Kaplan presented this case as a problem for Frege’s descriptivism, because, using
premises allegedly acceptable by the latter doctrine, it can be shown that the two
tokens (as I would say from the perspective of my token-oriented approach to
semantics) should express the same proposition.
Clearly, according to CD, the two tokens 1-c and 1-p express different proposi-
tions. Assume as in § 4.9 that i-c is the token of “I” uttered by Castor and i-p the
one uttered by Pollux. Then, the two proposition are, respectively, as follows (by
using “B” to express the property that both Castor and Pollux attribute to themselves
by means of the locution “was born before I was”, in order to simplify irrelevant
details14):
(1c) |the I@i-c is B|,
(1p) |the I@i-p is B|.
Clearly, the two expressed propositions are different, as required by the example.
This is so simply because they involve two different tokens of “I”, and not because,
as the referentialist Kaplan urges, they involve Castor and Pollux themselves as con-
stituents. The issue arises however as to which premises used by Frege are dropped
by the supporter of CD in order to avoid the conclusion that the two statements 1-c
and 1-p express the same propositions. Once they are identified, we should verify
that the supporter of CD can drop them legitimately.
Recall that Kaplan uses implicitly something like these principles in his
argument:
NM. Narrowness of Meanings. Any mental state of grasping a meaning is nar-
row and more generally any mental state involving a meaning as content is a
narrow state.
MSDM. Mental State Determines Meaning. If the mental state of grasping the
meaning of an expression, E1, is narrow and is identical to the grasping of the
meaning of some (other) expression, E2, then the meaning of E1 is identical
14It should be noted however that in fact, since the locution in question contains “I”, we cannot
take for granted that Castor and Pollux express the same property by uttering it.
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to the meaning of E2. More generally, if the state of having an attitude, A, to
the meaning of an expression, E1, is narrow and is identical to the state of
having the same attitude, A, to the meaning of E2, then the meaning of E1 is
identical to the meaning of E2.
PP. Putnam’s Principle. If X and Y are two mentally qualitatively indistinguish-
able subjects, and X is in a certain narrow state, s1, then there is state, s2, of
Y such that s1 is identical to s2.
Clearly, according to CD, the meaning of a written or spoken statement may
happen to be wide, by way of containing as constituent an objectively existing token
and, accordingly, having a propositional attitude to it may well be considered a broad
state. Hence, according to CD, NM is not in general true. We are not then free to
use MSDM, which can be applied only when narrow states are involved. In fact, if
Castor and Pollux are speaking out loud when they utter 1-c and 1-p, we may want
to say that the two propositions (1c) and (1p) are broad, because they involve, two
worldly objects, the acoustic tokens i-c and i-p, respectively. Consequently, Castor
and Pollux are in broad states when they believe (1c) and (1p), respectively, and thus
MSDM cannot be used.
It may be noted however that the two twins may very well “utter” the token 1-c
and 1-p in inner speech and, someone might argue, in this case, that the correspond-
ing propositions are not broad and the belief states in question are narrow. This
can be granted. Nevertheless, Kaplan’s argument should still be rejected, because,
I think, PP is questionable. The point is that two subjects may be mentally qualita-
tively indistinguishable even if they have the same attitude to two different contents,
provided these two contents differ by way of involving as constituents two numeri-
cally different but qualitatively indistinguishable particulars. In our example, Castor
has a believing attitude to the proposition (1c), whereas Pollux has one to the propo-
sition (1p). The two propositions differ in that the former contains the inner speech
token i-c, whereas the latter contains the inner speech token i-p. This difference
is not in conflict with the assumption that Castor and Pollux are in qualitatively
identical mental states, if we grant that i-c and i-p are qualitatively indistinguish-
able (which the supporter of CD may well concede). In conclusion, CD drops both
NM and PP. What is crucial however is the rejection of PP. As we have seen, this
can be done legitimately to the extent that we can appeal to the presence of (qual-
itatively indistinguishable) particulars as constituents of narrow contents. CD has
elbow room here in that it rejects the Fregean assumption that all meanings are
pure (devoid of particulars as constituents) and it rather follows Russell in admitting
impure meanings, and in particular impure descriptive contents, with particulars as
constituents. In a nutshell, what twin arguments show is that singular reference by
indexicals is not “mediated by purely qualitative senses”, as Garcia-Carpintero puts
it (2000, p. 122), and accordingly CD resorts to impure descriptive contents to take
care of this (which is not to deny that there may be other good reasons for admitting
them).
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8.10 Misdescription, Pronominal Contradiction
and Collateral Propositions
Recall the example of speaker reference by misdescription proposed by Donnellan
1966: someone (say, Tom) utters a token of
(1) Smith’s murderer is insane
and he succeeds, given the context, in referring to Jones (thereby attributing to him
the property of being insane), even if in fact Jones is no murderer (contrary to what
is assumed by Tom and, perhaps, his interlocutor, Mary). According to Donnellan,
this should be explained by postulating a special semantic ambiguity in a definite
description “the F” (and thus in the definite article): it can either express a descrip-
tive content, |the F|, or directly refer to an object. When a description is used in a
context in such a way that the pragmatic meaning is a directly referred object, it is
used referentially, otherwise attributively. Can we explain the data, without assum-
ing that definite descriptions are ambiguous in this way and thus without assuming
that tokens of definite descriptions can be directly referential?
I shall do so following, at least in part, Castañeda 1977 (p. 133). The basic idea
is that a speaker reference by misdescription takes place not so much because a
token of “the F” directly refers to an object, x, which is not F, nor because the token
in question somehow expresses a descriptive content |the H| such that H does not
entail F (as in the descriptivist view of Loar 1976), but simply because a speaker,
in uttering a token of a sentence of the form “the F is G” believes, or can be taken
to believe (whether consciously or unconsciously) a proposition like |the H is G|
(call it collateral proposition for the speaker) such that |the H| actually determines
x, so that the speaker attributes property G to x. This can happen for at least two
reasons: either because the speaker has, or can be assumed to have as a background
belief, the identity proposition |{the F} is identical to {the G}| (Castañeda 1977,
p. 133); or because, as a result of a pronominal contradiction, as we shall see below,
the speaker conversationally implicates (in the Gricean sense) |the H is G|.15
15Neale (1990, note 5, p. 103) provides a useful list of other philosophers, beside Castañeda, who
have rejected Donnellan’s semantic ambiguity account of reference by misdescription [including
Kripke (1977, 1980)]. Neale himself provides one such account, an account that follows Grice in
appealing to the notion of conversational implicature. I am not sure that we need to appeal to this
notion here, if not, as we shall see below, in dealing with pronominal contradiction (Neale does
not however appeal to conversational implicature to account for the latter). Be this as it may, more
importantly, Neale also assumes that, where I see a collateral proposition involving a descriptive
content that determines x, we should rather see a singular proposition involving x as a constituent,
which the speaker and the interlocutor(s) could express by a directly referential term, such as, by
Neale’s standards, a proper name. For instance, in the above example, the singular proposition
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With this in mind, let us discuss Donnellan’s example from the point of view of
CD. Strictly speaking, the proposition expressed by Tom’s token of (1) is
(1a) |the murderer of Smith@s is insane|,
where s is the relevant token of “Smith”. This descriptive content does not determine
Jones, since Jones, by hypothesis, did not murder Smith. Hence, Tom cannot be said
to refer to Jones by virtue of having used a token that refers to Jones. Yet, he can
be said to have referred to Jones as a result of a speaker reference by misdescription
for the following reasons. Although |the murderer of Smith@s| does not determine
Jones, there is a descriptive content, |the G|, such that Tom can be taken to have the
belief |{the murderer of Smith@s} is identical to {the G}|, as he tokens (1) (|the G|
could be, say, |the person called Jones, convicted for the murder of the person called
Smith| or |the individual presented by g|, where g is a perceptual image induced in
Tom’s field of consciousness by Jones’ presence in his surroundings). Accordingly,
the proposition
(1b) |the G is insane|
can be considered collateral for the speaker Tom, and, since |the G| determines
Jones, Tom can be said to have referred to the latter.16
Let us consider now the issue of pronominal contradiction. As we have seen, we
can enrich Donnellan’s example, by supposing that Mary replies:
would be expressible by “Jones is insane” and would have Jones himself as a constituent con-
tributed by the relevant token of “Jones”. Of course I cannot follow Neale and buy the referentialist
presuppositions implicit in this account.
16It should be noted that speaker reference by misdescription can occur even when the speaker
believes that the description she is using fails to describe the object that she is referring to, as
pointed out in Donnellan 1966, § 4, with the example of a speaker who refers to someone as “the
King”, despite believing that he is not the legitimate king. Castañeda (1981, p. 279) emphasized
this point with a variation on the theme of the famous martini example from Donnellan 1966. This
involves a man who is actually drinking water and a person who succeeds in referring to him by
asking “who is the man who is drinking martini?”; Donnellan concocted the case in order to show
that a referentially used description can turn up not only in an assertion but also in a question.
Castañeda’s variation goes as follows. Keith knows that a certain man at the corner in front of him
and Myrna is drinking a glass of water, but he also knows that Myrna believes of the same man
that he is drinking martini. Keith does not want to point at the man, but wants to induce Myrna to
go talk to him. He thus says to Myrna: “the man at the corner in front of us who is drinking martini
is a movie director looking for an actress for his new play”. In this case, Keith can be assumed
(by Myrna) to have, e.g., a belief such as |the man at the corner in front of us who is drinking
martini is the man presented by g| (where g is a visual presentation of a man in the surroundings,
and |the man presented by g| actually determines the man in question). There is a similar example
in Castañeda 1977, p. 133: John, who knows there is no dean, but knows that Peter believes that
George is the dean, says to Peter: “the dean is ill”, in order to convey to him the information that
George is ill.
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(2) he is not a murderer, someone else killed Smith.
In this case, Mary would also refer to Jones. Can this be accepted without buying
the referentialist picture, according to which Mary’s token of “he”, h, directly refers
to Jones? Here we might debate on whether h is used as a basic indexical or as an
anaphoric pronoun that traces back the relevant token, of “Smith’s murderer”. In
either case, the answer to the above question is “yes”, as we shall now see.
Suppose first that h is taken to be used as a basic indexical. Then, according
to CD, the pragmatic meaning of h must be understood in accordance with rule
S/HE/ITPP of § 6.5. In other words, h has a pragmatic meaning, |the he@h|, whose
property component is co-extensive with |most salient male in the interdoxastic
domain of h|. Clearly, the most salient male at issue (given the circumstances) is
Jones and thus h refers to Jones. Suppose now that h is working as an anaphoric
pronoun. In this case, in view of INPA of § 6.7, the pragmatic meaning of h is |the
(he & murderer of the Smith@s)|, where s is the token of “Smith” uttered by Tom.
Hence, the proposition expressed by Mary’s statement is
(2a) | the (he & murderer of Smith@s) is not a murderer|
(we neglect for simplicity’s sake that Mary also said “someone else killed Smith”).
Since |the (he & murderer of Smith@s)| does not determine Jones (as he did not
murder Smith), it is not in virtue of having expressed the proposition (2a) that
Mary has referred to Jones. However, since (2a) is trivially self-contradictory, and
Mary is not (by hypothesis) irrational, we must also admit that Mary has deliber-
ately violated the Gricean maxim of quality and therefore she has conversationally
implicated another quite different proposition, something like
(2b) |the person believed by Tom to be the murderer of Smith@s is not a
murderer|.17
Accordingly, (2b) can be considered collateral for the speaker Mary, and, since |the
person believed by Tom to be the murderer of Smith@s| determines Jones, Mary
can be said to have referred to Jones. We can handle in the same way Whitehead’s
example of pronominal contradiction considered in § 4.10 (with a speaker who says:
“that church is beautiful” and an interlocutor who replies: “it is not a church”).
17On the basis of what he says for a similar example, we can add that, according to Neale (1990,
p. 203), something like (2b) is the pragmatic meaning of Mary’s statement (Neale follows Davies’
idea (1981) that a pronoun such as Mary’s token of “he” can be considered “nonliteral” and
“ironic”). But to follow this line implies, as Neale admits, restricting the generality of his (P5)
rule (see his p. 182) for anaphoric pronouns, on which I myself relied in my treatment of anaphoric
pronouns. I prefer my account according to which the pragmatic meaning is (2a). An alternative
line that could be explored is the one offered by Sainsbury in his attempt (2005, § 4.1.5) to amend
Evans’s account of anaphoric pronouns in the light of pronominal contradiction and the like.
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8.11 Taming the Problems of Choice, Ignorance and Error
As explained in § 4.11, the problems of choice, ignorance and error arise with def-
inite descriptions, proper names and indexicals. I shall only discuss descriptions as
it should be clear that an analogous discussion from the point of view of CD could
be provided for the other categories of singular terms. It should first be noted, as
Neale (1990, p. 98) points out, that the problem of choice and the related problems
of ignorance and error can be raised as regards incomplete determiner phrases in
general and not just for incomplete descriptions. We thus need a general theory of
incomplete determiner phrases in order to deal with these problems, if we are to
tame them. I submit that CD provides such a theory. According to CD, the mean-
ing of an incomplete determiner phrase token, t, is determined in a principled way
by a very general recipe that appeals, so to speak, to the token t itself: if the con-
textualized linguistic meaning of t is |det F|, where det is any determiner meaning,
then, by DPPM of § 5.3, the pragmatic meaning is |det F@t|, and this is so indepen-
dently of the speaker’s intentions. Let us verify that this approach can account for
the intuitions that fuel the three problems in question.
Consider the table example discussed in § 4.11. While in room 201 of the
Philosophy department at the University of Iowa, Tom says
(1) the table is covered with books
and thereby refers to a certain table, x, and expresses a true proposition. According
to CD, the expressed proposition is
(1a) |the table@t is covered with books|,
where t is the singular term token uttered by Tom.
Consider now the set of all the properties that identify x and that could be consid-
ered, according to a supporter of the ellipsis theory criticized by the referentialists,
as good candidates in an effort to specify the pragmatic meaning of t. For instance, a
property such as |table in room 201 of the Philosophy department at the University
of Iowa| (on the understanding that the pragmatic meaning would be expressible
by something like “the table in room 201 of the Philosophy department at the
University of Iowa”). For any property, F, in this set, we can assume that PRAG(t,
|table|, F) holds. Accordingly, the property |table@t| also identifies x, just like F,
in line with the assumption that Tom’s token of “the table”, t, refers to x and thus
that there is a speaker reference to x. Yet, this is also in line with the intuition that x
was not referred by Tom as the F, but in a more neutral way, for, according to CD,
the pragmatic meaning of t is |the table@t| (and thus CD need not worry about the
problem of choice). That this is the meaning of the token t is also in line with the
fact that the speaker may not be able to provide any description of the kind |the F|
(and thus CD need not worry about the problem of ignorance). In fact the speaker
can simply have the tacit knowledge that the meaning is |the table@t| without any
explicit knowledge of a truth of the type PRAG(t, |table|, F). Moreover, the fact that
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the meaning of the token t is |the table@t| explains why the token refers to x, in
spite of the fact that the speaker may wrongly believe that in using the token he has
referred to an item characterizable as, say, the table in room 103, when in fact x is
not the table in room 103 (as it is located, say, in room 101) (accordingly, CD should
not worry about the problem of error). For the token t, in virtue of its having |the
table@t| as its pragmatic meaning, refers to x independently of the speaker’s beliefs
(for what t refers to depends solely on truths of the form PRAG(t, table, F), whether
the speaker believes them or not).
8.12 A Solution for the Pierre and Paderewski Puzzles
We have seen in § 4.12 that Kripke 1979 presents two puzzles having to do with
co-reference, which were supposed to be problematic for referentialists and descrip-
tivists alike. We shall now see that CD has no troubles in dealing with them.
Consider the Pierre puzzle and the Kripkean principles reported in § 4.12, namely,
PT. Principle of Translation. If a sentence of one language expresses a truth in
that language, then any translation of it into any other language also expresses
a truth (in that other language).
KDP. Kripke’s Disquotational Principle (for English). A normal English
speaker who is not reticent will be disposed to sincere reflective assent to “p”
(if and) only if he believes that p (provided “p” contains no indexical and, if
it contains ambiguities, it is understood in one way in all its occurrences).
True, by applying PT and KDP we are led to assert both:
(1) Pierre believes that London is pretty
and
(2) Pierre believes that London is not pretty.
However, from the point of view of CD, these sentences are in a sense elliptical
because beliefs expressible by recourse to proper names involve proper name tokens
as constituents and the sentences in question do not tell us which tokens are involved
in the beliefs. Thus, (1) and (2) should be viewed as conveying propositions along
these lines:
(1a) |there is a token, t, such that Pierre believes that the London@t is pretty|
and
(2a) |there is a token, t, such that Pierre believes that the London@t is not pretty|.
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Once we see things in this light, it is clear that (1) and (2) do not really attribute
contradictory beliefs to Pierre, any more than the existence of a contradiction is
proved by the fact that Tom truly says “the table is covered with books” in a room
with only one table which happens to be covered with books just when Mary truly
says “the table is not covered with books” in another room with only one table which
happens not to be covered with books. For (1) and (2) can now be seen as made true
by the fact that Pierre believes, say, these propositions:
(1a′) | the London@t1 is pretty|
and
(2a′) |the London@t2 is not pretty|,
where t1 and t2 are tokens of “Londres” and “London”, respectively. These two
beliefs do not logically contradict one another. Indeed, given the situation, we can
explain how Pierre comes to have them without assuming that he is irrational: for
him, the two tokens, t1 and t2, trace back to two different cities that share the
property of being London (and thus of being called Londres or London) but that
differ (inter alia) in that one is the source of the nominal-causal chain leading to
t1, whereas the other is the source of the nominal-causal chain leading to t2. His
mistake (not a logical one) lies in not knowing, as we may say in our technical ter-
minology, that both properties, source of the nominal-causal chain leading to t1, and
source of the nominal-causal chain leading to t2, are possessed by one and the same
city.18
The Paderewski puzzle can be dealt with in a similar manner. By KDP we can
infer both
(3) Peter believes that Paderewski had musical talent
and
(4) Peter believes that Paderewski had no musical talent.
18I have worked on the assumption that the tokens of “Londres” and “London” at play here have
the same linguistic meaning, as Kripke wants. However, according to CD, the linguistic meaning
of a proper name is a sortal concept. Given the assumption in question, the sortal concept is the
property |London|, linguistically expressed by both “London” and “Londres”. It is not obvious
however that “London” and “Londres” have exactly the same linguistic meaning. We might want
to say that the former expresses a property, |London|, analytically equivalent to |called London|
and the latter a property, |Londres|, analytically equivalent to |called Londres| (for more details on
this way of seeing the matter see Orilia 2000). Once we grant this, Pierre has these two beliefs:
|the Londres@t1 is pretty| and |the London@t2 is not pretty|.
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But from the point of view of CD these two sentences should be viewed as
expressing, respectively:
(3a) |there is a token, t, such that Peter believes that the Paderewski@t had musical
talent|
and
(4a) |there is a token, t, such that Peter believes that the Paderewski@t had no
musical talent|,
or something along similar lines. Clearly, these two propositions may be true with-
out there being any inconsistency in Peter’s system of beliefs. All we need to
suppose is that Peter has these two beliefs:
(3a’) |the Paderewski@t1 had musical talent|
and
(4a’) |the Paderewski@t2 had no musical talent|,
where t1 and t2 are two distinct tokens of “Paderewski”. Peter is simply mak-
ing the (non-logical) error of taking the two tokens in question as tracing back to
two different baptisms (involving two different individuals baptized with the same
name).
8.13 Referentialism and the Co-reference and No-reference
Problems
As we have seen, the problem of co-reference may arise in many guises, which
involve not only propositional attitudes, but also notions such as informativeness,
necessity and possibility. Arguably, however, it is in relation to propositional-
attitude reports that the issue is most pressing and thus unsurprisingly many
supporters of referentialism have tried to provide an account of such reports capa-
ble of relieving this doctrine of being jeopardized by this problem. Following
McKay and Nelson 2005, we can distinguish two main strategies19 put forward by
19Apart from descriptivism, McKay and Nelson 2005 discuss two other approaches to
propositional-attitude reports, which I set aside as less important, at least for present purposes.
First, there are viewpoints that deny that the objects of propositional attitudes are structured propo-
sitions, either because they are taken to be linguistic entities (sentences in Carnap 1958 and Quine
1956 and statements in Davidson’s paratactic approach of 1968) or because they are considered
sets of possible worlds or the like (Hintikka 1969, Stalnaker 1984, Lewis 1986, Montague 1974).
Second, there are “ ambiguity theories” according to which propositional attitude reports express
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referentialists in order to deal with the problem of co-reference, as it arises in propo-
sitional attitude reports: naive Russellianism and contextualism. Salmon 1986 and
Crimmins and Perry 1989 provide well-known versions of the former and the latter,
respectively, and thus I shall rely on them to give the flavour of these approaches.
However, I shall also dwell a bit on the more recent Soames 2002 in relation to
naive Russellianism and Perry 2001 in relation to contextualism.20 For illustration,
I shall focus on a classical example involving proper names and belief reports, but
the same ideas can of course be applied to indexicals and to propositional attitude
reports in general. For uniformity with what I have done in most of this book, I shall
assume as far as possible a token-oriented approach to meaning rather than a type-
oriented one, although not all proponents of naive Russellianism or contextualism
would agree. Nothing crucial however will hinge on this.
Let us pretend that the well-known Superman stories are true and thus assume
that the tokens, t1 and t2, of (1) and (2) below, respectively, are co-referentially
equivalent.
(1) Superman flies.
(2) Clark Kent flies.
Suppose we seem to have evidence that, in a given context, a token, t3, of (3) is true
and a token, t4, of (4) is false:
(3) Lois believes that Superman flies.
(4) Lois believes that Clark Kent flies.
According to naive Russellianism, it cannot really be the case that t3 is true and t4
is false, since the embedded that-clauses express the very same (mundane) singular
proposition, namely
(1/2) |superman flies|,
with Superman/Clark Kent as constituent, i.e., the one proposition expressed by both
t1 and t2. In Salmon’s terminology, this is the proposition that the relevant tokens
(because of an ambiguity in verbs such as “believe” and the like) both a relation between the attribu-
tee and a singular proposition and a relation between the attributee and a descriptive proposition
(see McKay and Nelson 2005 for discussion and criticism of these views).
20Beside Salmon 1986, McKay and Nelson cite many other manifestations of naive Russellianism,
including Tye 1978, McKay 1981, Bealer 1982, Soames 1987, 1989b, Braun 1998, Nelson 2002.
Perry 2001, p. 97, calls it, the “bite the bullet approach” and finds it in Barwise and Perry
1983, Salmon 1986 and Soames 1989a (Bealer abandons referentialism in his 1998, at least as
regards proper names, by associating them to modes of presentations). As regards contextual-
ism, beside Crimmins and Perry 1989, McKay and Nelson cite Loar 1972, Schiffer 1977, Richard
1990, Crimmins 1992. Recanati 1993 can presumably be added to the list. It should be noted
that although Schiffer has presented contextualism as worth more serious consideration than naive
Russellianism, he has nevertheless not committed himself to the former (Schiffer 1992, 2003).
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of the that-clause “semantically encode” (in my terminology it should be called
pragmatic meaning of such tokens). The impression that t4 is false must then be
explained away pragmatically, by trading on a distinction between the proposition
believed and ways of believing it or, more generally, modes of presentations, ways or
propositional guises in which or under which the proposition is taken, apprehended,
grasped or entertained. Presumably, one would expect that the modes of presentation
of a proposition should in turn involve modes of presentation of the constituents of
the proposition, but, as we shall see, this may in the end have to be rejected.21 In
the case at issue, there are different propositions, P3 and P4, about the way (1/2)
is believed by Lois (which presumably differ by virtue of involving two distinct
modes of presentation of Superman/Clark Kent). By uttering t3 one pragmatically
implicates P3 and by uttering t4 one pragmatically implicates P4 (by and large, P3
and P4 are propositions conversationally implicated in the sense of Grice, and thus
they are not pragmatic meanings in my sense of the term; in Salmon’s terminology
they are “pragmatically imparted” propositions). The idea is that P3 is true and P4
is false, and this is why, according to this strategy, we may have the impression that
t3 expresses a true proposition and t4 a false one.
Given this appeal to modes of presentation, Salmon urges that the ordinary dyadic
relation of belief (expressed by the English “to believe”) be understood by recourse
to a more primitive triadic relation, BEL, which can relate a subject, a proposition
and a mode of presentation of the proposition in question. The idea is that the mode
of presentation is quantified over. For example, given that (1/2) is the proposition
expressed by the that-clauses in t3 and t4, both statements express in effect this
proposition:
(3/4) |there is a mode of presentation, m, such that BEL(lois, |superman flies|, m)|.
This proposition is true, according to this account, because there is indeed a mode of
presentation in relation to which Lois is linked by BEL to (1/2), intuitively, the one
which arises from her thinking of the person, x, who happens to be both Superman
and Clark Kent as a superhero with such and such superpowers. However, contrary
to t3, t4 pragmatically implicates that Lois is linked by BEL to (1/2) by means of
a mode of presentation arising from a conception of x as a shy journalist wearing
glasses. But it is not the case that there is such a mode of presentation via which
BEL links Lois to (1/2).
It can be granted in this approach that Lois believes a contradiction, to the extent
that we also have reason to assert a token, t5, of
(5) Lois believes that Clark Kent does not fly.
21Salmon does not commit himself to any specific doctrine about the nature of these modes of
presentation, but of course a stand could be taken. For example, Braun 1998 proposes that they are
sentences in a language of thought.
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For to assert this is tantamount to asserting that Lois believes the opposite of (1/2),
namely ∼(1/2). But, it is argued, this does not mean that Lois is irrational, to the
extent that, roughly speaking, (i) she believes (1/2) under a way of believing involv-
ing a “Superman” mode of presentation; (ii) she believes ∼(1/2) under a way of
believing involving a “Clark Kent” mode of presentation; and (iii) she does not take
these two modes to be modes of presentation of the same individual. We can also
grant the truth of t3 together with the truth of a statement that appears to contradict
it, namely a token, t6, of
(6) Lois does not believe that Superman flies.
For t6 can be taken to express the proposition that there is a mode of presentation,
m, such that ∼BEL(Lois, |superman flies|, m) is true. And this of course does not
contradict the proposition expressed by t3, namely (3/4).
Soames has revised his approach considerably in moving to his 2002 from his
previous works 1987, 1989a and 1989b. Yet, he can perhaps still be considered
a naive Russellian. He works with a type-oriented approach to meaning and it is
difficult to convey his position from a token-oriented standpoint, so let us for a
moment switch to the type-oriented approach. Soames thinks that a simple sen-
tence involving a proper name, such as (1) and (2), may be uttered in order to
assert many different truth-conditionally equivalent propositions in different con-
texts (2002, Chapter 3). Roughly, these propositions differ in that they may have
different descriptive contents corresponding to the proper name of the sentence,
depending on how the speaker and the interlocutors conceive of the bearer of
the name. However, in all cases the singular proposition with the bearer of the
name in flesh and blood as constituent will be asserted. For this reason, Soames
argues, this singular proposition should be considered, in line with referentialism,
“the” meaning of the sentence. This approach is then transposed to the more com-
plicated case in which a simple sentence with a proper name is embedded in a
propositional-attitude context, as in (3) and (4). Even in these cases we may have
different propositions asserted by means of these sentences. Thus, for example,
with (3) the speaker may assert a proposition with a descriptive content such as
|the superhero| associated with the name “Superman”, beside conveying a propo-
sition with Superman/Clark Kent in flesh and blood as constituent. And with (4),
the speaker may assert a proposition with a descriptive content such as |the shy
journalist| associated with the name “Clark Kent”, beside asserting a proposition
with Superman/Clark Kent in flesh and blood as constituent. Thus, on the one hand,
we can say that (3) and (4) are both true (as the naive Russellian demands), since
both can be viewed as conveying that Lois believes the very same mundane sin-
gular proposition. But, on the other hand, we can also say that (3) is true and
(4) is false (as our prima facie intuitions demand), since Lois believes of Clark
Kent/Superman that he flies when conceiving of him as the superhero, but not when
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conceiving of him as the shy journalist (see in particular Soames 2002, pp. 206 and
213).22
According to contextualism, it is indeed the case that the token t3 of (3) is true
and the token t4 of (4) is false and this is so in spite of the fact the embedded that-
clauses express the very same mundane proposition, (1/2), with Superman/Clark
Kent as constituent. To achieve this result, the contextualist must also appeal to
modes of presentation or the like, but in a different way. As Crimmins and Perry
see it in their 1989, the difference in truth value between t3 and t4 is due to the
fact that they express23 two propositions, P3 and P4, that differ from each other
in that they involve two distinct, contextually determined, modes of presentations
(neglecting some details that we can leave out for present purposes) of the singu-
lar proposition (1/2), involving Clark Kent/Superman as constituent. These modes
of presentations are “unarticulated constituents” of the propositions (Crimmins and
Perry 1989, p. 218), since they are not contributed to these propositions by syn-
tactically explicit elements of the relevant statements (and thus are contributed,
according to Schiffer, by “hidden indexicals”; see, e.g., his 1992, p. 503).24 We
may thus say that, according to this approach, “believes” expresses a triadic relation
involving an attributee, a proposition and the mode of presentation working as the
unarticulated constituent, rather than a dyadic relation to be analyzed in terms of a
triadic relation, BEL, as in Salmon. The mode of presentation involved in the propo-
sition expressed by t3 is different from the one involved in the proposition expressed
by t4 and thus these two propositions are different. And it so happens that the former
is true and the other is false.
22Fine 2007 accepts naive Russellianism in dealing with the co-reference problem (p. 51), but its
approach is quite different from those we have just described, as it does not appeal to modes of
presentation. Fine relies on a non-standard semantics that in order to provide a new understanding
of variables gives up compositionality and then tries to put this approach at the service of the
naive Russellian (p. 37 ff.). Thus, according to Fine, although “Cicero” and “Tully” have the same
meaning, namely the referent, a certain person in flesh and blood, the two sentences “Cicero is
Cicero” and “Tully is Tully” do not have the same meaning. This is because, as Fine puts it at
p. 51, “‘Cicero’ is strictly coreferential with ‘Cicero’ but . . . ‘Cicero’ is only accidentally (not
strictly) coreferential with ‘Tully’”. Interesting and novel as this approach may be, I have been
working on the assumption, common to both the typical descriptivist and the typical referentialist,
that compositionality should by and large be preserved.
23Given my terminology, I should say, more precisely, “pragmatically expresses” rather than sim-
ply “expresses”. It should be noted however that, because of a different terminology, the supporter
of this approach may prefer “semantically expresses” or “semantically encodes”.
24To say that a contextualist approach appeals to modes of presentation is an approximation that
can do for present purposes, but that should be set aside once we focus on the differences among
the various contextualist theories. For example, Crimmins and Perry 1989 do not really appeal
to modes of presentation of a given singular proposition, but to a sequence of various notions of
constituents of the singular proposition (where these notions are understood as “cognitive particu-
lars;” see p. 215). In contrast, Schiffer 1992 appeals to kinds of mode of presentation (contextually
picked up by the hidden indexicals that he postulates; see p. 503).
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The referentialist approach more recently provided by Perry 2001 can also be
considered a contextualist theory of sorts. Perry distinguishes between the proposi-
tion working as the official content or meaning of a statement and other propositions
working as additional contents that can be associated with the statement (in particu-
lar, “reflexive contents”, which involve as constituents elements of the statement
itself, as in Reichenbach 1947 and in my own token-reflexive version of CD).
The idea seems to be that t3 and t4 differ in truth value because their embedded
that-clauses, although having as their official meaning the very same singular propo-
sition, P, with Superman/Clark Kent as constituents, are associated to two different
additional contents. It may not be immediately clear how this association is to be
understood (so much so that Perry has been suspected of sliding back to a form
of descriptivism; cf. Loeffler 200125). However, Perry (2001, p. 97) claims that
his new approach fits with the one of Crimmins and Perry 1989 (further devel-
oped in Crimmins 1992) and so we might surmise that such additional contents are
contextually-determined unarticulated constituents that work as modes of presen-
tations of the singular proposition expressed by the embedded that-clause, pretty
much as in Crimmins and Perry 1989.26
Both naive Russellianism and contextualism have been subject to many criti-
cisms. As regards naive Russellianism, Richard 1990 has pointed out that belief
attributions can be used to express propositions with explanatory and predictive
roles. For example, t3 invites the correct prediction that Lois will invoke the super-
hero’s help, as she is about to fall from a skyscraper, whereas t4 invites the wrong
prediction that Lois will invoke the shy journalist’s help and thus t3 and t4 can hardly
be taken to express the same proposition. Perhaps this issue can be addressed by
moving to the level of what is pragmatically imparted, but it has been pointed out
that the appeal to Gricean ideas to substantiate a distinction such as the one between
what is semantically encoded and what is pragmatically imparted is problematic
(Recanati 1993, Chapter 17). Further, Schiffer 1987 has concocted a puzzle involv-
ing an iterated belief attribution, a puzzle that arises once belief is analyzed in the
way proposed by Salmon (more on this below). Still further, Bealer 2004 has pre-
sented an argument to the effect that the recourse to modes of presentation by the
contextualist threatens to force her to abandon basic principles of the logic of iden-
tity.27 As regards contextualism, a battery of arguments against it is presented in
Schiffer 1992. As I see it, the most serious is that a verb such as “believe” is hardly
25Actually, Loeffler 2001 does not refer to Perry 2001 but to previous works of Perry, where how-
ever the approach presented in the latter is already articulated (Perry 1990, 1997). This approach
should not be confused with Perry’s earlier one, which relies heavily on belief states and roles,
which are analogues of Kaplan’s characters (Perry 1977, 1979).
26This was confirmed to me by John Perry in conversation.
27As a matter of fact, Bealer does not distinguish between contextualism and naive Russellianism
in the way I am doing it here and claims that he is criticising referentialism in general (or,
as he puts it, the “direct reference theory”). His argument however is in fact directed against
naive Russelianism as here understood. At any rate, it seems to me that the argument should be
extendable to contextualism as well.
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comparable to verbs for which we have good evidence that they are triadic. For
example, Schiffer argues (p. 518), to somebody who says “Mary sold the house”,
we may ask “to whom?” and expect a clear reply. But not so if we ask something
like “in what way?” to someone who utters a belief report such as “Mary believes
that Cicero is an orator”. Criticisms have also been levelled against the recourse to
unarticulated constituents (or hidden indexicals), for they appear to be appealed to
in ways that can hardly be motivated from a syntactic point of view (McKay and
Nelson 2005, p. 19).
As might be expected, there is a vast literature of replies and counter-replies
emerging from the attempts by the supporters of these approaches to free them from
the traps that their critics have lain for them. It is hard to avoid the impression
however that in being disentangled from these traps the approaches in question are
in turn entangled in highly suspicious theoretical epicycles. This is most evident
if we have a look at the literature arising from Schiffer’s (1987) argument based
on iterated beliefs against Salmon’s approach. Salmon has replied in his 1989 and
the two philosophers have taken up the issue again in Schiffer 2006 and Salmon
2006. The problem is this. Given Salmon’s approach, if Tom knows that Superman
is Clark Kent and he is also aware of Lois’ doxastic situation, we should say that
Tom believes that Lois believes that Superman flies and also that Tom believes that
it is not the case that Lois believes that Superman flies. Thus, Tom believes a propo-
sition and its opposite, but since we have no reason to say that this is due to modes
of presentation of Superman/Clark Kent which Tom takes to be modes of presenta-
tion of distinct individuals, we seem forced to the unwelcome conclusion that Tom
is irrational. In his 2006 reply, Salmon resorts to the idea that Tom (or more gen-
erally a person in a situation such as his) is not irrational in that he takes the very
same proposition (1/2) under two different modes of presentation (since he attributes
to it two complementary properties, namely being believed by Lois and not being
believed by Lois), despite the fact that there are no constituents of this proposition
of which it can be said that Tom grasps them under two different modes of presen-
tation.28 However, it seems to me that this result is highly problematic for it leaves
us with no clear conception of how modes of presentation are supposed to work.
Given this problem with iterated beliefs, if not for other reasons, contextualism
is preferable to naive Russellianism (as Schiffer seems to assume in his 1992, where
28Braun 2006a also accepts this consequence and tries to argue that it is compatible with the
thesis, defended in his 1998, that propositional modes of presentations are sentences in a language
of thought (a thesis on which Schiffer 2006 dwells in particular). The problem is to show that
Tom may be rational even though in his belief box there are sentences of the form ‘S(a)’, ‘∼S(b)’
and ‘a = b’. From Braun’s discussion it seems clear that Tom’s rationality depends on his having
other highly theoretical beliefs, comparable to beliefs to the effect that the referentialist account
of proper names is wrong. Similarly, Salmon 2006 argues that Tom can be depicted as coherent
by attributing to him a descriptivist account of proper names. Now, it seems to me that these are
strange acknowledgements for a referentialist to make, for anybody can be in a situation analogous
to Tom’s (including referentialists such as Salmon and Braun) and we would thus expect that,
if referentialism is true, someone in Tom’s situation can be rational without a commitment to
anti-referentialist views. But how this is possible is not explained by Salmon and Braun.
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he presents his version of it as “the best theory [of belief ascriptions] . . . relative
to a certain assumption” (p. 499). Be that as it may, it is clear from the above that
both approaches must face theoretical complications and ontological commitments
that should give us pause and this is even clearer, as we shall see below, if we
bring to the fore the no-reference problem, with which the issue of co-reference is
strictly intertwined. As I see it, in an attempt to address the co-reference problem
both approaches appeal somehow to cognitive significances (cf. § 3.6 above), how-
ever understood, which are (i) somehow associated to that-clauses involving terms
that are directly referential by referentialist standards; and (ii) somehow correspond
to the mundane singular propositions that by referentialist standards are expressed
by the that-clauses in question. These cognitive significances are (i) modes of pre-
sentation of propositions, where these modes are not themselves to be regarded
as propositions, according to Salmon 1986 and Crimmins and Perry 1989; or (ii)
additional propositions somehow associated to the main, as it were, (singular and
mundane) proposition expressed by the that-clause, according to Soames 2002 and
Perry 2001. Now, these cognitive significances are hardly distinguishable from the
non-mundane propositions that, according to the descriptivist, are expressed by the
that-clauses in question: they really play pretty much the same theoretical role. And
thus we might agree with Soames 2002 and Perry 2001 in saying that they are indeed
propositions. This assumption is not really crucial for what I want to say now, but
let us make it, since it renders my appraisal of the matter simpler.
The situation seems then to be this. Since any statement can in principle be
embedded qua that-clause in an intentional context, the referentialist, just like the
descriptivist, is forced to admit that a statement, S, that by referentialist standards
expresses a mundane singular referentialist proposition, RP, is somehow associated
to a non-mundane descriptivist proposition, DP, qua cognitive significance (except
that the descriptivist takes DP to be the official meaning of the statement, whereas
the referentialist takes RP to be such). There seems to be a symmetry. The referen-
tialist takes RP to be the official meaning of S, but admits that S is somehow also
associated to DP qua mediator between the subject of a propositional attitude and
RP. Similarly, the descriptivist takes DP to be the official meaning, but admits that
DP can somehow correspond to RP (see § 7.9 above).
But there are complications for the referentialist that the descriptivist does
not have to face. First, as Salmon understands very well, for the referentialist
propositional attitudes become triadic because they must involve both DP and
RP, whereas the descriptivist has no reason to say this and thus can embrace
a simpler theory, perfectly in line with the intuition that propositional attitudes
just are dyadic relations between a subject and a proposition. Second, and more
seriously, as the no-reference problem illustrates, there are many cases in which we
would want to say, at least prima facie, that S does not correspond to any mundane
proposition, because it is a gappy statement, containing some proper name or
indexical with no referent. The descriptivist can admit this, since DP is available
as official meaning of S. In contrast, it seems that the referentialist, in all these
cases, beside admitting that DP, qua cognitive significance, is at work (cf. § 3.6
above), must complicate the ontology in order to provide for something that plays
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the role of official meaning of S (and of a third item, beside DP and the attributee,
in propositional attitudes).29 For example, the referentialist must introduce “gappy
propositions” with a gap where a regular proposition would have a constituent
or propositions involving Meinongian objects, possibilia, fictional objects or the
like as constituents directly referred to by singular terms (Braun 1993, Salmon
1998, Taylor 2000).30 Alternatively, the referentialist must either resort to the
quite unpalatable view that a statement involving a non-referring term expresses
no proposition and thus has no meaning (Donnellan 1974 bites this bullet31) or
give some complicated explanation of why some non-mundane proposition turns
out to be the meaning. For example, Crimmins and Perry (1989, p. 224) speak
of “providing conditions” that are somehow associated to statements and that
must be met for a term in the statement to refer, and suggest that when there
is a reference failure the expressed proposition is about the providing condition
rather than about the object that meets such condition. For another account in
the same vein, Everett 2000 speaks of a “degenerate” semantic contribution to
a proposition, the same for all empty names, which an empty name provides by
virtue of the fact that it refers to nothing. Explanations of this kind however seem to
me rather ad hoc, because they fail to furnish a general recipe for the assignment of a
29That the problem of no-reference is a hurdle for the referentialist is an issue that keeps coming
up. See for example Faderman 2000 for a recent way of pressing it. It may be thought that a
pretence account of fictional discourse à la Walton (1990) might provide an easy way out for
the referentialist, but there are serious problems with such approaches (Richard 2000). Another
way out may seem to come from the assumption of a free logic in the background (Sainsbury
2005). As is well known, free logic is meant to allow us to formally manipulate empty names, e.g.
“Vulcan”, without being committed to assertions such as “∃x(x = Vulcan)”. By relying on this and
on a truth-theoretic Davidsonian account of semantics, Sainsbury provides reference conditions for
empty names which appear to make them intelligible, without assuming that they have descriptive
contents as meanings or that they commit us to nonexistent objects. For example, we may have
the following reference condition: for all x, x refers to x iff x = Vulcan (Sainsbury 2005, p. 73).
However, in spite of such reference conditions, once we assume that an empty name has neither
a referent nor a descriptive content, there seems to be nothing that the name can contribute to a
proposition expressed by a sentence in which the name occurs. And this is problematic for the
compositional account of meaning based on propositions as complexes made up of constituents,
which is taken for granted here (just as in many other referentialist and descriptivist frameworks).
30For the referentialist who is prepared to take on Meinongian objects, possibilia or fictional
objects as referents to obviate the no-reference problem, the ontological proposals abound
(Castañeda 1989, Lewis 1986, Parsons 1980, Thomasson 1988, Voltolini 2006, Zalta 1983, to name
a few), but of course they involve ontological commitments that the descriptivist can avoid. The
idea of gappy propositions is considered by Kaplan (1989, p. 496, n. 23) and developed in Braun
1993. Salmon argues in his 1998 that the referentialist needs to appeal to both fictional objects
and “structurally challenged propositions” (his version of gappy propositions, which are taken to
be neither true nor false, unlike Braun’s gappy propositions which are always false, when atomic).
Soames in conversation has mentioned to me Salmon 1998 as his own favourite approach to the
no-reference problem.
31Similarly, Perry 2001 bites the bullet (as confirmed to me by Perry in conversation). For Perry,
there is no singular proposition expressed by a token of, e.g., “Santa Claus has a white beard” and
thus this token has no official meaning. However, it can still be viewed as endowed with a truth
value, by appealing to the additional contents that can be associated with it.
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meaning to statements involving terms that by referentialist standards are
directly referential: sometimes they express singular propositions and sometimes
items of a quite different nature such as providing conditions.
8.14 Concluding Remarks
In sum, the co-reference and no reference problems are very closely connected and
the referentialist must appeal to serious theoretical complications (possibly involv-
ing dubious ontological commitments) of some kind or another in an attempt to
deal with them. To a referentialist these complications might seem a price worth
paying in the light of the referentialist success in dealing with the data discussed
in Chapter 4. But since, as we have seen, (by endorsing CD) the descriptivist can
also successfully account for these data, descriptivism (at least in the version pro-
vided by CD) must be given due consideration. At the very least, one must wonder
whether the theoretical complications that descriptivism must appeal to in account-
ing for the referentialist data are a heavier burden than those that the descriptivist
must acknowledge in dealing with the referentialist data. My impression is that they
are not and that it is rather the other way around.
Appendix
For the reader’s convenience, this appendix records that the detenser sign, “#”, is
first introduced at p. 30 and that the contextualization sign, “@”, is first introduced at
p. 137 and then explained in §§ 5.3-5.4. Moreover, it provides an alphabetical list of
the labels used in the text to identify some prominent propositions, with a reference
to the page where each label first appears and is associated with its corresponding
proposition.
A/N1: p. 52. HRC: p. 174. P4: p. 143.
A/N2: p. 52. HRPP: p. 185. P5: p. 143.
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